Considerations of equity in international arbitrations with special reference to territorial and boundary disputes. by Miyoshi, Masahiro
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Considerations of equity in international arbitrations with special reference to
territorial and boundary disputes.
Miyoshi, Masahiro
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES 
a 
Submitted for the degree of Ph. D. 
By 
Masahiro Miyoshi 
Registered at King's College London 
-1- 
ABSTRACT 
In view of the growing reference to equity in recent 
international treaties and arbitral and judicial decisions, 
an attempt is made first to ascertain equitable provisions 
in arbitration clauses. While there are no marked 
differences between general arbitration clauses and 
compromis in the wording of the basis of decision, the 
latter tend to have more particularized expressions 
conducive to the settlement of the dispute concerned for 
which they are drawn up. 
Then some arbitral and judicial decisions of 
territorial and boundary disputes, a vital concern of 
States, are examined to see how equitable considerations 
are given in the application of an equitable or legal basis 
of decision. In some cases equitable considerations in 
procedural matters are found to have led to such 
considerations in substantive matters as well. In a 
majority of cases they have taken the form of considering 
their special or relevant circumstances, often balancing 
them up. Some tribunals may even be suspected to have gone 
beyond the bounds of law, presumably to meet the overriding 
requirement of an equitable solution of the dispute 
concerned. 
But this -reflects the growing awareness of 
the 
importance of consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances of a given dispute, rather than the 
traditional mode of strict application of the law by 
singling out such circumstances as are amenable to it. In 
some cases the relevant circumstances may as well be put in 
historical and cultural perspective. 
Despite the persistent, generally tenable criticism on 
the application of equity in international law for its 
subjectivity,, the fact cannot be denied that some States 
conclude compromis or general arbitration treaties with 
equitable provisions for the basis of decision. The reason 
is perhaps to meet the emerging necessities of 
international relations. 
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Introduction 
It used to be said that States,, and especially the 
newly independent States, were not willing to submit their 
disputes to the International Court of Justice, 
1) because 
they feared that under Article 38 of the Court's Statute, 
the customary international law, in the formation of which 
they had not participated, might be applied if they had 
brought their disputes to it. 2) 
The reluctance of States to go to the International 
Court has since waned, and over the past few years more 
Third World States have had recourse to it than developed 
Western or socialist States. 
3) They nevertheless still 
seem to entertain the complaint of inadequacy in the 
applicable law of the Court. Viewed in a broader 
perspective, their dissatisfaction extends to international 
law in general or at least to some parts of its traditional 
rules which in effect they maintain are inequitable. 
4) 
When placed in historical perspective, howeverf a 
conflict of norms between the older and newer actors in the 
international arena is not at all unusual. 
5) The 
controversy between the Grotian 
, 
mare liberum. and Selden's 
mare clausum and the political and economic circumstances 
of that time is one example, and in the history of the 
development of modern international law examples of this 
kind abound, the most recent one being the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
Under these circumstances the question which has 
sprung up to the mind of this writer is whether equity 
could work to fill the gaps in legal thinking between the 
East and the West and the North and the South. 
6) Whilst 
there seem to be more writers who respond negatively to the 
question than those who expressly admit the positive role 
of equityf there is growing recognition directly or 
indirectly that equity does have an important part to play 
in the international law of today and tomorrow. 
The tendency may be observed in the change which took 
place in the attitude of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice towards 
- 15 - 
equity between the years 1952 and 1970. In a paper read 
before the Gorotius Society at its meeting in Cambridge on 
25 July 1952, discussing "The United Nations and the Rule 
of Law",, Fitzmaurice said that the "idealist is the most 
dangerous of all the enemies of the Rule of Law 7) and 
went on to contrast him with the Romans: 
"What the Romans were concerned with was system, 
principle, certainty, regularity, good sense, 
practical possibilities. In achieving these things, 
they achieved justice, so far as in a fallible world 
it can be achieved. The reverse side of this process 
(and indeed the proof of its validity) may be seen in 
those systems which, like the English system of 
Equity, began as deliberate and conscious attempts to 
do abstract justice in cases where the ordinary law 
was held to be harsh or defective, but yet which ended 
as bodies of rules and principles not less elaborate 
and systematic than the law they were supposed to 
supplement or supplant-ended in fact as law 
themselves. , 8) 
Here the author takes a negative attitude towards equity in 
favour of the certainty and regularity of law. But 
eighteen years later a change of mind seems to have 
occurred in his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction,,. 
Light and Power Company,, Limited case (second phase) of 
1970. In a section, entitled "Equitable Considerations and 
Equity as a System", though a small part of his whole 
statement,, Fitzmaurice discussed equity in general terms 
and, in so far as equitable considerations were concerned, 
dissented from the judgment. 
9) one year before in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 he aligned 
himself in voting for the judgment, and thus may be 
interpreted as having set count on equity if it was a 
judgment of equity. A few years later considering the same 
question, he asked "what are the principles and rules of 
equity that would be suitable for application in the 
international field--not on a basis ex aequo et bono but as 
- 16 - 
legal principles that must enter into every decision of an 
international tribunal to which they may be material" in 
his Special Report to the Institut de Droit International 
at its centenary. 
10) 
To turn to international practice, there are two major 
categories of practice in which support of the growing 
importance of equity is evident. In the first place, some 
recent arbitral and judicial decisions on the delimitation 
of continental shelf boundaries have tended to emphasize 
the importance of the application of "equitable principles" 
provided that the "relevant circumstances" of each case are 
taken into account. Thus due account was taken of the 
socio-economic, geographical and historical factors in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf, Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf, Gulf of Maine, 
Guinea-Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Delimitation, and 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf cases. 
11) 
Secondly, there has been a tendency in the field of 
the management of resources to stress the importance of 
their equitable utilization. Among the recent decisions, 
those in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (merits) of 
1974 12 ) are an example of this. The resolution of the 
Institut de Droit International on the "Utilisation des 
eaux internationales non maritimes (en dehors de la 
navigation)" of 1961 
13) 
and the International Law 
Association's "Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers" of 1966 
14) 
are two major attemptst 
formally but of a private nature, at codification of 
pertinent rules on water use. Another recent codification 
and progressive development of the law of the sea is the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 
which contains frequent references to equity in its 
provisions. 
15) The Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 
1983, too, includes some clauses providing for equity. 
16) 
Perhaps it is in view of these developments that 
writers have come to discuss equity in particular when 
considering the distribution or management of resources. 
17) 
This has been the case in the delimitation of continental 
- 17 - 
shelf boundaries, which is to be found in some recent 
arbitral and judicial decisions, where the foremost concern 
of the States involved 18) has been the implication of the 
decisions on their rights to explore for and exploit 
submarine petroleum and natural gas resources. This is why 
there are so many books and articles on this particular 
topic that an annotated bibliography on maritime boundary 
delimitation of 1983 has as many as 580 entries. 
19) 
And 
this is by no means an exhaustive list. 
While maritime boundary delimitation will remain a 
major field in which equity is expected to play an 
important r6le in the years to come, other areas like human 
rights, international economic law and particularly the law 
of indemnification in case of nationalization would 
likewise be amenable to the application of equity. 
20) Of 
potential importance could be cultural values in their 
relation to international law. The very idea of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, in collaboration with the 
United Nations University, sponsoring a workshop on "The 
Future of International Law in a Multicultural World" in 
1983 21) is a reflection of the growing awareness of the 
potential importance of the impact of different cultures on 
international law. A variety of opinions were presented at 
the Workshop. Majid Khadduri stated that non-Western 
cultures could also provide the fundamental concepts of law 
and general principle for international law; 
22 ) Adda B. 
Bozeman stressed the diversity of law-related customs and 
values in the world; 
23) Antonio Cassese spoke of the 
tendency of developing countries to conceive law as one of 
the instruments for exercising authority 
24) 
and to prefer, 
in the international arena, to work with general principles 
rather than detailed and precise rules; 
25) K. Mbaye 
emphasized the African peoples' preference for dialogue and 
conciliation over adjudication; 
26) Ren6 David saw the 
tradition unchanged behind the Westernized fagade in 
non-Western societies; 
27) Sompong Sucharitkul attributed 
the hesitation of newly independent States in accepting the 
existing rules of customary international law to the lack 
of "humanistic characteristics" in the traditional 
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international law. 28) 
On the other hand, Guy de Lacharri6re, commenting on 
Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, maintained that cultural diversity "se ramýne 
A l1aspect formel, ext6rieur des choses , 
29) 
, while R. P. 
Anand pointed out that it was national interests,, rather 
than religious philosophies or cultural traditions, that 
accounted for the apathetic attitude of new Afro-Asian 
States towards international adjudication. 
30) Mohammed 
Bedjaoui was of the opinion that culture was "built in" in 
international law. 31) But H. Sanson asserted that the 
interests of either the State or the individual are always 
evaluated by a cultural judgment. 
32) 
Whatever one might think of these presentations, one 
could fairly conclude, as does Ren6-Jean Dupuy, that those 
observations from comparative points of view enlighten 
international lawyers on the misunderstanding between Third 
World lawyers and Western lawyers who remain attached to 
positivism. 
33) 
In addition to those trends which favour a growing 
resort to equity, mention must be made finally of what may 
be termed the raison d16tre of equity in international law. 
Both scholarly writings, from Aristotle down to 
contemporary writers, and practical reports 
34) 
often make 
reference to the basic nature of equity and practical 
reasons for its functions. In his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle has this to say on the basic nature of equity: 
"When ... the law lays down a general rule, and 
thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the 
rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver's 
pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective 
and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as 
the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present 
on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been 
cognizant of the case in question. Hence, while the 
equitable is just, and is superior to one sort of 
justice, it is not superior to absolute justice, but 
only to the error due to its absolute statement. This 
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is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a 
rectification of law where law is defective because of 
its generality. ... 
11.9 P9 it is a special kind of Justice, not a 
different quality altogether. , 
35) 
Writing on "Conscience and Independence of the Judge", 
Kotaro Tanaka states with emphasis that "the true judgment 
must be a declaration of justice and equity made with the 
power of character of the judge in respect of the 
particular case, , 
36) 
In a world of politicization, such as that of today, 
co-existence of diverse political cultures requires 
accommodation and the sophistication of conflict 
resolution. 
37) This admittedly difficult undertaking would 
call for a new kind of sophistication which could even 
collide with the traditional methodology that has been 
developed in a context of comparative homogeneity. This is 
not, however, to say that no efforts have been made in this 
direction. In the late 1920s and the early 1930s there was 
a strong movement for the establishment of methods for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
38) Some 
writers then argued for a separation of the functions of 
judicial settlement and arbitration on the grounds that 
political disputes were more amenable to settlement by 
arbitration on the basis of equity. 
39) This may be a 
reflection of the numerous bilateral treaties on 
arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement, 
prescribing different modes of settlement for legal and 
non-legal disputes. 
40) 
In a sense the trend has revived since the end of the 
Second World War. Interestingly enough there has recently 
been a tendency for States to prefer arbitration to 
judicial settlement if they have to choose adjudication. 
The recent Chamber of the International Court of Justice 
composed for the Gulf of Maine case is something akin to an 
arbitral tribunal. 
41) If the preference for arbitration is 
as real as it is sometimes said to be, 
42) it would imply 
not only the State's desire to control the choice of 
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arbitrators but also, it is submitted, the State's 
expectation of the tribunal's application of law with 
equity, or equitable principles, for an equitable solution 
of the dispute. According to the Netherlands Government, 
"the somewhat mediatory quality of the award should be 
first in our mind". Here is more of the Netherlands 
comment on the draft Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure: 
"Though arbitration must be kept on the 'basis of 
respect for law' ... the award, however, will always 
show a predisposition towards mediation and 
arbitrators are prone to adhere to the law in a less 
orthodox way than a judge is apt to do, as soon as 
they consider such deviation more in keeping with 
general principles of law and equity. The rule dura 
lex sed lex will be less resorted to by arbitrators 
than by judges. " 43) 
On the basis of the problematique of equity in 
international law as described above, the present study 
will be started with some preliminary reflections on the 
concept of equity. This will be followed by a Chapter 
analyzing arbitration clauses with equity or equity- 
equivalent provisions. In the next Chapter arbitrations of 
territorial and boundary disputes will be discussed to see 
how equity is applied in the actual arbitrations. But the 
analysis will be confined to territorial and boundary 
cases; although equity is resorted to in a larger measure 
in claims or damages cases, they are, despite their 
enormous number, of less importance to the parties. 
Territorial and boundary disputes are of vital importance 
to the States concerned, and it is hoped that applications 
of equity in this category of cases will provide a variety 
of good illustrations of the functioning of equity, because 
these cases involve more complicated circumstances in which 
applications of equity can be more varied than in damages 
cases. This analysis of arbitral and judicial cases will 
be supplemented by a discussion of their theoretical 
aspects. 
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Chapter I 
Preliminary Considerations of the Concept of Equity 
At the outset of this study it is essential to attempt 
to give a working definition of the concept of equity, 
which will serve as the basis for its further elaboration. 
1. Diverse Meanings of Equity 
It is proposed in this study to understand the term 
"equity" in its general sense, rather than in its technical 
sense such as is found in Anglo-American law. 1) While both 
senses of equity certainly have much in common, as the 
history of English equity shows, 
2) the problem of equity in 
international law today, as heretofore, seems to be to ask 
the question "What is equitable? ", rather than to apply 
technical principles of equity, in the relations between 
States. Probably because of the general sense in which it 
is used, diverse meanings are given to the word equity. 
3) 
In a recent, eminently equitable judgment in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, the International 
Court of Justice defined what was involved in the matter of 
delimitation as "not a question of applying equity simply 
as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of 
law which itself requires the application of equitable 
principles". 
4) This interpretation of equity as involving 
the application of a rule of law requiring the application 
of equitable principles, which largely followed the 
contention of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 5) is a clear understanding of equity. It is not, 
however, a generally accepted interpretation of equity. 
The express reference to equity or expressions having 
equivalent effect in the numerous arbitration clauses would 
rather seem to show that there is disagreement among States 
on its meaning, as will be seen later. 
6) Writers are 
likewise divided as to what equity is. 
7) 
On the other hand, some attempts have been made to 
identify the concept of equity in the light of its 
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functions. For example, J. C. Witenberg divides the 
function of equity into two: on the one hand, 
"116quit6 s'exerce dans les limites de la regle de 
droit,, ou si elle slen 6loigne, pour la prolonger, ne 
le fait qulavec prudence et timidite. Elle est moins 
une source de motivation, qulune m6thode dlappliquer 
aux cas concrets les principes habituels de la 
motivation, , 8) 
On the other hand, 
"1'6quit6 constituerait une source de droit et de 
motivation lind6pendantel et autonome, remplissant 
dans le cadre des sources de la motivation lun r6le 
compAmentaire ou suppletif' (de Visscher). "9) 
Two functions of equity are identified also by J. H. W. 
Verzijl who, acting as the Presiding Commissioner in the 
arbitration of the Georges Pinson case of 1928, defined 
them in these words: 
" 1'6quit6 [est] invoqu6e encore comme principe 
suppl6mentaire de decision dans les cas oiiA le droit 
positif est silencieux, ou comme correctif dans les 
cas exceptionnels otil l1application du droit strict 
a Merait 'a des re"sultats Dans m( 6videmment injustes. 
le premier cas, 116quite fait function de source 
subsidiaire de droit international; dans le second, 
invoquer 116quite" 6quivaut a confesser que le droit 
positif, comme toute oeuvre humaine, est imparfaite et 
que, pour cela, il a quelquefois besoin de correction 
par un principe sup6rieur, quIon l'indique par justice 
ou par equit6. "10) 
Witenberg's second function of equity is understood to 
grant "pouvoir pour le juge sinon m8me de faire comple'te 
abstraction des principes juridiques reconnus, en tout cas 
de construire une solution de toutes pAces dans les cas 
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o1a, A d6faut de r6gles de droit, chacun des Etats litigants 
serait en principe pleinement ind6pendant pour agir en un 
sens ou en l1autre". 
11) 
This seems to imply the function 
of supplementing the lacuna of law, and correspond to 
Verzijlls first function. Thus the two classifications of 
functions of equity mean in fact an identification of three 
functions. 
Witenberg predicted that a controversy would be 
inevitable over the two concepts or functions of equity, 
12) 
as indeed diverse meanings have been given to equity in the 
practice of States, arbitral and judicial decisions, and 
scholarly writings. But there seems to be general 
agreement on the classification of three functions: (1) the 
modification of law to apply it to particular facts; (2) 
the supplementing of law by filling in 'gaps' in the 
positive law; and (3) the correction of law, or its 
supplanting as a distinct basis of decision. 
13) These 
correspond to equity infra lege , equity praeter legem and 
equity contra lege . 
14) In practice strict distinction of 
these functions would be almost impossible or even 
useless, 
15) however apposite or plausible it might be from 
theoretical points of view. 
2. Attempts at Clarification of the Meaning of Equity 
If the function of equity is classified into three 
categories, will the meaning of equity as a whole be made 
clear? There are two major questions which arise in this 
context. One is whether "equity" and "equitable 
principles" are the same thing or different, and the other 
the relationship between "equity" and "ex aequo et bono". 
(1) "Equity" and "equitable principles" 
In a report of the International Law Commission on the 
"Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other Than 
Treaties", prepared by Special Rapporteur Mohammed Bedjaoui 
in 1979, equity is discussed in some detail, especially in 
the light of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. The 
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relevant part of it is worth quoting here: 
"In the view of the Court, 'equitable principles' 
are 'actual rules of law' founded on 'very general 
precepts of justice and good faith'. These 'equitable 
principles' are distinct from 'equity' viewed 'as a 
,, 16) matter of abstract justice' . 
Put simply, "equity" is "a matter of abstract justice" " 
while "equitable principles" are "actual rules of law based 
on general precepts of justice and good faith". "Equity", 
in other words, is understood in the sense of natural 
justice, whereas "equitable principles", in the sense of 
the judgment of the Court in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases in which the applicable law was found not in 
the conventional law but in customary law, 
17) 
are part of 
customary international law. Thus the distinction, however 
qualified it may be, would seem in itself to be 
fundamental,, for "equity" is understood in the sense of 
natural or abstract justice while "equitable principles" 
are understood to form part of the positive law. This 
would have been implied by the same Court when it said in 
its judgment in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case 
that "'equitable principles' cannot be interpreted in the 
abstract. , 
18) 
The very general nature of "equity" in international 
law, as compared with the nature of "equity" in national 
legal systems, is identified in the same case: 
"Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation 
of the idea of justice. The Court whose task is by 
definition to administer justice is bound to apply it. 
In the course of the history of legal systems the term 
'equity' has been used to define various legal 
concepts. It was often contrasted with the rigid 
rules of positive law, the severity of which had to be 
mitigated in order to do justice. In general, this 
contrast has no parallel in the development of 
international law; the legal concept of equity is a 
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general principle directly applicable as law. "19) 
(Emphasis added) 
This does seem to imply that equity in international law, 
being of so broad a nature, can be an independent basis of 
decisionin adjudication. 
(2) "Equity" and llex aequo et bono" 
In an effort to clarify the- meaning of equity, the 
second question that could arise is whether the two 
concepts of "equity" and "ex aequo et bono", different at 
least in expression, have the same meaning or different 
meanings. As it will be seen later in Chapter II, they are 
distinguished in 'some of the numerous arbitration clauses, 
but in others they are used as synonimous. 
The history of incorporation of "ex aequo et bono" in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice shows that in the course of the 
discussion of the Advisory Committee of Jurists on the 
applicable law of the projected Permanent Court the 
addition of "principles of equity" was proposed, that 
subsequently in the Sub-Committee of the Third Commission 
of the League of Nations Assembly the addition of 
"principles of justice" was proposed, and in the end that 
the adjustment of the wording resulted in the current "ex 
aequo et bono". 
20) The fact that the delegates at the 
Sub-Committee meetings agreed to the adoption of the phrase 
with due regard to the previous development of this 
question would seem to imply that they did not think that a 
strict distinction should be made between the three 
differen t expressions of "equity", "justice" and "ex aequo 
et bono". It should be noted, however, that the proviso of 
"if the parties agree thereton was expressly added to limit 
the Court's power to decide a case ex aequo et bono. The 
Advisory Committee of Jurists was silent on such a proviso 
when it was discussing the proposed addition of "principles 
21) 
of equity" . The very proposal of such an addition 
failed to be adopted. 
22) During the course of the 
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discussion of "principles of justice" in the Assembly's 
Sub-Committee, an additional amendment was proposed tc 
attach the phrase "with the consent of the parties", and 
this was finally adopted. 
23) 
The additional amendment was 
intended to prevent the Court from acting without regard to 
the intentions of the parties. But on the other hand it 
has created a logical possibility that the Court may be 
enabled by an agreement of the parties to avoid the 
application of law and decide ex aequo et bono instead. 
Thus the legislative history of Article 38 of the 
Statute implies that "ex aequo et bono" was not to be 
strictly differentiated from "equity" or "justice". Are 
these simply different expressions of the same thing then? 
There are some writers who do not make strict distinction. 
From an ambitious point of view of advocating "ex aequo et 
bono pax oritur",, Louis B. Sohn does not appear to think it 
necessary to make the distinction but rather stresses the 
importance of understanding equity in its broad gense. 
24) 
Daniel Bardonnet, in discussing the arbitral award in the 
Rann of Katch case of 1968, in which the tribunal excluded 
the idea of acting ex 
_aequo 
et bono but recognized equity 
as forming part of international law, raises the following 
question and seems unwilling to make a clear-cut 
distinction: "on puet se demander si la d6cision aurait 
6t6 sensiblement diff6rente si le Tribunal avait statue sur 
la base de 116quit6 au sens g6n6ral quIelle rev8t en droit 
international. , 25) This is supported by A. L. W. Munkman 
who says: "It is not ... obvious that a different decision 
would ... have been reached by a tribunal empowered to 
adjudicate ex aequo et bono * , 
26) 
But other writers, much greater in number, prefer to 
distinguish ex aequo et bono from equity. J. L. Brierly 
says that the power to decide ex aequo et bono is 
"essentially a power to legislate" 
27) (emphasis original). 
At the least he does not expressly say that it includes 
equity. H. Lauterpacht, too, considers an ex aequo et bono 
settlement as a "legislative" settlement departing from the 
existing law. 
28) Charles de Visscher regards it as 
11toujours plus 16gislative, souvent mgme plus politique que 
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judiciaire 29) C. W. Jenks and G. G. Fitzmaurice 
understand it in much the same way. 
30) 
S. Oda, in his 
capacity as counsel for a foreign Government in a 
litigation, argues similarly. 
31) 
What is common to the views of these writers is that 
"equity" is thought to blend with law whereas "ex aequo et 
bono" is not. They seem to share in the intent of the 
resolution of the Institut de Droit International of 1937, 
which provides in paragraph 1 that 111'equit6 est 
normalement inh6rente a une saine application du droit, et 
que le judge international, aussi bien que le juge interne, 
est, de par sa t&che m6me, appe16 A en tenir compte dans la 
mesure compatible avec le respect du droit. , 
32) But it 
provides in paragraph 2 that "le juge international ne peut 
s'inspirer de 116quit6 pour rendre sa sentence, sans 8tre 
li6 par le droit en vigueur, que si toutes les parties 
donnent une autorisation claire et expresse a8 cette 
fin, , 33) thereby making clear the requirement of express 
authorization by the parties for the judge to depart from 
the law. The resolution does not use the phrase ". ex aequo 
et bono" but "equity" throughout, but a comparison of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 would show that the term "equity" is to 
be treated differently according to its different 
functions. The function of "equity" as provided for in 
paragraph 2 is, it is submitted, that of "ex aequo et bono" 
in the understanding of those writers. 
Does this mean that "equity" has not only the function 
inherent in a sound application of law but also the 
function of affording an independent basis of decision 
apart from the law if the parties agree thereto,, whereas 
only the second function is expected of "ex aequo et 
bono"? 
In Article 28 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes of 1928, however, a 
decision ex 
aequo et bono is contingent on the non-existence of 
the law 
but not on the agreement of the parties. 
34) This seems to 
imply that a decision ex aequo et bono is expected to 
perform the function of filling a gap 
in law. This 
function of filling a gap in law without prior 
authorization of the parties 
is rejected by those mentioned 
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writers among them Brierly who severely criticizes Article 
28 of the General Act, 35) 
To turn now to arbitral and judicial decisions for 
their views of ex aequo et bono settlementr there are two 
kinds of views. In the arbitral award of the Cayuga 
Indians case of 1926, the tribunal took the view, on the 
basis of Anzilottils view, that the procedure ex aequo et 
bono "is meant for cases ... which call, not for principles 
36) of equity, but for a degree of compromise" . The 
Permanent Court of International Justice, in its order of 6 
December 1930 in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex case (2nd phase), stated that an ex aequo 
et bono power, "de nature absolument exceptionnel devrait 
r6sulter d'un texte positif et clair". 
37) Likewise in the, 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 the International 
Court of Justice rejected any decision ex aequo et bono, 
"such as would only be possible under the conditions 
prescribed by Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Court's 
Statute". 38) This brief review of case law suggests that 
the award in the Cayuga Indians case referred to the 
substantive meaning of a decision ex aequo et bono that it 
is suitable for cases calling for a compromise, while the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the 
International Court of Justice naturally confirmed the 
requirement of prior consent of the parties to the 
procedure. 
39) 
The most that could be said from the foregoing is that 
writers are in broad agreement that "equity" has three 
functions, that the phrase "ex aequo et bono" may be used 
for the functions of equity praeter legem and contra lege , 
and that the phrase is not used to express the subsidiary 
function of equity inherent in the application of law 
(infra lege ). 
3. Expressions Having an Equivalent Effect to Equity 
Equity or considerations of equity are often couched 
in a variety of expressions in general arbitration clauses, 
compromis and arbitral and judicial decisions. 
40) The 
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common factor in these seems to be "the consideration of 
the circumstances peculiar to a given case", however 
qualified it may be. The three "factors to be taken into 
account" by the parties in the course of their 
negotiations, i. e., the geographical and geological factors 
and the element of proportionality, which the Court 
mentioned in its judgment in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, 
41) 
are an example of the "circumstances 
peculiar to a given case". The reason why these are to be 
understood as considerations of equity is that they are to 
be taken into account in the application of "equitable 
principles" as part of the "principles and rules of 
international law applicable to the delimitation as between 
the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the 
42) North Sea" . Needless to say, what are the peculiar 
circumstances varies from case to case and they must of 
necessity be specified accordingly. 
Nor would it be necessary to say that equity or 
equitable considerations, as provided in a treaty clause or 
given in an adjudication, is the equity or equitable 
considerations so defined at the time of its provision in 
the clause or determination by the tribunal. For what was 
once believed to be equitable may no longer be thought so 
in the legal context of today. Thus equity must be 
understood in the context of space and time in which it is 
applied. 
If the "consideration of the circumstances peculiar to 
a given case", is another expression of equity, it could 
theoretically fulfill any of the mentioned three functions: 
it could assist the interpretation or application of law, 
supplement the lacuna of law, or displace law if necessary. 
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Chapter II 
Arbitration Clauses 
It is proposed in this Chapter to make an analysis of 
arbitration clauses which provide for some form of equity 
as the basis of decision with a view to ascertaining what 
the provisions mean in their given expressions. The scope 
of this enquiry is limited to arbitration clauses in the 
modern period which-, for our purposes, starts with the Jay 
Treaty or the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 
1794 between Great Britain and the United States. Modern 
international adjudication is generally said to have begun 
with this treaty. 
In this Chapter both general and special arbitration 
clauses are included for study in order to ensure as broad 
a basis of enquiry as possible to see what State practice 
is like in the understanding of the meaning or the role of 
equity in international arbitration. Thus it would be 
better to include as many clauses as possible that appear 
to fall under the general rubric of equity than to choose 
some and exclude others. In this way a wide variety of 
phrases are available for analysis. 
The clauses are arranged under categories of trpaties: 
General multilateral arbitration treaties; Restricted 
multilateral arbitration and functional treaties; Bilateral 
arbitration and functional treaties; and Special agreements 
for the submission of particular disputes to arbitration. 
For the sake of analytical convenience, it is assumed 
in this Chapter that different words or phrases, even if 
seemingly synonimous with one another, represent different 
conceptions. The assumption is made in the hope that in 
the end it would help an attempt to define the meaning or 
the role of equity in international arbitration. 
1. Multilateral Arbitration Treaties 
In this section three major multilateral arbitration 
treaties are taken up for the discussion of their clauses 
- 31 - 
which provide for an equitable basis of decision in one way 
or another: the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement 
of Disputes of 1899; the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice of 1920; and the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928. 
The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes 
On 29 July 1899 the First Hague Peace Conference 
adopted a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes. Article 15 of the Convention defines 
international arbitration in a general manner and specifies 
the basis of decision. It reads: 
"L'arbitrage international a pour objet le 
r *ýglement de litiges entre les ttats par des juges de E 
leur choix et sur la base du respect du droit. "') 
The clause, a codification of the practice of States in 
international arbitration, provides a basis for decision 
with the words of "sur la base du respect du droit". it 
does not say "sur la base du droit", which raises the 
question of whether there might be some room for other than 
legal considerations as the basis of decision. 
Since no clear differencer except in their expressions, 
can be made between the two phrases, it is reasonable to 
have recourse to the travaux pr6paratoires of the clause. 
2) 
According to the Report which M. le Chevalier Descamps, 
President and Rapporteur of the Comit6 d'Examen of the 
Troisieme Commission of the Peace Conference, drafted as a 
result of the discussion and deliberation in his Comit6i, 
international arbitration was understood in those days as a 
third-party procedure not intended to supplement direct 
negotiations nor to suppress mediation but to point in the 
direction of what is today termed judicial settlement. 
3) 
In the words of the Report, "La justice arbitrale 
internationale regle--clest-a-dire termine d6finitivement-- 
les litiges internationaux qui lui sont soumis. Elles 
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r6gle ces, litiges 
, 
sur la base du respect du droit, 
conformement aux exigences, de la justice. Elle rogle par 
l'organe de juges choisis en vertu de l1accord des Etats 
eux-m8mes. Tels sont les, traits fondamentaux de la justice 
arbitrale. , 
4) (Emphasis added) The Report was adopted by 
the Troisieme Commission "sans observations" at its 9th 
(4th special) meeting on 25 July, 
5) 
and finally adopted by 
the Conference "sans discussion" at its 7th meeting on the 
same day. 
6) 
The Convention was revised and enlarged at the Second 
Hague Peace Conference in 1907. But Article 15 of the 1899 
Convention remained intact,, except for the addition of a 
second paragraph, originally proposed by Sweden as Article 
40 in the new convention, to become paragraph 2 of Article 
37. The article as amended was adopted by the Plenary 
meeting of the Conference at its 9th meeting on 16 October 
1907.7) In short, no change was made in the wording of 
Article 37 of the 1907 Convention in so far as the basis of 
decision is concerned. Thus one has only to look to the 
travaux pr6paratoires of or comments on Article 15 of the 
1899 Convention, if it is necessary to do so, for the guide 
to understand the meaning of the phrase "sur la base du 
respect du droit". 
At the time of discussion of Article 15f it may 
perhaps have been felt too early to apply law in its strict 
sense. It may also have been felt that application of law 
would unduly narrow the scope of arbitration. But on the 
other hand there might have been an urge for the 
application of law. Hence the formula: "sur la base du 
respect du droit", instead of I'sur la base du droit". Such 
a reasoning may be supported by the qualifying phrase 
"conform6ment aux exigences de la justice" in the 
commentary of the Report by Descamps. 
Dr. H. Lammasch, who was a member of the Comit6 
d'Examen of the Troisi6me Commission at the First Peace 
Conference in 1899, later comments that the phrase has no 
other meaning than that "the arbitrator shall 
decide in 
accordance with equity, ex 8 
aequo et bono, when positive 
rules of law are lacking" . The comment would seem 
to 
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point towards the same direction as the commentary provided 
by M. le Chevalier Descamps on Article 15 in his Report. 
It is not clear to the best of the present writer's 
knowledge whether this phrase was ever used prior to the 
1899 Hague Convention, and although a number of subsequent 
arbitration treaties refer to the Convention, only a very 
few employ the formula "sur la base du respect du droit". 9) 
(2) The Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice 
The second major 
systematization of 
establishment of thE 
Justice and its Statu 
Statute stipulates: 
step forward in the history of the 
international adjudication is the 
Permanent Court of International 
te. Article 38, paragraph 2, of the 
"This provision shall not prejudice the power of 
the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties agree thereto. "10) 
As the Court is expected in paragraph 1 of the Article to 
apply conventional or customary law, or if need be "general 
principles of law", it is authorized to act on this second 
basis of decision only when the parties agree to it. The 
Latin expression of ", ex aequo et bonoll had been used prior 
to its incorporation in the Statute,, 
11) but it has been 
employed far more frequently in the many arbitration 
clauses subsequent to the Statute. 
It is necessary to have a brief look into the 
legislative history of Article 38, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute to understand precisely what the Latin phrase 
means. It seems that a clause providing for equity was 
originally suggested for inclusion by Mr. Ricci-Busatti,, 
the Italian memberi, in the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
that drafted the Statute. 
12) Mr. de Lapradelle, the 
Rapporteur from France, while admitting that a proposed new 
Court of Justice should be distinct from the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, put his case for a provision of 
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equi Y. 
13) 
The proposition was cautiously supported by 
Mr. Hagerup, the Norwegian member, who wished to qualify it 
with a prior authorization by the parties, in recognition 
of the fact that equity was a very vague concept and that 
it did not always harmonize with justice. 
14) When at a 
later stage an amended draft article on the applicable law 
was presented by Mr. Root, the American member, 
15) 
Mr. Ricci-Busatti felt disappointed that principles of 
equity were not mentioned in it. 
16) But he does not seem 
to have insisted on his proposition, for his later 
amendment to the proposals jointly presented by the 
President and Lord Phillimore includes no such 
reference. 
17) 
The Report prepared by Mr. de Lapradelle and approved 
unanimously by the Advisory Committee on the last day of 
its session, while cursorily invoking Article 7 of the 
abortive convention concerned with the creation of an 
International Prize Court of 18 October 1907, makes no 
mention of, nor any reference to, equity in its draft 
article on the applicable law. 
18) Thus the Committee 
failed to draft a provision for equity during its work on 
the Statute. 
The matter was raised again, however, in the Assembly 
of the League of Nations. At its 7th meeting on 1 December 
1920, the Sub-Committee of the Third Commission of the 
Assembly found Mr. Fromageot (France) raising the question 
of widening the wording of draft Article 35 on the 
applicable law. He suggested adding to No. 3 "the general 
principles of law and justice", 
19) 
which gave rise to some 
further discussion. In answer to a question as to the 
probable consequences of his amendment, Mr. Fromageot 
explained that its effect would be to enable the Court to 
state as the sole reason for its judgment that the award 
had seemed to it to be just. This did not imply that the 
Court might disregard existing rules of law. Af ter an 
exchange of some comments on it, the amendment was put to 
the vote and adopted. 
20) 
But at the 10th meeting of the Sub-Committee on 7 
December 1920, Mr. Politis (Greece) raised the question as 
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to whether the text of Article 35, No. 3, as amended and 
adopted by the Sub-Committee, did actually express the 
Sub-Committee's opinion on the subject. This opinion was, 
according to Mr. Politis, that the Court should have the 
right to apply the general principles of justice only by 
virtue of an agreement between the parties. He thus 
proposed to alter the paragraph to read: 
"The general principles of law and with the 
consent of the parties, the general principles of 
justice recognized by civilized nations. , 
21) 
After some discussion, Mr. Fromageot proposed to meet 
Mr. Politis' point by adding at the end of Article 35, 
No. 3, what has turned out to be the present paragraph 2 of 
Article 38. The Article thus amended was adopted. 
22) 
The 
Report submitted to the Third Commission by Mr. Hagerup, as 
President and on behalf of the Sub-Committee, stated that 
"La Sous-Commission a ajout6 A Particle un nouvel 
alin6a pour donner cl la Cour la f aculte de rendre, 
avec llagr6ment des parties, une d6cision ex aequo et 
bono., , 23) 
The Report was sent through the Third Commission to the 
Plenary meeting of the Assembly, 
24) 
which finally adopted 
the Article as amended by Mr. Fromageot and adopted by the 
Sub-Committee of the Third Commission. 
25) 
It may now be asked why and how the formula "general 
principles of justice" as proposed by Mr. Fromageot,, or 
"principles of equity" as suggested by Mr. Ricci-Busatti, 
shifted to the Latin phrase "ex aequo et bono". There 
seems to be no recorded explanation available. Perhaps the 
members of the Sub-Committee considered these concepts as 
interchangeable. 26) It does not seem, at least, that they 
made strict distinction between the terms. This could 
possibly throw light on whether or not there is any 
distinction between the concepts. Also the fact that 
Mr. Fromageot's proposal was divided in the end into 
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"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" 
and "ex aequo et bono" may perhaps cast another stream of 
light on the meaning of "equity "0 
27) 
At any rate the additional provision was welcomed by 
some eminent jurists of the day. In the words of Judge 
Anzilotti, for example, "Tenant compte de certains besoins 
des rapports internationaux et dans 11intention louable de 
favoriser le recours A la Cour, ce texte (i. e., Article 38, 
paragraph 2) permet aux parties d1obtenir une sentence 
fond6e sur 116quit6, plut6t que sur le droit stricte 
0000 , 
28) Anzilottils mention of "certains besoins des 
rapports internationaux" would be worthy of note as a 
justification of the raison d18tre of the formula. 
(3) The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes 
The next major multinational attempt to systematize 
the pacific settlement of disputes is the General Act for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 26 
September 1928. Its Article 28 provides for the basis of 
decision to be applied to the disputes other than those "au 
sujet desquelles les parties se contesteraient 







silence du compromis ou ä defaut de 
tribunal appliquera les regles de fond 
is l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour 
Justice internationale. En tant qu'il 
de pareilles ri-ý>gles applicables au 
tribunal jugera ex aequo et bono. 29) 
As it is clearly stated here, the rule is that the tribunal 
should primarily apply "les r6gles de fond 6num6r6es 
dans 
l1article 38 du Statut". But in so far as there exists no 
such rule applicable to the dispute, "le tribunal 
jugera ex 
aequo et bono". In this case there is no need 
for the 
parties to agree to authorize the tribunal to 
decide on 
this basis. This point, however, gave rise to much 
- 37 - 
controversy among international lawyers of the day. 
30) 
The above provisions afforded a model for the 
applicable law clause in a great number of general 
bilateral arbitration treaties from late 1928 into the 
early 1930s. 31) 
2. Restricted Multilateral Treaties 
There are some regional multilateral arbitration 
treaties with a clause providing for equity as the basis of 
decision. Similar provisions of equity or some reference 
to the relevant clauses of the multilateral arbitration 
treaties, global or regional, can be found in several 
multilateral treaties of a functional character. Also a 
few multilateral treaties for the settlement of commercial 
or civil disputes have provisions for equity as the basis 
of decision. 
(1) Regional Arbitration Treaties 
a) The Convention Establishing the Central American 
Court of Justice to Act as a Permanent Court of 
Arbitration 
The Convention to establish the short-lived Central 
American Court of Justice, signed in Washington on 20 
December 1907, by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador lays down the basis of decision 
in Article 21: 
"In deciding points of fact that may be raised 
before it, the Central American Court of Justice shall 
be governed by its free judgment, and with respect to 
points of law, by the principles of international 
law .94, o 
, 32) 
Thus, although restricted in the decision of points of 
fact, the Court must exercise "free judgment". This can be 
understood to involve weighing the relevant circumstances 
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of a given case, and is an instance of equitable 
consideration. 
b) The Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration between 
Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland 
In this treaty between four Baltic countries, signed 
at Helsingfors on 17 January 1925, there is no clause 
expressly laying down the applicable law. But with respect 
to the arbitral procedure Article 20 provides: 
11 
0*0A d6faut de clauses compromissoires contraires, 
[les Parties en litigel se conformeront pour tout ce 
qui concerne la procedure arbitrale aux dispositions 
etablies par la Convention, sign6e A La Haye le 19 
octobre 1907 pour le r6glement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux, y compris les articles 53 et 54 et 
tenant compte de l1article 83 de ladite 
Convention. , 
33) 
Admittedly the reference is to the "dispositions 6tablies 
par la Convention" "pour tout ce qui concerne la proc6dure 
arbitrale", but inasmuch as the Convention has established 
arbitration as a procedure to decide "sur la base du 
respect du droit", rather than "sur la base du droit", the 
reference could perhaps be said to involve that to the 
basis of decision laid down in its Article 37. 
c) Little Entente: General Act of Conciliation, 
Tr`b-itration and Judicial Settlement 
This arbitration treaty between Roumania, the Kingdom 
of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Czechoslovakia, 
signed in Belgrade on 21 May 1929, has the following clause 
stipulating the basis of decision for arbitration: 
"Article 31: Dans le silence du compromis ou A d6faut 
de compromis, le Tribunal appliquera les r6gle 
de fond 
6nume'r6es dans Particle 38 du Statut de la Cour 
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permanente de Justice internationale. En tant qulil 
nlexiste pas de pareilles regles applicables au 
diffftend, le Tribunal jugera ex aequo et bono. "34) 
This is identical with the wording of Article 28 of the 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
DisPutes of 1928. 
d) The American Treat 
_(Pact 
of Bogotd) 
The inter-American arbitration treaty of 30 April 
1948,, Article 36,, provides for the basis of decision in 
judicial settlement in these words: 
"In the case of controversies submitted to the 
judicial procedure to which the Treaty refers, the 
decision shall devolve upon the full Court, or, if the 
parties so request, upon a special chamber in 
conformity with Article 26 of the Statute of the 
[International Court of Justice]. The parties may 
agree,, moreover,, to have the controversy decided ex 
aequo et bono. , 
35) 
For our purposes this Article has no new element to add to 
Article 38,, paragraph 2, of the Statute. What may be of 
interest, however, is that no reference is made in the 
provisions on the "Procedure of Arbitration" in Articles 38 
to 49 to the basis of decision or applicable law. 
e) The European Convention for the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes 
Article 26 of this regional arbitration treaty of 29 
April 1957 provides for the basis of decision in these 
terms: 
"If nothing is laid down in the special agreement 
or no special agreement has been made, the Tribunal 
on Pacific Settlement 
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shall decide ex aequo et bono, having regard to the 
general principles of international law, while 
respecting the contractual obligations and the final 
decisions of international tribunals which are binding 
on the parties. " 
36) 
The Tribunal's decision ex 
_aequo 
et bono is qualified, 
first, by the lack of a special agreement or non-existence 
of rules of applicable law in the special agreement. The 
further requirement is that international law and the other 
relevant legal factors must be taken into account. Put in 
a simplified way, this is a provision of law and equity. 
f) The Protocol to the Charter of the organization of 
African Unity 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the Charter of the 
organization of African Unity of 1963, a Protocol was 
signed in Cairo on 21 July 1964 to establish the Commission 
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Article 30 
reads: 
"In the absence of any provision in the compromis 
regarding the applicable law, the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall decide the dispute according to treaties 
concluded between the parties, International Law, the 
Charter of the United Nations, and, if the parties 
agree, ex aequo et bono. " 
37) 
In so far as equity is concerned, there is nothing new 
in 
this stipulation. 
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Co-o peration in Europ e 
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Co- 
operation in Europe, adopted 
in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, 
deals with "Questions relating to Security 
in Europe", 
wherein "1. (a) Declaration on 
Principles Guiding Relations 
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between Participating States" has a provision on "V. 
Peaceful settlement of disputes": 
" [The participating States] will endeavour in good 
faith and a spirit of co-operation to reach a rapid 
and equitable solution on the basis of international 
law. , 38) 
To the extent that the solution envisaged is an equitable 
one, it could be reached with equitable considerations in 
the application of international law. 
h) The Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
Cartagena Agreement 
By decision 184 adopted at its 37th Extraordinary 
Session, Quito, 18-19 August 1983, the Commission of the 
Cartagena Agreement drew up the Statute of the Court of 
Justice. But it has no express basis of decision, except 
that in Article 56 it stipulates: 
"The judgment must contain: 
00* 
f) The considerations or elements on which the 
judgment is based; ... " 
39) 
In so far as it is not strictly obligated to base its 
judgment on law, the Court could give equitable 
considerations in its decision of cases brought before it. 
(2) Treaties of a Functional Character 
a) The Statute on Freedom of Transit 
In the Statute on Freedom of Transit, an integral part 
of the Convention on Freedom of Transit signed 
in Barcelona 
on 20 April 1921, r Article 
13 provides in part for the 
settlement of disputes in these terms: 
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"In order to settle such disputes (as may arise as 
to the interpretation or application of this Statute], 
however, in a friendly way as far as possible, the 
Contracting States undertake, before resorting to any 
judicial proceedings and without prejudice to the 
powers and right of action of the Council and 
Assembly, to submit such disputes for an opinion to 
any body established by the League of Nations, as the 
advisory and technical organization of the Members of 
the League in matters of communications and transit. 
,, 40) 0 
40 * 
This clause has no express provision for the basis of 
decision, but in so far as it refers to the intention of 
settling disputes "in a friendly way as far as possible" by 
an advisory and technical body set up by the League of 
Nations, the "opinion" of such a body could possibly 
involve considerations of equity. 
An identical wording can be found in Article 22 of the 
Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of 
International Concern which forms an integral part of the 
Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of 
International Concern signed in Barcelona on 20 April 
1921.41) 
b) The Slave Convention 
In this multilateral slave convention of 25 September 
1926, which was later amended by a Protocol of 7 December 
1953 opened for signature and acceptance at the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, Article 8 provides for 
three alternative adjudicatory organs to one of which the 
dispute relating to the interpretation or application of 
this Convention should be submitted: 
11 oee In case either or 
both of the States Parties to 
such a dispute should not be parties to the 
Protocol 
of December 16th, 1920, relating to the 
Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the dispute shall 
be 
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referred, at the choice of the Parties and in 
accordance with the constitutional procedure of each 
State, either to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice or to a court of arbitration constituted in 
accordance with the Convention of October 18th, 1907 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
or to some other court of arbitration. " 
42) 
PHerein is no express reference to the basis of decision. 
But if the dispute is submitted to a court of arbitration 
constituted in accordance with the Hague Convention,, the 
basis of decision of "respect du droit" will come into play 
unless the compromis provides otherwise. In this sense 
considerations of equity have a possibility, if remote, of 
application. 
c) The Treaty Establishinc 
Steel Commun 
the European Coal and 
The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community of 18 April 1951 provides that the High Authority 
takes measures to ensure "une 6quitable reparation" if its 
decisions or recommendations are declared by the Court of 
Justice void and referred back to it. Article 34 runs: 
"En cas d'annulation, la Cour renvoie l'Affaire 
devant la Haute Autorite. Celle-ci est tenue de 
prendre les mesures que comporte l'execution de la 
Mcision d'annulation. En cas de prejudice direct et 
sp6cial subi par une entreprise ou un groupe 
d'entreprises du fait d'une decision ou d'une 
recommandation reconnue par la Cour entach6e d'une 
faute de nature a' engager la responsabilit6 de la 
Communaut6, la Haute Autorite" est tenue de prendre, en 
usant des pouvoirs qui lui sont reconnus par les 
dispositions du Pr6sent Trait6, les mesures propres ä 
assurer une 6quitable reparation du pr6judice 
r6sultant directement de la Mcision ou de la 
recommandation annu16e et d'accorder, en tant que de 
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besoin, une juste indemnite. 
Si la Haute Autorite s'abstient de prendre dans en 
d61ai raisonnable les mesures que comporte l'ex6cution 
d'une d6cision d'annulation, un recours en indemnite 
est ouvert devant la Cour. 43) 
d) The European Fisheries Convention 
Annex II (Arbitration) of the thirteen-nation European 
Fisheries Convention of 9 March 1964 provides for a 
compensation of a secondary order in its Article 12: 
"If the execution of an award or the Arbitral 
Tribunal would conflict with a judgment or measure 
enjoined by a court of law or other authority of one 
of the parties to the dispute,, and if the municipal 
law of that party does not permit, or only partially 
permits, the consequences of the judgment or measure 
in question to be annulled, the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall, if necessary, grant the injured party equitable 
satisfaction. , 
44) 
As is clear from the wording, the provisions are concerned 
with a possibly necessary compensation in the event of a 
conflict between an award and a domestic law measure. 
Within that framework it is an equitable consideration. 
e) The BENELUX Protocol concerning 
of Economic and Social Policies 
the Co-ordination 
The Protocol, drawn up at The Hague on 24 July 1953, 
Article 8, paragraph 5, provides: 
"Les arbitres se prononceront en amiables 
compositeurs dans 1'esprit des accords conclus par les 
trois Gouvernements. " 
45) 
As the somewhat old-fashioned expression of "amiable 
compositeur" implies, the arbitrators would be authorized 
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to give considerations of equity provided they act within 
the spirit of agreements between the three Governments. 
f) The Treaty Instituting the BENELUX Economic Union 
The Treaty of 3 February 1958 to set up an economic 
union among the Benelux countries, in its Article 45, 
provides for the basis of decision of disputes: 
Ili" Le Coll6ge arbitral statue sur la base du 
respect du droit. Avant de rendre sa sentence, il 
peut, dans tout 6tat du litige, proposer a llagr6ment 
des parties un r6glement a 11amiable du diff6rend. 
2. Si les parties sont dlaccord, le Coll6ge 
arbitral statue ex aequo et bono. , 
46) 
Interpreted literally, the primary basis of decision 
of "respect du droit" would seem to be provided here as 
opposed to 11un r6glement 21 l'amiable" and "ex aequo et 
bono". If this is tenable, the possible elements of equity 
in the former phrase, as we have seen above in the analysis 
of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, are different from those in the 
latter phrases. The official English translation provided 
by the United Nations Secretariat for the authentic French 
text's I'sur la base du respect du droit" is "on the rule of 
law "1 47) which gives the impression that there is a gap 
between the text and the translation. Unless the 
translation is wrong, the phrase "the rule of law" should 
have the notion of not only "law" but also "respect for 
law", which is of a broader scope. 
g) The Act rega ding Navigation and Economic C07 
operation between the States of the Niger Basin 
Article 7 of the nine nation agreement of 26 October 
1963 for functional purposes provides for the method of 
settling disputes arising out of the 
interpretation or 
application of the agreement: 
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"Tout diff6rend qui pourrait surgir entre les 
Etats riverains relativement 21 l'interpr6tation ou 2[ 
l'application du present Acte sera regle entre eux a 
Pamiable ou par llinterm6diaire de Porganisme 
inter-gouvernemental prevu au articles 5 et 6 
ci-dessus. A d6faut d'un tel r6glement le diff6rend 
sera tranch6 par voie d'arbitrage et notamment par la 
Commission de M6diation, de Conciliation et 
d'Arbitrage de 11organisation de l'Unite" Africainer ou 
par voie de r6glement judiciaire par la Cour 
internationale de Justice. 48) 
In so far as the use of the OAU Commission is envisaged as 
one of the alternative means of settlement when 
negotiations or the intergovernmental organ has failed to 
settle the dispute, there is a possibility that the parties 
may agree to have the Commission decide ex aequo et bono. 
h) The European Convention for the Protection of 
=mals during International Transport 
In this multilateral functional treaty of 13 December 
1968, Chapter VII (Settlement of Disputes) , Article 47 
(sole article), paragraph 3, has this to say: 
"The arbitration tribunal shall lay down its own 
procedure. Its decisions shall be taken by majority 
vote. Its award which shall be based on this 
Convention shall be final. , 
49) 
The award is to be based on this Convention, which, 
however, gives no express basis of decision. But inasmuch 
as the tribunal is authorized to lay down its rules of 
procedure, it has latitude to prescribe equitable rules. 
It is difficult to deny the tribunal the same latitude to 
give equitable consideration for a case before it. 
- 47 - 
The International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial-Dir-scrimination 
The Convention, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 21 December 1965 and opened for signature 
on 7 March 1966, provides for an "amicable solution" of the 
dispute by an ad hoc Conciliation Commission of five 
members. Article 13, paragraph 1, lays down: 
"When the Commission has fully considered the 
matter, it shall prepare and submit to the Chairman of 
the Committee a report embodying its findings on all 
questions of fact relevant to the issue between the 
parties and containing such recommendations as it may 
think proper for the amicable solution of the 
dispute. , 50) 
A similar solution of the dispute is provided for in the 
American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969. 
Article 48, paragraph 1 (f), provides: 
"The Commission (= the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights) shall place itself at the disposal of 
the parties concerned with a view to reaching a 
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of 
respect for the human rights recognized in this 
Convention. , 
51) 
i) The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
opened for signature on 10 December 1982, 
has a number of 
equitable provisions for the settlement of 
disputes. 
Article 59 provides for the settlement of disputes 
in the 
exclusive economic zone: 
"In cases where this Convention does not attribute 
rights or jurisdiction to the coastal 
State or tc 
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other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a 
conflict arises between the interests of the coastal 
State and any other State or States, the conflict 
should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the 
light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into 
account the respective importance of the interests 
involved to the parties as well as to the 
international community as a whole. " 
52) 
Here an express reference to equity is made along with 
equitable considerations to be given to "all the relevant 
circumstances" and "the respective importance of the 
interests involved to the parties as well as to the 
international community as a whole. " 
"Equitable arrangements" must be made for the sake of 
land-locked States in the exploitation of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone, as is provided in 
Article 69, paragraph 3: 
"When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State 
approaches a point which would enable it to harvest 
the entire allowable catch of the living resources in 
its exclusive economic zone, the coastal State and 
other States concerned shall co-operate in the 
establishment of equitable arrangements on a 
bilateral, sub-regional or regional basis to allow for 
participation of developing land-locked States of the 
same sub-region or region in the exploitation of the 
living resources of the exclusive economic zones of 
coastal States of the sub-region or region, as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances and on terms 
1153) satisfactory to all parties. 000 
Another "equitable solution" formula is contained in 
the provisions for the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf 
in Articles 74 and 
83, paragraph 1: 
"The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/ 
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continental shelf between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the 
basis of international law, as referred to in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution. , 54) 
An "amicable settlement" provision, if not precisely the 
same as the "equitable solution", is in Article 5 of Annex 
V, which is devoted to the procedure of conciliation: 
"The commission may draw the attention of the 
parties to any measure which might facilitate an 
amicable settlement of the disputes, , 
55) 
Article 293 on the applicable law, after mentioning 
"this Convention and other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention", makes mention of the ex 
aequo et bono decision: 
"Paragraph 1 does not prejudice the power of the 
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this 
section to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties so agree. , 
56) 
(3) Treaties for the Settlement of Commercial or Civil 
D is put e. -:; p 
a) The European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration 
Article 7 of the Convention, signed at Geneva on 21 
April 1961, provides a basis for decision in these words: 
oil, The parties shall be free to determine,, by 
agreement, the law to be applied by the arbitrators to 
the substance of the dispute. Failing any indication 
by the parties as to the applicable law, the 
arbitrators shall apply the proper law under the rule 
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of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable. In 
both cases the arbitrators shall take account of the 
terms of the contract and trade usages. 
2. The arbitrators shall act as amiable 
composteurs if the parties so decide and if they may 
do so under the law applicable to the arbitration, , 
57) 
In paragraph 1 "the proper law under the rule of conflict 
that the arbitrators deem applicable" could involve 
principles of equity. The text of paragraph 2 needs no 
explanation. 
b) The Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
5isputes between States and Nat! -onals of Other 
States 
The multilateral treaty for the settlement of 
investment disputes of 18 March 1965 has provisions for the 
basis of decision in Article 42, which runs: 
Ill, The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the 
Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State 
party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable. 
2. The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non 
liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the 
law. 
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not 
prejudice the power of the Tribunal to 
decide a 
dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree.,, 
58) 
What is interesting in this Article is paragraph 2, where 
specific reference is made to the obligation of 
the 
Tribunal to avoid a finding of non 10 Silence or 
obscurity of the law does not 
justify it. This may be 
interpreted to imply the necessity for the Tribunal 
to 
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decide on the basis of equity or "general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations" to avoid such a finding. 
For when a tribunal finds itself in a situation in which it 
is unable to find the law applicable to the case before it 
and yet it is not allowed to pronounce a non liquet, the 
logical consequence is that it should have some discretion 
or latitude in order to fulfil its function. The 
discretion, by implication, involves resort to equity in 
such a dilemma. 
c) The Convention on Settlement by Arbitration of 
ýýivil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, 
Scientific and Technical Co-operation 
In this rare dispute settlement treaty between eight 
East European countries, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972, a 
general provision is given in Article 1, paragraph 1, which 
reads: 
"All disputes between economic organizations 
resulting from contractual and other civil law cases 
arising between them in the course of economic, 
scientific and technical co-operation of the 
countries-parties to the present Convention shall be 
subject to arbitration proceedings with the exclusion 
of the above disputes from jurisdiction of the courts 
of law. " 
59) 
Here "arbitration proceedings" is clearly distinguished 
from "jurisdiction of the courts of law", and would imply a 
procedure that does not apply strict law but may mitigate 
it or give equitable considerations to the relevant 
circumstances of the case concerned. 
d) The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 
The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 21 June 1985 provides 
"rules 
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applicable to substance of dispute" in Article 28: 
" (1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the 
dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance 
of the dispute. Any designation of the law or legal 
system of a given State shall be construed, unless 
otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the 
substantive law of that State and not to its conflict 
of laws rules. 
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by 
the conflict of laws rules which it considers 
applicable. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et 
bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties 
have expressly authorized it to do so. 
(4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall 
decide in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and shall take into account the usages of the trade 
applicable to the transaction. , 60) 
Similar provisions can be seen in the International Energy 
Agency's Dispute Settlement Centre Procedures for 
Arbitration and Additional Rules of 10 November 1981,61) 
Bilateral Treaties 
There are a great number of bilateral arbitration 
treaties or treaties for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes dating from the mid-nineteenth 
century. These normally have a clause or clauses providing 
for the basis of decision in one way or another. Many of 
them have express or implicit reference to equity or 
equitable considerations. Besides such arbitration 
treaties., there are a variety of bilateral treaties for 
some specific functional purposes, which in most cases have 
provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes. Among 
these are clauses stipulating the basis of decision in 
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terms of equity or equitable considerations. 
In this section such collected clauses will be grouped 
by the phrases used therein, in order to show what 
expressions are employed for equitable bases of decision. 
This in turn would help hopefully to elucidate the meaning 
of equity from the way it is used in treaty clauses. On 
the other hand, this mode of analysis would also reveal 
that certain States prefer certain phrases of equity, 
rather than others, for the settlement of certain kinds of 
disputes. 
(1) General Arbitration Treaties 
1) "ex aequo et bono" 
"ex aequo et bono" 
Article 17 of the Treaty of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of 30 April 1926 between Belgium and Sweden, 
which provides for the decision of all questions other than 
those "with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as 
to their respective rights", runs in part: 
I'Le tribunal statuera ex aequo et bono ". 
62) 
Put simply, the provision is complete in itself. But it is 
well to bear in mind that the "tribunal" is an arbitral 
tribunal constituted, in the absence of any compromis 
between the Parties, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 45 of the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, at the request of 
either Party when the Parties have not reached agreement 
within one month of the termination of the proceedings of 
the Permanent Conciliation Commission. This seems partly 
to explain the latitude of the tribunal to decide ex aequo 
et bono, which is re-inforced by the sentence immediately 
preceding the above-mentioned sentence: 
"Toutefois, si dans un d61ai de six mois ä date du 
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jour otl llune des Parties aura adi 
demande tendant A soumettre 
Varbitrage, le compromis vis6 par 
de La Haye nla pas e6t6 sign6, il 








A 11 autre une 
ft. differend a 
ite Convention 
6tabli, a la 
le tribunal 
An identical wording for the basis of decision can be 
found in a few other arbitration treaties between Belgium 
and Sweden on the one hand and other European States. 
63) 
More or less immediate qualifications for the phrase "ex 
aequo et bono" are included in the examples of clauses that 
follow. 
b) "according to the principles of international law, 
or ex aequo et bono" 
In the Argentina-Brazil General Arbitration Treaty of 
7 September 1905, the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal 
has the choice to base his or its decision on law or 
alternatively decide ex aequo et bono under Article 10, 
which runs as follows: 
"The arbitrator 
obliged to decide 
international law, 
the two parties maý 
bono, in accordance 
conferred upon them 
or the arbitral tribunal shall be 
according to the principles of 
following the special rules which 
have established, or ex aequo et 
with the powers that may have been 
by the agreement. , 
64) 
c) "a tribunal having authority to decide ex aequo et 
bono" 
The France-Sweden Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration of 3 March 1928 in its Article 
16 provides for the basis of decision in these terms: 
"Les diff6rends autres que les litiges [ayant pour 
objet un droit allegu6 par une des Parties et contest6 
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par l'autre... ] seront, 'a' defaut de conciliation, 
soumis A un Tribunal arbitral ayant le pouvoir de 
statuer ex aequo et bono. , 
65) 
d) "a tribunal ha 
bono, provided tha 
cannot be applTe-a7 
Article 19 of the Spain-Turkey Treaty of Conciliation, 
Judicial Settlement and Arbitration of 28 April 1930 
provides for the decision ex aequo et bono on the condition 
that there exists no rule of international law applicable 
to the dispute: 
"In the event of failure to reach an agreement 
between the Parties, the dispute shall, at the request 
of either Party, be submitted for decision to an 
Arbitral Tribunal having power to decide ex aequo et 
provided that a rule of international law cannot 
be applied. , 
66) 
e) "ex aequo et bono if there exist no such 
substantive rules applicable as those of Article 
38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice" 
In much the same wording as Article 28 of the General 
Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 
1928, Article 29, paragraph (d) , of the Pact of Friendship, 
Conciliation and Judicial Settlement of 27 March 1929 
between Greece and the Kingdom of the Serbs,, Croats and 
Slovenes lays down the basis of decision: 
ei 00' Dans 
le silence du compromis, le Tribunal 
appliquera les regles de fond gnum6r6es dans l'article 
38 du Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice 
internationale. En tant qulil nlexiste pas de 
pareilles regles applicables au diff6rend, le Tribunal 
jugera ex aequo et bono. " 
67) 
ower to decide ex aequo et 
a rule of international law 
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Among the many clauses in identical or much the same 
wording as the above, 
68) it is interesting to note that 
Article 31 of the Denmark-Yugoslavia Treaty of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement of 14 
December 1935 has an additional phrase of "si les deux 
Parties sont d1accord" in the second sentence thus: 
le tribunal jugera, si les deux Parties sont 
, 69) d accord, ex aequo et bono. 
This is a cautious wording in view of the controversy which 
arose out of the lack of that very phrase in Article 28 of 
the General Act of 1928.70) But one may well wonder why 
neither Denmark nor Yugoslavia added this phrase in their 
other treaties of arbitration. 
f) "ex aequo et bono if there are no rules of 
international-law applicable" 
Article 31 of the Belgium-Turkey Convention of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement of 8 
April 1931 has a slightly different wording from that of 
Article 28 of the General Act of 1928: 
"Dans le silence du compromis ou A d6faut de 
compromis, le tribunal appliquera les r6gles du droit 
international. En tant qulil n'existe pas de 
pareilles rogles applicables au differend, le tribunal 
jugera ex aequo et bono. " 
71) 
g) "If the dispute is not of a juridical nature in 
the opinion of the Court, the Parties agree to its 
being settled ex aequo et bono. " 
The Italy-Switzerland Treaty of 
Judicial Settlement of 20 September 1924, 
model for the subsequent bilateral 
treaties for the pacific settlement 
disputes, provides in its Article 15 
decision in the following words: 
Conciliation and 
which afforded a 
and multilateral 
of international 
. or the 
basis of 
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if Si l'une des Parties nfaccepte pas les 
propositions de la Commission permanente de 
conciliation ou ne se prononce pas dans le delai fix6 
par son rapport, chacune d'elles pourra demander que 
le litige soit soumis A la Cour permanente de Justice 
internationale. 
Dans le cas oU', de l'avis de la Cour, le litige ne 
serait pas d1ordre juridique, les Parties convinennet 
qulil sera tranch6 ex aequo et bono. , 
72) 
The second paragraph is important in that the Court is 
empowered to judge whether the dispute submitted to it is 
legal in nature, and that the non-legal dispute, if so 
found by the Court, is to be decided ex aequo et bono, thus 
linking non-legal disputes with a decision ex aequo et 
bono. 
Article 18 of the Luxembourg-Poland Treaty of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of 29 October 1928 supplies a 
variant of the above provisions of Article 15 of the 
Italian-Swiss Treaty by adding an "arbitral tribunal" to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice to make the 
relevant phrase read "de l1avis de la Cour ou du Tribunal 
arbitral. , 
73 A further variant is afforded by Article 26, 
paragraph 2, of the Bulgaria-Turkey Treaty of Neutrality,, 
Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration of 6 
March 1929,, which makes the Court's decision ex aequo et 
bono contingent on "en tant qu'il n1existe pas aucune rogle 
du droit international applicable au diff6rend 0 
74) 
h) "arbitration, but the right reserved to submit 
the case to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice which decides ex aequo et bono" 
Disputes of a non-juridical nature, after an attempt 
for conciliation, are to be submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal but may alternatively be submitted to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice under Article 17 
of the Belgium-Portugal Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration of 9 July 1927: 
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"Si les Parties ne puevent 8tre conciliees, le 
litige sera, (I la requ6te d1une seul des Parties, 
soumis pour d6cision A un tribunal arbitral constitue 
dans les conditions et suivant la proc6dure prevues 
par la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 
pour le r6glement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux. 
Les Parties se r6servent, toutefois, la faculte de 
soumettre le litige, d'un commun accord, A la Cour 
permanente de Justice internationale, laquf? lle 
statuera ex aequo et bono. , 
75) 
"non-legal disputes to be submitted to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, which 
decides ex aequo et bono if there is no rule of 
law applicable" 
In the Finnish-Swiss Treaty of Conciliation and 
Judicial Settlement of 16 November 1927, Article 15 
provides in part: 
"Les Parties conviennent, en outre, que, dans le 
cas oü le litige ne rentrerait pas dans l'une des 
quatre cat6gories de diffgrends d'ordre juridique 
gnum6r6es ä l'article 36, alin6-a 2, du Statut de la 
Cour de Justice, chacune d'entre elles pourra 
n6anmoins demander qu'il soit d6f6r6 ä la Cour 
permanente de Justice internationale, qui le tranchera 
ex aequo et bono dans la mesure oiö. il nlexiste pas de 
76) 
regle de droit applicable. " 
Here the determination of whether a given dispute falls 
under the category of those in Article 36, paragraph 
2, of 
the Statute is to be made by the parties, but such 
determination is made by the Permanent Court under Article 
23 of the Persian-Turkish Treaty of Conciliation, 
Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration of 23 January 1932.77) 
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"non-legal disputes may be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice, which may decide 
ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree" 
In a recent Treaty for Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration of 7 July 1965 between the 
United Kingdom and Switzerland, Article 14 (of Chapter III: 
Judicial Settlement) provides in part: 
11 (3) By special agreement between the Contracting 
Parties, disputes other than those mentioned in 
paragraph (1) of this Article (i. e., the four 
categories of disputes in Article 36, paragraph 2, of 
the Statute) may also be submitted to the Court. This 
provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the Contracting 
Parties so agree. 1,78) 
2) "the powers of an amiable compositeur" 
In a series of arbitration treaties concluded by Spain 
with some European States and a couple of such treaties of 
Norway with European States,, a clause is provided for an 
arbitral tribunal to have the powers of an amiable 
compositeur. Thus Article 19 of the Belgo-Spanish Treaty 
of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration of 19 
July 1927 runs: 
"Si les Parties ne peuvent Atre conciliees, le 
conflit sera, a la requAte d1une seule des Parties, 
soumis pour d6cision A un tribunal arbitral, qui, a 
d6faut d'autre accord entre les Parties, sera compose 
de cinq membres d6sign6s pour chaque cas particulier, 
suivant la m6thode pr6vue ... en ce qui concerne 
la 
Commission de Conciliation. Ce tribunal arbitral 
aura, en pareil cas, les pouvoirs 
d'amiable 
compositeur et dictera un r6glement obligatoire pour 
les Parties. , 
79) 
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A variation of the clause quoted above, which can be 
found in Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Luxembourg-Norway 
Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement 
of 12 February 1932, reads: 
I'Dans le cas oti, de l1avis de la [Cour permanente 
de Justice internationale] ou du Tribunal arbitral, le 
diffe"rend ne serait pas d1ordre juridique, la Cour ou 
le Tribunal auront les pouvoirs d'amiables 
compositeurs et dicteront un r6glement obligatoire 
1180) pour les Parties, go* 
This is instructive in that it substitutes "les pouvoirs 
d'amiables compositeurs" for "le pouvoir de statuer ex 
aequo et bono" as found in, for example, Article 16 of the 
1928 Franco-Swedish arbitration treaty as seen above in 
sub-section 1) - c). From this it would be safe to say 
that here at least,, the phrases of "les pouvoirs d'amiable 
compositeur" and "le pouvoir de statuer ex aequo et bono" 
are perhaps thought to be interchangeable. This reasoning 
may be re-inforced by Articles 19 and 20 of the Spanish- 
Greek Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and 
Arbitration of 23 January 1930, which provide that an 
arbitral tribunal having "les pouvoirs d'amiable 
compositeur" under Article 19 "jugera ex aequo et bono", in 
so far as there is no such substantive rule as enumerated 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, under Article 20.81) 
3) "Unless the compromis imposes the application of 
special rules or authorizes the arbitrator to 
decide as an amiable compositeur, he must apply 
the principles of international law7r-- 
In some arbitration treaties between several South 
American States,, a clause is incorporated providing that 
the arbitrator should decide according to general 
international law unless he is instructed to apply special 
rules or authorized to act as an amiable compositeur. Thus 
Article 6 of the Brazil-Chile Arbitration Treaty of 18 May 
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1899 runs as follows: 
"The arbitrator is competent to decide on the 
validity of the compromise and on its interpretation. 
He must decide according to the principles of 
international law, provided that the compromise does 
not impose the application of special rules or does 
not authorize the arbitrator to decide as friendly 
arbitrator. , 
82) 
4) "on the basis of claims of the 
absence of a compromis" 
A somewhat ambiguous basis of decision, the claims of 
the parties, is provided in Article 2 of the Denmark-Italy 
Convention d'arbitrage obligatoire of 16 December 1905, 
which reads in part: 
"A d6faut d'un compromis sp6cial, les arbitres 
jugeront sur la base des pr6tentions formulees par les 
deux Parties. , 
83) 
This may be said to be a truism, because without a 
compromis, the arbitrators would be left without an express 
basis of decision, and consequently would have no other 
choice than to rest their judgment on the claims of the 
parties and the evidence presented in support thereof. But 
the provision is significant since it is an express 
statement of a basis of decision which could 
involve 
considerations of equity. 
5) "in accordance with the 
equity" 
rinciples of justice and 
Article 2 of the Finland-Iceland Convention regar ing 
the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 27 June 1930, after 
providing for the submission of the 
disputes to arbitration 
following the procedure of investigation and conciliation, 
provides in part: 
rties in the 
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"The Parties agree that the dispute referred to in 
the present Article shall be settled in accordance 
with the principles of justice and equity,,, 
84) 
6) "in accordance with considerations of equity, if 
the parties agree" 
In a series of arbitration treaties between Germany 
and her neighbouring States during the 1920s, it was 
provided that the parties could agree to authorize the 
tribunal to give an award in accordance with considerations 
of equity, rather than legal principles. Article 5 of the 
German-Swiss Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and 
Judicial Settlement of 3 December 1921, for example, 
provides in part: 
"If the Parties agree, the Tribunal may, instead 
0f basing its decision on legal principles, give an 
award in accordance with considerations of equity. , 
85) 
This sentence comes after the provision that the tribunal 
must apply first the relevant treaties, secondly customary 
law, and thirdly general principles of law. 
7) "in accordance with the principles of law and 
1 11 equity 
In some arbitration treaties between the Nordic 
States, a clause is included to provide that non-legal 
disputes should be settled according to the principles of 
law and equity. Thus the Norway-Sweden Convention 
for the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 25 November 1925 has 
these provisions in its Article 2: 
"The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to 
arbitration, in accordance with 
the ensuing 
provisions, all disputes other than those 
[which fall 
within one of the categories specified 
in Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of 
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_nternational Justice], provided that they have first 
been subjected to the procedure of enquiry and 
conciliation ... and that it has not been possible to 
settle them by this means. 
The Parties agree that the disputes referred to in 
the present Article shall be settled in accordance 
with the principles of law and equity. , 
86) 
8) "differences which are justiciable in their nature 
by reason of being susceptible of decision by the 
application of the principles of law or equi 
In the arbitration treaties of the late 1920s 
concluded by the United States with the European and a few 
Afro-Asian States, a clause linked legal disputes with the 
application of principles of law or equity. Thus Article 2 
of the United States-France Treaty of Arbitration of 6 
February 1928 provides: 
"All differences relating to international matters 
in which the High Contracting Parties are concerned by 
virtue of a claim of right made by one against the 
other under treaty or otherwise, which it has not been 
possible to adjust by diplomacy, which have not been 
adjusted as a result of reference to the above- 
mentioned Permanent International Commission, and 
which are justiciable in their nature by reason of 
being susceptible of decision by the application of 
the principles of law or equity, shall be submitted to 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration ... or to some 
other competent tribunal, as shall be decided 
in each 
J7) 
case by special agreement 0000 
Admittedly this is not an express basis of decision, 
but 
refers to "law or equity" only in so 
far as it concerns the 
justiciability of disputes. It would be fair to surmise, 
however, that inasmuch as disputes are deemed to 
be 
susceptible of decision on the 
basis of law or equity, the 
tribunal will accordingly base its decision on 
the 
principles of law or equity. 
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"Permanent Court of Arbitration unless otherwise 
agreed" 
rticle 7 of the United States-Switzerland Treaty of 
Arbitration and Conciliation of 16 February 1931 provides 
for the method to determine the tribunal: 
"The tribunal to which juridical differences shall 
be submitted shall be determined in each case by the 
Contracting Parties but shall, in the absence of other 
agreements, be the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
established at The Hague by the Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes concluded 
October 18,1907. Decision as to the tribunal shall 
be made in each case by a special agreement, which 
special agreement shall define its (i. e., the 
Il88) tribunal's) powers 9004 
It is needless to say that if the dispute is submitted to 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the basis of decision 
will be "respect for law" unless otherwise laid down in 
specific terms by the compromis. 
10) "an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes" 
Article 16 of the Czechoslovak-Swedish Treaty of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of 2 January 1926, providing 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 that the dispute should or may be 
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice 
by a compromis or by application in the absence of a 
compromis in the event of no amicable agreement being 
reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, 
stipulates the alternative means of submitting the dispute 
to an arbitral tribunal in paragraph 3: 
"La disposition de cet article ne porte pas 
atteinte 'a la faculte des Parties de soumettre la 
contestation, par voie de compromis, (I un tribunal 
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arbitral dans les conditions et suivant la procedure 
prevues par la Convention de La Haya du 18 octobre 
1907 pour le r6glement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux. , 89) 
When a dispute is submitted to an arbitral tribunal as is 
provided in this clause it is logical to assume that the 
tribunal will decide "on the basis of respect for law" 
unless any other specific basis of decision is indicated in 
the compromis. 
Provisions to the same effect, although in different 
wordings, can be found in a number of arbitration treaties 
concluded during the late 1920s and the early 1930s. 
90) 
"the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
accordance with its ýtatute or an arbitral 
tribunal according to the Hague Convention" 
Article 16 of the Germany-Belgium Arbitration Treaty 
of 16 October 1925 provides in part: 
"A d6faut de conciliation devant la Commission 
permanente de conciliation, la contestation sera 
soumise par voie de compromis soit A la Cour 
permanente de Justice internationale dans les 
conditions et suivant la proc6dure pr6vues par son 
statut, soit a un tribunal arbitral dans les 
conditions et suivant la proc6dure pr6vues par la 
Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le 
reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux. 1191) 
Some arbitration treaties of the late 1920s and the early 
1930s have clauses with identical wording. 
92) 
A slightly different wording is used to give 
provisions to the same effect in some other treaties of 
arbitration during the same period. Article 
4 of the 
France-Netherlands Treaty of 10 March 1928, for example, 
runs in these words: 
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"Si, dans le cas d'un des litiges [de quelque 
nature qulils soient, ayant pour objet un droit 
allegu6 par une des Hautes Parties contractantes et 
contest6 par l1autre), les deux Parties n'ont pas eu 
recours a la. Commission permanente de Conciliation ou 
si celle-ci n1a pas r6ussi A concilier les Parties, le 
litige sera soumis d1un commun accord par voie de 
compromis soit a la Cour de Justice internationale qui 
statuera dans les conditions et suivant la procedure 
pr6vues par son statut, soit A un tribunal arbitral 
qui statuera dans les conditions et suivant la 
proc6dure prevues par la Convention de La Haye du 18 
octobre 1907 pour le r6glement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux. , 93) 
12) "Provisions of the Ha gue Convention in the absence 
of particulars in the compromis" 
A. rticle 27 of the 
Conciliation, Arbitration and 
September 1929 makes indirect 
decision in these words: 
Norway-Poland Treaty of 
Judicial Settlement of 9 
reference to the basis of 
"A d6faut d1indications ou de pr6cisions 
suffisantes dans le compromis, relativement aux points 
indiques dans Varticle pr6c6dent, il sera fait 
application, dans la mesure n6cessaire, des 
dispositions de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 
1907 pour le r6glement pacifique des conflits 
internationaux. " 94) 
13) "Article 38 of the Statute to be applied by the 
arbitral-tribunal" 
Non-legal disputes are to be submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal which will mutatis mutandis apply the rules of 
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice under Article 2 of the Finnish- 
Norwegian Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
of 3 February 1926. The Article runs: 
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"Les Parties Contractantes s'engagent 'a soumettre 
a la proc6dure d'arbitrage, conform6ment aux 
dispositions ci-apres, tous differends qui ne sont pas 
d'ordre juridique et qui n'auront pu 6tre r6gl6s par 
la voie diplomatique, toutefois seulement apr6s qulils 
auront 6t6 soumis, sans avoir pu 6tre r6gl6s par cette 
voie, a la proc6dure dIenqu8te et de conciliation 
pr6vue dans la Convention du 27 juin 1924, concernant 
11institution d1une Commission permanente dlenqu8te et 
de conciliation. 
Les r6gles de Particle 38 du Statut de la Cour 
permanente de Justice internationale trouveront 
l1application correspondante dans les d6cisions du 
tribunal arbitral. , 
95) 
In so far as the "r6gles de Particle 38 du Statut" are to 
be applied, its second paragraph providing for ex aequo et 
bono decision could not be excluded from application. 
14) "equitable compensation for conse 
An equitable consideration, of the nature of 
compensation provided in the European Fisheries Convention 
of 1964, is provided in clauses in a number of arbitration 
treaties during the inter-war years. Thus Article 16 of 
the Hungary-Switzerland Treaty of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of 18 June 1924 provides in these words: 
"Si le tribunal 6tablissait qu'une decision d'une 
instance judiciaire du toute autre autorite" relevant 
de l'une des Parties contractantes se trouve 
enti6rement ou partiellement en opposition avec le 
droit des gens et si le droit constitutionnel de cette 
Partie ne permet pas ou ne permet qulimparfaitement 
dleffacer par voie administrative les cons6quences de 
la d6cision en cause, il serait accord6 a la Partie 
16s6e une satisfaction equitable d'une autre 
ordre. " 
96) 
ences of a 
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Treaties of a Functional Character 
In arbitration clauses of treaties of a functional 
character, there are some different bases of decision 
provided from those in general arbitration treaties which 
have been glanced at above. It could be understood as 
showing that treaties concluded for some specific 
functional purposes are limited in their scope of 
application, with disputes arising therefrom being 
accordingly limited, and consequently that their bases of 
decision in the dispute settlement provisions could 
naturally differ from those in general arbitration 
treaties. While, as will be seen below, this seems true in 
a limited number of arbitration clauses of functional 
treaties, it would be worthy of note as indicating a 
possible link between certain disputes of specific kinds 
and the basis of decision in the procedure of settlement of 
those disputes. 
1) "on the basis of respect for law" 
In a recent series of capital investment/economic 
co-operation treaties between one or two of the Benelux 
countries and a few African countries, it is laid down that 
the tribunal shall decide primarily on the basis of respect 
for law. Thus under Article 4 of the Netherlands-Tunisia 
Convention concerning the encouragement of capital 
investment and the protection of property of 23 May 1963: 
11 **. Le tribunal statue sur 
la base du respect du 
droit. Avant de rendre sa sentence, il peut, dans 
tout 6tat du litige, proposer A l'agr6ment des Parties 
e un reglement a l'amiable du diff'rend. 
Si les Parties sont d'accord, le tribunal statue 
ex aequo et bono. " 
97) 
These provisions as a whole would suggest an amicable 
settlement of disputes involving equitable considerations 
for the parties concerned, rather than a settlement based 
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on strictly legal considerations. 
A similar provision is included, although indirectly, 
in the Agreement between the Philippines and the Asian 
Development Bank of 22 December 1966 regarding the 
Headquarters of the Bank. Article XIV, "Settlement of 
Disputes", Section 53 which provides for the arbitral 
tribunal's basis of decision refers to the "Rules of 
Arbitration and Conciliation of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Settlement of Disputes. , 
98) 
The 
"Rules", elaborated by the International Bureau of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in February, 1962, lays down 
in its Article 30: 
"The Tribunal shall decide on the basis of respect 
for law, unless an agreement between the parties 
provides for it to rule ex aequo et bono". 
99) 
2) "the powers of an amiable compositeur" 
In a couple of Spanish treaties of friendship and 
amity, the tribunal is empowered to act as an amiable 
compositeur. In Article III of the Treaty of Friendship of 
27 September 1947 between the Philippines and Spain, it is 
provided in part that 
"This Court (= Arbitration Court) shall have the 
powers of a referee and its award or decision shall be 
final and conclusive for both Parties. "100) 
3) it ex aequo et bono" 
The Polish-Czechoslovak Convention of 4 July 1947 for 
ensuring economic co-operation, Annex No. 15 which 
constitutes the Protocol concerning mediation and 
arbitration procedure, Section 9, provides: 
"The members of the board of arbitrators shall be 
completely independent in the exercise of their 
functions and neither Party may give them any 
- 70 - 
instructions whatsoever. 
The board of arbitrators shall give its decisions 
ex ae quo et 
-bono. 
" 10 1) 
Allowing for the fact that this clause is included for 
mediation and arbitration procedure, and not for 
arbitration or judicial settlement, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that this is an ex aequo et bono 
decision pure and simple. - 
In the Federal Republic of Germany's two agreements of 
28 January 1971, one with Denmark and the other with the 
Netherlands , concerning the delimitation of the continental 
shelf under the North Sea, it is laid down that an 
arrangement should be made for the exploitation of a 
mineral deposit when it is found to straddle the boundary 
line. Then in Article 2, paragraph 4, of each agreement it 
is provided that 
"Should an arrangement pursuant to paragraph 2 or 
3 of this article not be concluded within a reasonable 
period of time, either Contracting Party may refer the 
matter to the arbitral tribunal provided for in 
article 5 of this Agreement. The arbitral tribunal 
may in such cases also decide ex 
_ 
aequo et 
bono .... 1,102) 
Normally the arbitral tribunal decides on the basis of the 
international law applicable between the Contracting 
Parties on the disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Agreement or any such arrangement as 
mentioned above. 
Likewise the ex aequo et bono decision is an 
alternative to a decision on the basis of law in the 
Netherlands-Belgium Treaty of 13 May 1963 concerning the 
connection between the Scheldt and the Rhine. Article 42, 
paragraph 2, of the Treaty reads: 
"La. Commission arbitrale statue sur la base des 
dispositions du pr6sent Trait6 et des principes 
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g6n6raux du drout international public. Elle statue, 
au besoin, ex aequo et bono dans les cas vises a 
l'article 14, paragraph 2, a l'article 16,, paragraph 
4, A Particle 17, paragraph 3, a l'article 37, 
paragraph 2, et a l1article 39, paragraph 4, du 
pr6sent Traite. , 103) 
In the cases envisaged in the mentioned paragraphs, the 
arbitral commission is expected to decide "en tenant 
compte des int6r8ts de la navigation et de tous les autres 
int6r8ts en cause" (Article 14, paragraph 2) '104) "en 
prenant consid6ration tous les int6r8ts en cause de part et 
d'autre" (Article 37, paragraph 2), 105) and "en tenant 
compte de tous les int6r8ts li6s au canal de jonction" 
(Article 39, paragraph 4). 
106) 
These may be classified as 
11relevant circumstances" to be taken into account in the 
arbitral commission's decision. This Dutch-Belgian treaty 
has another interesting clause, Article 6 in Annex III: 
"Composition, Proc6dure et De"tail des Attributions de la 
Commission arbitrale", which provides: 
"Dans tout 6tat du litige, la Commission arbitrale 
peut proposer aux Parties un r6glement amiable. 11107) 
This would seem another characteristic of arbitration 
clauses of the Benelux countries. 
11consideration of relevant circumstances" 
In a number of treaty clauses it is provided that the 
arbitral tribunal, or the boundary commission in the case 
of boundary delimitation treaties, should be authorized to 
take into account the relevant circumstances of the dispute 
or situation concerned. For example, in the French-Italian 
Treaty of Turin of 24 March 1860, Article 3 provides for 
the consideration of such circumstances in these words: 
11 ... une commission mixte 
de'terminera, dans un esprit 
d'6quit6, les fronti6res des deux Etats en tenant 
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compte de la configuration des montagnes et de la 
n6cessit6 de la de"fense. , 108) 
This is confirmed in more concrete terms in the preamble of 
the Convention of delimitation of 7 March 1861. On the 
basis of Article 3 of the Treaty of Turin of 24 March 1860, 
the staff officers appointed as commissioners by the two 
Governments, proceeded to 
"Pop6ration du trac6 de la ligne de d6limitation sur 
le terrain et sur les plans g6ographiques, de m8me 
quIA 116tude locale et & la d6signation pr6-liminaire 
des rectifications, 6changes et arrangements sp6ciaux 
A stipuler, soit pour 6tablir une de"marcation 
convenable, soit pour favoriser, des deux c6t6s, les 
propriftaires frontaliers dans des vues commune 
dI 6quit6. " 10 9) 
Compensatory considerations which can be seen in the 
above provisions may also be found in Article 1 of the 
Argentine-Chilean Convention of Demarcation of 2 March 
1904, which runs as follows: 
11 9o* if in the course of the material 
demarcation of 
the straight lines indicated in the arbitral award, it 
should result that these lines lie near some ridge or 
other natural feature that,, by its proximity to the 
same lines, may offer a more permanent boundary, the 
mixed commission shall ... propose to their respective 
Governments the substitution of these lines by natural 
limits on the basis of an equitable compensation. "110) 
Local geographical and economic conditions were 
mentioned as the relevant circumstances in favour of which 
the boundary might be diverted slightly in the Treaty of 
Peace of 10 February 1947 between the Allied Powers and 
Italy. Article 5,, paragraph 5, of the treaty reads in 
part: 
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11 99. les commissaires seront autoris6s A s'6carter de 
0,5 km de la ligne 6tablie par le present trait6, afin 
d'adapter la frontiere aux conditions g6ographiques et 
economiques locales, sous r6serve de ne placer sous 
une souverainet6 autre que celle r6sultant des 
d6limitations stipul6es dans le present trait6 aucun 
village ni aucune ville de plus de 500 habitants, 
aucune route ou voie ferr6e importante, ni aucune 
centre important d'approvisionnement en eau ou de la 
fourniture d'6nergie 6lectrique". 111) 
Similarly the Allied Powers-Germany Agreement of 30 
August 1924 concerning the Agreement of August 9,, 1924, 
between the German Government and the Reparation Commission 
provides for the consideration of relevant economic 
circumstances. Clause 2, paragraph (d)-(ii) runs in these 
terms: 
"In laying down the programmes (i. e., for the 
deliveries of products), the Arbitral Commission shall 
take into account the possibilities of production in 
Germany, the position of her supplies of raw materials 
and her domestic requirements in so far as necessary 
for the maintenance of her social and economic life, 
and also of the conditions set out in the Expert's 
Report, nor shall it exceed the limits fixed by the 
Transfer Committee with a view to the maintenance of 
the German exchange*" 
112) 
of consideration of special circumstances" 
What may be said to be a variant of the relevant 
circumstance s-spec ial circumstances-is provided 
for as 
having to be taken into account in the Swedish-Finnish 
Agreement of 29 September 1972 concerning the Delimitation 
of the Continental Shelf 
in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Aland 
Sea and the Northernmost Part of the Baltic 
Sea. Article 1 
reads: 
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"The boundary between the areas of continental 
shelf over which Finland and Sweden respectively 
exercise sovereign rights for the purpose of the 
exploration and utilization of natural resources shall 
in principle be a median line between the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
country is measured. Departures from this principle 
have, however, been made in order to take into 
account, as special circumstances within the meaning 
of the Geneva Convention, the boundary lines which 
were established, on the one hand, in the year 1811 in 
the topographic description of the frontier drawn up 
after the Peace of Fredrikshamn and,, on the other 
hand, in the Convention of 20 October 1921 relating to 
the non-fortification and neutralization of the Aland 
,, 113) Islands. ... 
There have been some agreements on the delimitation of 
continental shelf in which the existence of islands was 
thought to constitute an instance of special circumstances 
as between the parties with opposite coasts and special 
considerations were given for the median line to deviate in 
some parts. For example, in the Italian-Tunisian Agreement 
of 20 August 1971 relating to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, Article 1 lays down that the boundary of 
the continental shelf shall be the median line, taking into 
account islands, islets and low-tide elevations "with the 
exception of" four specific islands. Then Article 2 gives 
each of those islands an envelope of circles with a radius 
of 12 or 13 nautical miles, the circumference of which 
forms the boundary line around it. 
114) Such a treatment of 
islands is nothing other than the consideration of special 
circumstances in a given situation. 
6) "pursuant to equity" 
Reference to equity as the basis of decision is found 
in Article 25 of the France-China Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation of 24 October 1844: 
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"Lorsqu'un citoyen Frangais aura quelque sujet de 
plainte ou quelque r6clamation a formuler contre un 
Chinois, il devra d'abord exposer ses griefs au 
Consul, qui, apr()s avoir examin6 l'affaire, 
slefforcera de l1arranger amiablement. De m8me, quand 
un Chinois aura & se plaindre d1un Francais, le Consul 
6coutera sa. r6clamation avec int6r8t et cherchera A 
m6nager un arrangement amiable. Mais si, dans l'un ou 
l'autre cas, la chose 6tait impossible, le Consul 
requerra Passistance du fonctionnaire Chinois 
comp6tent, et tous deux, apres avoir examin6 
conjointement l'affaire, statueront suivant 
116quit6. , 115) 
Similarly, the Venezuela-Netherlands Treaty of 31 
March 1978 on the delimitation of the maritime boundary in 
two areas of the Caribbean Sea, in its Preamble, lays down 
that the aim of the agreement is to delimit common maritime 
areas justly and precisely on the basis of equity. 
116) 
"justice and equity" 
The United States-China Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
of 3 July 1844, Article 24, and the same parties' Treaty of 
Peace, Amity and Commerce of 18 June 1858, Article 28 have, 
in part, the following identical provisions: 
"And if controversies ari-c 
United States and subjects 
amicably settled otherwise, 
and decided conformably to 
public officers of the 
117) 
conjunction. " 
of ,e between citizens the 
of China, which cannot be 
the same shall be examined 
justice and equity by the 
two nations acting in 
If the "public officers of the two nations acting in 
conjunction" can be compared to a mixed arbitration 
commission, it is interesting to note that the arbitrator, 
as in the Convention of Peace of 28 January 
1854 between 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua, or the mixed arbitral tribunal, 
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as in the Treaty of Peace of 24 July 1923 between the 
Allied Powers and Turkey, were to decide in accordance with 
justice and equity, rather than legal principles, provided 
that they were dealing with the disputes which came under 
their jurisdiction. 118) 
"law and equity" 
The Treaty of Peace and Alliance of 10 July 1654 
between Cromwell and the King Jean IV of Portugal provides 
in its Article 25 for the settlement of outstanding claims 
"ex jure et aequo". 
119) 
In the more recent Convention between Hungary and 
Czechoslavakia regulating the running of Czechoslovak 
trains over the Hungarian section of the Cata-Lucenec line 
of 8 March 1923, Article 1 provices for the tribunal to 
decide according to law and equity: 
"Chacune des Parties contractantes a le droit, en 
cas de dissentiments surgissant 6ventuellement de 
llinterpr6tation ou de l1ex6cution de la pr6sente 
convention, de porter le diff6rend devant un tribunal 
arbitral. Ce tribunal devra d6cider selon les 
dispositions de la pre"sente convention et d'apres les 
I1 , 120) principes generaux de droit et d'equit6. 
9) "equity in the absence of law" 
The Bolivian-Peruvian Provision of 20 April 1886 for 
arbitrating disputes which might arise out of the execution 
of the boundary convention, after stating in its Preamble 
that "The most excellent Council of Ministers... desiring, 
moreover, to render due homage to the principles of justice 
and conciliation on which South American public law is 
based..., , 121) provides in its Article 4: 
"On doubtful, vague or disputed points, the 
commissioners, proceeding by common accord, shall 
determine the dividing line in accordance with the 
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titles of dominion, possession and use, authentic 
copies of which shall be produced for the purpose. 
In the absence of titles, the dividing line shall 
be determined according to equity and the mutual 
interest of the parties. . 
122) 
In the Yugoslav-Romanian Statute of the Mixed 
Commission for the iron gates of 30 November 1963, an 
integral part of the Agreement on the iron gates system of 
the same date, Article 3, paragraph 3 runs as follows: 
"The Board for the Settlement 
settle differences in accordance 
of the Agreement, Conventions and 
the Iron Gates System and, in 
provisions applicable to the 
accordance with equity (ex aequo 
10) "in an e, quitable manner" 
of Differences shall 
with the provisions 
Protocols concerning 
the absence of any 
specific case, in 
,, 123) at bono) . 
Iran's agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain 
and the United Arab Emirates concerning the delimitation of 
the continental shelf state, in their respective Preambles, 
that the parties are desirous of determining "in a just and 
accurate manner" and "in a just, equitable and precise 
manner" the boundary line between the respective areas of 
the continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights 
in accordance with international law. 
124) 
11) "amicable settlement" 
In some treaties between one or two of the Benelux 
countries and the other countries, amicable settlement is 
provided for with respect to the disputes which arise out 
of the interpretation or application thereof. Thus Article 
9 of the Agreement of 25 February 1965 between Belgium and 
Luxembourg on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other 
concerning the indemnification of Belgian and Luxembourgian 
interests in Bulgaria provides in part: 
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"Si un diff6rend au sujet de 1'execution du 
pr6sent Accord venait A se produire, les Gouvernements 
int6ress6s rechercheraient une solution A l'amiable au 
sein d1une Commission intergouvernementale.... , 125) 
The Netherlands agreements on economic and technical 
co-operation with Indonesia (7 July 1968), Sudan (22 August 
1970) and Thailand (6 June 1972) have an identically worded 
clause, which runs: 
"The tribunal shall base its decision on the 
provisions of the present Agreement in conformity with 
the principles of law. Before the tribunal gives its 
decision, it may at any stage of the proceedings 
propose to the parties that the dispute be settled 
amicably. The foregoing provisions shall not 
prejudice the power of the arbitral tribunal to decide 
the dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so 
agree. " 
126) 
Here the basis of decision is clearly law. The tribunal is 
nevertheless empowered to propose an amicable solution 
before it gives its decision. It may also decide ex aequo 
et bono, provided the parties agree to it. 
Much the same provisions, except for the ex aequo et 
bono decision, can be found in Article 11 of the Agreement 
of 30 April 1966 between Austria, Federal Republic of 
Germany and Switzerland regarding the withdrawal of water 
from Lake Constance: 
" (1) The arbitration commission shall endeavour, at 
every stage of the proceedings, to bring about an 
amicable settlement of the case. If it does not prove 
possible to achieve such a settlement, the commission 
shall adopt a decision by majority vote.... 
(2) The arbitration commission shall base its 
proposals for a settlement and its decision on: 
- The provisions of this Agreement; 
- Any relevant agreements of a general or special 
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nature in force between the riparian States; 
- The general principles of law. " 
127) 
Likewise the arbitral tribunal in the Netherlands-Federal 
Republic of Germany Treaty of 8 April 1960 concerning 
arrangements for co-operation in the Ems Estuary, Article 
52, paragraph 5,, may endeavour, by discussing with both 
Governments the dispute referred to it, to bring about an 
amicable settlement. The tribunal, however, must.. under 
Article 53, paragraph 1, base its decisions on the 
provisions of this Treaty and on the general rules of 
international law. 128) 
12) "on the basis of mutual interests" 
In the Qatar-Abu Dhabi Agreement of 20 March 1969 on 
the Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign 
Rights over Islands, the Preamble states in part: 
and desirous of* settling maritime boundary lines 
and sovereign rights over islands on the basis of 
their mutual interests, the Contracting Parties have 
agreed as follows: .. , 
129) 
This is a guiding principle for the negotiations in the 
Preamble, a part of the context in which the terms of the 
treaty must be interpreted, as laid down in Article 31, 
paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 23 May 1969.130) 
13) "reference of the claim to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration" 
In a number of treaties on the regulation of the 
liquor traffic concluded by the United States with some 
European countries in the mid-1920s, the dispute is to be 
submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
for 
settlement. For example, in the United States-Germany 
Convention respecting the Regulation of the Liquor Traf f ic 
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of 19 May 1924, Article 4 provides: 
If,, * , the claim shall be referred to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration .... The proceedings shall be 
regulated by so much of Chapter IV of the said 
Convention (= the Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1907) and of 
Chapter III thereof (special regard being had for 
Articles 70 and 74, but excepting Articles 53 and 54) 
as the Tribunal may consider to be applicable and to 
be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement 
. 131) 0*00 
It will suffice here to say that the settlement of disputes 
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the application of 
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1907, and especially of Chapter IV thereof,, 
implies the possibility of the basis of decision being "sur 
la base du respect du droit" as provided in Article 37 of 
the Convention. 
Provisions different in wording but to much the same 
effect can be seen in Article 4 of the China-Spain Treaty 
of Amity of 19 February 1953: 
11 ... If settlement cannot be attained through ordinary 
diplomatic channels such differences and disputes 
shall be referred to a commission of arbitration to be 
appointed according to the usual rules of 
international law, and if this commission fails in its 
purpose or no agreement can be reached as to its 
constitution, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
The Hague shall be qualified to solve such differences 
and disputes. , 
132) 
14) "application of the 
of 1928" 
Article 21 of the Siam-France Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation of 7 December 1937 provides for any 
rovisions of the General Act 
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future disputes which may not be settled diplomatically to 
be settled by the application of the 1928 General Act in 
these terms: 
"Conform6ment aux principes 6nonc6s dans le Pacte 
de la Societ6 des Nations, les Hautes Parties 
contractantes conviennent d'appliquer les dispositions 
de l'Acte g6neral pour le reglement pacifique des 
diff6rends internationaux, adopt6 le 26 septembre 1928 
par l'Assembl6e de la Societ6 des Nations, au 
r6glement des questions litigieuses qui surgiraient 
entre elles dans Pavenir et qui ne pouraient 8tre 
r6solu par la voie diplomatique. , 
133) 
It will suffice to recall that Article 28 of the General 
Act has a provision for the decision ex aequo et bono. 
15) "arbitration based on the principle of parity" 
In at least two treaties of commerce and navigation 
concluded by the Soviet Union in the mid-1940s, a clause is 
inserted for the settlement of disputes by means of 
arbitration. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 17 
August 1946 between Denmark and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics has such a clause in Article 14 which 
runs: 
"The settlement of any disputes which may arise in 
connection with contracts relating to commerce between 
the two Parties may be effected by means of 
arbitration. 
Each Contracting Party shall be prepared, at the 
request of the other Party, to enter into negotiations 
with a view to concluding an agreement regarding the 
best method of arbitration on uniform lines based on 
the principle of parity, and also regarding the method 
"134) 
of enforcing arbitration awards, 'Pee 
It is not clear what is meant by the phrase 
"the best 
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method of arbitration on uniform lines based on the 
principle of parity", but it could be inferred that what is 
intended thereby, and more specifically by "the principle 
of parity", would be something other than the positive 
legal rules and principles, which could, if partly, imply 
considerations of equity. 
16) "arbitration, rather than legal proceedi 
The Denmark-Sweden Agreement regarding Ferry-boat 
Communications between Elsinore and Helsingborg of 14 and 
26 January 1920 (to be more precise, between the General 
Directorate of Danish State Railways and the Royal Railway 
Administration) provides in paragraph 4: 
"In the unlikely event of any dispute arising with 
regard to the application of this Agreement and its 
proving impossible to reach an agreed settlement, such 
disputes shall be decided by arbitration, and may not 
11135) form the subject of legal proceedings. *00 
Here arbitration is distinguished from "legal proceedings", 
and may be understood as a dispute settlement procedure 
which employ extralegal and equitable considerations. 
17) "rules of 
eq ity" 
rocedure in accordance with justice and 
In the series of Treaties of Peace between the Allied 
and Associated Powers on the one hand and Germany, Austria, 
Bulgaria and Hungary respectively on the other hand, an 
identically worded clause is provided for the rules of 
procedures of the proposed Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on 
economic matters. Article 304 (Part X: Economic clauses; 
Section VI: Mixed Arbitral Tribunal) , Annex, paragraph 2, 
of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany of 28 June 1919 
reads: 
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"The Tribunal may adopt such rules of procedure as 
shall be in accordance with justice and equity and 
decide the order and time at which each party must 
conclude its arguments, and may arrange all 
formalities required for dealing with the 
evidence. , 
136) 
While it may not follow that the rules of procedure based 
on justice and equity lead directly to the substantive 
judgment based on justice and equity, the basis of 
substantive decision could not be clearly separated from 
the rules of procedure laid down in accordance with justice 
and equity. 
18) "rules of procedure of the Hague Convention" 
The rules of procedure as laid down in the Hague 
Convention of 1899 or 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes may be employed for arbitration 
under some treaties. For example, Article 4 of the Treaty 
between the Netherlands and Venezuela concerning the 
Re-establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 11 May 1920 
provides in part: 
"Should the High Contracting Parties be unable to 
agree as regards the rules for the arbitration 
procedure, the rules laid down in the Hague Convention 
of July 29th 1899, for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes shall be observed. , 
137) 
19) "rules of procedure to be decided by the tribunal" 
The rules of procedure are to be decided by the 
arbitral tribunal itself where there is no provision 
for 
the applicable law in some bilateral air transport 
agreements and other functional treaties. Thus 
the Air 
Transport Agreement of 31 August 1957 between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Uruguay, Article 13, paragraph 
3, 
provides: 
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"In the event of failure to reach an amicable 
settlement, the arbitral tribunal shall take its 
decision by majority vote. Unless otherwise agreed by 
the Contracting States, the arbitral tribunal shall 
determine its own rules of procedure and place of 
meeting. , 
138) 
Provisions to the same effect may be found in some 
functional bilateral agreements between States and 
international organizations such as the International 
Development Association., the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research. 139) 
20) "provisions of the European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration" 
In the French-Soviet Agreement concerning the Mutual 
Protection and Use of Industrial Property Rights of 19 May 
1970, Article 7 provides for the basis of decision in these 
terms: 
11 *9* Si la procedure de conciliation n'a pas ete mise 
en oeuvre ou si elle n1a pu aboutir au r6glement du 
litige, celui-ci est soumis a l1arbitrage conform6ment 
aux dispositions de la Convention europ6ene sur 
l1arbitrage commercial international, signee A Gen6ve 
le 21 avril 1961. , 
140) 
The relevant provisions of the said Convention may be found 
in Article 7, entitled Applicable Law: 
"1. The parties shall be free to determine, by 
agreement, the law to be applied by the arbitrators to 
the substance of the dispute. Failing any 
indication 
by the parties as to the applicable law, the 
arbitrators shall apply the proper 
law under the rule 
of conflict that the arbitrators 
deem applicable. In 
both cases the arbitrators shall take account of the 
- 85 - 
terms of the contract and trade usages. 
2. The arbitrators shall act as amiable 
Sompositeurs if the parties so decide and if they may 
do so under the law applicable to the 
arbitration. , 141) 
4. Special Agreements (Compromis) 
The special agreements which it is proposed here to 
analyze in the same way as the bilateral treaties in 
Section 3 above are the agreements or com romis to submit 
specific disputes to arbitration for settlement. As each 
dispute has its own peculiar circumstances, the special 
agreement for its submission to arbitration is more or less 
of a nature of being sui generis. Yet it seems possible to 
point out some identical or similar expressions prescribing 
the basis of decision in a certain category of clauses, and 
other phrases in other clauses. This seems especially true 
in special agreements on disputes involving claims for 
damages in one way or another. 
Thus it is proposed in this Section conveniently to 
divide special agreements into two groups: one is special 
agreements for arbitration of claims cases, and the other 
is those for arbitration of territorial and boundary 
disputes, the number of which is much smaller and which 
each has a stronger nature of being sui generis. 
(1) Special Agreements for Arbitration of Claims Cases 
1) "according to e 
A typical clause providing for equity as the basis of 
decision is Article 1 of the British-Spanish Convention of 
12 March 1823 for the settlement of British claims, which 
read in part: 
"A Mixed Commission, English and Spanish, 
consisting of two Members of each Nation, shall ... 
meet ... for the purpose of 
taking into consideration 
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and deciding in a summary manner, according to equity, 
upon all cases that shall be brought before it 
,. 142) 0000 
A variant of this formula is contained in an Ecuador- 
Italy Protocol of 28 March 1898 for the settlement of the 
claims of the Salesian priests. The protocol, after 
nominating two persons as the conciliatory arbitrators and 
amiables compositeurs in Article 1, provides in Article 2: 
"The arbitrators shall decide in accordance with 
the rules of equity and public conveniences, without 
being subject to laws nor judicial procedures. , 
143) 
2) Ifu on a basis of absolute e 
In ten "Protocols" of 1903 submitting to arbitration 
claims of the citizens of ten Euro-American States against 
Venezuela, the basis of decision was "absolute equity", 
with additional provisions which seem to strengthen it. 
Article 1 of the United States-Venezuela Protocol of 17 
February 1903, the earliest of the ten, runs in part as 
follows: 
11 ... Before assuming the functions of their office the 
Commissioners and the Umpire shall take solemn oath 
carefully to examine and impartially decide, according 
to justice and the provisions of this Convention, all 
claims submitted to them 
The Commissioners, or in case of their 
disagreement the Umpire, shall decide all claims upon 
a basis of absolute equity, without regard to 
objections of a technical nature, or of the provisions 
of local legislation. ... , 
144) 
"according to justice and equity" 
This formula, frequently found in compromis on claims 
cases, first appeared in the modern history of 
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international arbitration in the Jay Treaty of 1794. 
Article 61, which laid down that the outstanding debts of 
British subjects should be repaid by United States 
citizens, of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 
of 19 November 1794 between Great Britain and the United 
States provides in part: 
11 00 one of the Commissioners appointed ... do 
solemnly swear or affirm, that I will honestly, 
diligently, impartially and carefully examine, and to 
the best of my judgment,, according to justice and 
equity, decide all such complaints, as shall be 
preferred to the said Commissioners. ... 
The said Commissioners are empowered and 
required to take into their consideration all 
claims ... according to the merits of the several 
cases, due regard being had to all the circumstances 
thereof,, and as equity and justice shall appear to 
them to require. ... " 
145) 
It should be noted that in the second of the quoted 
paragraphs is the phrase "due regard being had to all the 
circumstances [of the several cases]",, in addition to 
"according to the merits of the several cases" and "equity 
and justice". 
A "justice and equity" formula with an interesting 
accompanying explanation appears in a few special 
agreements between Mexico and the Euro-American States for 
the settlement of claims of their nationals arising from 
the revolutionary acts of Mexico during the 1910s. Article 
2 of the Mexico-United States Convention for the Settlement 
of Claims of U. S. citizens Arising from Revolutionary Acts 
in Mexico from November 20,1910, to May 31,1920, signed 
in Mexico City on 10 September 1923,, provides in part in 
these terms: 
each member of the Commission, before entering 
upon his duties, shall make and subscribe a solemn 
declaration stating that he will carefully and 
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impartially examine and decide, according to the best 
of his judgment and in accordance with the principles 
of justice and equity, all claims presented for 
decision. 
... 
The Mexican Government desires that the claims 
shall be so decided because Mexico wishes that her 
responsibility shall not be fixed according to the 
generally accepted rules and principles of 
international law, but ex gratia feels morally bound 
to make full indemnification ... 0 , 
146) 
Article 6 further provides: 
"Since the Mexican Government desires to arrive at 
an equitable settlement of the claims of the citizens 
of the United States and to grant them a just and 
adequate compensation for their losses or damage, the 
Mexican Government agrees that the Commission shall 
not disallow or reject any claim by the application of 
the general principle of international law that the 
legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition 
precedent to the validity or allowance of any 
claim. , 
147) 
For unknown reasons the phrase "justice and equity" is 
replaced by "equity" in the French-Mexican and German- 
Mexican agreements, 
148) 
which otherwise have much the same 
wording with the above-mentioned in the relevant clauses. 
4) "carefully and impartially" 
This somewhat ambiguous expression could be 
interpreted as a guide for the basis of decision where 
there is no express provision for it. Thus in the British- 
Spanish Agreement of 4 March 1868 to refer to a Mixed 
Commission the claim of the British schooner Mermaid 
Article 2 reads in part: 
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The Commissioners ... before entering upon the 
execution of their duties shall make and subscribe a 
solemn declaration that they will carefully examine 
and impartially decide the question submitted to them 
,, 149) 0000 
The formula appeared as early as 1794 in the Jay Treaty, 
repeating itself in a number of subsequent special 
agreements concluded by Great Britain and the United States 
with the other European States. In so far as no other 
express basis of decision is provided than "careful" 
examination and "impartial" decision, the Commissioners 
would be empowered implicity to give equitable 
considerations to the claims of the parties. 
What may be understood as substantiating such 
discretion of the arbitral tribunal can be found in a 
clause in the Agreement of 27 August 1921 between Great 
Britain and Peru respecting the mineral property "La Brea y 
Pariflas". After giving the traditional formula of 
"carefully and impartially" in Article 4,150) the Agreement 
in Article 10 provides in part: 
In case the Tribunal should, before rendering its 
award, suggest terms of settlement which the two 
Governments may accept as satisfactory, or in case the 
two Governments should themselves agree upon terms of 
settlement, the Tribunal shall, in either case, 
incorporate such settlement in an Award, which shall 
11151) be treated as the Award of the Tribunal. .. 0 
The Tribunal's being empowered to suggest terms of 
settlement implies its wide discretion, something like that 
of an amiable compositeur. 
"equitable or just solution" 
In the Protocol which was adopted on 30 July 1858 in 
the 13th session of the Conference between Austria, 
France, 
Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey 
- 90 - 
concerning the organization of the Principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, the last paragraph provides: 
It M. 1e Pl6nipotentiaire de Russie appelle 
l'attention de la Conf6rence sur le conflit existant, 
dans les Principaut6s, touchant les biens des couvents 
d6di6s. Apr6s examin, la Conf6rence d6cide que, pour 
donner une solution 6quitable au diff6rend qui existe 
ce sujet entre les Gouvernements des Principaut6s et 
le Clerg6 grec, les parties int6ress6es seront 
invit6es a s'entendre entre elles au moyen d1un 
compromis; .. " 
152) 
The various expressions of "justly and equitably", "le plus 
juste", "equitable and just", "just decision", "in a just 
and equitable manner", and so forth may be grouped under 
the present heading. 
153) 
"Amicable settlement" could be thought a variant. it 
is provided in Article 8 of the Argentine-French Convention 
d'Indemnite of 21 August 1858 for the settlement of French 
claims arising from the Argentine civil war. 
154) Similar 
provisions are in the Argentine-British and Argentine 
Sardinian conventions for the settlement of British and 
Sardinian claims respectively 0 
155) 
As another variant could be considered "the judgment 
of the tribunal"r which appearst for example, in Article 5 
of the British-Portuguese Minute of instructions of 13 
November 1840 agreed upon between Viscount Palmerston and 
Baron Moncorvo for the guidance of the Members of the Mixed 
British and Portuguese Commission on the claims of British 
subjects who served in the Portuguese Army and Navy during 
the war for the liberation of Portugal. 
156) A similar 
provision can be found in Article 3 of the Special 
Convention of 4 February 1859 between the United States and 
Paraguay relative to the claims of the United States and 
Paraguay Navigation Company. 
157) 
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6) "amiable compositeur" 
The United States-Peru Convention of Claims of 20 
December 1862 provides in Article 1: 
"The two Contracting Parties agree in naming as 
arbiter, umpire and friendly arbitrator,, His Majesty 
the King of Belgium, conferring upon him the most 
ample power to decide and determine all the questions 
both of law and fact involved in the proceedings of 
the Government of Peru in the capture and confiscation 
of the ships Lizzie Thompson and Georgiana. , 
158) 
The "friendly arbitrator" or "amigable componedor" in the 
Spanish text, i. e. 
, 
amiable compositeur,, is thus granted 
"the most ample power to decide and determine all the 
questions both of law and fact", which describes the nature 
of the amiable compositeur. 
An interesting association of it with the power to 
decide ex aequo et bono is provided in the Chile-United 
States Convention of arbitration of 6 December 1873 
relative to the frigate Good Return and the Chile-France 
Protocol of 3 July 1897 for the submission to arbitration 
of claims of Frenchman Carlos Fr6raut. Article 1 of the 
former runs in part: 
"The Governments 
North America ... 
Levenhagen, Minister 
in Chile, so that he 
and amiable compos 
proceeding ex aequo 
.. 159) *000 
of Chile and the United States of 
nominate SeAor Don Carlos F. 
Residentiary of the German Empire 
may, as a conciliatory arbitrator 
iteur, decide with full powers, 
et bono, on the following points 
Article 1 of the Chile-France protocol has an 
identical 
wording for the relevant provision. 
160) 
The Treaty of Peace of 26 April 1898 between Costa 
Rica and the Republic of Central America 
has another 
interesting clause, which, although not employing 
the 
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expression amiable compositeur, in substance provides for 
it. Article 3 lays down that the Tribunal should decide 
"according to international law, as it may consider just 
and equitable", but Article 7 has another characterization 
of the Tribunal in these words: 
" The Judges of this Tribunal will try the 
questions submitted to them, and pass their verdict 
thereon, in the character not only of Arbitrators, but 
also as peacemakers, allowing that feeling of charity 
to enter into their counsels which should reign where 
vexatious incidents have occurred between brothers, 
and taking into account how greatly a prompt 
settlement,, dictated by friendship, will redound to 
the benefit of the mutual interests of Central America 
,, 161) 0000 
"ex aequo et bono" 
The formula seems to have first appeared in the 
compromis of the Macedonian claims case. The United 
States-Chile Convention of 10 November 1858 for the 
arbitration of Macedonian claims provides in its Preamble 
in these terms: 
of 0"0 Therefore the above-named ministers agree 
to name 
his Majesty the King of Belgium as arbiter, to decide 
with full powers and proceeding ex aequo et bono, on 
the following points .... , 
162) 
It is provided as an alternative, at least formally, 
to "law" in Article 3 of the Brazil-Peru Convention of 
arbitration of 12 July 1904 for the settlement of 
complaints of their citizens: 
11 e** the 
Tribunal should examine and resolve all 
claims, with the power to judge them according 
to law 
or ex aequo et bono. " 
163) 
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"according to_evidencell 
Article 1 of the United States-Mexico Convention of 11 
April 1839 for the settlement of the claims of American 
citizens provides: 
11 a9. The said Commissioners, so appointed, shall be 
sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said 
claims according to such evidence as shall be laid 
before them on the part of the United States and the 
Mexican Republic respectively. , 
164) 
Examination of evidence would involve considerations of 
equity, as well as those of law and fact. 
9) "taking into account all relevant matters" 
The equitable formula appears in Article 311 of the 
Treaty of Peace at Se"vres of 10 August 1920, which deals 
with the British intention to buy out a French railway 
company, a former concessionaire in Turkish territory, and 
to provide equitable compensation for it: 
if 0-0 The Tribunal shall 
take into account, from both 
the legal and equitable standpoints, all relevant 
matters, on the basis of the maintenance of the 
contract adapted as indicated in the following 
paragraph. ... , 
165) 
A variant phrase "the legitimate needs of the parties 
concerned" is provided in the clauses dealing with cessions 
concerning navigation of river systems in the Versailles 
Treaty of Peace of 28 June 1919. Article 339, for example, 
runs in part: 
" ... The number of 
the tugs and boats, and the amount 
of the material so ceded, and their 
distribution, 
shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators 
nominated by the United States of America, 
due regard 
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being had to the legitimate needs of the parties 
concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic 
during the five years preceding the war .... , 
166) 
10) "to the best of the arbitrator's judqment and according to lYw-w- 
In the United States-Spain Agreement of 12 February 
1871 for the settlement of certain claims of United States 
citizens arising from the insurrection in Cuba, Article 2 
combines the traditional solemn declaration on the part of 
the arbitrator and the legal basis of decision in these 
terms: 
"The arbitrators and umpire ... shall, before 
proceeding to business, make and subscribe a solemn 
declaration that they will impartially hear and 
determine, to the best of their judgment, and 
according to public law and the treaties in force 
between the two countries and these present 
stipulations, all such claims as shall, in conformity 
with this agreement, be laid before them .... , 
167) 
The Colombia-Ecuador Convention of 28 June 1884 for 
the arbitration of claims of citizens of the former against 
the Government of the latter, after providing for the 
traditional oath on the part of the arbitrators in Article 
it 168) stipulates in Article 3: 
"The commission of arbiters shall decide the 
claims on the merits of the evidence presented in 
accordance with the principles of international law 
and the legal precedents established by analogous 
modern tribunals of high authority, , 
169) 
Provisions to the same effect, though in a different 
wording, are in the Protocol of 18 August 1894 between 
Italy and Colombia for the arbitration of the Cerruti claim 
over the losses and damage to his property in Colombia 
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during the political troubles of 1885: 
if ". As soon as the arbitrator by his acceptance of 
the office shall have qualified himself to enter upon 
his functions, he shall become vested with full power, 
authority and jurisdiction to do and perform, and to 
cause to be done and performed all things without any 
limitation whatsoever, which in his judgment may be 
necessary or conducive to the attainment, in a fair 
and equitable manner; of the end and purposes which 
this agreement is intended to serve. 
And he shall thereupon proceed to examine and 
decide according to the documents and evidence that 
may be submitted to him and the principles of 
public law .... , 
170) 
"to the best of the arbitrator's judgment and 
according to justice, equity and law" 
Article 7 of the Jay Treaty, providing for the 
settlement of claims for damage arising from maritime 
captures, lays down that, after having taken an oath or 
affirmation that they will honestly, diligently, 
impartially and carefully examine, and to the best of their 
judgment, according to justice and equity, decide the 
complaints brought to them, 
" [the five Commissioners] 
question, according to 
cases, and to justice, 
nations. " 
171) 
shall decide the claims in 
the merits of the several 
equity and the laws of 
In the same Article the Commissioners are to "receive 
testimony, books, papers and evidence in the same latitude" 
as in Article 6 which deals with pecuniary claims, and 
"exercise the like discretion and powers respecting [the 
amount of the losses and damage]". 
172) It is interesting 
to note that the basis of decision in Article 
6 is "justice 
and equity", 
173) 
rather than "justice, equity and the 
laws 
of nations" as in Article 7.174) 
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12) "accordingto justice and in compliance with the 
provisions of this convention" 
In the United States-Ecuador Convention of 25 November 
1862 relative to the claims of citizens of the two 
countries, Article 1 provides in part: 
it 00* The Commissioners ... before proceeding to 
business shall make solemn oath that they will 
carefully examine and impartially decide according to 
justice, and in compliance with the provisions of this 
Convention, all claims that shall be submitted to them 
,, 175) 0000 
13) "according to law and/or equity" 
An Act of Congress, dated 2 March 1901" in 
implementation of Article 7 of the United States-Spain 
Treaty of Peace of 10 December 1898, provides in part for 
the basis of decision that the Commission should 
"adjudicate said claims according to the merits of the 
several cases, the principles of equity and of 
international law" . 
176 Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace 
stipulates that the parties relinquish their claims 
mutually which may have arisen since the insurrection in 
Cuba, and that the United States will adjudicate and settle 
the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in 
the Article. 
177) 
In a tripartite convention of 7 November 1899 between 
Great Britain,, Germany and the United States relating to 
the settlement of certain claims in Samoa by arbitration, 
Article I provides for the basis of decision in these 
terms: 
"All claims ... shall 
be decided by arbitration in 
conformity with the principles of international 
law or 
consi derations of equity. , 
178) 
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Domestic and international law and practice, together 
with equitable considerations, are provided in the special 
agreement on the Trail Smelter case. Article 4 of the 
Canada-United States Convention of 15 April 1935 regarding 
claims arising from the operation of the smelter at Trail, 
British Columbia runs as follows: 
"The Tribunal shall apply the law and practice 
followed in dealing with cognate questions in the 
United States of America as well as International Law 
and Practice, and shall give consideration to the 
desire of the High Contracting Parties to reach a 
solution just to all parties concerned. , 
179) 
Needless to say, "consideration to the desire of the High 
Contracting Parties to reach a solution just to all parties 
concerned" is an equitable one. The domestic practice in 
the United States followed in dealing with cognate 
questions could perhaps imply equitable considerations. 
14) "on the basis of respect for law" 
In the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement 
of Claims by the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 19 
January 1981, which was to enter into force with the 
notification of adherence by the parties, the "respect for 
law" formula was adopted. Article 5 provides: 
"The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis 
of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules 
and principles of commercial and international law as 
the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into 
account relevant usages of the trade, contract 
provisions and changed circumstances, " 
180) 
The Tribunal Rules of 3 May 1983, Article 33, paragraph 1. 
has the identical wording, while its paragraph 2 refers to 
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an ex aequo et bono decision: "The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide ex aequo et bono only if the arbitrating parties 
have expressly and in writing authorized it to do so. "181) 
15) "provisions of the Hague Convention" 
In the United States-Mexico Protocol of an agreement, 
dated 22 May 1902, for the adjustment by arbitration of 
certain contentions arising under what is known as "The 
Pious Fund of the Californias", preambular paragraph 3 
provides in part: 
11 &*. and the High Contracting Parties , animated by a 
strong desire that the dispute so arising may be 
amicably, satisfactorily, and justly settled, have 
agreed to submit said controversy to the determination 
of Arbitrators, who shall, unless otherwise herein 
expressed, be controlled by the provisions of the 
International Convention for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes, commonly known as the Hague 
Convention .... , 
182) 
Reference to the Hague Convention could imply that the 
basis of decision should be "sur la base du respect du 
droit", although it may be said to be a truism since the 
Arbitrators in this case are those of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration. 
16) "rules of procedure conforming_ to justice and 
equity" 
The Agreement of 12 June 1952 between some Allied 
Powers and Japan for the settlement of disputes arising 
under Article 15 (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, 
Article 5 provides for the manner in which the commission's 
rules of procedure should be adopted, rather than the basis 
of decision, in these words: 
"Each commission created under the Agreement shall 
determine its own procedure, adopting rules conforming 
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to justice and equity" 
183) 
Let it suffice here to say that the commission's power to 
determine its rules of procedure could imply its latitude, 
and consequently the possibility of equitable 
considerations. 
17) "rules of_ procedure of the Hague Convention" 
Article 7 of the French-Greek Compromis d'arbitrage of 
15 July 1931 for the settlement of the Lighthouses case 
runs in part in these terms: 
Pour le surplus, le tribunal se conformera aux 
r6gles de la proc6dure arbitrale ins6r6es au chapitre 
III du titre IV de la Convention pour le r6glement 
pacifique des conflits internationaux sign6e A La Haye 
de 18 octobre 1907. , 
184) 
This implies the possibility of the tribunal, following the 
rules of procedure of the Hague Convention, of giving 
equitable considerations in the merits of the case, as well 
as the matters of procedure. 
(2) Special Agreements for Arbitration of Territorial and 
Boundary Disputes 
1) "scrupulous and impartial decision" 
In the Island of Lamu case between Germany and Great 
Britain the Award dated 17 August 1889 shows in the 
following terms the arbitrator's basis of decision: 
"Nous baron Lambermont . .. ayant accepte 
les 
fonctions d'arbitrage ...; animg du 
dgsir sincere de 
r6pondre par une d6cision scrupuleuse et impartiale a 
la confiance que les deux gouvernements nous ont 
temoignges; .o 185) 
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The Anglo-American Convention of 24 January 1903 for 
the adjustment of the boundary between Canada and Alaska, 
Article 1 provides for the obligation of the members of the 
tribunal to subscribe an oath and thus lays down a similar 
basis of decision. 
186) 
But a further legal basis of 
decision is prescribed in Article 3, which runs in part: 
"It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that 
the Tribunal shall consider in the settlement of the 
questions submitted to its decision the Treaties 
respectively concluded between His Britannic Majesty 
and the Emperor of All the Russias .... 
The Tribunal shall also take into consideration 
any action of the several Governments,, or of their 
respective Representatives, preliminary or subsequent 
to the conclusion of said Treaties .... , 
187) 
2) "exchange of territory" 
In the Bulgaria-Servia Arrangement for the Renewal of 
Diplomatic Relations of 13/25 October 1886, a political 
give-and-take is provided in Article 1: 
"Le Gouvernement Princier de Bulgarie regrettant 
l'incident de Bregovo qui avait alt6r6 les relations 
d'amitie entre les deux Etats voisins, fera 6vacuer le 
terrain conteste" vis-a-vis de ce village, 
imm6diatement apres la signature du pr6sent Acte. Le 
terrain dont il slagit sera d6clar6 neutre jusqu'a la 
solution d6finitive de la question dite de Bregovo, 
par une Commission Serbo-Bulgare qui sera nomm6e 
a cet 
effet. Dans le cas otU l1endroit contest6 serait 
attribu6 par la Commission A la Serbie, 
le 
Gouvernement Royal consent en principe a le c6der a la 
Bulgarie en echange d1un terrain 6quivalent sur un 
autre point de la frontiere. " 
188) 
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"according to evidence" 
rticle 5 of the Jay Treaty of 1794, dealing with the 
dispute over what river was intended under the name of 
River St Croix in the Anglo-American Treaty of Peace of 
1783, does not give any other basis of decision than 
"according to evidence" and "impartially": 
11 00. the three Commissioners so appointed shall be 
Sworn impartially to examine and decide the said 
question according to such Evidence as shall 
respectively be laid before Them on the part of the 
British Government and of the United States, ... 1,189) 
Very much the same provisions are in Article 4 of the 
Great Britain-United States Treaty of Peace (or Treaty of 
Ghent) of 24 December 1814,190) and more recently in 
Article 3, paragraph (ii) , of the India-Pakistan Agreement 
of 30 June 1965 for the Rann of Kutch arbitration. 
191) 
4) "arbitrators of equity, acting ex aequo et bono" 
In the Bolvia-Paraguay Treaty of Peace, Amity and 
Boundaries of 21 July 1938, Article 2 provides in part: 
"La ligne frontiere dans le Chaco entre la Bolivie 
et le Paraguay ... sera determin6e par 
les Pr6sidents 
des R6publiques suivantes: Argentine., Br6sil, Chili, 
Etats-Unies d'Am6rique,, P6rou et Uruguay, en qualite 
d'arbitres selon 116quit6, lequels, agissant ex aequo 
et bono,, formuleront leur d6cision arbitrale 
conformement a la pr6sente clause et aux clauses 
ci-apres: ... " 
192) 
Article 3 further provides: 
"Les arbitres se prononceront apres avoir entendu 
les Parties et en toute conscience, compte tenu de 
llexp6rience acquise par la Conference de la Paix et 
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des avis formule"s par les assesseurs militaires de 
ladite conf6rence. ... , 
193) 
"equitable solution" 
Article 4 of the Persia-Turkey Treaty of delimitation 
of 31/19 May 1847 provides for the basis of decision in 
these words: 
"Il est respectivement d6cide que des Commissaires 
seront. imm6diatement nomm6s de part et d'autre, pour 
juger et, regler d'une maniere 6quitable les questions 
des dommages essuy6s des deux c6t6s depuis 
Vacceptation des propositions amicales trac6s et 
communiquees par les deux grandes Puissances 
mediatrices au, mois de Dj6maziy-ul-Evvel, 1261; ainsi 
que celles des droits de paturages depuis llannee otl 
leur paiement a 6te arridr6. , 
194) 
A "just and expedient" decision is provided for in 
Article 5 of the Honduras-Salvador Preliminary convention 
of 18 December 1880 for the arbitration of questions 
concerning the ownership of frontier lands and towns: 
"If the documentary proof should be insufficient 
on any point, or if doubts should arise as to its 
applicability to the decision of the boundary dispute 
between the contracting parties, the arbiter may 
determine the doubtful points in the manner which he 
may judge most just and expedient, giving 
consideration to the special needs of the respective 
peoples, and especially to matters which may reconcile 
in a satisfactory manner their adverse claims, so as 
to secure, by means of a compromise, their 
acquiescence and satisfaction. " 
195) 
In the Bolivia-Peru Treaty of arbitration of 30 
December 1902 for the settlement of the boundary questions, 
the basis of decision is the law but equitable decision may 
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be sought when the law does not define the right of 
possession to a territory in a clear manner. Article 3 
runs as follows: 
"For the purposes of his award, the Arbitrator 
shall act in conformity with the laws in the 
Collection of Statutes of the Indies, Royal Letters 
Patent and Orders, Ordinances of the Provincial 
Governors, diplomatic instruments relating to the 
demarcation of the frontiers, official maps and 
descriptions, and generally, with such documents of 
official character as may have been issued, so as to 
give the true interpretation to and carry out the 
royal dispositions in question. , 
196) 
And Article 4 reads: 
"Wherever the royal enactments or dispositions do 
not define the right of possession to a territory in a 
clear manner, the Arbitrator shall decide the question 
equitably, keeping as far as possible to their meaning 
and to the spirit which inspired them. , 
197) 
Similarly the relevant treaties, which is the basis of 
decision, may be put aside for an equitable solution in the 
Colombia-Ecuador Convention of 5 June 1907, which 
supplements the Treaty of 5 November 1904. In Article 10 
the Convention provides: 
"The arbiters shall determine the dividing line in 
accordance with existing treaties and the 
modifications established by the present convention; 
but they may, leaving to one side strict law, adopt an 
equitable line in accordance with the necessities and 
convenience of the two countries. , 
198) 
6) "according to justice and equity" 
"Justice and equity" is provided for as the basis of 
decision,, along with "impartially, carefully and to the 
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best of the arbitrator's judgment", in Article 1 of the 
Anglo-American Treaty of 5 June 1854 relating to fisheries, 
commerce and navigation, which deals with the prevention or 
settlement of any disputes as to the places reserved for 
British and American fishermen respectively: 
The said Commissioners, before proceeding to any 
business, shall make and subscribe a solemn 
declaration that they will impartially and carefully 
examine and decide, to the best of their judgment, and 
according to justice and equity, without fear, favour, 
or affection to their own country, upon all such 
places as are intended to be reserved and excluded 
from the common liberty of fishing under this and the 
next succeeding article .... 11199) 
7) "according to law and justice or ecplity" 
In the Honduras-Salvador Convention of boundaries of 
19 January 1895, Article 2, paragraph 4, provides for the 
basis of decision of the mixed commission in these words: 
"The Mixed Commission, to fix the boundaries, will 
pay attention to the territory control plainly proven. 
The possession shall only be valued as it is just, 
legitimate and adequate, in accordance with the 
general principles of law and with the rules of 
justice which the Law of Nations has sanctioned on 
this particular matter. " 
200) 
The Great Britain-Venezuela Treaty of 2 February 1897 
respecting the settlement of the boundary between British 
Guiana and Venezuela has more specific nRules" for the 
basis of decision. Thus Article 4 runs in part: 
11 In deciding the matters submittedr the 
Arbitrators ... shall be governed 
by the following 
Rules, which are agreed upon by the High Contracting 
Parties as Rules to be taken as applicable to the 
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case, and by such principles of international law not 
inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall 
determine to be applicable to the case: 
Rules ... 
(c) In determining the boundary-line, if territory 
of one Party be found by the Tribunal to have 
been at the date of this Treaty in the 
occupation of the subjects or citizens of the 
other Party,, such effect shall be given to 
such occupation as reason, justice, the 
principles of international law, and the 
equities of the case shall, in the opinion of 
the Tribunal, require. , 
201) 
Not only law and equity are expressly referred to but 
also the relevant circumstances of fact are detailed in 
Article 4 of the special agreement of 30 July 1954 between 
Great Britain on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and His 
Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur on the one hand and 
Saudi Arabia on the other: 
of 
*"* the Tribunal shall have due regard to all 
relevant considerations of law, fact and equity 
brought to its attention by the Parties .... In 
particular, but without being limited thereto [the 
Tribunal is instructed to] take into account the 
following factors in so far as it deems them relevant: 
(a) Historical facts relating to the rights of His 
Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and his forefathers 
and the rights of the other Rulers concerned and their 
forefathers; 
(b) The traditional loyalties of the inhabitants 
of the area concerned; 
(c) The tribal organization and the way of life of 
the tribes inhabiting the area concerned; 
(d) The exercise of jurisdiction and other 
activities in the area concerned; 
(e) Any other considerations brought to its 
attention by either Party. , 
202) 
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8) "provisions of the Hague Convention" 
In the Great Britain-United States Special Agreement 
of 27 January 1909 for the submission to arbitration of 
questions relating to fisheries on the North Atlantic Coast 
at a Tribunal to be chosen from the general list of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Article 5 
naturally refers to the "provisions of the Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 18 
October 1907, excepting Articles 53 and 54" for the basis 
of decision. 
203) 
Likewise the French-Spanish Treaty of 27 November 1912 
regarding relations in Morocco, Article 27 refers to the 
Hague Convention as follows: 
"La Convention du 26 f6vrier, 1904, renouvelee le 
3 f6vrier, 1909, ainsi que la Convention g6n6rale de 
La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, slappliqueront aux 
diff6rends qui viendraient a sl6lever entre les 
parties contractantes au sujet de llinterpr6tation et 
de llapplication des dispositions de la pr6sente 
Convention et qui nlauraient pas 6t6 regle"es par la 
voie diplomatique; un compromis devra 8tre dresse" et 
il sera proced6 suivant les rogles des mgmes 
Conventions en tant qulil nly serait pas d6roge par un 
accord expr6s au moment du litige. " 
204) 
A technical commlsslon for demarcation, however, is 
empowered under Article 4 to take account of some relevant 
circumstances in its work: 
"Une commission technique, dont les membres seront 
d6sign6s en nombre 6gal par les Gouvernements frangais 
et espagnol, f ixera le trace' exact des delimitations 
sp6cifiees aux articles pr6c6dents. Dans son travail, 
la Commission pourra tenir compte non seulement des 
accidents topographiques, mais encore des contingences 
locales. ... " 
205) 
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9) "taking into account the relevant circumstances" 
Article 3 of the Nassau-Prussia Treaty of Vienna of 31 
May 1815, providing f or the cession of territory, 
stipulates the basis of decision of the Commissioners in 
these terms: 
It &a. Les Commissaires se conformeront au principe de 
la contigul*'t6 de ces Portions avec les Territoires 
respectifs, et auront un soin particulier pour que les 
rapports communaux, eccl6siastiques et industriels 
actuellement existants, soient maintenus; ... , 
206) 
In a like manner Article 3 of the Great Britain-Russia 
Protocol of 10 September 1885 relative to the Afghan 
frontier provides that the Commissioners, in tracing the 
frontier, "tiendront diftment compte des Localit6s et des 
n6cessit6s et du bien-8tre des populations locales. , 
207) 
The Latvia-Lithuania Convention of 28 September 1920 
providing for the settlement of frontier questions by a 
Mixed Commission of Arbitration and the Estonia-Latvia 
Convention of 22 March 1920 entrusting the final 
determination of the frontier to the arbitration of a Joint 
Commission have much the same provisions in the way of 
referring to the relevant circumstances. Article 3 of the 
former runs in part as follows: 
"En prenant sa resolution, la Commission doit 
tenir compte des principes ethnographiques, 
historiques, des inter6ts politiques et des inter8ts 
d'Etat de chaque pays (militaires, strat6giques, 
6conomiques et de communications), de m8me que des 
int6rAts de la population locale. ... " 
208) 
In a most recent Special Agreement of 10 June 1977 
between Libya and Tunisia for the Submission of the 
Question of the Continental Shelf between the Two Countries 
to the International Court of Justice, Article 1 defines 
the request for the Court in the following terms: 
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"The Court is requested to render its Judgment in 
the following matter: 
What are the principles and rules of 
international law which may be applied for the 
delimitation of the area of the continental shelf 
appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia and the 
area of the continental shelf appertaining to the 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and, in 
rendering its decision, to take account of 
equitable principles and the relevant 
circumstances which characterize the area, as well 
as the recent trends admitted at the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, ... , 
209) 
Regard to actual conditions and international law was 
mentioned in the Norway-Sweden compromis of 14 March 1908 
for the arbitration of the Grisbadarna case. Article 3 
runs: 
"The Court of Arbitration shall have power to 
determine how far the boundary line shall be 
considered to be, either wholly or in part, determined 
by the Boundary Treaty of 1661, together with the 
charts appertaining to the same, and how such boundary 
line is to be drawn, and also,, in so far as the 
boundary line can be considered as undetermined by the 
Treaty and chart in question, shall have power to 
determine the same, having regard to actual conditions 
and the principles of international law. 11210) 
10) "in view of the reasons and documents produced" 
The Argentina-Brazil Treaty of Arbitration of 7 
September 1889, Article 5 provides: 
"The frontier is to be formed by the rivers which 
Brazil or the Argentine Republic has designated, and 
the arbitrator shall be requested to decide in favour 
of one of the parties as shall seem to him just in 
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view of the reasons and documents which they shall 
have produced. , 
211) 
11) flaccordingto equitable principles" 
In the Special Agreement between 
submitting their dispute over the 
delimitation to the International Court 
on 10 June 1977, specific reference was 
principles" as the basis of decision. 
English translation of the original Ari 
by Libya, runs in part: 
Tunisia and Libya 
continental shelf 
of Justice, signed 
made to "equitable 
Article 1, in the 
abic text, supplied 
11 
&*. the Court shall take its decision according to 
equitable principles, and the relevant circumstances 
which characterize the area, as well as the new 
accepted trends in the Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. , 
212) 
The mention of "equitable principles" and the "relevant 
circumstances" has no doubt drawn upon the judgment of the 
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969.213) 
If this is a specification, as it ought to be, of the 
provisions of Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Court's 
Statute, it is an interesting instance of specification. 
The above provision is further noteworthy in that it 
mentions "the new accepted trends in the Third Conference 
on the Law of the Sea", which can be a dangerous departure 
from the application of the law. 
***** 
In the provisions analyzed above in the special 
agreements concerning territorial and boundary disputes, 
what may be of interest to note is that none refers to the 
arbitrator's or the tribunal's power to decide his or its 
rules of procedure. 
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Conclusions 
The foregoing analysis has shown that arbitration 
treaties and clauses contain a wide variety of expressions 
for an equitable basis of decision. From it may be drawn a 
set of conclusions, but it would be well, before proceeding 
to conclusions, to remember that the clauses collected and 
analysed above do not include those which have a legal 
basis of decision only, and that the collected clauses 
cannot claim by any means to be an exhaustive list of 
equity clauses. They are clauses containing an equitable 
basis of decision, or else an equitable basis of decision 
along with a legal one. Bearing this in mind, these 
conclusions follow by way of a summary. 
Multilateral arbitration treaties of a general nature, 
such as the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, have provided 
models for subsequent arbitration treaties and clauses. 
The Hague Convention's formula of "sur la base du respect 
du droit" has been adopted in treaties of the Benelux 
countries, and indeed alluded to in every category of 
treaty. The "ex aequo et bono" formula with the consent of 
the parties under Article 38, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
has been extensively used, especially in bilateral general 
arbitration treaties, often with a variety of 
qualifications. The General Act's "ex aequo et bono" 
formula I silent on the consent of the parties,. ) has 
been 
employed much less than the Hague Convention and the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
Of the restricted multilateral treaties, the regional 
arbitration treaties have adopted the formulas of the 
earlier general multilateral arbitration treaties with or 
without modifications in their wording. The only exception 
is the Convention Establishing the Central American Court 
of Justice of 20 December 1907, which did not follow the 
Hague Convension's formula but provided for the Court's 
"free judgment" with respect to the decision of points of 
- ill - 
facts and "principles of internatiqnal law" with respect to 
points of law. 
The multilateral functional treaties have arbitration 
clauses providing for equitable bases of decision which are 
not necessarily copies of the formulas of the earlier 
multilateral general arbitration treaties. 
In the three multilateral treaties for the settlement 
of commercial or civil law disputes, arbitration treaties 
of a specialized category,, the two of Western countries 
provide for a legal basis of decision with an alternative 
basis of "amiable compositeur" or "ex aequo et bono", 
whereas the third of East European countries seems to tend 
towards equity for a basis of decision. 
There are a few points to make with respect to 
bilateral general arbitration treaties. First, in these 
treaties there are not many clauses providing for a basis 
of decision in terms of only equity or equitable 
considerations in contradistinction to law. For example, 
the ex aequo et bono formula is more often than not 
qualified by some additional phrases referring to law. 
Secondly, the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (or 
more recently the International Court of Justice) and the 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, and especially the first two, are either employed 
or alluded to in many clauses of treaties of this category. 
Thirdly, despite frequent reference to the Hague 
Convention, no clause in these treaties expressly provides 
for recourse to it for the tribunal's rules of procedure or 
for the tribunal itself to decide its rules of procedure. 
Fourthly, "equitably", "in a friendly manner" and the like 
expressions are not included in these treaties as in 
bilateral functional treaties and compromis. But the 
formula of amiable compositeur is provided in some 
bilateral general arbitration treaties, and could perhaps 
produce much the same effect as those mentioned phrases 
do. 
Clauses of the bilateral treaties of a functional 
nature raise a few points of note. The first is that the 
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ex ae uo et bono formula is rarely used in these treaties, 
as compared with bilateral general arbitration treaties. 
Secondly, the "consideration of relevant or special 
circumstances" formula is included in some of these 
treaties, while it does not appear in the general 
arbitration treaties. Perhaps this would imply that while 
general arbitration treaties are intended for unspecified 
disputes which may arise between the parties, functional 
treaties have their respective specified subject-matters 
which correspondingly restrict disputes that may arise 
within certain limits. It would be for this reason that 
the "relevant or special circumstances" of the dispute can 
be taken into account in its settlement. Providing for 
such consideration simply does not make sense in general 
arbitration treaties. Thirdly, some clauses in these 
treaties have provisions for the tribunal to decide its 
rules of procedure "in accordance with justice and equity" 
or by itself or observe the rules of procedure of the Hague 
Convention. Although this is admittedly a procedural 
aspect of dispute settlement,, equitable considerations in 
it could lead on to like considerations in the tribunal's 
deliberation on the merits of the case before it. 
No marked differences seem to exist between general 
arbitration and functional treaties on the one hand and 
special agreements on the other in so far as expressions of 
the basis of decision are concerned. It would be 
nevertheless worth pointing out that special agreements or 
compromis have more particularized expressions for the 
basis of decision than general arbitration treaties or 
functional treaties, since they are drawn up for the very 
purpose of setting disputes which have arisen under certain 
specific circumstances. Thus Articles 5,6 and 7 of the 
Jay Treaty had "according to evidence", "according to 
justice and equity" and "according to the merits of the 
several cases and to justice, equity and the 
law of 
nations" for the basis of decision to suit the respective 
categories of territorial, damages and maritime seizure 
cases. 
In the compromis for claims cases there are just a 
few 
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clauses providing that "all relevant matters" should be 
taken into account in the decision by the tribunal. In one 
such clause, Article 6 of the Jay Treaty where the 
"Commissioners" were to decide 
, 
on claims for damages, the 
"justice and equity" formula was accompanied by a phrase 
"according to the merits of the several cases, due regard 
being had to all the circumstances thereof". Another such 
clause, Article 4 of the Canadian-United States compromis 
for the Trail Smelter case,, stipulates that the tribunal 
should, in the application of the American and 
international law and practice followed in cognate 
questions, "give consideration to the desire of the High 
Contracting Parties to reach a solution just to all parties 
concerned. " Secondlyý noticeable is an "absolute equity" 
formula. In the series of ten compromis of 1903 between 
Venezuela and the ten Euro-American States to recover the 
losses incurred during the post-independence civil war in 
Venezuela, a clause was inserted providing for the basis of 
decision in terms of "absolute equity" to the exclusion of 
legal considerations. Likewise in the series of Mexican 
compromis with the six Euro-American States to settle by 
arbitration claims for damages arising out of the 
revolution in Mexico, a "justice and equity" or "equity" 
basis of decision was laid down to the exclusion of legal 
remedies. Thirdly, there are some clauses providing for 
the rules of procedure of the tribunal to be decided 
according to justice and equity or to the Hague Convention. 
By contrast, compromis on territorial and boundary 
cases have no such clause laying down that the tribunal's 
rules of procedure should be decided according to any 
standards or principles. A second point to make is that 
there is not a wide variety of general verbal expressions, 
like "justice and equity", in the clauses of the basis of 
decision. Perhaps the most noticeable is the comparatively 
large number of "equitable solutions" or its equivalent, 
followed by "consideration of the special or relevant 
circumstances" and "law and equity" in their particularized 
wordings. The more individualized or particularized 
the 
given expressions are to suit the peculiarities of 
the 
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case, the more specific, although limited, guide the 
arbitrator or tribunal has in deciding the case. The 
"needs". "conveniences" and "interests" of the population 
or area concerned are examples. 
As has been seen above, the basis of decision in 
certain verbal expressions provided in compromis does not 
seem to be essentially different from that in general 
arbitration treaties or functional treaties. What is 
important is how a given basis of decision is applied. 
This must be verified by an analysis of arbitral awards in 
which the tribunal's mode of application of an equitable 
basis of decision may be seen. For the purpose of 
verification, analysis could conveniently be made of 
arbitral awards of territorial and boundary cases. This 
convenient choice of territorial and boundary disputes 
arbitrations is due primarily to the gravity of those 
arbitrations as compared with claims cases where normally 
the interests of the individual are concerned. Its 
justification may also be found in the comparatively small 
number of territorial and boundary arbitrations, when 
compared with the literally innumerable arbitrations of 
claims for damages. 
- 115 - 
Chapter III 
Arbitrations of Territorial and Boundary Disputes 
In this Chapter it is proposed to see how the 
equitable basis of decision provided in a special agreement 
(compromis) is applied in the arbitration of a particular 
case. It is also proposed to examine how some cases are 
decided in an 6quitable manner although their compromis lay 
down a legal basis of decision. This examination includes 
not only arbitrations of territorial and boundary disputes 
but those of cases involving territorial jurisdiction in 
one way or another. In view of their theoretical, as well 
as practical, importancer some recent cases of maritime 
boundary delimitation and jurisdiction are also taken up 
for analysis. The inclusion of these cases should be 
justified in the light of a finding of the International 
Court of Justice in its judgment in the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case (jurisdiction of the Court) of 1978: 
"Whether it is a land frontier or a line in the 
continental shelf that is in, question, the process is 
essentially the same, and inevitably involves the same 
element of stability and permanence, 
The present Chapter is divided into three main 
Sections. In the first two Sections equitable 
considerations are analyzed with respect to, 
first, 
procedural matters, and secondly, substantive matters. 
An 
attempt will be made in the third Section to summarize 
the 
main points of such considerations. 
EmUtable Considerations in Procedural Matters 
; L- 
Some tribunals have shown considerations of an 
equitable nature, which have no express 
basis in the 
compromis, before proceeding to decide on 
the merits of the 
case. While they only relate to the procedural 
aspect, 
they in fact have some impact on the subsequent 
findings of 
- 116 - 
the tribunal on questions of substance. Logically it is 
small wonder that this should be so; it would be illogical 
that the tribunal's reasoning should have a gap between 
matters of procedure and substance. 
Tribunal's liberty of accepting and collecting 
evij-e-nce 
In the Island of Palmas case of 1928, a case before 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the sole arbitrator Max 
Huber) states that in the proceedings falling within the 
scope of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 1907, the provisions of the 
Convention should serve as subsidiary law at least to 
construe the compromis. Thus he holds: 
"This liberty of accepting and collecting evidence 
guarantees to the tribunal the possibility of basing 
its decisions on the whole of the facts which are 
relevant to its opinion. , 
2) 
He makes a further point on his latitude to appreciate 
the pleadings: 
"The authorization given to the Arbitrator by Article 
III of the Special Agreement to apply to the Parties 
for further written Explanations would be 
extraordinarily limited if such explanations could not 
extend to any allegations already made and could not 
consist of evidence which included documents and maps. 
soo It is for the Arbitrator 
to decide both whether 
allegations do or--as being within the knowledge of 
the tribunal--do not need evidence in support and 
whether the evidence produced is sufficient or not; 
and finally whether points left aside by the Parties 
ought to be elucidated. This liberty is essential to 
him, for he must be able to satisfy himself on those 
points which are necessary to the legal construction 
upon which he feels bound to base his judgment. He 
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must consider the totality of the allegations and 
evidence laid before him by the Parties, either motu 
roprio or at his request and decide what allegations 
are to be considered as sufficiently substantiated. , 3) 
That is the way the arbitrator identifies his discretion to 
deal with the pleadings. His two preliminary points of the 
"liberty of accepting and collecting evidence" and the need 
to "consider the totality of the allegations and evidence 
laid before him" would seem to suggest that he is willing 
to evaluate the claims and supporting evidence of the 
parties in as comprehensive a manner as possible. In this 
sense such equitable considerations for procedural matters 
could presumably, if not necessarily, lead on to similar 
considerations with respect to the merits of the case. 
Similarly, the tribunal's latitude to choose a third 
line is clarified before it proceeds to discuss the merits 
of the case in the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of 
Kutch) case of 1968. Although it is not identified by the 
tribunal itself but by the parties subsequently to the 
compromis of 1965, the extended powers of the tribunal 
would have provided it with wider discretion. The Award 
states in its introduction: 
"Both Parties agree that, should the Tribunal f ind 
that the evidence establishes that the disputed 
boundary between India and Pakistan lies along a line 
different from the claim lines of either Party, the 
Tribunal is free to declare such a line to be the 
boundary. " 4) 
The authorization of the tribunal to act with such extended 
powers would be in line with the identification of the 
applicable law of this arbitration. For, when the question 
arose during the meetings of the tribunal in February, 
1966 
as to whether the compromis conferred on the tribunal 
the 
power to decide the case ex aequo et bono, 
it decided that 
it had no such power as the parties had not 
by any 
subsequent agreement consented thereto, 
but it decided on 
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the other hand that "equity forms part of International 
Law; therefore, the Parties are free to present and develop 
their cases with reliance on principles of equity, , 
5) 
The Fisheries Jurisdiction case (merits) of 1974 is 
still another case in which a liberal interpretation was 
made of the competence of the International Court of 
Justice to ascertain the law applicable and consider the 
dispute in all its aspects. Thinking it its duty, rather 
than that of the parties, to ascertain and apply the 
relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, "the 
Court has had cognizance not only of the legal arguments 
submitted to it by the Applicant but also of those 
contained in various communications addressed to it by the 
Government of Iceland, and in documents presented to the 
Court. " It was also assisted by the oral and written 
answers given by the Applicant in reply to the questions 
asked by the members of the Court during the oral 
proceedings and thereafter. 
6) The Court further stressed 
the need to see the case in a broad perspective and take 
account of "all relevant elements": 
"Furthermore, the dispute before the Court must be 
considered in all its aspects. Even if the Court's 
competence were understood to be confined to the 
question of the conformity of Iceland's extension with 
the rules of international law, it would still be 
necessary for the Court to determine in that context 
the role and function which those rules reserve to the 
concept of preferential rights and that of 
conservation of fish stocks. Thus, whatever 
conclusion the Court may reach in regard to 
preferential rights and conservation measures, it is 
bound to examine these questions with respect to this 
case. Consequently, the suggested restriction on the 
Court's competence not only cannot be read into the 
terms of the compromissory clause, but would unduly 
encroach upon the power of the Court to take 
into 
consideration all relevant elements in administering 
justice between the Parties. , 
7) 
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Those considerations of a preliminary nature are to lead on 
to some equitable considerations on the substantive 
matters, as we shall see later. 
(2) Acceptance of additional documents during the 
preliminary phase 
In the Argentine-Chile Frontier case of 1966, the 
President of the Court of Arbitration gave an equitable 
warning to Argentina on what would otherwise have turned 
out an unfavourable position of her. In his Note of 15 
December 1965 the President of the Court stated as follows: 
"The Court notes that every extensive information on 
land use, which is essential to complete the 
geographical picture, has been received from Chile but 
little such information has been received from the 
Argentine Republic. [Wlill the Agent for the 
Government of the Argentine Republic suggest ways of 
overcoming this difficulty? "8) 
At the occasion of the preliminary oral hearings, which 
took place between 29 and 31 December 1965, the Agent for 
Argentina explained that 
"in his Government's view acts of the Parties on the 
ground were legally irrelevant to the determination of 
the question submitted to the Court by the Compromiso. 
Notwithstanding this reservation he suggested that his 
Government be allowed to file with the Court, on or 
before 14 January 1966, a Memorandum on Land Use. "9) 
After considering the matter, 
"the Court authorized both Parties to submit, not 
later than noon on 14 January 1966, supplementary 
memoranda containing such further information relating 
to land use, settlement and circulation of local trade 
as they might desire. The Court declared 
that it was 
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understood that the deposit of this information should 
be without prejudice to the question of its legal 
relevance, which question the Parties might deal with 
in the Counter-Memorials. "10) 
As a result of this advice, the Argentine Government filed 
on 14 January 1966 a "Memorandum on Land Use, Settlement 
and Circulation of Local Trade". 
") 
That the advice of the 
President of the Court was an equitable consideration of a 
procedural nature was in a sense confirmed by the Court 
itself, when it stated later in the Award: 
"Although the Court--for reasons which will be 
explained below--shares Argentina's view that the 
reference to interpretation and fulfilment in the 
Compromiso is intended to mean interpretation and 
fulfilment by the Court rather than by the Parties, 
the Court has not taken the view that 'the fulfilment 
material' submitted by either side ought to be 
excluded as completely irrelevant. This is because, 
in the Court's opinion, such evidence is relevant to 
the question of settlement--whether for instance what 
was settled in 1902-03 has since become unsettled or 
has settled in a different way, and whether too 'the 
fulfilment material' throws any light on the question 
whether what was left unsettled in 1902-03 has since 
become settled. , 
12) 
A similar equitable consideration of a procedural 
nature may be found in the arbitration of 14 February 1985 
between Guinea and Guinea Bissau on the maritime boundary 
delimitation. The question arose in connection with the 
tribunal's examination of the travaux preparatoires of a 
relevant boundary treaty between France and Portugal, the 
former colonial powers of the parties. 
By their compromis of 18 February 1983 the parties 
requested the tribunal to decide on three questions the 
second of which ran: 
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"Quelle valeur juridique peut-on attribuer aux 
protocoles et documents annexes de la convention de 
1886 pour llinterpretation de ladite convention? " 13) 
This is supplementary to the first request as to whether 
the 1886 convention on the land boundary determines the 
maritime boundary as well. The award states: 
"Comme il est indique au paragraphe 39 ci-dessus, 
les travaux pr6paratoires de la convention de 1886 
consistent essentiellement en protocoles nume"rote"s de 
1a 12 et assortis d'annexes diverses qui contiennent 
le proces-verbal des r6unions franco-portugaises 
tenues a Paris du 22 octobre 1885 au 12 mai 1886. On 
peut utilement y ajouter les notes et d6peches 
diplomatiques annex6es par les Parties 'a leurs 
m6moires et, bien que cela ne fasse pas partie stricto 
sensu. des travaux pr6paratoires, les documents qui ont 
et6 fournis llann6e suivante aux Parlements frangais 
et portugais en vue de la ratification de la 
convention et qui ont 6t6 remis par les Parties au 
Tribunal sur sa demande. , 
14) (Emphasis added) 
At its first meeting the tribunal - had decided to use the 
same rules of procedure as those of the Rules of Court of 
the International Court of Justice, particularly Articles 
30-31,49-50,52,54,56-58,60-68,71-72,94-95 and 98 
mutatis mutandis. 
15) Indeed the above-mentioned course of 
action coincides with the provisions of Article 56, 
paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. For Article 56 
provides: 
"1. After the closure of the written proceedings, 
no further documents may be submitted to the Court by 
either party except with the consent of the other 
party or as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
2. In the absence of consent, the Court, after 
hearing the parties, may, if it considers the 
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document necessary, authorize its production. 11 
It is not quite clear whether the tribunal requested the 
parties to submit supplementary documents after the closure 
of the written proceedings, but the request for such 
documents would have been made for the same purpose as 
provided in Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court. 
At any rate what the tribunal did, could be understood 
as showing the willingness of the tribunal to ensure a most 
appropriate interpretation of the relevant boundary treaty. 
This may be seen in the manner in which the document 
concerned is examined for the use of the consideration of 
the merits. When discussing how the text of the treaty of 
12 May 1886 was drafted, the tribunal stated: 
"Le nouveau texte de Particle (= Article 1) fut 
adoptd lors de la s6ance suivante du 10 avril 1886 
(protocole nO 13) et annexe, apres quelques 
modifications mineures et sans autre commentaire, au 
protocole de signature du 12 mai 1886 (nI 16). Il est 
conforme au texte ratif6 reproduit au paragraphe 45 
ci-dessus. En particulier le premier alin6a y est 
divise en quatre alin6as non num6rot6s mais, dans la 
copie manuscrite en frangais conservee au ministE)re 
des affaires 6trangeres de France, les deuxiE)me et 
troisieme alin6as sont suivis de points-virgules et il 
ya encore un point-virgule a la fin du troisiome 
alin6a dans un texte imprim6 du projet de loi soumis 
au Parlement frangais. En revanche, dans la version 
bilingue imprime pour le Parlement protugais, il nly a 
plus de point-virgule et llon a ainsi la ponctuation 
du texte qui sera ratif ie. , 
16) 
(3) Examination of pleas of estoppel and the critical date 
In the Argentine-Chile bo arbitration of 1966, 
the Court of Arbitration would seem to have given equitable 
considerations in the examination of pleas of estoppel and 
the critical date as procedural matters. 
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With respect to estoppel, Chile put forward the 
contention that Argentina, "by her representations to Chile 
in her diplomatic Notes of 1913-15 regarding the course and 
source of the river whose mouth is opposite Post 16, was 
and still now is precluded from denying that the boundary 
follows the course of a channel which has its source in the 
vicinity of the Cerro Herrero. " (Final Submission No. 33) 
To this Argentina replies that, by reason of a series of 
official Chilean maps issued between 1913 and 1952, Chile 
is precluded from putting forward her present contention 
that the boundary should follow the channel called by 
Argentina the Rio Falso Engafto and that it should not 
follow the channel called by Argentina the Rio Encuentro. 
In Argentina's view, Chile is also precluded by the same 
maps from arguing that the boundary should not pass through 
Cerro de la Virgen. 
17) 
After an examination of the contentions of the 
parties, the Court concludes: 
"Accordingly, the Court 
estoppel is made out by 
other, and that therefo, 
without preclusion of any 
respective contentions as 
boundary. " 
18) 
finds that no claim of 
either Party against the 
re both Parties are free 
kind to put forward their 
regards the course of the 
On the critical date the Court finds: 
"In so far as the Court is asked to 
interpret and 
fulfil the Award of 1902, there is obviously a sense 
in which the critical date is 1902 
itself--or at least 
1903, the date of the demarcation. there 
is 
equally obviously a sense in which 
the critical date 
is the date of the submission of the dispute to 
the 
Arbitration, i. e., 1964. 
"For these reasons, the Court has considered 
the 
notion of the critical date to 
be of little value in 
the present litigation and has examined 
all the 
evidence submitted to it, 
irrespective of the date of 
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the acts to which such evidence relates. 1119) 
Thus the Court would seem to have sought to look at every 
possible relevant evidence and circumstance that may be 
submitted to it by the parties in regard to both the 
argument of estoppel and that of the critical date. 
(4) Taking account of the spirit which 
conclusion of the treaty 
In the Lake Lanoux case of 1957., the tribunal was 
faced with the opposing interpretations by the French and 
Spanish Governments of the relevant treaties, with the 
French taking a textualist line and the Spanish 
interpreting them in a more liberal way. Since the 
question posed by the compromis was "uniquement relative au 
traite" et a l'Acte additionnel de 1866", the tribunal 
thought it proper to deal with the matter of interpretation 
in a general and preliminary way. It says it will apply 
"les r6gles suivantes" in respect of each particular point: 
"Les dispositions claires du droit conventionnel 
n1appellent aucune interpr6tation; le texte traduit 
une rogle objective qui saisit la matiere a laquelle 
elle s applique; quand il ya matiere a 
interpr6tation,, celle-ci doit 6tre op6re"e selon le 
droit international; celui-ci ne consacre aucun 
systeme absolu et rigide dlinterpr6tation; il est donc 
permis de tenir compte de llesprit qui a presid6 aux 
traites pyr6n6ens, ainsi que des rogles du droit 
international commun. " 
20) 
It would appear to have struck the balance between 
the two 
suggested methods of interpretation,, as Frangoise 
Dulery 
points out in her comment on this case: 
"Le Tribunal a r6solu cette dif f icult6 par une 
argumentation extr8mement souple, qui slapparenterait 
plut6t a la tradition des Commissions 
de conciliation 
iA j= A +- h ra 
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qu'A celles des Tribunaux arbitraux, en donnant a 
chacune des parties une satisfaction. Si, en effect, 
il paralt d'abord se ranger 2i la these frangaise en 
d6clarant la question pos6e par le compromis 
uniquement' relative au Traite et a l'Acte 
additionnel de 1866, se conformant en cela a la 
jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice 
internationale (arrOt des prises dleau a la Meuse) , il 
Wen ajout pas moins que, dans l'interpr6tation de ces 
textes,, quand ceux-ci ne lui paraitront pas clairs, 
Ile droit international ne consacrant aucun systc6me 
absolu et rigide dlinterpr6tation, il est permis de 
tenir compte de 1'esprit qui a pr6sid6 aux Trait6s 
pyr6n6ens, ainsi que des r6gles du droit international 
communt. Il aboutit en fait 'a se reserver la faculte 
de se r6f6rer aux principes du droit international 
commun, quitte, dans la forme, A les appliquer A 
chaque article de l'Acte additionnel au lieu de les 
appliquer in abstracto. , 
21) 
The tribunal has made this clarification of its 
position on interpretation at the outset of the discussion 
of the legal issues. Its somewhat conciliatory attitude in 
the preliminary and procedural matter, it is submitted, 
foreshows its subsequent equitable manner of dealing with 
the merits of the case. 
Equitable Considerations in Substantive Matters 
It is needless to say that each territorial or 
boundary arbitration, like any other kind of arbitration, 
is sui generis with its own peculiarities of historical, 
political, economic and cultural backgrounds and 
implications. Consequently, analysis for equitable factors 
could be made of one case after another, or it could be 
made on the basis of some categorized subjects of equitable 
considerations as follows. The latter approach is taken 
because it could hopefully serve better to identify what 
are equitable principles and considerations that conduce to 
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equitable settlement of disputes. 
As has been seen before, equity is connected with law 
in some way: it is considered as forming part of law in the 
majority of cases, and occasionally as filling the gap of 
law or as being applicable even in defiance of law. It 
would be well, therefore, to follow these categories of 
law-equity relationship in the analysis of equitable 
factors that may be found in the arbitrations. 
(1) Equitable considerations infra legem 
Very careful weighing on legal bases of the claims 
and supporting evidence of the parties 
In the Island of Palmas case of 1928 between the 
Netherlands and the United States, the arbitrator was 
placed under a strict request for the determination of 
"whether the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) in its entirety 
forms a part of territory belonging to the United States of 
America or of Netherlands territory. " 
22) In other words, 
"since, according to the terms of its Preamble, the 
agreement of January 23rd, 1925, has for its object to 
'terminate' the dispute, it is the evident will of the 
Parties that the arbitral award shall not conclude by 
a 'non liquet', but shall in any event decide that the 
island forms a part of the territory of one or the 
ot . her of two litigant Powers. " 
23) 
Thus the arbitrator stood on the recognition that in so 
far 
as "the evidence produced as regards sovereignty over a 
territory in the circumstances of the island in dispute 
might prove not to be sufficient to lead to a clear 
conclusion as to the existence of sovereignty", 
24) the only 
possibility open to him was "to found his 
decision on the 
relative strength of the titles invoked on either side". 
25) 
Since he was mandated to decide the case 
"in accordance 
with the principles of International Law and any applicable 
treaty provisions" 
26) 
and not allowed to deviate therefrom, 
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he had to compare the claims and supporting evidence of the 
parties on the basis of legal principles. 
With respect to the United States claim to sovereignty 
over the island, the arbitrator holds that if it is derived 
from Spain by way of cession under the Treaty of Paris of 
10 December 1898, the essential point is to decide whether 
Spain had sovereignty over the island at the time of the 
coming into force of the 1898 Treaty. 27) On the United 
States claim, the arbitrator concludes: 
"The United States base their claim on the titles of 
discovery, of recognition by treaty and of contiguity, 
i. e. titles relating to acts or circumstances leading 
to the acquisition of sovereignty; they have however 
not established the fact that sovereignty so acquired 
was effectively displayed at any time. 1128) 
The conclusion has been reached as a result of the 
rejection of the three claimed titles of the United States. 
An inchoate title,, the most that the title of discovery 
could amount to, cannot prevail over a definite title 
founded on continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. 
The title of contiguity, understood as a basis of 
territorial sovereignty, is rejected as having no 
foundation in international law. The title of recognition 
is held as inapplicable, because the rights of Spain to be 
derived from the Treaty of Miinster of 1648 would have been 
superseded by those which were acquired by the Treaty of 
Utrecht of 1714. Further, "even if the Treaty of Utrecht 
could not be taken into consideration, the acquiescence of 
Spain in the situation created after 1677 would deprive her 
and her successors of the possibility of still involving 
conventional rights at the present time. , 
29) 
So far as the Netherlands claim is concerned, the 
arbitrator proceeds to examine what they say "the title of 
peaceful and continuous display of State authority" is. 
" The f acts of indirect or direct display of 
Netherlands sovereignty at Palmas (or Miangas), 
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especially in the 18th and early 19th centuries are 
not numerous, and there are considerable gaps in the 
evidence of continuous display. ... It may suffice 
that such display existed in 1898, and had already 
existed as continuous and peaceful before that date 
long enough to enable any Power who might have 
considered herself as possessing sovereignty over the 
island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have, 
according to local conditions, a reasonable 
possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state 
of things contrary to her real or alleged rights, , 
30) 
But such facts are not, in the view of the arbitrator, to 
establish a full-fledged title, but merely an inchoate 
title. What is now left for the arbitrator to do is to 
compare the two inchoate titles. 
"These facts at least constitute a beginning of 
establishment of sovereignty by continuous and 
peaceful display of State authority, or a commencement 
of occupation of an island not yet forming a part of 
the territority of a State; and such a state of things 
would create in favour of the Netherlands an inchoate 
title for completing the conditions of sovereignty. 
Such inchoate title, based on display of State 
authority, would, in the opinion of the Arbitrator, 
prevail over an inchoate title derived from discovery, 
especially if this latter title has been left for a 
very long time without completion by occupation; and 
it would equally prevail over any claim which, in 
equity, might be deduced from the notion of 
contiquity. ... If, as in the present 
instance, only 
one of two conflicting interests is to prevail, 
because sovereignty can be attributed to but one of 
the Parties, the interest which involves the 
maintenance of a state of things having offered at the 
critical time to the inhabitants of the disputed 
territory and to other States a certain guarantee for 
the respect of their rights ought, in doubt, to 
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prevail over an interest which--supposing it to be 
recognized in international law--has not Yet received 
any concrete form of development. , 
31) 
Thus on the ground of the "relative strength of the titles 
invoked by each Party" the arbitrator comes to the 
conclusion that the island forms in its entirety a part of 
Netherlands territory. When, further, all the evidence is 
taken into account that shows the unchallenged acts of 
peaceful display of Netherlands sovereignty in the period 
of 1700 to 1906, when the dispute arose, the conclusion is 
reinforced with greater force. 
32) 
The arbitrator has very carefully weighed the claims 
and titles of the parties on the recognition that inasmuch 
as there is no treaty between the parties which clearly 
establishes the attribution of the island, there is no 
other way than to examine other facts to see which party 
can establish territorial sovereignty over the island. 
33) 
But such careful weighing of claims and titles was not 
performed in disregard of law, but would presumably have 
exercised what Dr. Huber defined elsewhere a few years 
later as the function of "116quit6 r6gulatrice du 
34) droit" . In this sense the view of Dr. Charles de 
Visscher would be shared with much sympathy when he states: 
"Cette mise en balance de consid6rations 6quitables 
fournit une importante contribution au r6le de 
1'6quite dans les attributions de territoires. , 
35) 
The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case of 1932, 
decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
may be understood to have shown as careful a balancing of 
the claims and evidence of the parties as the Island of 
Palmas case. By way of a general observation the Permanent 
Court of International Justice states: 
"In most of the cases involving claims to territorial 
sovereignty which have come before an international 
tribunal, there have been two competing claims to the 
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sovereignty, and the tribunal has had to decide which 
of the two is the stronger. ... It is impossible to 
read the records of the decisions in cases as to 
territorial sovereignty without observing that in many 
cases the tribunal has been satisfied with very little 
in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, 
provided that the other State could not make out a 
superior claim. This is particularly true in the case 
of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly 
populated or unsettled countries. , 
36) 
With such a situation in view, the Court embarks upon a 
careful weighing of the claims and evidence of the parties. 
The way the Court examines them, discussing their legality 
and opposability on the basis of Article 38, paragraph 1, 
of its Statute, is strictly legal. But the very way of 
detailed discussion or testing the relevant claims of one 
party against those of the other could perhaps be said to 
be another instance of fair and equitable considerations. 
A similar careful weighing of claims and evidence of 
the parties may be seen in the Indo-Pakistan Western 
Boundary (Rann of Kutch) case of 1968. The tribunal was to 
decide the case "in the light of [the] respective claims 
and evidence produced before it", 
37) but when the question 
arose during the preliminary hearings in February, 1966 as 
to whether the tribunal was empowered to decide ex aequo et 
bono, the tribunal concluded that it was not so empowered, 
while confirming with the parties that equity forms part of 
international law. 38) 
The tribunal was aware that "the territorial dispute 
which the Tribunal is called upon to decide does not differ 
in essence from other like disputes in which opposing 
claims have been made in reliance upon conflicting 
testimony, and where a judgment has to be rendered on the 
relative strength of the cases made out by two parties. 
" 39) 
The award, or the opinion of the Chairman to which the 
arbitrator chosen by Pakistan accededr determines 
the 
disputed region in these words: 
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"Reviewing and appraising the combined strength of the 
evidence relied upon by each side as proof or 
indication of the extent of its respective sovereignty 
in the region, and comparing the relative weight of 
such evidence, I conclude as follows. In respect of 
those sectors of the Rann in relation to which no 
specific evidence in the way of display of Sind 
authority, or merely trivial or isolated evidence of 
such a character, supports Pakistan's claim, I 
pronounce in favour of India. These sectors comprise 
about 90 per cent of the disputed territory. However, 
in respect of sectors where a continuous and for the 
region intensive Sind activity, meeting with no 
effective opposition from the Kutch side, is 
established, I am of the opinion that Pakistan has 
made out a better and superior title. This refers to 
a marginal area south of Rahim ki Bazar, including 
Pirol Valo Kun, as well as to Dhara Banni and Chhad 
Bet, which on most maps appear as an extension of the 
mainland of Sind. " 
40) 
Indeed that conclusion was reached after a very detailed 
examination of historical facts, surveys and maps, relevant 
documents, reports, acts of jurisdiction, etc. in respect 
of almost all parts of the disputed territory. 
41) 
Such 
assessment of the award is shared by J. J. A. Salmon who 
aptly states: 
"Cette technique d'exposition est peut-6tre le reflet 
du souci du Pr6sident de m6nager la susceptibilit6 des 
parties; elle est aussi le signe 6vident de 116quit6, 
du sens de la justice. , 
42) 
Much the same careful weighing of evidence is 
conducted, but for a different purpose, in the Beagle 
Channel case of 1977.43) The Court of Arbitration presents 
a detailed review of the evidence submitted to it with a 
view to confirming what it has already found from a 
strictly legal, that is constructionist, approach in 
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interpreting the Argentine-Chile boundary treaty of 1881. 
In this sense the consideration of "corroborative or 
confirmatory incidents and material" is only secondary to 
the decisive textualist interpretation. 44) 
But it may be defended as the right course of action 
for the Court, for the very reason that it was intended for 
the confirmation, and hence strengthening, of the Court's 
conclusion reached through an abstract-logical approach to 
treaty interpretation. Also it may be called an equitable 
approach since it has squarely responded to all that the 
Parties submitted to the Court for consideration. 
Whether it is the tradition of Angle-Saxon judicial 
practice, as a commentator says it is, 
45) the conscientious 
review of the evidence may well be due to the thoughtful 
initiative of the President of the Court. For, on a later 
occasion Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice expressed his conviction of 
the importance of consideration for the litigant parties 
and especially the losing party: 
"States and parties in the international f ield-- 
entities which are proud, sensitive, and always to 
some extent at the mercy of their own domestic public 
opinion--disposed also to be distrustful of legal 
procedures--need to be given the feeling that their 
arguments have been adequately considered and above 
all, understood--so that they have something to show 
for the risks they have taken in going to law. , 
46) 
This attitude would seem an equitable consideration in so 
far as it is intended for an equitable settlement of the 
dispute, the primordial objective of the settlement of 
disputes. 47) 
2) By reason of historical riqht, of equity and of a 
geographical nature 
A case of equitable, as well as legal, considerations 
may be seen in the Honduras-Nicaragua boundary arbitration 
of 1906. The compromis or Bonilla-Gamez Treaty of 
7 
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October 1894 does not specify any basis of decision for the 
arbitral tribunal, but empowers the Mixed Boundary 
Commission to settle "all pending doubts and differences" 
" in a friendly manner" (Article I), "equitably" to 
determine the boundary line as a result of consulting the 
maps and public and private documents, geographical or 
otherwise (Article II, paragraph 5) and to grant, if it 
deems it appropriate, "compensations and even fix 
indemnities in order to establish, in so far as possible, a 
well-defined, natural boundary line" (Article II, paragraph 
48) 6) . The disputed point or points of the boundary line 
which the Mixed Commission failed to settle were to be 
submitted to an arbitral tribunal for final solution 
(Article 111). 49) The Mixed Commission having succeeded in 
fixing the boundary line from the Pacific coast to Portillo 
de Teotecacinte, the determination of the remaining part of 
Portillo de Teotecacinte to the Atlantic coast fell upon 
the arbitral tribunal which turned out the King of 
Spain. 50) 
In choosing Cape Gracias 6 Dios as the boundary on the 
Atlantic coast, the arbitrator, after examining the 
relevant acts and documents, states: 
"from what is inferred from all the foregoing, the 
point which best answers the purpose by reason of 
historical right, of equity and of a geographical 
nature, to serve as a common boundary on the Atlantic 
coast between the two contending States, is Cape 
Gracias 6 Dios for the Atlantic coast, and further, as 
this Cape fixes what has practically been the limit or 
expansion or encroachment of Nicaragua towards the 
north and of Honduras towards the south. " 
51) 
If that is a more legal decision, an equitable 
"compensation" is attempted in awarding the bay and town of 
Cape Gracias A Dios to Nicaragua: 
11 **e whilst, on 
the other hand, and as compensation 
for having taken the mouth of the Segovia in the 
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manner previously mentioned, the bay and town of Cape 
Gracia A Dios remain within the domain of Nicaragua, 
which, according to facts beyond dispute and with a 
,, 52) greater right, would correspond to Honduras; ... 
The International Court of Justice, in its judgment of 
18 November 1960 in the case concerning the Arbitral Award 
by the_King of Spain on 23 December 1906, comments that the 
award as a whole has given "all relevant considerations": 
"However, an examination of the Award shows that it 
deals in logical order and in some detail with all 
1,53) relevant considerations 600* 
3) Equitable interpretation of treaty provisions 
a) Most reconciliatory interpretation of the 
documents which present no desired clarf-t: 
of the case 
In the Colombia-Venezuela boundary case of 1891 
decided by the Queen of Spain, the arbitrator gave 
equitable interpretations of the relevant documents. The 
original compromis or I'Trait6 d'Arbitrage 'juris" of 14 
September 1881 provided that the arbitrator should act "en 
qualit6 d1arbitre Juge de droit", 
54) but an additional 
"Acte de Paris" of 15 February 1886 extended his powers in 
these terms: 
"l'arbitre ... pourra fixer 
la ligne de la mani6re 
qulil croira. la plus rapproch6e des docu; nents 
existants, lorsque, dans Pun ou Vautre point de la 
dite ligne, ils ne pr6senteront pas toute clart6 
voulue. " 
55) 
Basing herself upon this enlarged power of decision, 
the arbitrator proceeds to determine Section 5 of the six 
Sections into which the disputed territory was divided, on 
the ground that the relevant document raises doubts: 
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"Consid6rant que la C6dule Royale de cr6ation de la 
Commandance de Barinas du 15 f6vrier 1786 qui doit 
servir de base 16gale pour la d6termination de la 
ligne de frontiE)re de la cinquiome section, suscite 
des doutes en ce quIelle cite des lieux inconnus 
aujourd'hui, savoir: las Barrancas del Sarare et le 
Paso Real de los Casanares; 
Consid6rant que pour cette raison l'Arbitre se 
trouve dans l'un des cas pr6vus dans l'Acte- 
d6claration de Paris de 1886, suivant lequel it doit 
fixer la ligne frontAre de la manAre qulil estime la 
56) plus rapproch6e des documents existants" . 
The award finds similarly on the second part of Section 6: 
"Consid6rant que les termes de la dite 
ne sont pas aussi clairs et precis que 
sorte de document pour pouvoir fonder 
sur eux une d6cision 
Conside"rant, par cons6quent, que 
trouve dans le cas prevu dans llActe- 







Equitable interpretation of the text so as to 
give practically significant effect to it 
In the Walfish Bay case of 1911 in which Germany and 
Great Britain disputed the southern boundary of the enclave 
within German territory, an equitable interpretation was 
placed on a relevant document. Because of the silence of 
the compromis or "declaration" of 30 January 1909 on the 
applicable law, the arbitrator determined it in this way: 
the two fundamental questions which he defined "must be 
solved in conformity with the principles and positive rules 
of public international law, and where they fail, in 
conformity with the general principles of law, since 
neither the said Agreement of 1890 nor the supplementary 
Declaration of Berlin of the 30th January, 1909, in any way 
authorize the arbitrator to base his decision on other 
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rules, and it is notorious, according to constant theory 
and practice, that such authority cannot be presumed" 0 
58) 
In a word he denies the applicability of extra-legal 
principles. 
The question at issue is the meaning of the phrase 
"including the plateau" in the Proclamation of 12 March 
1878 which Captain Dyer of the Industry issued in the name 
of Her Majesty the Queel of Great Britain and Ireland in 
taking possession of the port and station of Walfish Bay 
and of certain adjacent territory. The annexed district 
was bounded as follows: 
"On the south by a line from a point on the coast 15 
miles south of Pelican Point to Scheppman's Dorp; on 
the east by a line from Scheppman's Dorp to Rooibank, 
including the plateau, and thence to 10 miles inland 
from the mouth of the Swakop River; on the north by 
the last 10 miles of the course of the Swakop 
59) River" . (Emphasis added) 
At the time of annexation, Captain Dyer would seem to have 
gone beyond the instructions to annex the "plateau". On 24 
April 1889 when he was invited by the British Government to 
furnish a new report, in reply to the observation and 
arguments formulated by the German member of the mixed 
commission which had signed separate reports in January 
1889, he testified that his initial intention had been to 
annex the Walfish Bay strictly in accordance with the terms 
of telegram of the Governor to Captain Mills on 22 February 
1878.60) But a conversation with Mr. Ryder, representative 
of Ericsson & Co. of Capetown, and others, as his 
memorandum of 12 March 1878 addressed to Commodore F. W. 
Sullivan, explains, "as there was no fresh water nor 
pasture in Walfish Bay", he considered it indispensable 
that there should be included in the annexation, if 
possible, a place containing both these things. With this 
object "he made a journey in bullock-wagon to Rooibank ... 
to view the plateau" which was "the nearest point available 
to supply the Bay with water and good pasture". 
61) 
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In examining the evidence, the arbitrator felt the 
German evidence rather weak for not being based on personal 
or first-hand knowledge of the annexation whereas he gave 
some credence to the British evidence. 
62) 
Thus he decides 
in favour of the British contention on what the "plateau" 
means in Mr. Dyer's phrase, "including the plateau". 
11 e*. the whole plateau ... is pastureland with plenty 
of water, since there exist or have existed to the 
east of the church at Scheppmansdorf wells and 
gardens, also a large area covered with 'quickgrass' 
... and a considerable number of trees which afford, 
in addition to fuel, valuable fodder for cattle, such 
as the anna--circumstances which, if taken in 
conjunction with the obvious intention of Mr. Dyer to 
provide water and good pasture for the station of 
Walfish Bay and with the fact of his having been 
advised in this matter by persons knowing the 
locality, render any interpretation difficult which 
would result in this grazing ground being divided, 
since in the conception of this word, as in the 
conception of 'plateau', there is a sense of unity 
whose division in case of doubt cannot be 
presumed. , 
63) 
The arbitrator concludes: 
Ile e9 the prolongation of 
the plateau of pastures 
Scheppmansdorf to Ururas explains satisfactorily the 
terms of the proclamation of the 12th March, 1878, 
because, as Scheppmansdorf was therein indicated as 
the limit of British territory and the name was known 
to be somewhat vague, inasmuch as it applied to land 
extending some miles, it was necessary to add 
something to make the frontier precise; and this 
necessity was the origin of the use of the words 
'including the plateau', by which it was desired to 
indicate beyond doubt, in the only possible way, as 
there were no maps, that the boundary would have to 
be 
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laid down, not at the beginning nor in the middle of 
the lands of Scheppmansdorf, but where its pastures 
terminate, and with them the plateau whose annexation 
was desired. , 64) 
Basing himself on legal principles, the arbitrator 
first made a grammatical examination of the word "plateau" 
as described by Captain Dyer, but later took account of the 
requirement of a "topographical unity" or indivisibility of 
the plateau, which seemed to him to accord with the object 
and purpose of Captain Dyer's action. 
65) 
A similar equitable interpretation of a certain term 
of the treaty in question was supplied in the North 
Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 1910. When dealing with 
the definition of a "bay" in connection with Question 5, 
the tribunal presented a notable theory of treaty 
interpretation taking account of "all the individual 
circumstances": 
"The interpretation must take into account all the 
individual circumstances which for any one of the 
different bays are to be appreciated, the relation of 
its width to the length of penetration inland, the 
possibility and the necessity of its being defended by 
the State in whose territory it is indented; the 
special value which it has for the industry of the 
inhabitants of its shores; the distance which it is 
secluded from the highways of nations on the open sea 
and other circumstances not possible to enumerate in 
general. , 
66) 
c) Considerations to give the best interpretation of 
the intention of the diplomatic instruments 
In the Argentina-Chile boundary case of 1902, the 
tribunal adopted the boundary line which it judged would 
best interpret the intention of the relevant diplomatic 
instruments. Under the compromis of 17 April 1896 the 
arbitrator was to "apply strictly" the Boundary Treaty of 
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1881 and its Additional and Explanatory Protocol of 
1893,67) but the tribunal which was appointed by the 
arbitrator found it impossible because those agreements 
were susceptible of diverse and opposite interpretations. 
This is how the tribunal came to place an equitable 
interpretation on the documents: 
"In short, the orographical and hydrographical 
lines are frequently irreconcilable; neither fully 
conforms to the spirit of the Agreements which we are 
called upon to interpret. It has been made clear by 
the investigation carried out by our Technical 
Commission that the terms of the Treaty and Protocols 
are inapplicable to the geographical conditions of the 
country to which they refer. We are unanimous in 
considering the wording of the Agreements as 
ambiguous, and susceptible of the diverse and 
antagonistic interpretations placed upon them by the 
Representatives of the two Republics. 
"Confronted by these divergent contentions we 
have, after the most careful consideration, concluded 
that the question submitted to us is not simply that 
of deciding which of the two alternative lines is 
right or wrong, but rather to determine--within the 
limits defined by the extreme claims on both sides-- 
the precise boundary-line which, in our opinion, would 
best interpret the intention of the diplomatic 
instruments submitted to our consideration. , 
68) 
d) Consideration of special circumstances in the 
interpretation of treaty provisions 
One of the two main areas in which equitable 
considerations were given in the An glo-French Continental 
Shelf case of 1977 is the applicable law. The compromis of 
10 July 1975 lays down the basis of decision as "the rules 
of internatio nal law applicable in the matter as 
between 
the Parties" . 
69) In interpreting Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, h owever, the 
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Court of Arbitration reveals an equitable approach to 
treaty interpretation. According to the travaux 
pr6paratoires of Article 6 in the International Law 
Commission and at the Geneva Conference of 1958, the Court 
says, the "special circumstances" condition was introduced 
to avoid an unreasonable or inequitable delimitation of the 
continental shelf which the application of the equidistance 
principle may not infrequently lead to because of 
particular geographical features or configurations. 70) The 
Court concludes: 
"In short, the r6le of the 'special circumstances' 
condition in Article 6 is to ensure an equitable 
delimitation; and the combined 'equidistance-special 
circumstances rule', in effect, gives particular 
expression to a general norm that, failing agreement, 
the boundary between States abutting on the same 
continental shelf is to be determined on equitable 
principles. " 
71) 
The International Court of Justice has shown a similar 
approach to treaty interpretation, though by way of an 
obiter dictum, in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case 
(Jurisdiction) of 1978. Greece rested its case for the 
Court's jurisdiction on the General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, as well as on 
the joint communiqu6 of Brussels of 31 May 1975, and the 
question arose whether the present dispute fell under 
reservation (b), one of the two reservations which Greece 
made in acceding to the General Act in 1931, which is 
worded as follows: 
11 (b) disputes concerning questions which by 
international law are solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes 
relating to the territorial status of Greece, 
including disputes relating to its rights of 
sovereignty over its ports and lines of 
communication 40 
72) 
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The real question for decision, preliminary to the 
determination as to whether the present dispute falls 
within the scope of reservation (b) in the opinion of the 
Court, is whether the dispute relates to the territorial 
status of Greece. 
73) In this sense the Court takes a broad 
contextual approach in contrast to the linguistic argument 
of the Greek Government: 
"No doubt, it is true the expression territorial 
status is commonly used in international law with 
reference to a legal condition or r6gime of a 
territory; but although the expression, as Article 39, 
paragraph 2, of the General Act itself indicates, 
denotes a category or concept covering clearly 
specified subject-matters, it is not an expression 
which can be said to have rigid legal connotations. 
On the contrary, the Court considers it to be a 
generic expression which comprises within its meanings 
various legal conditions and relations of territory. 
The answer to the question whether any given matter is 
properly to be considered as relating to the 
territorial status of a State must, therefore, depend 
on the particular circumstances of the case. 
74) 
e) Intentions of the parties ascertained from treati 
provisions in the light of all the circumstances 
The International Court of Justice says that the 
intention of the parties to a treaty must be ascertained 
from its provisions in the light of all the circumstances 
in the Frontier Land case of 1959. In examining the 
Netherlands contention, her f irst alternative contention,, 
that the Boundary Convention of 8 August 1843 is vitiated 
by mistake, the Court states: 
"The Netherlands contends however that it need not 
establish the origin of the mistake, since a simple 
comparison between the copy of the Communal Minute 
produced by it and that appearing in the Descriptive 
Minute reveals sufficiently that a mistake occurred. 
- 142 - 
The matter is not, however, capable of being disposed 
of on this narrow ground. The Court must ascertain 
the intention of the Parties from the provisions of a 
treaty in the light of all the circumstances. " 75) 
f) Liberal and detailed appreciation of alleged facts 
In the Austria-Hungary boundary case of 1902 in which 
the boundary between the districts of Neumarkt (Austria) 
and Szepes (Hungary) in the vicinity of Lake "Meerauge" (in 
Hungarian "Halast6) in the Tatra mountains was disputed, a 
pair of national legislations constituted the compromis, 
which gave no basis of decision. Nor did the rules of 
procedure adopted by the tribunal in its initial meetings 
on 5 and 6 April 1902 specify it. But this is an equitable 
arbitration as the tribunal itself admits it. 
76) 
Starting with an examination of the Austrian arguments 
for a "dry" boundary and the Hungarian contentions of a 
"fluvial" boundary on the basis of the documents submitted 
to it, the tribunal fails to reach a decisive conclusion. 
A review of "les faits ult6rieurs" invoked by the parties 
does not lead to any conclusion nor to a finding of 
"possession imm6moriale 77) Under these circumstances the 
tribunal, basing itself on the position that 11 la 
d6marcation de la frontiere litigieuse 6tait abandonn6e a 
sa libre appr6ciation, tous les faits all6gu6s ayant 6-te 
minutieusement examin6s"j, 
78) 
proceeds to deal with the 
question of "fronti6re naturelle". Thus the tribunal 
finds: 
I'Dans le cas pr6sent, la frontiere la plus 
naturelle semble etre celle qui suit en remontant la 
riviere Bialka jusqu'ä son origine, c'est-a-dire 
jusqu'au confluent des torrents du Fischsee et du 
Poduplasky et de lä suit en remontant la crA-te des 
monts Zabie vers le plus haut sommet de la chaine, 
c'est-a-dire la 'Meeraugenspitzel. L'Expert estime 
que toutes les anciennes descriptions de la frontiere 
... sont en 
harmonie avec le choix de cette frontiere 
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naturelle. , 79) 
Such a boundary line would, in the opinion of the tribunal, 
be for the interests of both parties. The disputed 
territory, easily accessible from the side of Neumarkt 
(Austria), certainly has greater value for Austria than for 
Hungary, 80) whereas a part of the forest which, from the 
material point of view, is certainly the most valuable part 
of the disputed territory is attributed to Hungary. 81) In 
this way the conflict in the region has now been minimized 
and the possibility avoided that the beautiful forest may 
be divided by a boundary line. 
82) 
In short,, this is a case decided on the basis of 
equitable considerationst as the tribunal expressly says: 
"On a ainsi tenu compte, pour des motifs dl6quit6 
et des consid6rations pratiques, dans le mesure du 
possible et dans le cadre de la configuration 
topographique, de la cohabitation pacifique des 
populations de la fronti6re et des int6r8ts de la 
Hongrie. , 83) 
4) Considerations concerning estoppel 
a) Estoppel or preclusion from the previous 
arrangement, provided it is an equitable principle 
In the Manica Boundary case of 1897 between Great 
Britain and Portugal, what would amount to the principle of 
estoppel was applied in respect of the conduct of one of 
the parties in the consideration of one of the three 
sections of the boundary line into which the disputed 
territory was divided conveniently by the arbitrator. 
The basis of decision was the Treaty of 11 June 1891 
between Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of 
Portugal defining their respective Spheres of Influence. 
The relevant portion of the treaty is: 
11 oe. Thence 
it f ollows the upper part of the eastern 
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slope of the Manica Plateau southwards to the centre 
of the Sabi, follows that channel to its confluence 
with the Lunte, ... 
"It is understood that in tracing the frontier, 
along the slope of the plateau, no territory west of 
longitude 32130' east of Greenwich shall be comprised 
in the Portuguese sphere, and no territory east of 
longitude 33* east of Greenwich shall be comprised in 
the British sphere. The line shall, however, if 
necessary, be deflected so as to leave Mutassa in the 
British sphere, and Massi-Kessi in the Portuguese 
sphere. " 
84) 
It was understood, although not expressly written in the 
treaty, that the "regle fondamental" was to attribute the 
"plateau" to Great Britain and the "pente" to Portugal. 
The drafters of the treaty admitted that this was a natural 
consequence and an essential condition. 
85) 
Thus, while 
formally following the law, the arbitrator was allowed some 
latitude for certain purposes. 
In so far as the third and southernmost section of the 
arbitration area is concerned, it is important to take note 
of the fact that with a view to assuring Great Britain of 
the band of territory between the watershed line and the 
edge line of the eastern slope, Lord Salisbury proposed a 
compensation or indemnity of 18,000 to 60,000 square 
kilometres of territory in the north of the Zambezi to 
Portugal which accepted it (British memorial, No. 17). 
86) 
The arbitrator refers to this transaction in finding 
Portugal estopped from taking any territory west of the 
longitude 320301 east of Greenwich: 
"Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier que la Grande- 
Bretagne, pour slassurer que la frontiere ne 
d6passerait le 320301 vers l'ouest et n1irait jamais 
empifter sa zone au del(! de cette limite, a fait, 
comme nous avons plus d1une fois remarqu6, la 
concession d'une large 6tendue de territoire au nord 
du Zamb6ze au Portugal pour le d6dommager de la perte 
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qu'il aurait subie sur le plateau de Manica. Or, il 
serait contraire aux-principes de justice que, sous un 
pr6texte quelconque, le Portugal, en d6passant cette 
mgme limite, reprit une partie du territoire en 6chage 
duquel il a accept6 la dite compensation. Il est 
vrai, quIA 116gard de cette concession, ou, pour mieux 
dire, de cet arrangement, le Portugal devant l'Arbitre 
n1a manqu6 de soulever des exceptions, soit sur sa 
valeur, soit sur les droits de la Grande-Bretagne 'a 
116gard de territoire c6d6. Mais nous devons repeter, 
ce que nous avons d6jA eu Poccasion d1observer, que 
le Portugal, apr8s avoir acceptd par le Trait6 ce 
territoire comme une compensation 6quitable, il West 
plus recevable a opposer des exceptions dont, au 
surplus, il n'a fourni aucune justification, sl6tant 
born6 a de simples all6gations. , 
87) 
If this is not an instance of strict application of the 
principle of estoppel or preclusion, the arbitrator would 
appear to be quite right in saying, "il serait contraire 
aux principes de justice que ... le Portugal ... reprit une 
partie du territoire en 6change duquel il a accept6 la dite 
compensation. " 
Diplomatic correspondence suffices to prevent 
the establishment of a title to territory 
In the Chamizal case of 1911 between Mexico and the 
United States in which territorial sovereignty was disputed 
over a tract of land formed by repeated floods of the Rio 
Grande, the United States put forward as part of its 
contentions the plea of prescription or estoppel. In its 
counter-case the United States contended that it had 
acquired "a good title by prescription to the tract in 
dispute, in addition to its title under treaty 
provisions "0 
88) In its argument it also contended that 
"the Republic of Mexico is estopped from asserting the 
national title over the territory known as 'El Chamizal' by 
reason of the undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged 
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possession of said territory by the United States of 
89) America since the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo" . 
The tribunal, acting "in accordance with the various 
treaties and conventions now existing between the two 
countries, and in accordance with the principles of 
international law". 90) finds very controversial the 
question whether the right of prescription invoked by the 
United States is an accepted principle of the law of 
nations, and goes on to say: 
"In January,, 1867, Don Matias Romero forwarded 
Mr. Seward, Secretary of State,, a communication from 
the prefecture of Brazos relating to the controversy 
between the people of El Paso del Norte (now Juarez) 
and the people of Franklin (now El Paso, Texas) over 
the Chamizal tract, then in process of formation. 
From that time until the negotiation of the convention 
of 1884, a considerable amount of diplomatic 
correspondence is devoted to this very question, and 
the convention of 1884 was an endeavour to fix the 
rights of the two nations with respect to the changes 
brought about by the action of the waters of the Rio 
Grande. 
It 000 
"It is quite clear from the circumstances ... that 
however much the Mexicans may have desired to take 
physical possession of the district, the result of any 
attempt to do so would have provoked scenes of 
violence and the Republic of Mexico cannot be blamed 
for resorting to the milder forms of protest contained 
in its diplomatic correspondence. 
In the present case the Mexican claim was 
asserted before the International Boundary Commission 
within a reasonable time after it commenced to 
exercise its functions, and prior to that date the 
Mexican Government had done all that could be 
reasonably required of it by way of protest against 
the alleged encroachment. 
"Under these circumstances the commissioners have 
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no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the 
plea of prescription should be dismissed. " 91) 
c) Absence of rotest ma 
provided 
lead to a title to 
sovereignt 
expected 
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In the Temple of Preah Vihear case (Merits) of 1962 
before the International Court of Justice, the parties 
presented, in addition to arguments based on natural 
features such as rivers, mountain ranges, escarpments, 
etc. , some arguments "of a physical, historical, religious 
and archaeological character", but the Court was unable to 
regard them as "legally decisive" . 
92 ) Thus the Court would 
have meant to reject what might otherwise have been thought 
incidental equitable considerations. It concentrates on 
the principle of estoppel or preclusion and concludes: 
"Even if there were any doubt as to Siam's 
acceptance of the map in 1908, and hence of the 
frontier indicated thereon, the Court would consider, 
in the light of the subsequent course of events, that 
Thailand is now precluded by her conduct from 
asserting that she did not accept it. She has, for 
fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 
1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable 
frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on 
Thailand's acceptance of the map. ... It is not now 
open to Thailand, while continuing to claim and enjoy 
the benefits of the settlement, to deny that she was 
ever a consenting party to it. l, 
93) 
The point is developed more extensively by Vice- 
President Alfaro in his separate opinion. Quoting an 
argument of Lauterpacht on estoppel, the Vice-President 
seems to think that Thailand was precluded by her failure 
to protest "in due course" from claiming title to 
sovereignty over the Temple region, and that such 
preclusion is equitable. Lauterpacht states in his paper 
on the continental shelf: 
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11 00. the f ar-reaching ef f ect of the f ailure to protest 
is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an 
essential requirement of stability--a requirement even 
more important in the international than in other 
spheres; it is a precept of fair de inasmuch as 
it prevents states from playing fast and loose with 
situations affecting others; and it is in accordance 
with equity inasmuch as it protects a State from the 
contingency of incurring responsibilities and expense, 
in reliance on the apparent acquiescence of others, 
and being subsequently confronted with a challenge on 
the part of those very States. , 
94) (Emphasis added) 
It is important,, however,, to note the proviso that the 
right to protest is to be exercised "in due course", as 
Alfaro rightly says, "the failure to reserve rights of 
which a State is legally possessed and which it is entitled 
to claim or exercise in due course ... may be and has been 
interpreted as a waiver of such rights. " 
95) (Emphasis 
added) 
d) Silence or non-reaction not necessarily 
recognition of a claim to sovereignty 
In the same case, two forceful contrary opinions were 
expressed by Judges Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender in 
their dissenting opinions. Their contentions are, in 
effect, that cultural and historical considerations should 
make the principle of estoppel or preclusion inapplicable. 
On the incident of a visit of Prince Damrong of 
Thailand to the Temple in January, 1930 and the presence of 
the French Resident of the neighbouring Cambodian province 
of Kompong Thom on the scene in his official uniform with 
decorations and the appearance of the French flag on a pole 
in front of his own pavillian, 
96) Judge Wellington Koo 
presents an interesting observation based on cultural- 
historical considerations. His opinion merits quotation in 
some detail: 
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41 
"The display of his national flag by a foreign 
official, even by a private Occidental, was not an 
uncommon sight in an Asiatic country during that 
epoch; it may or may not have displeased the Prince. 
There was no clear cause for the Prince to make a 
protest at the time or to ask his Government to lodge 
one in Bangkok, though in the affidavit of one of his 
daughters who was with the Prince during this visit, 
it is stated that he privately considered the hoisting 
of the French flag at the place of their meeting and 
the donning of his official uniform by the French 
officer to be 'impudent'. The despatch of a letter of 
thanks and some photographs taken during this visit by 
Prince Damrong to the French Minister for transmission 
to the French authorities in Indo-China meant no more 
than a customary act of Oriental courtesy. In a word, 
the incident viewed in the light of the available 
evidence and the then prevailing conditions in Siam-- 
and, in fact, in other parts of Asia--did not have the 
meaning and significance sought to be inferred from 
it. 97) 
"The reason why 'he did not ask the Government to 
lodge a protest' was eloquently stated by his 
daughter, Princess Phun Phitsamai Diskul, who went 
with him during the visit to the Temple, to be as 
follows: 
'It was generally known at the time that we 
only give the French an excuse to seize more 
territory by protesting. Things had been like 
that since they came into the river Chao Phya with 
their gunboats and their seizure of Chanthaburi. 
' 
In view of the history of the relations between 
Siam 
and French Indo-China at the time and earlier 
during 
the preceding decades, the Princess's explanation 
seems natural and reasonable. It was a situation not 
peculiar to Siam. It was, generally speaking, 
the 
common experience of most Asiatic 
States in their 
intercourse with the Occidental Powers during 
this 
period of colonial expansion. " 
98) 
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In more specific legal terms, he 
acquiescence in Cambodia's claim 
Temple area: 
concludes on Thailand's 
to sovereignty over the 
"Moreover, there is no valid ground in law for 
holding Thailand accountable for acquiescence. The 
rule of Roman law that 'he who keeps silent is held to 
consent if he must and can speak' is, in my view, not 
applicable because the several occasions which are 
alleged to have been such as to call for a protest or 
reservation by her have been shown earlier to be 
entirely of a different character. Silence or failure 
to react, even when it constitutes a relevant factor, 
cannot alone be considered as implying recognition or 
acceptance of the other party's claim of sovereignty. 
... In the case under consideration, no evidence has 
been adduced of any declaration or act by Siam or 
Thailand pointing clearly to her intention to 
recognize or accept Cambodia's claim of sovereignty 
over the Temple area. 1199) 
Judge Sir Percy Spender elaborates on the point in a 
similar way with, however, a clearer sense of intertemporal 
law: 
"It is easy to fall into the error of judging the 
events of long ago by present day standards, indeed 
sometimes by standards which do not always have 
relation to real life. 
"In determining what inferences may or should be 
drawn from Thailand's silence and absence of protest 
regard must, I believe, be had to the period of time 
when the events we are concerned with took place, 
to 
the region of the world to which they related, to the 
general political conditions existing 
in Asia at this 
period, to political and other activities of 
Western 
countries in Asia at the time and to the 
fact that of 
the two States concerned one was Asian, the other 
European. It would not, I think, be just to apply to 
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the conduct of Siam in this period objective standards 
comparable to those which reasonably might today be or 
might then have been applied to highly developed 
European States. "100) 
Sir Percy refers to the same statement of Princess Phun 
Phitsamai Diskul that Judge Wellington Koo quotes, and 
concludes, after citing more supporting evidence, 
101) 
on 
the Siamese apprehension about the aspirations of France: 
"This apprehension on the part of Siam as to 
France's attitude towards her is a factor which cannot 
be disregarded in evaluating Siam's conduct--her 
silence, her lack of protest, if protest might 
otherwise have been expected of her. , 
102) 
Further on the principle of preclusion, Sir Percy seems to 
deny the applicability of the principle in the present 
case: 
"To accord to the concept of recognition by a 
State of a fact or situation, without more, the legal 
consequence of a preclusion not only finds, in my 
opinion, despite the views of certain writers, no 
authority as a principle of international law under 
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, but provides 
an invitation to apply to the determination of a case 
in which recognition of a fact or of a situation is 
relied upon, considerations which are scarcely 
distinguishable from considerations ex aequo et bono. 
In short, the evidentiary value of the 
recognition or acquiescence must be weighed against 
all the relevant evidence disclosed in the 
record, , 
103) 
This last point, a summary statement of what he has said 
earlier about the Siamese position vis-a-vis France as 
evidenced in her lack of protest, is an equitable 
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consideration stressing the need to see an act, if passive, 
of a State in the light of all the relevant circumstances. 
Equitable considerations marginally infra legem 
Consideration of particular circumstances of the 
case 
a) Geographical conditions of the arbitration area 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, the 
forerunner of the recent judicial and arbitral decisions on 
the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries in which 
equitable considerations were given in one way or another, 
the International Court of Justice was faced with a 
situation where a State with a concave coastline lies 
between two adjacent States with convex coastlines. The 
focal point was whether the equidistance method of drawing 
the boundary line, a conventional rule and found in the end 
inapplicable as between the parties, would produce an 
equitable delimitation. This depends on the geographical 
conditions of the sea area concerned. The equidistance 
method, despite its known advantages, would, in the opinion 
of the Court, lead to inequity in this disputed part of the 
North Sea. The difficulty was two-fold in the words of the 
Court: 
(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is 
automatically magnified by the equidistance line 
as regards the consequences for the delimitation 
of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen 
in the case of concave or convex coastlines that 
if the equidistance method is employed, then the 
greater the irregularity and the further from the 
coastline the area to be delimited, the more 
unreasonable are the results produced. So great 
an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural 
geographical feature must be remedied or 
compensated for as far as possible, being of 
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itself creative of inequity. 
(b) In the case of the North Sea in particular, where 
there is no outer boundary to the continental 
shelf, it happens that the claims of several 
States converge, meet and intercross in localities 
where, despite their distance from the coast, the 
bed of the sea still unquestionably consists of 
continental shelf. A study of these convergences, 
as revealed by the maps, shows how inequitable 
would be the apparent simplification brought about 
by a delimitation which, ignoring such 
geographical circumstances, was based solely on 
the equidistance method. , 
104) 
Such considerations result in the operative paragraph of 
the judgment in one of the three "factors to be taken into 
account" "in the course of the negotiations" of the parties 
to be conducted in accordance with the judgment of the 
Court. It is worded as follows: 
the general configuration of the coast of the 
Parties, as well as the presence of any special or 
unusual features". 
105) 
This was not identified by the Court as a rule or principle 
of international law which should guide the negotiations of 
the parties, but as one of the factors to be taken into 
account in such negotiations. It is, however, an equitable 
factor in that it will be included in "all the relevant 
circumstance" as provided in the first of the two 
"principles and rules of international law" applicable to 
the delimitation in the present case. 
106) 
In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977,. 
too, the importance of taking account of the geographical 
conditions of the arbitration area was stressed: 
first in 
respect of the extraordinary location of the 
Channel 
Islands being very close to the French coast, and secondly 
in respect of the Atlantic region, i. e. west of 
the 
Scillies-Ouessant line, where the coasts of the parties are 
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considered by the Court of Arbitration to be "adjacent" or 107) lateral,, rather than "opposite" . Since the Channel 
Islands region is to be discussed under separate headings 
below, the Atlantic region is conveniently taken up here. 
The Court first identifies its basic position in 
general terms: 
"The appreciation of the effect of individual 
geographical features on the course of an equitable 
line has necessarily to be made by reference to the 
actual geographical conditions of the particular area 
of continental shelf to be delimited and to the actual 
relation of the two coasts to that particular 
area. jjl08) 
Specifically at issue in 
projection of the Cornish 
Scilly, or at least their 
westernmost coast of the 
d'Ouessant. 
this region is the 






i. e. Ile 
"The projection of the Cornish peninsula and the 
Isles of Scilly, further seawards into the Atlantic 
than the Brittany peninsula and the island of Ushant, 
is a geographical fact, a fact of nature; ... 
Nevertheless, when account is taken of the fact that 
in other respects the two States abut on the same 
continental shelf with coasts not markedly different 
in extent and broadly similar in their relation to 
that shelf, a question arises as to whether giving 
full effect to the Scilly Isles in delimiting an 
equitable boundary out to the 1,000 metre isobath may 
not distort the boundary and have disproportionate 
effects as between the two States. In the view of the 
Court, the further projection westwards of the Scilly 
Isles, when superadded to the greater projection of 
the Cornish mainland westwards beyond Finistere, is of 
much the same nature for the present purposes, and has 
much the same tendency to distortion of the 
- 155 - 
equidistance line, as the projection of an 
exceptionally long promontory, which is generally 
recognized to be one of the potential forms of 
Ispecial circumstances'. In the present instance, the 
Court considers that the additional projection of the 
Scilly Isles into the Atlantic region does constitute 
an element of distortion which is material enough to 
justify the delimitation of a boundary other than the 
strict median line envisaged in Article 6, paragraph 
1. of the Convention [on the Continental Shelf of 
19581119 109) 
The crucial problem is identified in more specific terms: 
"The problem therefore is, without disregarding 
Ushant and the Scillies, to find a method of remedying 
in an appropriate measure the distorting effect on the 
course of the boundary of the more westerly position 
of the Scillies and the disproportion which it 
produces in the areas of continental shelf accruing to 
the French Republic and the United Kingdom, "110) 
Thus what the Court considers to be an equitable 
solution is devised, drawing on a previous case in State 
practice. 
111) 
"The appropriate methoa, in the opinion of the 
Court, is to take account of the Scilly isles as part 
of the coastline of the United Kingdom but to give 
them less than their full effect in applying the 
equidistance method. Just as it is not the function 
of equity in the delimitation of the continental shelf 
completely to refashion geography, so it is also not 
the function of equity to create a situation of 
complete equity where nature and geography have 
established an inequity. Equity does not, therefore, 
call for coasts, the relation of which to the 
continental shelf is not equal, to be treated as 
having completely equal effects. What equity calls 
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for is an appropriate abatement of the 
disproportionate effects of a considerable projection 
onto the Atlantic continental shelf of a somewhat 
attenuated portion of the coast of the United 
Kingdom. , 112) 
The "half-effect" method thus conceived is explained in 
these words: 
"The method of giving half-effect consists in 
delimiting the line equidistant between the two 
coasts, first without the use of the offshore island 
as a base-point and secondly, with its use as a base- 
point; a boundary giving half-effect to the island is 
then the line drawn mid-way between those two 
equidistance lines. " 
113) 
The Court does not attribute any special force as a 
criterion to the ratio of approximately 2 to 1 in the 
distances of the Scillies and Ouessant from their 
respective mainlands, but finds in it "an indication of the 
suitability of the half-effect method as a means of 
arriving at an equitable delimitation in the present 
case ". 
114) 
In other words, the boundary line thus 
delimited is a qualified equidistance line, or a solution 
"as an equitable variant of the equidistance principle 
expressing a necessarily approximate appreciation of 
diverse considerations" as the Court confirms in its 
interpretive decision of 14 March 1978.115) 
The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982 is 
still another case in which the "geographical conditions of 
the arbitration area" were not only mentioned as necessary 
for consideration in general preliminary terms, but taken 
into account as specific requirements for the actual 
delimitation of the boundary. The Special Agreement 
requests the International Court of Justice, in rendering 
its judgment, "de tenir compte des principes 6quitables et 
e des circonstances pertinentes propres a la r"gion, ainsi 
que des tendances r6centes admises 'a la troisieme 
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Conf6rence sur le droit de la mer" (in the French 
translation of the original Arabic text supplied by 
Tunisia) 
116) 
or to "take its decision according to 
equitable principles, and the relevant circumstances which 
characterize the area, as well as the new accepted trends 
in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea" (in the 
English translation of the same supplied by Libya), 117) 
Thus the Court is under the obligation to "take account of" 
or "take its decision according to" equitable principles 
and the relevant circumstances of the area. The Court 
first refers to the necessity to take account of the 
relevant circumstances: 
"There can be no doubt it is virtually impossible 
to achieve an equitable solution in any delimitation 
without taking into account the particular relevant 
circumstances of the area. ... The Special Agreement 
moreover confers on the Court the task of ascertaining 
what are the relevant circumstances and assessing 
their relative weight for the purpose of achieving an 
equitable result. , 
118) 
Following this general observation, the Court sets out 
to specify the relevant circumstances: i) change in 
direction of the coast in the Gulf of Gab6s, 
119) ii) Island 
of Jerba, Kerkennah Islands and surrounding low-tide 
elevations, 
120) iii) de facto line of 26" east of north 
which is roughly perpendicular to the coastline at the end 
of the land frontier, 
121) iv) proportionality between the 
length of the coastline and the continental shelf area. 
122) 
Of these the circumstances of a geographical nature are i), 
ii) and iv) . As factors ii) to 
iv) are to be discussed 
elsewhere under their appropriate headings, let it suffice 
to see what f actor i) is. The Court identifies the legal 
significance of the marked change in direction of the 
Tunisian coast: 
"While the initial part of the Tunisian coast, 
westwards from Ras Ajdir, runs for some distance in 
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approximately the same direction as the Libyan coast, 
the most marked characteristic of the coast ... is 
that it subsequently changes direction, so as to run 
roughly southwest-northeast. This aspect of the 
geographical situation as it exists in the area 
relevant to the decision is legally significant, in 
the context of the present examination of the 
application of equitable principles, as one of the 
relevant circumstances which characterize the 
area. , 
123) 
Such a change of direction on the Tunisian coastline is 
considered to occur at the most westerly point of the 
coastline of the Gulf of Gab6s. This chosen point is later 
to play an important role as the "reference-point for 
reflecting that change in the delimitation". 
124) 
An extremely interesting, if controversial, 
consideration of the geographical context of the 
arbitration area was given in the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the Libya Malta 
Continental Shelf case of 3 June 1985. The Court defines 
the area to be delimited as one where there is no claim or 
interests of third States, and particularly Italy,, 
involved, thus limiting its "arbitration area" to a 
trapezium of the 15*101E and 13*501E meridians and the two 
other sides of the Maltese and Libyan coasts. 
125) Having 
defined the area to be delimited in this way, the Court 
goes on to deal with the status of Malta as an island State 
in the Central Mediterranean. 
The question here is what status should be accorded to 
Malta, an independent State, for purposes of shelf 
delimitation in a semi-enclosed sea. Libya insists that no 
distinction should be made between an island State and an 
island politically linked with a mainland State, whereas 
Malta distinguishes between the two. 
126) In the view of 
the Court, 
"This aspect of the matter is related not solely to 
the circumstances of Malta being a group of islands, 
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and an independent State, but also to the position of 
its islands in the wider geographical context, 
particularly their position in a semi-enclosed 
sea. 11127) 
Repeating the necessity of looking beyond the area 
concerned in the present case and considering the general 
geographical context in which the delimitation will have to 
be effected, the Court observes that 
"that delimitation, although it relates only to the 
continental shelf appertaining to two States, is also 
a delimitation between a portion of the southern 
littoral and a portion of the northern littoral of the 
Central Mediterranean. , 128) 
It is in this broader geographical perspective that the 
Court devises a unique method of modifying the initial 
median line between Malta and Libya-transposing it 
northwards so that Libya may be allowed a larger 
continental shelf area. Immediately following the above- 
quoted passage, the Court has this to say: 
"If account is taken of that setting., the Maltese 
islands appear as a minor feature of the northern 
seaboard of the region in question, located 
substantially to the south of the general direction of 
that seaboard, and themselves comprising a very 
limited coastal segment. From the viewpoint of the 
general geography of the region, this southward 
location of the coasts of the Maltese islands 
constitutes a geographical feature which should be 
taken into account as a pertinent circumstance; its 
influence on the delimitation line must be weighed in 
order to arrive at an equitable result. , 
129) 
The transposition of the median line is effected in this 
way: 
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"Let it be supposed, for the sake of argument,, that 
the Maltese islands were part of Italian territory, 
and that there was a question of the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between Libya and Italy, within 
the area to which this judgment relates. Again, 
between opposite coasts, with a large, clear area 
between them,, that boundary would not then be the 
median line, based solely upon the coasts of Libya to 
the south and Sicily to the north. At least some 
account would be taken of the islands of Malta; and 
even if the minimum account were taken, the 
continental shelf boundary between Italy and Libya 
would be somewhat south of the median line between the 
Sicilian and Libyan coasts. Since Malta is not part 
of Italy, but is an independent State, it cannot be 
the case that, as regards continental shelf rights, it 
will be in a worse position because of its 
independence. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that an equitable boundary between Libya and Malta 
must be to the south of a notional median line between 
Libya and Sicily; for that is the line, as we have 
seen, which allows no effect at all to the islands of 
Malta. The position of such a median line, employing 
the base-lines on the coasts of Sicily established by 
the Italian Government, may be defined for present 
purposes by its intersection with the meridian 
15*10'E; according to the information supplied to the 
Court, this intersection is at about latitude 34036'N. 
The course of that line evidently does not run 
parallel to that of the median line between Malta and 
Libya, but its form is, it is understood, not greatly 
different. The equidistance line drawn between Malta 
and Libya (excluding as base-point the 
islet of 
Filfla), according to the information available to the 
Court#, intersects that same meridian 15*101E at 
approximately 34*121N. A transposition northwards 
through 24 minutes of latitude of the Malta-Libya 
median line would therefore be the extreme 
limit of 
such northward adjustment. " 
130) 
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Admittedly this consideration of the "general 
geography" context is not the only factor motivating the 
transposition of the initial median line, which is effected 
in conjunction with other factors, notably the disparity in 
lengths of the relevant Maltese and Libyan coasts and the 
considerable distance between them. 
131) 
Yet the broad 
contextual consideration as such would seem to be 
susceptible of criticism. It is perfectly true, as Judge 
Schwebel says in his dissenting opinion, that the islands 
of Malta, in their general geographical context, appear as 
a relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea. 
132) 
However that may be, they are as a whole an independent 
State, and the principle of sovereign equality of States 
should apply to the relationship between Libya and Malta. 
As Judge Schwebel aptly states, "the general geographical 
context operates neither for nor against either Malta or 
Libya; rather, what operates for each of them is the 
extent, configuration and situation of its coastal 
fronts-relative, however, to those of opposite and 
adjacent States. " 
133) It is therefore in conjunction with 
the other relevant circumstances that the Court's 
transposition of the median line may be justified. 
If, unlike the Court's choice of a portion of the 
Libyan coasts which makes the ratio of lengths of the 
Maltese and Libyan coasts 1 to 8. the entire stretch of the 
Libyan coast were included in a calculation of 
proportionality, the disproportion between Libya's and 
Malta's coasts would be so extreme that, if proportionality 
were to be taken as a method of delimitation---which the 
Court disclaims-, Malta might have very little or no 
continental shelf at all. 
134) It may be doubted whether 
this would be an equitable result. it is true that the 
Court gives no good reason for the choice of a 
transposition of the median line through 18 minutes of 
latitude, but the delimitation of a boundary line which 
accords to the Parties continental shelf areas at 
the ratio 
of some 3.8 to Libya and 1 to Malta 
135) 
could perhaps, if 
reluctantly, be said more equitable than one which 
would 
give very little or no share to Malta. 
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b) Consideration of actual circumstances 
In the Grisbadarna arbitration of 1909 the tribunal 
was asked to determine the seaward portion of the 
territorial sea boundary between Norway and Sweden. The 
basis of decision, as well as the issue, was laid down in 
Article 3 of the compromis of 14 March 1908: "le tribunal 
aura a fixer ... en tenant compte des circonstances de fait 
et des principes du droit international. " 136) In this 
connexion there was a further understanding that "les 
lignes limitant la zone, qui peut 8tre 11objet du litige 
par suite des conclusions des parties, et dans laquelle la 
ligne fronti6re sera par cons6quent 6tablie, ne doivent pas 
8tre trac6e de fagon a comprendre ni des Iles, ni des 
ilots, ni des r6cifs qui ne sont pas constamment sous 
lleau". 137) The tribunal was thus authorized to take into 
account "des circonstances de fait" and "des Iles", "des 
ilots" and "des r6cifs qui ne sont pas constamment sous 
lleau", along with the application of the principles of 
international law. 
The tribunal shows three main considerations of equity 
which, combined together, contribute to the eventual 
delimitation of a single maritime boundary line. First, it 
notes that the parties are agreed on the great 
inconveniences which would result from a boundary line 
dividing the important fishing banks. 
138) Such a line, 
however, would have been drawn on the basis of the 
automatic division of maritime territory as a result of the 
Roskilde peace treaty of 1658, for the line should have 
been drawn perpendicularly to the general direction of the 
coast, extending towards the west at about 20' to the 
south. If it were drawn at an angle of 19* instead of 200, 
the line would completely avoid the mentioned 
inconveniences and run between the two important banks of 
the Grisbadarna and the Skj6ttegrunde. 
139) 
Secondly, the tribunal finds that Sweden has a far 
better record of utilization and management of the 
Grisbadarna than Norway: 
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une d6marcation qui attribue les Grisbadarna 
a la Su6de se trouve appuy6e par 1'ensemble de 
plusieurs circonstances de fait, qui ont et6 releve'es 
aux cours des d6bats, et dont les principales sont les 
suivantes: 
a) la circonstance que la p8che aux homards aux 
bas-fonds de Grisbadarna a 6t6 exerc6e depuis un temps 
bien plus recul6, dans une bien plus large mesure et 
avec un bien plus grand nombre de p8cheurs par les 
ressortissants de la Su6de que par ceux de la Norvege; 
b) la circonstance que la SuE)de a effectu6 dans 
les parages de Grisbadarna, surtout dans les derniers 
temps, des actes multiples eman6s de sa conviction que 
ces parages 6taient su6dois, comme, par exemple, le 
balisage, le mesurage de la mer et. 11installation d1un 
bateau-phare, lesquels actes entrainaient des frais 
consid6rables et par lesquels elle ne croyait pas 
seulement. exercer un droit mais bien plus encore 
accomplir un devoir; tandis que la Norvoge, de son 
propre aveu, sous ces divers rapports s'est souci6e 
bien moins ou presque pas de tout de ces parages. " 
140) 
Concerning circumstance a) above, the tribunal states that 
"dans le droit des gens, clest un principe bien 6tabli, 
qulil faut slabstenir autant que possible de modifier 
1'6tat des choses existant de fait et depuis longtemps", 
adding that this principle should be applied especially 
with respect to private interests which, once 
damaged, 
could not be safeguarded effectively. 
141) 
Thirdly, the tribunal accepts the Norwegian interests 
in the Skj6ttegrunde: 
"* 00 une 
d6marcation, qui attribue les 
Skj6ttegrunde--la partie la moins importante 
du 
territoire litigieux--a la Norv8ge se trouve 
suffisamment appuy6e, de son c6t6, par 
la circonstance 
de fait s6rieuse que, quoiquIon doive conclure 
des 
divers documents et t6moignages, que les p6cheurs 
Su6dois--comme il a 6t6 dit plus haut--ont exerc6 
la 
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p6che dans les parages en litige depuis un temps plus 
recul6-, dans une plus large mesure et en plus grand 
nombre, il est certain d'autre part que les p8cheurs 
Norv6giens n'y ont 6t6 jamais exclus de la p8che; ... 
en outre il est. av6r6 qulaux Skjbttegrunde, les 
p6cheurs Norv6giens ont presque de tout temps, et 
d1une maniere relativement bien plus efficace qu'aux 
Grisbadarna, pris part & la p6che aux homards. , 
142) 
It is an equitable consideration that the tribunal has 
dealt with the Skj6ttegrunde, "the less important part of 
the disputed territory", with so much care as would have 
been due to that area. 
Thus the tribunal would seem to have struck the 
balance equitably, attributing the Grisbadarna in its 
entirety to Sweden and the Skj6ttegrunde in its entirety to 
Norway and thereby drawing the boundary line between these 
major fishing banks. 
An equitable consideration of actual circumstances, 
though on a minor scale, was shown in the Beagle Channel 
case of 1977 in the tracing of the boundary line: 
"In drawing its own line ... the Court has been 
guided by the considerations indicated in Annex IV 
hereto (which shows how the line has been traced), --in 
particular by mixed factors of appurtenance, coastal 
configuration, equidistance, and also of convenience, 
navigability, and the desirability of enabling each 
Party so far as possible to navigate in its own 
waters. None of this has resulted in much deviation 
from the strict median line except, for obvious 
reasons, near Gable Island where the habitually used 
navigable track has been followed. , 
143) 
Annex IV states in part: 
"The Boundary-Line itself is the resultant of 
construction lines drawn between opposite, shore to 
shore,, points, sometimes to or from straight 
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baselines. It is in principle a median line, adjusted 
in certain relatively unimportant respects for reasons 
of local configuration or of better navigability for 
the Parties. Over the whole course, account has been 
taken of sand banks, siltings, etc. which would make a 
strict median-line unfair, as in the case of certain 
islets or rocks. , 
144) 
Judge Gros, in his Declaration, presents a broader approach 
of viewing the case within the whole "complex" of events 
and circumstances--not only with respect to the tracing of 
the boundary line but the whole context of the dispute. 
Although he has reached the same conclusion as the Court, 
he has done so as a result of taking account of the "whole 
complex comprising the text, its historical origins, the 
general political circumstances of the negotiations, and 
the explanation given by the negotiators and 
statesmen". 
145) 
The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977 has, 
in its aspect of the Channel Islands region, a similar 
treatment of the actual circumstances. The basis of 
decision as provided in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the 
compromis--"the rules of international law applicable in 
the matter as between the Parties"--is interpreted by the 
Court as not foreclosing the appreciation of the conditions 
of the Channel Islands. 
"The political status of the Channel Islands 
yis-a-vis France for the purpose of the delimitation 
of the continental shelf is, therefore, a matter to be 
appraised by this Court itself. " 
146) 
Thus the Court does not "deny all relevance to the size and 
importance of the Channel Islands which ... may properly 
be 
taken into account in balancing the equities in this 
147) 
region" . 
Another point of interest is the Court's consideration 
for the potential extension to 12 miles of the territorial 
sea of the Islands. After reciting the French and 
British 
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establishment of 12-mile fishery zones, the French 
extension of her territorial sea to 12 miles and a 
potential British extension of her territorial sea to 12 
miles, the Court states: 
"Consequently, the Court has to take account of 
the fact that, apart from their three-mile zone of 
territorial sea the Channel Islands have an existing 
fishery zone of 12 miles, expressly recognized by the 
French Republic, and the potentiality of an extension 
of their territorial sea from three to 12 miles. " 
148) 
As a result of this the Court is later to award a belt of 
12-mile continental shelf to the Islands, an enclave of 
British continental shelf area lying within the French 
continental shelf area, instead of sticking to the strictly 
positivist position. 
149) 
c) Legal ties based on tribal and religious 
backgrounds- 
In the Western Sahara case of 1975, the International 
Court of Justice was requested by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations to give an advisory opinion on these 
questions: 
"I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El 
Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a 
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Whilst finding that there existed "legal ties of allegiance 
between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living 
in the territory of Western Sahara" and that there existed 
"rights, including some rights relating to the land, which 
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constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity ... 
and the territory of Western Sahara",, the Court did not see 
"any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory 
of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the 
Mauritanian entity" established. 
151) 
In this finding may 
be seen no particular trait of equitable consideration. 
152) 
But in recognizing the existence of "legal ties" 
between Western Sahara and her neighbours, the Court may 
well be understood to have presented a new interpretation 
of the word "legal", somewhat different from its 
traditional, Western-oriented meaning. 
153) As background 
for such interpretation,, the Court first introduces the 
peculiar characteristics of the area concerned. 
"At the time of its colonization by Spain, the 
area of this desert ... was being exploited, because 
of its low and spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively 
by nomads, pasturing their animals or growing crops as 
and where conditions were favourable. It may be said 
that the territory, at the time of its colonization, 
had a sparse population that, for the most part, 
consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which 
traversed the desert on more or less regular routes 
dictated by the seasons and the wells or water-holes 
available to them. 
154) 
"In consequence,, the nomadic routes of none of 
them were confined to Western Sahara; some passed also 
through areas of southern Morocco, or of present-day 
Mauritania or Algeria, and some even through further 
countries. All the tribes were of the Islamic faith 
and the whole territory lay within the Dar al- 
Islam. 155) In general, authority in the tribe was 
vested in a sheikhr subject to the assent of the 
liumalat, that is, of an assembly of its leading 
members, and the tribe had its own customary 
law 
applicable in conjunction with the Koranic 
law. Not 
infrequently one tribe had ties with another, either 
of dependence or of alliance, which were essentially 
tribal rather than territorial, ties of allegiance or 
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vassalage.,, 
156) 
It is against such background that the Court holds: 
"It is in the context of such a territory and such 
a social and political organization of the population 
that the Court has to examine the question of the 
'legal ties' between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity at the time of 
colonization by Spain. , 157) 
While being within the bounds of a legal consideration in 
the light of the implications of Article 9 of the Statute 
of the Court, 
158) 
such a consideration is undoubtedly an 
equitable one in that it is intended for a realization of 
justice under the particular circumstances of the case. 
d) Geographical realities, decisive 
The very peculiar geographical conditions of the 
coastal State, together with the local population's 
livelihood dependent on such geographical realities, were 
considered decisive in determining the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured in the 
Fisheries case of 1951. The crucial point was the 
"skjaergaard" ,a chain of outlying islands at a short 
distance from the mainland of Norway, which Norway claimed 
should constitute base-points for drawing a series of 
straight baselines. The Court states: 
"Within the ' ski aergaard I, almost every island has 
its large and its small bays; countless arms of the 
sea, straits, channels and mere waterways serve as a 
means of communication for the local population which 
inhabits the islands as it does the mainland. The 
coast of the mainland does not constitute, as it does 
in practically all other countries, a clear dividing 
line between land and sea. What matters, what really 
constitutes the Norwegian coast line, is the outer 
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line of 'skjaergaard'. 
"The whole of this region is mountainous. The 
North Cape, a sheer rock little more than 300 meters 
high, can be seen from a considerable distance; there 
are other summits rising to over a thousand metres, so 
that the Norwegian coast, mainland and 'skjaergaard', 
is visible from far off. 
"Along the coast are situated comparatively 
shallow banks, veritable under-water terraces which 
constitute fishing grounds where fish are particularly 
abundant; these grounds were known to Norwegian 
fishermen and exploited by them from time immemorial. 
Since these banks lay within the range of vision, the 
most desirable fishing grounds were always located and 
identified by means of the method of alignments 
(Imeds'), at points where two lines drawn between 
points selected on the coast or on islands 
intersected. 
159) 
"In these barren regions the inhabitants of the 
coastal zone derive their livelihood from fishing. 
"Such are the realities which must be borne in 
mind in appraising the validity of the United Kingdom 
contention that the limits of the Norwegian fisheries 
zone laid down in the 1935 Decree are contrary to 
international law. " 
160) 
The Court then concludes on the impact of such geographical 
realities on the delimitation of the territorial sea: 
"The Court f inds itself obliged to decide whether 
the relevant low-water mark is that of the mainland or 
of the Iskjaergaard'. Since the mainland is bordered 
in its western sector by the Iskjaergaard', which 
constitutes a whole with the mainland, it is the outer 
line of the 'skjaergaard' which must be taken into 
account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian 
territorial waters. This solution is dictated by 
_geographic 
realities. " 
161) (Emphasis added) 
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e) Presence of islands asa special circumstance 
In the An lo-French Continental Shelf case, the 
Channel Islands region was one of the two main areas which, 
in the view of the Court of Arbitration, presented 
difficulties in discharging its task. The French argued 
that because of their proximity to the French coast, they 
would create inequity if given full effect as British 
territory, and that they constituted a "special 
circumstance" in the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf of 1958.162) The United Kingdom 
contended that the Channel Islands, because of their large 
size and legal and economic importance, could not 
constitute a "special circumstance" which only very small 
islands could constituter as the travaux pr6paratoires of 
the Convention show. 
163) 
To the Court the controversial 
Islands appeared to be prima facie "a special circumstance" 
within the meaning of Article 6. It also thought them to 
constitute "a circumstance creative of inequity" merely 
prima facie. 
164) In the opinion of the Court, the solution 
must be equitable "in relation to both Parties and in the 
light of all the relevant circumstances"o 
165) 
It is in search of such a solution that the Court 
attempted an "intermediate solution" which would effect a 
"more appropriate and a more equitable balance between the 
respective claims and interests of the Parties". 
166) This 
is how the twofold "intermediate solution" was conceived: 
"First, in order to maintain the appropriate 
balance between the two States in relation to the 
continental shelf as riparian States of the Channel 
with approximately equal coastlines, the Court decides 
that the primary boundary between them shall be a 
median line, ... In 
delimiting its course in the 
Channel Islands region, .. the Channel 
Islands 
themselves are to be disregarded, since their 
continental shelf must be the subject of a second and 
separate delimitation. 
"The second part of the solution is to delimit a 
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second boundary establishing, vis-a-vis the Channel 
Islands, the southern limit of the continental shelf 
held by the Court to be appurtenant to the French 
Republic in this region to the south of the mid- 
Channel median line. This second boundary must not, 
in the opinion of the Court, be so drawn as to allow 
the continental shelf of the French Republic to 
encroach upon the established 12-mile fishery zone of 
the Channel Islands. The Court therefore further 
decides that this boundary shall be drawn at a 
distance of 12 nautical miles from the established 
baselines of the territorial sea of the Channel 
Islands. The effect will be to accord to the French 
Republic a substantial band of continental shelf in 
mid-Channel which is continuous with its continental 
shelf to the east and west of the Channel Islands 
region; and at the same time to leave to the Channel 
islands, to their north and to their west, a zone of 
sea-bed and subsoil extending 12 nautical miles from 
the baselines of the two Bailiwicks. " 
167) 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, the 
Island of Jerba and the Kerkennah Islands were 
circumstances which called for consideration. 
168) Since 
the presence of the Island of Jerba was in the end given no 
special effect in favour of the other prevailing 
considerations, 
169) it suffices here to treat the existence 
and position of the Kerkannah Islands. This factor was 
considered by the Court in the broad context of calculating 
the bearing of a line as reflecting the general direction 
of the Tunisian coastline from its most westerly point 
north-eastward. The Court first evaluates the position of 
the Islands. 
"The general change in direction of the Tunisian 
coast may, in the view of the Court, 
be regarded as 
expressed in a line drawn from the most westerly point 
of the Gulf of Gab6s ... to Ras 
Kaboudia, and the 
Court notes that the bearing of this 
line is 
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approximately 421 to the meridian. To the east of 
this line, however, lie the Kerkennah Islands 
surrounded by islets and low-tide elevations, and 
constituting by their size and position a circumstance 
relevant for the delimitation, and to which the Court 
must therefore attribute some effect. ... In these 
geographical circumstances, the Court has to take into 
account not only the islands, but also the low-tide 
elevations which, while they do not, as do islands, 
have any continental shelf of their own, do enjoy some 
recognition in international law for certain purposes, 
as is shown by the 1958 Geneva Conventions as well as 
the draft convention on the Law of the Sea. ... a line 
drawn from [the most westerly point of the Gulf of 
Gab6s] along the seaward coast of the actual islands 
would clearly run at a bearing of approximately 62* to 
the meridian. However,, the Court considers that to 
cause the delimitation line to veer even as far as 
620, to run parallel to the coastline, would, in the 
circumstances of the case, amount to giving excessive 
weight to the Kerkennahs. , 
170) 
Without further specifying the reason or reasons why a 
delimitation line running parallel to the Kerkennah 
coastline would amount to giving excessive weight to the 
Islands, 
171) the Court goes on to propose a "half-effect" 
or "half-angle" method, perhaps drawing on a similar method 
used in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case: 
"Taking into account the position of the Kerkennah 
Islands, and the low-tide elevations around them, the 
Court considers that it should go so far as to 
attribute to the Islands a 'half-effect'. ... on this 
basis the delimitation line, seawards of the parallel 
of the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gab6s, 
is to 
be parallel to a line drawn from that point bisecting 
the angle between the line of the Tunisian coast 
(420) 
and the line along the seaward coast of the Kerkennah 
Islands (62"), that is to say at an angle of 52* to 
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the meridian. 11172) 
Still another equitable consideration can be found in 
an arbitral tribunal allowing a 12-mile belt of territorial 
sea around an island as envisaged in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. In the 
arbitration between Guinea and Guinea Bissau on the 
maritime boundary delimitation of 14 February 1985, the 
tribunal was requested to draw the boundary line. 173) In 
interpreting the boundary treaty of 1886 between France and 
Portugal, former colonial powers of the parties, the 
tribunal considered the phrase of "limite sud" in Article 
1, paragraph 5, as a factor to be taken into account for an 
equitable delimitation of that portion of the boundary line 
which should run from the coast to the north of the 
Alcatraz Island. It was a line 2.25 miles north of the 
island. In the words of the tribunal, 
"Ensuite ladite limite emprunte le parall6le de 
100401 de latitude nord et passe A 2,25 milles marins 
au nord de Me d'Alcatraz, qui est la possession la 
plus occidentale de la Guin6e. ... Pour tous ces 
motifs, le Tribunal slestime fond6 2i consid6rer la 
'limite sud' jusquIA la hauteur d'Alcatraz comme un 
facteur dont il doit tenir compte en vue d1une 
d6limitation tendant a obtenir un r6sultat 
6quitable, " 174) 
In what it deems to be an equitable solution, howeverr the 
tribunal awards a belt of 12 miles to the west of the 
island: 
"Puisque ... 11ile en question n1auralt 
que 2,25 
milles marins d'eaux territoriales vers le nord et 
qulil existe d'autant moins de motif de 
lui en 
accorder plus dans cette direction que la Ilimite sud' 
marque la revendication maximale de la Guin6e 
dans ses 
conclusions, le Tribunal consid6rerait comme 
6quitable 
de lui attribuer au moins vers 11ouest les 
12 milles 
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marins pr6vus par la convention sur le droit de la mer 
de 1982, sans toutefois tenir compte des rg-cifs. La 
'limite sudl pourrait donc Atre adopt6e jusqu'a 12 
milles ä llouest d'Alcatraz; ... 175) 
2) Consideration of economic factors 
a) Consideration of local economic interests 
In the Behring Sea Fur Seal arbitration of 1893, the 
tribunal gave an equitable exceptional consideration for 
the interests of the local Indian population living on 
their traditional fur seal fishing. Under the compromis of 
29 February 1892, the tribunal was to proceed "impartially 
and carefully examine and decide the questions" 
176) 
concerning "the jurisdictional rights of the United States 
in the waters of Behring Sea, and concerning also the 
preservation of the fur-seal in or habitually resorting to 
the said sea, and the rights of the citizens and subjects 
of either country as regards the taking of fur-seal in or 
habitually resorting to the said waters. , 
177) It decided, 
as matters of law, on the five specified points which it 
was asked by the compromis to answer. On Point 5, the crux 
of the controversy, it held that "the United States has not 
any right of protection or property in the fur-seals 
frequenting the islands of the United States in Behring 
Sea, when such seals are found outside the ordinary 3-mile 
limit,,. 178) 
This decision, however, seems to have been balanced, 
as it were,, by a set of "concurrent Regulations" setting 
forth the rules to be observed by fur-seal fishers of 
either party, which are of a restrictive nature. 
179) 
Article 8 thereof provides: 
" The regulations contained in the preceding 
articles shall not apply to Indians dwelling on the 
coasts of the territory of the United States or of 
Great Britain,, and carrying on fur-seal fishing in 
canoes or undecked boats not transported by or used 
in 
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connection with other vessels and propelled wholly by 
paddles, oars, or sails, and manned by not more than 
five persons each in the way hitherto practised by the 
Indians, provided such Indians are not in the 
employment of other persons, and provided that, when 
so hunting in canoes or undecked boats, they shall not 
hunt fur seals outside of territorial waters under 
contract for the delivery of the skins to any person. 
11180) 000 
Thus the aborigines were given certain preferential 
treatment, provided they fished on their own in their 
traditional manner. 
The local economic interests were taken into account, 
in addition to the peculiar geographical realities, in the 
determination of the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured in the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries case. In the description of the peculiar 
geographical features and configurations of the Norwegian 
coasts,, the International Court of Justice briefly refers 
to the basic economic conditions of the local people: 
"In these barren regions the inhabitants of the 
coastal zone derive their livelihood essentially from 
fishing. , 181) 
This is confirmed later with more emphasis: 
"Finally, there is 
overlooked, the scope o., 
geographical factors: 
interests peculiar to 
importance of which are 
usage. 1,182) 
one consideration not to be 
E which extends beyond purely 
that of certain economic 
a region, the reality and 
clearly evidenced by a long 
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Merits) of 1974, 
the International Court of Justice recognized the 
preferential fishing rights of the coastal State in a 
situation of special dependence on coastal fisheries. 
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Originating in the proposals submitted by Iceland at the 
Geneva Conference of 1958, the concept of preferential 
rights for coastal State, while having failed to obtain the 
necessary majority at the Conference, was in effect 
incorporated in a resolution concerning the situation of 
countries or territories whose people are overwhelmingly 
dependent upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood or 
economic development. 
183) Then at the 1960 Conference it 
was embodied in a joint amendment presented by Brazil, Cuba 
and Uruguay, which in turn was incorporated by a 
substantial vote into a joint United States-Canada proposal 
concerning a 6-mile territorial sea and an additional 
6-mile fishery zone subject to a phasing-out period. 
184) 
Some State practice also endorses the trend. The Court is 
explicit in recognizing the concept of such preferential 
rights as customary law: 
"Two concepts have crystallized as customary law 
in recent years arising out of the general consensus 
revealed at that Conference [of 19601. ... The second 
is the concept of preferential rights of fishing in 
adjacent waters in favour of the coastal State in a 
situation of special dependence on its coastal 
fisheries .... , 
185) 
Indeed Iceland's exceptional dependence on its fisheries 
had been explicitly recognized by the United Kingdom, the 
186) 
Applicant, in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961, 
and the Court took judicial note of it by declaring that it 
was "necessary to bear in mind the exceptional dependence 
of the Icelandic nation upon coastal fisheries for its 
livelihood and economic development". 
187) 
b) Presence of mineral resources astride the boundaEy 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the unity of 
mineral deposits was considered as a factual element to be 
taken into account in the delimitation of continental shelf 
boundaries. Indeed as the Truman Proclamation of 1945 
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shows, the very idea of a legal regime for the continental 
shelf started with the desire to exploit the mineral 
resources. But, as the Court says, 
"it frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on 
both sides of the line dividing a continental shelf 
between two States, and since it is possible to 
exploit such a deposit from either side, a problem 
immediately arises on account of the risk of 
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other 
of the States concerned. , 
188) 
While taking note of some State practice in the North Sea 
region in the matter of the unity of deposits, however, the 
Court does not consider it anything more than "a factual 
element which it is reasonable to take into consideration 
in the course of negotiations for a delimitation". 
189) As 
one of the alternative solutions, the Court shows the 
r6gime of joint development, an equitable and practical 
form of solution, in one of the two "principles and rules 
of international law applicable to the delimitation as 
between the Parties of the ... continental shelf 
in the 
North Sea" which should guide the negotiations of the 
Parties: 
11 if ... the delimitation 
leaves to the Parties areas 
that overlap, these are to be divided between them in 
agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, 
unless they decide on a r6gime of joint jurisdiction, 
user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any 
part of them. " 
190) 
Judge Jessup, in his separate opinion, presents a 
number of economic factors which he believes to merit 
consideration in a delimitation, on the basis of an 
extensive study of the practice of States, especially the 
Parties to the case. 
191) 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, Judge ad 
hoc Evensen propounds a system of joint development area 
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formed by two lines at an angle of 10*-15* on both sides of his proposed delimitation line. Based on the idea that an 
arrangement for joint development over restricted 
overlapping areas may be "a corollary to other equity 
considerations", 
192) 
he presents, first, an adjusted 
equidistance line starting from the point where the "de 
facto line from Ras Ajdir at an angle of 26* east of 
north" 
193) intersects the 12-mile territorial sea limit. 
He proposes such an adjusted line to veer from this point 
in a direction some 461-47* (north-east). Then he sets out 
a joint exploitation zone: 
"on both sides of the straightened line a line 
veering some 100-150 from the delimitation line should 
be drawn. The areas thus indicated should be of 
approximately the same size. The two areas thus 
indicated should constitute a joint exploitation 
zone. , 
194) 
c) Avoidance of probable inconveniences by tilting 
the boundary line 
In the Grisbadarna case, the expected inconveniences 
which the application of a treaty would have caused to the 
parties were avoided by tilting the delimitation line by a 
degree. The Roskilde peace treaty of 1658 provided for an 
automatic division of maritime territory, but the dividing 
line would have been drawn, on a rational basis, 
perpendicularly to the general direction of the coast. 
Thus the line should extend westwards at an angle of about 
20" south of west. 
195) But it would have cut across the 
Grisbadarna bank, causing a great inconvenience as the 
parties admitted. The tribunal tilted the line by a degree 
to avoid it. 
11 o9. les Parties sont dI accord 
A reconnaitre le grand 
inconv6nient qulil y aurait a tracer la ligne 
frontiere a travers des bancs importants; 
une ligne de frontie're, trac6e du point XX dans 
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la direction de 110uest, a 19 degr6s au Sud, 6viterait 
comple"tement cet inconv6nient puis quIelle passerait 
juste au Nord des Grisbadarna et au Sud des 
Ski6ttegrunde et quIelle ne couperait non plus aucun 
autre banc important. " 196) 
This was not an independent motivation of the solution, 
but, together with a consideration of actual circumstances, 
provided an equitable solution. 
197) 
Consideration of the existence of a de facto Eoundary 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, the Court 
indicated several relevant circumstances to be taken into 
account in achieving an equitable delimitation, one of 
which was a de facto maritime boundary line as evidenced in 
the conduct of the parties prior to 1974 in the grant of 
petroleum concessions. Such a line is supported by some 
evidence, according to the Court: the initial grants of 
concessions for offshore exploration and exploitation of 
oil and gas; its correspondence to the line perpendicular 
to the coast at the end of the land frontier; virtual 
observance of it in subsequent concessions; and its 
correspondence to the fisheries jurisdiction line of a 
modus vivendi during the colonial days. 
The Court reasons as follows: 
lie 0. the Court could not 
fail to note the 
existence of a de facto line from Ras Adjir at an 
angle of some 261 east of north, which was the result 
of the manner in which both Parties initially granted 
concessions for offshore exploration and exploitation 
of oil and gas. This line of adjoining concessions, 
which was tacitly respected for a number of years, and 
which approximately corresponds furthermore to the 
line perpendicular to the coast at the frontier point 
which had in the past been observed as a de facto 
maritime limit, does appar to the Court to constitute 
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a circumstance of great relevance for the 
delimitation. , 198) 
Such a line is supported by the subsequent conduct of the 
parties, which the Court describes in these words: 
"The circumstance ... which the Court finds to be 
highly relevant to the determination of the method of 
delimitation is a circumstance related to the conduct 
of the Parties. ... the history of the enactment of 
petroleum licensing legislation by each Party, and the 
grant of successive petroleum concessions, during the 
period from 1955 up to the signing of the Special 
Agreement,, shows that ... the phenomenon of actual 
overlapping of claims did not appear until 1974, and 
then only in respect of areas some 50 miles from the 
coast. A Tunisian enlarged concession of 21 October 
1966 was bounded on the east by a 'stepped' line (a 
form apparently dictated by the grid/block system for 
grant concession) the eastern angles of which lay on a 
straight line at a bearing of approximately 260 to the 
meridian. In 1968 Libya granted a concession (No. 137) 
'lying to the eastward of a line running south/ 
southwest from the point 330551N, 120E to a point 
about one nautical mile offshore' the angle thereof 
viewed from Ras Ajdir being 26*; the western 
boundaries of subsequent Libyan concessions followed 
the same line, which Libya has explained, 'followed 
the direction of the Tunisian concessions'. The 
result was ... a de facto line 
dividing concession 
areas which were the subject of active claims, in the 
sense that exploration activities were authorized by 
one Party, without interference, or (until 1976) 
protests, by the other. The Court does not of course 
overlook the fact that the areas to which a legal 
claim was asserted by both Parties were more 
far-reaching; Libya claimed sovereign rights as far 
west as the ZV 45* line, and in 1974 adopted an 
equidistance line as south-eastern boundary of its 
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concessions. The actual situation, however, was that 
which has just been described. 199) 
"[The de facto line] was drawn by each of the two 
States separately, Tunisia being the first to do so, 
for purposes of delimiting the eastward and westward 
boundaries of petroleum concession, a fact which, in 
view of the issues at the heart of the dispute between 
Tunisia and Libya, has great relevance. , 
200) 
During the colonial days a modus vivendi was entered into 
concerning the delimitation of a fisheries jurisdiction 
line at approximately 260 to the meridian. 
"A further relevant circumstance is that the 26" 
line thus adopted was neither arbitrary nor without 
precedent in the relations between the two States. ... 
The Court has already indicated how, in the relations 
between France and Italy during the period when these 
States were responsible for the external relations of 
present-day Tunisia and Libya, there came into 
existence a modus vivendi concerning the lateral 
delimitation of fisheries jurisdiction expressed in de 
facto respect for a line drawn from the land frontier 
at approximately 261 to the meridian ... which was 
proposed on the basis that it was perpendicular to the 
coast, " 
201) 
3) Balancing-up of relevant circumstances 
Experience shows that the consideration of individual 
relevant circumstances as independent, separate 
factors 
unrelated to each other is not enough for an equitable 
settlement of the dispute, but that a weighing of the 
equities of the parties or all those circumstances 
is 
necessary for such a settlement. Apart from 
how it was 
applied in the arbitration, which is analyzed elsewhere 
under another heading, the compromis of 2 February 
1897 for 
the British Guiana-Venezuela boundary arbitrationy Article 
4, provides an example: 
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it (C) In determining the boundary-line, if 
territory of one Party be found by the Tribunal to 
have been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation 
of the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such 
effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, 
justice, the principles of international law, and the 
equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the 
Tribunal, require, , 
202) (Emphasis added) 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, a general 
comment to such effect is made in considering the relevant 
circumstances to be taken into account for an equitable 
boundary delimitation: 
11 ... there is no legal limit to the considerations 
which States may take account of for the purpose of 
making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and 
more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such 
considerations that will produce this result rather 
than reliance on one to the exclusion of all others. 
The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to 
different considerations naturally varies with the 
circumstances of the case. " 
203) 
In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977,, 
the Court of Arbitration, after deciding that the legal 
rules to be applied in the Channel Islands region are those 
of customary internation law, rather than of Article 6 of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, discusses the 
principle of natural prolongation which is thought 
applicable under customary international law. Unlike some 
misunderstanding by writers of the status which the 
International Court of Justice has placed on the principle 
of natural prolongation in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases, 
204) the Court of Arbitration gives a relative weight 
to it by balancing it with other relevant circumstances. 
If the force of the principle of natural prolongation of 
land territory were absolute, an island, large or small, 
would block the natural prolongation of the territory of 
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the nearby mainland, as in the Channel Islands region. As 
the Court says, "The question of the appurtenance to the 
Channel Islands of the areas of continental shelf extending 
to their north and north-west is not therefore resolved 
merely by referring to the principle of natural 
prolongation of territory. " 
205) 
In more general terms, the 
Court goes on to say, the application of the principle has 
to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant 
geographical and other considerations of law and 
equity. 
206) 
Thus the Court proceeds to devise the 
"intermediate solution" of awarding an enclave of 
continental shelf area around the Channel Islands to their 
north and north-west, which all lies within the French area 
of the continental shelf. 
207) 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982, 
judge ad hoc Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, discussing in his 
separate opinion the equidistance method and equitable 
principles under the head of "New Accepted Trends at the 
Third UNCLOS", one of the three factors which the Court was 
requested by the compromis to take account of in rendering 
its decision, 208) makes reference to the balancing of 
relevant circumstances: 
Ile 00 the application of equidistance and of 
equitable principles are not to be viewed as two 
distinct and successive phases, nor as requiring that 
equitable principles are only to be resorted to after 
applying equidistance, in order to correct its result. 
There is no such succession in time and the process 
must be a simultaneous one. All the relevant 
circumstances are to be considered and balanced; they 
are to be thrown together into the crucible and their 
interaction will yield the correct equitable solution 
of each individual case. " 
209) 
While the metaphor of the crucible may be unconvincing, it 
should be to his credit that he pointed out that "All the 
relevant circumstances are to be considered and balanced". 
- 184 - 
4) Equitable balancinq of interests of the parties 
a) Practical req ulation of a positive ri ght in 
reciprocation to its recog nition - in p rinciple 
In the Behr, ing Sea Fur Seal Fi case of 1893, of 
the five questions submitted to the arbitral tribunal for 
decision, point 5, the crucial one, was worded as follows: 
"Has the United States any right, and if so, what 
right of protection or property in the fur seals 
frequenting the islands of the United States in 
Behring Sea when such seals are found outside the 
ordinary three-mile limit? " 210) 
The tribunal held, by a majority of 5: 
the United States has not any right of protection 
or property in the fur seals frequenting the islands 
of the United States in Behring Sea, when such seals 
are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit. " 
211) 
Thus the right of the British nationals, as of any other 
countries,, to take fur seals on the high seas or outside 
the territorial sea of the United States was recognized. 
But the set of "concurrent Regulations" which was drafted 
by the three neutral arbitrators and acceded to by one of 
the British arbitrators provided for some restrictive 
measures. Article 1 bans totally any killing, capture or 
pursuit of fur seals within a zone of 60 miles around the 
Pribilov Islands; Article 2 provides for a close season of 
1 May to 31 July both inclusive in the specified parts of 
the north Pacific Ocean; Articles 3 to 7 stipulate modes 
and procedures of fishing operations; Article 8 excepts the 
aboriginal Indians from the restrictive measures; and 
Article 9 lays down the duration of the Regulations. 
212) 
In the words of the United States Agent, the Regulations 
were drafted "for the protection and preservation of the 
seal herd" consistent with the tribunal's decision on point 
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5.213) In this sense it would seem that an equitable 
balance was struck between the decision on point 5 and the 
Regulations. 
b) Reciprocity of the performances of the parties 
In the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case of 1937, 
Judge Hudson appended an individual opinion in which he 
developed an extensive discussion of equity. On the basis 
of a general discussion of equity in international law, he 
places the Netherlands and Belgium on even ground so far as 
their respective "Locks" in question were concerned under 
the treaty of 1863, in reply to the Netherlands contention 
that the feeding of certain canals by the Neerhaeren Lock 
with water taken from the Meuse elsewhere than at 
Maestricht is contrary to the Treaty of 1863 and that 
Belgium should discontinue that feeding. 
As a result of a brief comparative description of 
Bosscheveld Lock in the Netherlands territory and the 
Neerhaeren Lock in Belgian territory, 
214) he places the two 
Locks on an equal footing in respect of their physical 
aspects: 
"The Bosscheveld Lock and the Neerhaeren Lock are 
thus alike, in that the operation of each of them 
results in supplying to the Zuid-Willemsvaart a 
considerable quantity of lock-water taken from the 
Meuse but not by the conventional prise d'eau. 1,215) 
An analysis of some relevant provisions of the Treaty of 
1863 Regulating the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse 
adds to the above conclusion: 
"It must be concluded that, in law as well as in 
fact, the Bosscheveld Lock and the Neerhaeren Lock are 
in the same position. The latter cannot be treated 
more unfavourably than the former. If the 
discharge 
of lock-water into the Zuid-Willemsvaart by one of 
these locks is in accordance with the Treaty, it is 
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equally so with respect to the other lock; if such 
discharge is a violation of the Treaty as to one lock, 
it is a violation also as to the other lock. 11 
216) 
Then he discusses equity as a part of international 
law in some detail, and concludes that "under Article 38 of 
the Statute,, if not independently of that Article,, the 
Court has some freedom to consider principles of equity as 
217) part of the international law which it must apply" . 
Based on this understanding of equity, he goes on to state: 
"It would seem to be an important principle of 
equity that where two parties have assumed an 
identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which 
is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that 
obligation should not be permitted to take advantage 
of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the 
other party. 
in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard 
for the limitations which are necessary, a tribunal 
bound by international law ought not to shrink from 
applying a principle of such obvious fairness. " 
218) 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus Judge Hudson argues for reciprocity between the 
parties: 
"As the moving Party, the Netherlands asks that 
the Belgian action with respect to the operation of 
the Neerhaeren Lock be declared contrary to the Treaty 
of 1863, and that Belgium be ordered to discontinue 
that action. Yet, in its operation of the Bosscheveld 
Lock, the Netherlands itself is now engaged in taking 
precisely similar action, similar in fact and similar 
in law. This seems to call for an application of the 
principle of equity stated above. 
"One result of applying the principle will be that 
even if the Court should be of the opinion that the 
Belgian action with regard to the functioning of the 
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Neerhaeren Lock is contrary to the Treaty of 1863, it 
should nevertheless refuse in this case to order 
Belgium to discontinue that action. In equity, the 
Netherlands is not in a position to have such relief 
decreed to her. Belgium cannot be ordered to 
discontinue the operation of the Neerhaeren Lock when 
the Netherlands is left free to continue the operation 
,, 219) of the Bosscheveld Lock. .. 0 
on one further point that the Netherlands request the Court 
to render a declaratory judgment for the protection against 
a continuance of the violation of the Treaty of 1863,, 
rather than for the reparation for a past violation 
thereof, Judge Hudson, while admitting that in 
international jurisprudence "a declaratory judgment will 
frequently have the same compulsive force as a mandatory 
judgment", concludes emphatically: 
11 In the circumstances of this case, on the 
assumption that the operation of both the Neerhaeren 
Lock and the Bosscheveld Lock is contrary to the 
Treaty of 1863, the Netherlands would not be entitled 
to a declaratory judgment for the same reason that it 
is not entitled to a mandatory judgment, " 
220) 
In a word Judge Hudson would seem to be based on the 
fundamental perception of fairness. 
5) Balanced obligation of the parties 
a) Obliýation of the upstream country to reconcile 
its interests with those of the downstream country 
In the Lake Lanoux case of 1957, the arbitral tribunal 
was asked to consider the two "questions fondamentales": 
"a) Les travaux dlutilisation des eaux du lac 
Lanoux, dans les conditions pr6vus au projet et aux 
propositions frangais vis6s au pr6ambule du compromis 
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constitueraient-ils, en eux-m8mes, une infraction au 
droits reconnus 'a 1'Espagne par les dispositions de 
fond du Trait6 de Bayonne du 26 mai 1866 et de llActe 
additionnel de la m8me date? 
"b) En cas de r6ponse n6gative 6 la question 
pr6c6dente, llex6cution dedits travaux constituerait- 
elle une infraction aux dispositions du Trait6 de 
Bayonne du 26 mai 1866 et. de l'Acte additionnel de la 
m8me date, pour la raison que ces dispositions 
subordonneraient, en tout cas, ladite ex6cution a un 
accord pr6alable entre les deux Gouvernements ou que 
dlautres r6gles de l'article 11 de llActe additionnel 
concernant. les tractations, entre les deux 
Gouvernements nlauraient. pas 6t6 respect6es? " 
221) 
Proceeding, as it did, on a strictly legal basis of 
decision, on which the compromis of 19 November 1956 was 
silent, the tribunal in the end answered both questions in 
the negative. In connexion with the second question, it 
first denies the alleged obligation of prior agreement for 
the use of water of an international waterway under 
customary law or as a general principle of law. 
222) it 
admits the obligation to seek agreement through 
negotiations, but not agreement as such. 
223) Yet the 
tribunal, in accordance with Article 11 of the "Acte 
additionnel". states that the littoral country planning a 
new work likely to change the flow of water has an 
obligation to give prior notification to the other riparian 
country of such a project. 
224) 
Secondly, the tribunal deals with the question of how 
"tous les int6r6ts qui pourraient 8tre engag6s de part et 
d'autre" should be protected. It is here that the tribunal 
identifies an equitable obligation on the part of the 
upstream country to take due account of the interests of 
the downstream country: 
"Le tribunal est d1avid que 1'Etat d'amont a, 
d'apr6s les r6gles de la bonne foi, 11obligation de 
prendre en consid6ration les diff6rents int6r8ts en 
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pr6sence, de chercher a leur donner toutes les 
satisfactions compatibles avec la poursuite de ses 
propres int6r8ts et de montrer qulil a, 'a ce sujet, un 
souci r6el de concilier les int6r6ts de l1autre 
riverain avec les siens propres. , 
225) 
Again, more specifically, the tribunal goes on to elaborate 
on the point: 
"Quand on examine si la France a, tant dans les 
tractations que dans les propositions, pris 
suffisamment en consid6ration les int6r8ts espagnols, 
il faut souligner combien sont intimement li6es 
11obligation de tenir compte, au cours des 
tractations, des int6r8ts adverses et 11obligation de 
faire a ceux-ci, dans la solution retenue, une place 
raisonnable. Un Etat qui a conduit des n6gotiations, 
avec compr6hension et bonne foi, selon l1article 11 de 
l'Acte additionnel, n'est pas dispens6 de faire, dans 
la solution retenue, une place raisonnable aux 
int6r6ts adverses, parce que les conversations ont eft6 
interrompues, flat-ce par 11intrasigeance de son 
partenaire. A 11inverse, lorsqulil slagit d'appr6cier 
la mani6re dont un projet tient compte des int6r8ts en 
pr6sence, la fagon dont les n6gociations se sont 
d6roul6es, 11inventaire des int6r8ts qui a pu y 8tre 
pr6sent6, le prix que chacune des Parties 6tait pr8te 
a payer pour en obtenir la sauvegarde sont des 
facteurs essentiels pour 6tablir, au regard des 
obligations de l1article 11 de l'Acte additionnel, le 
m6rite de ce projet. 1,226) 
In the opinion of the tribunal, France's project met the 
conditions as set out by Article 11 of the "Acte 
additionnel" in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case. 
227) 
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b) Obligation to inform of one's stay in_return for 
privileges granted 
In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 1910 
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the tribunal 
showed a discernible consideration of equity in the sense 
of fairness or reciprocity in connexion with Question IV, 
which was worded as follows: 
"Under the provisions of the said Article that the 
American fishermen shall be admitted to enter certain 
bays or harbours for shelter, repairs, wood, or water, 
and for no other purpose whatever, but that they shall 
be under such restrictions as may be necessary to 
prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein 
or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges 
thereby reserved to them, is it permissible to impose 
restrictions making the exercise of such privileges 
conditional upon the payment of light or harbour or 
other dues, or entering or reporting at custom-houses 
or any similar conditions? " 
228) 
The tribunal answers the question in the negative, but 
requires the privileged American fishermen to fulfil a 
minimal obligation in return for the privileges: 
"It seems reasonable, however, in order that these 
privileges accorded by Great Britain on these grounds 
of hospitality and humanity should not be abused, that 
the American fishermen entering such bays for any of 
the four purposes aforesaid and remaining more than 48 
hours therein, should be required, if thought 
necessary by Great Britain or the Colonial Government, 
to report, either in person or by telegraph, at a 
custom-house or to a customs official, 
if reasonably 
convenient opportunity therefor is afforded. 
" 229) 
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c) Obligation of the coastal State to give equitable 
shares to foreign countries traditionally fis 
in the coastal waters 
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Merits) of 1974, 
the International Court of Justice, after finding that 
Iceland has preferential fishing rights in a situation of 
special dependence on coastal fisheries, admits the 
Applicant's special interests in the disputed waters for 
centuries, which the Court substantiates with Iceland's 
concession of it as evidenced in the Exchange of Notes of 
11 March 1961, the discussions between the two States and 
Icelandic Prime Minister's statement of 9 November 
1971.230) On the basis of this recognition, the Court's 
point of departure for an equitable solution of the case is 
as follows: 
"It follows from the reasoning of the Court in 
this case that in order to reach an equitable solution 
of the present dispute it is necessary that the 
preferential fishing rights of Iceland,, as a State 
specially dependent on coastal fisheries, be 
reconciled with the traditional fishing rights of the 
Applicant, " 
231) 
But in the opinion of the Court such reconciliation cannot 
be effected by a phasing-out of the Applicant's fishing as 
was provided in the Exchange of Notes of 1961; 
"it is 
essentially a matter of appraising the dependence of the 
coastal State on the fisheries in question in relation to 
that of the other State concerned and of reconciling them 
in as equitable a manner as is possible". 
232) 
As may be predicted from such consideration, the Court 
concludes: 
"Due recognition must be given to the rights of 
both Parties, namely the rights of the United Kingdom 
to fish in the waters in dispute, and the preferential 
rights of Iceland. Neither right is an absolute one: 
t- Z1.1 ý') i- 192 - 
the preferential rights of a coastal State are limited 
according to the extent of its special dependence on 
the fisheries and by its obligation to take account of 
the rights of other States and the needs of 
conservation; the established rights of other fishing 
States are in turn limited by reason of the coastal 
State's special dependence on the fisheries and its 
own obligation to take account of the rights of other 
States, including the coastal State, and of the needs 
of conservation. 1233) 
6) Proportionality between the continental shelf area 
and the length of the coastline 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 the 
International Court of Justice suggested proportionality 
between the extent of continental shelf areas and the 
length of the coastline as one of the factors to be taken 
into account in the negotiations of the parties for an 
equitable delimitation. After discussing the importance of 
balancing-up of all the relevant circumstances or 
considerations, the Court states that in balancing the 
factors in question "it would appear that various aspects 
must be taken into account". 
234) It is in this context 
that the Court refers to the element of proportionality, as 
well as the doctrine of the continental shelf being an 
appurtenance of the land territory and the unity of 
deposits: 
"A final factor to be taken account of is the 
element of a reasonable degree of proportionality 
which a delimitation effected according to equitable 
principles ought to bring about between the extent of 
the continental shelf appertaining to the States 
concerned and the lengths of their respective 
coastlines, --these being measured according 
to their 
general direction in order to establish 
the necessary 
balance between States with straight, and those with 
markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very 
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irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. 11235) 
This is repeated, with some modifications in the wording, 
in the dispositif of the judgment with the addition of a 
clause reading: "account being taken for this purpose of 
the effects, actual or prospective, of any other 
continental shelf delimitations between adjacent States in 
236) the same region" . 
This seems to be the first time that any judicial or 
arbitral decision has ever propounded the element of 
proportionality in such a meaning as in this case. Given 
the geographical situation of the three parties with 
coastlines of roughly the same length, though the 
sandwiched German coast being concave and the adjacent 
Danish and Dutch coasts convex, the element of "a 
reasonable degree of proportionality" between the share of 
the continental shelf and the length of the coast measured 
in its general direction sounds an equitable factor to be 
taken into account. 
237) But this is not free from 
ambiguity. The Court only presented it as such a factor, 
and left the "choice and application of the appropriate 
technical met; -ods" for the parties. 
238) 
The idea of proportionality was adopted in the 
Franco-Spanish Convention on the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelves of the Two States in the Bay of Biscay 
of 29 January 1974. Following the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone boundary line, the continental shelf 
boundary line was drawn in two main sections. The first 
section, immediately following the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone boundary line, is an equidistance line 
based on the normal baselines of the parties. The second 
section is a negotiated straight line drawn in a manner in 
which the ratio of the "artificial coastlines" of the 
parties is reflected in the division of the continental 
shelf area in this part of the Bay of Biscay. The ratio of 
such artificial coastlines being calculated 1: 1.541 between 
Spain and France, the boundary line of the second section 
was so drawn as to apportion the continental shelf area at 
this ratio to the parties. 
239) Allowing for the fact that 
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this is the result of an agreement between the parties, and 
not a judicial or arbitral decision, the idea of 
proportionality was the basic principle upon which the 
delimitation was effected, rather than a mere factor taken 
into account in the delimitation process. 
In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977,, 
the Court of Arbitration touches on proportionality at the 
end of its discussion of the applicable law. But the Court 
does not treat it as a general criterion to be applied in 
all cases: 
its 00 this Court does not consider that the 
adoption in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 
the criterion of a reasonable degree of 
proportionality between the areas of continental shelf 
and the lengths of the coastlines means that this 
criterion is one for application in all cases. ... In 
the present case, the role of proportionality in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf is, in the view 
of the Court, a broader one, not linked to any 
specific geographical feature. 
240) 
"The factor of proportionality may appear in the 
form of the ratio between the areas of continental 
shelf to the lengths of the respective coastlines, as 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. But it may 
also appear, and more usually does, as a factor for 
determining the reasonable or unreasonable--the 
equitable or inequitable--effects of particular 
geographical features or configurations upon the 
course of an equidistance-line boundary. , 
241) 
In short, 
"Proportionality, therefore, is to be used as a 
criterion or factor relevant in evaluating the 
equitels of certain geogr cal situations, not as a 
general principle providing an independent source of 
rights to areas of continental shelf. " 
242) (Emphasis 
added) 





thus defined was 
the continental 
as the test of 
used in the actual 
shelf in the Channel 
equitableness of the 
11 0*. where the coastlines of two opposite States 
are themselves approximately equal in their relation 
to the continental shelf not only should the boundary 
in normal circumstances be the median line but the 
areas of shelf left to each Party on either side of 
the median line should be broadly equal or at least 
broadly comparable. Clearly, if the Channel Islands 
did not exist, this is precisely how the delimitation 
of the boundary of the continental shelf in the 
English Channel would present itself. , 
243) 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982, 
proportionality seems to have been used in a similar way to 
that in which it was used in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases or, in technical terms, in the Franco-Spanish 
Convention of 1974. The Court thought it necessary first 
to define the area to be delimited, and considered the 
parallel of latitude passing through Ras Kaboudia on the 
Tunisian coast and the meridian of longitude passing 
through Ras Tajoura on the Libyan coast as affording 
appropriate seaward limits of that area on account of their 
cartographic convenience. 
244) Then the ratio of the 
lengths of the coastlines of the parties is calculated for 
the delimitation of the area. 
"The Court notes that the length of the coast of 
Libya from Ras Tajoura to Ras Ajdir, measured along 
the coastline without taking account of small inlets, 
creeks and lagoons, is approximately 185 kilometres; 
the length of the coast of Tunisia from Ras Ajdir to 
Ras Kaboudia, measured in a similar way, and treating 
the island of Jerba as though it were a promontory, is 
approximately 420 kilometres. Thus the relevant 
coastline of Libya stands in the proportion of 
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approximately 31: 69 to the relevant coastline of 
Tunisia. It notes further that the coastal front of 
Libya, represented by a straight line drawn from Ras 
Tajoura to Ras Ajdir, stands in the proportion of 
approximately 34: 66 to the sum of the two Tunisian 
coastal fronts represented by a straight line drawn 
from Ras Kaboudia to the most westerly point of the 
Gulf of Gab6s, and a second straight line from that 
point to Ras Ajdir. With regard to sea-bed areas, it 
notes that the areas of shelf below low-water mark 
within the area relevant for delimitation appertaining 
to each State following the method indicated by the 
Court stand to each other in approximately the 
proportion: Libya 40; Tunisia 60. This result, taking 
into account all the relevant circumstances, seems to 
the Court to meet the requirements of the test of 
proportionality as an aspect of equity. , 
245) 
The Court presents proportionality as one of the five 
listed relevant circumstances to be taken into account in 
achieving an equitable delimitation. 
246) 
The wording of 
this clause on proportionality is almost the same as that 
in the judgment of the North Sea cases. 
It would be interesting to note the criticism against 
the Court's finding on proportionality as exceeding the 
modest role it should properly play. Judge ad hoc Jim6nez 
de Ar6chaga, who voted in favour of the judgment, stresses 
that it constitutes "a test to be applied ex post facto to 
the results obtained through the appreciation of the 
relevant circumstances, and not a relevant circumstance or 
independent factor itself "0 247) Judges Gros and Oda and 
Judge ad hoc Evensen, all dissenters, express their 
criticism, saying, "The present Judgment drastically alters 
the restricted role which properly belongs to the 
proportionality factor", 
248) "In conclusion, 
proportionality may have to be gauged simply by eyeing the 
area concerned as a whole, from a very broad macro- 
geographical standpoint, rather than with an eye to 
establishing any predetermined ratio in the apportionment 
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of the area., 
249) 
and ". .. the Court in the present case 
seems to have gone much farther in almost elevating the 
proportionality test--applied as a mathematical formula--to 
the status of international law r 
250) 
respectively. 
In the Gulf of Maine case of 12 October 1984 between 
Canada and the United States, the Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice took proportionality into 
account in the delimitation of the second segment of the 
boundary liner although it said it was aware that "to take 
into account the extent of the respective coasts of the 
Parties concerned does not in itself constitute either a 
criterion serving as a direct basis for a delimitation, or 
a method that can be used to implement such 
delimitation". 251) The Chamber noted that "the length of 
the coasts belonging to the United States .. is 
considerably greater than that of the coasts belonging to 
Canada, even if part of the Bay of Fundy coasts is included 
in the calculation of this perimeter [of the Gulf]. This 
difference in length is a special circumstance of some 
weight, which, in the Chamber's view, justifies a 
correction of the equidistance line, or of any other 
line. , 252) 
Thus the Chambcr took into account part of the Bay of 
Fundy coastlines, which are wholly Canadian, in adjusting 
the median line between the Nova Scotian coast and the 
Massachusetts coast which face each other. 
253) 
This was 
done much as in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 
1982 and the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1974. 
Proportionality was taken into account as a factor 
justifying a correction of the median line in a situation 
of two opposite coasts in the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf 
case of 3 June 1985. In the defined area to be delimited 
the Libyan coast extends 192 miles and the Maltese coast 24 
miles, or in the proportion of 8 to 1, which in the view of 
the International Court of Justice constitutes a relevant 
circumstance that should be reflected in the drawing of the 
delimitation line. 254) In other words, the difference in 
the coastal lengths is "so great as to justify the 
adjustment of the median line so as to attribute a larger 
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255) 
shelf area to Libya". 
In the view of the Court the proportionality 'factor' 
arises from the equitable principle that nature must be 
respected. 
256) 
The very basis of the legal regime of 
continental shelf lies in the coastal State's sovereignty 
over its land territory,, as the idea is expressed in the 
adage that "the land dominates the sea". 
257) 
The Court, however, does not apply proportionality as 
a criterion of delimitation, but rather takes the disparity 
or disproportion in the length of the relevant coasts into 
238) account for an equitable delimitation. Another factor 
which the Court thinks to be relevant is the "considerable 
distance" between the Maltese and Libyan coasts. This is 
"an obviously important consideration when deciding 
whether, and by how much, a median line boundary can be 
shifted without ceasing to have an approximately median 
location, or approaching so near to one coast as to bring 
259) into play other factors such as security" . What the 
Court does on the basis of these considerations is to draw 
a fictitious median line between Italy and Libya which 
intersects the meridian 151101E at about latitude 34*36'N 
and makes it the northern limit of transposition, while 
drawing the median line between Malta and Libya which 
intersects that same meridian at about 340121N. The Court 
shifts the Malta-Libya median line northwards through 18 
minutes of latitude or three-quarters of the latitudinal 
difference between the two median lines. 
260) 
But the transposition by so much of latitute is not 
related mathematically to the ratio of lengths of the two 
opposite coasts, as the drawing of the delimitation line 
was to the relevant coasts in the Tunisia-Libya Continental 
Shelf case of 1982 and the Gulf of Maine case of 1984. The 
Court justifies its method of delimitation as an equitable 
one in these words: 
"The conclusion to which the Court comes in this 
respect is that there is certainly no evident 
disproportion in the areas of shelf attributed to each 
of the Parties respectively such that it could be said 
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that the requirements of the test of proportionality 
as an aspect of equity were not satisfied. , 261) 
(3) Equitable considerations praeter legem 
Recourse to equity in the absence of law 
a) Recourse to equity by reason of carefull-we nq 
of the_claims and sup2 rt, -inq evidence impossible 
In the British Guiana-Venezupla Boundar case of 1899, 
the com]2romis of 2 February 11.897 laid down three rules for 
the basis of decision: 
if 000 the Arbitrators shall ... be governed by the 
following Rules, which are agreed upon by the High 
Contracting Parties as Tr'\'i--. les to be taken as applicable 
to the case, and by such princiLples of international 
law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators 
shall determine to be applicable to the case: -- 
Rules 
(a) Adverse holding or prescription during a 
period of fifty years shall make a good title. 
7he Arbitrators mav deem exclusive political 
control of a distr' _ct, as well as actual 
settlement thereof, s Jf-icient +_0 constitute 
adverse holding or to make title by prescription. 
(b) The Arbitrators may recognize and give effect 
to rights and claims resting on any other ground 
whatever valid according to international law, and 
on any principles of international law which the 
Arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, 
and which are not in contravention of the 
foregoing rule. 
(c) in determining the boundary-line, if territory 
of one Party be found by the Tribunal to have been 
at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of 
the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such 
effect shall be given to such occupation as 
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reason, justice, the principles of international 
law,, and the equities of the case shall,, in the 
opinion of the Tribunal, require. , 
262) 
The basis of decision s, on -t-_hcý 1,7'r --)JC_ the law But . 
4 inasmuch e as Ru 1e (c) -r r cý-v C. 31 -o cr- fect shall be 14ý ý_ ýL 
given to" the actual _-, 71 -ory "as reason, 
justice, the principle. s. of -4-: 1, -e. ý law, and -he 
7 equities of the case ýihall, 
,, - _D 
-1 n- the Tribunal, 
re uir 11, equity is inc]'Lu.,,, -. _-;,. - -in t'; -I, m_ 5ý '-as. 's of decision. 
Interpretation of t", As was divided 
between the pa-rties. the British 
17, ribI interpretation,, the A2 n absolute discretion. 
It may deflect the bounrl-, 
3 
ry -at it t7eems to be an 
W, 
equitable compensation -Eolr -i, -]P e_ at J_ on; or make one or 
the other par- 4C. y pay ca c o,.,, ýp satJ, cn for the 
delimitation. 263) It may, und, ---: ý, fr t*-; --s r11,. ]_e, if reason, 
justice, equity ; and the .. t-, -national law 
justify it, draw a give a. -nd take e al,, ough in drawing 
cný_L a that which that give and take 7-n - -1 r- -'s 
to Grea-r- Britain strictly belongs to G3. - _, _ - ii -, ý, -? i 25 
that which belongs to D nr -i". - 
Venezuela 2 r-s-, t-rictively. 
What the Tr.; _b16-. na1_ 0- 
tý ng the CU S' 
equities or in -ý_he way of revent any 
-i's --o p- 
consideration from reSU-I'Cina 1-. n "a change n the boundary 
J 
26 -5) ) line as fixed". Ru 1e - 7., -Jt contemplate the c) C 0; 
f ixing of a give a., nd tak-e here and taking I-Lne, 
266) 
there. 
The award, han ýf_own ion 3 october 1899, is not 
accompanied by a staternent of upon which it is E 
-%at based,, but merely sets c, of Arbitration in 
-c full, recites the prelimina ry proceedings and determines l 
the boundary. Consequently it lanknown whether, and if so 
how far, equitable cons ralt io_-ý s were given in the 
examination of the cla. _ms the parties 
and their O.; _ -111, 
supporting document s. But frc. m a perusal of the Cases and 
Counter-Cases, the Proceedings and the fact that the award 
was read within a week after the !: ýýst (lay of the three- 
Z. 01 
month oral arguments on 27 September 1899, it could be 
inferred that the tribunal failed, or was unable, 
scrupulously to weigh the respective claims of the parties 
and the supporting documents, which exceeded 2,650 in 
number. 
267) 
It would seem, nevertheless,, that at least 
some consideration was given to strike the balance between 
the claims, awarding to Great Britain the major part of the 
disputed territory and attributing to Venezuela the 
strategically important right bank of the mouth of the 
Orinoco. 
268) 
Both in the pleadings and the oral arguments the 
debate centred on "discovery, occupation, possession and 
abandonment", in the words of Lauterpacht. 
269) 
Briefly, 
the respective claims of the parties were as follows. The 
Venezuelan claims were: (i) Spain discovered Guiana; hence 
the territory was not terra nullius; any nation coming 
subsequently to claim title must acquire it by conquest, 
cession or prescription; 
270) 
and (ii) Requirements of 
corpus and animus should be strictly applied to the claims 
of the Dutch and the British as conflicting with their good 
and original title. 
271) The British claims were: (i) 
Discovery is a mere entitlement to the right of effective 
occupation within a reasonable period of time, and the 
power which subsequently occupies the territory with 
effective control obtains an absolute title; 
272) (ii) There 
was not such an extent of practical control and possession 
on the part of either Holland or Spain as to create a 
presumption of perfect title; 
273) 
and (iii) Private law may 
be resorted to as against the Venezuelan contention founded 
on first discovery. 
274) 
So far as the effective control of the area extending 
between the Essequibo in the east and the Orinoco in the 
west was concerned, the parties submitted a huge volume of 
documents in support of their respective claims. They 
argued mainly on the basis of their relevant official acts, 
and especially placed emphasis on the proving of their 
political control over the area concerned. 
275) They also 
relied on their people's private acts and activities, 
including inter alia Spanish settlements of missions, 
276) 
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agricu tural, fishing and trading activities. 277) 
Although the tribunal did not find the documents 
effective enough to support the claims of the parties and 
to convince it of the effective control of the disputed 
area by either of them, it is proposed here to venture a 
comparison of the claims and allegations of the parties. 
The history of the territory is divided into six periods 
for the sake of analytical convenience. 
1) Prior to the Treaty of Miinster of 1648 
During this period almost any claim of one party is 
refuted by the other. Venezuela maintains that there were 
Spanish settlements in Santo Thom6 in 1596, while Britain 
contends that Spain had no settlements before 1596 in 
Guiana and that from 1596 up to 1723 Santo ThomC? was the 
only Spanish settlement on the south bank of the 
Orinoco. 
278) 
While Venezuela says Spain maintained colony 
on the Essequibo as late as 1615 or even 1618, Britain 
denies it,, contending that all the Spaniards did was to 
visit the Essequibo just as the Dutch and the English did 
and that the Spaniards were not on the Essequibo after 
1618. Instead,, Britain says, the Dutch had settlements 
between the Corentin and the Orinoco at least as early as 
1623. To the Venezuelan allegation that Spain had excluded 
all other nations from the disputed territory as late as 
1625,, Great Britain faltly denies that it was true. As 
against the British contention that Dutch trade dated back 
to before 1625, Venezuela objects that the Dutch traded to 
the Essequibo not earlier than 1625.279) 
2) At the time of the Treaty of Miinster in 1648 
The Dutch holdings were limited to Kykoveral on the 
Essequibo,, according to Venezuela, but Britain maintains 
that the Dutch were in possession of the greater part of 
the coast from the Orinoco to the Amazon and had control of 
all rivers flowing into the Atlantic except the 
Orinoco. 280) 
3) The period between 1648 and 1814 when the three 
Dutch colonies were ceded to Great Britain 
Concerning the Spanish activities during the period, 
Venezuela appears to be comparatively reticent. Britain 
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has very much to say about the Dutch activities: (i) in 
1684 the Dutch held "a small shelter" at Barima, a 
strategic point at the mouth of the Orinoco; 
281) 
(ii) In 
1714, the year of the Treaty of Utrecht, the Dutch were the 
master of the territory extending to Barima in the north 
and beyond the Cuyuni in the northwest; 
282) (iii) The Dutch 
sent complaints to Spain about the capture of some Dutch 
fishing boats in the Orinoco and the alleged establishment 
of a Mission in the Cuyuni in 1746, and some other 
complaints in 1759,1769 and 1775 respectively, all of 
which were not responded to properly by Spain; 
283) (iv) In 
1749 the Commander at Essequibo said that Barima was under 
his jurisdiction; 284) (v) In 1755 and 1790 there were 
reports that the Dutch had alliance with the natives; 
285) 
(vi) In a report of 1764 and letter of 1768 it was shown 
that the Colony of Essequibo included Barima and Waini; 
286) 
(vii) From 1781 to 1802 the British tried to seize the 
Dutch colonies off and on, the French intervening; 
287) 
(viii) On December 3,1802 the colonies were restored to 
the Dutch by the Peace of Amiens, the Dutch sovereignty 
proclaimed on December 20; 
288) (ix) In Septembero, 1803 
Colonies of Essequibo, Demerary and Berbice were retaken by 
the British; 
289) (x) In 1804 British postholders seem to 
have been stationed in Upper Essequibo, Moruka and 
Mora; 290) and (xi) In 1805 a Post existed in Massaruni, 
further inland 0 
291) 
4) From the cession in 1814 to the first Schomburqk 
line of 1840 
Britain claims that at the time of the Dutch cession 
of the three Colonies to Britain as a result of the Treaty 
of 1814, Spain raised no question of boundary although it 
had been reported to the Spanish Goyernment that the 
English apportioned the lands taken from the Dutch as far 
as the Orinoco. 
292) 
In 1836, according to Venezuelai, British Consul at 
Angustura and Minister at Caracas admitted that Barima 
Point was under Venezuela's exclusive jurisdiction. 
British Minister at Caracas even requested Venezuela to 
erect a lighthouse at Barima Point. 
293) Britain responds 
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by saying that such request was made without authority and 
knowledge of the British Government, that it was not acted 
upon by Venezuela nor was the fact of its having been made 
communicated to the British Foreign Office. Britain claims 
that there was no copy of any such note among the papers in 
the possession of the Foreign Office, repeating that there 
was no evidence of Venezuela having controlled Barima Point 
at that or any other time, the incident having no bearing 
upon the question of right. 
294) 
In 1838, Britain says, Superintendents of Rivers and 
Creeks were created to work as Magistrates throughout the 
disputed territory. 
295) 
In 1839 Schomburgk proposed to the British Government 
to survey a boundary line. His original line was approved 
by Britain in 1840.296) 
5) From the 1840 Schomburgk Line to the 1850 
Arrangement 
In 1841 Venezuela protested to Britain against the 
Schomburgk line. 
297) Venezuela maintains that in a 
confidential letter of Schomburgk dated October 23,1841 to 
Governor Light of Guiana, he pointed out the importance of 
Barima Point. 
298) Lord Aberdeen agreed that Barima and 
Amakuru posts set up by Schomburgk should be removed. 
299) 
In 1850 an agreement, in Venezuela's wording, was 
concluded with Britain that pending the settlement of the 
boundary, neither side should occupy or encroach upon the 
disputed territory. Britain admits that there was an 
"arrangement" made with Venezuela, but that no definition 
was made of the disputed territory, consequently that 
Britain was free to develop the country east of the 
Schomburgk line. 
300) 
6) Subsequent to 1850 
Venezuela repeatedly complains of British violations 
of the 1850 "agreement" and the terms of the Treaty of 
Miinster. It mentions, in support of its complaints, the 
Proclamation by the Colonial authorities of British Guiana 
of January 30,1867, to show British commitment to adhere 
to the 1850 "agreement". 
301) 
Britain protests against Venezuelan concessions of 
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disputed territory to foreigners in 1881-1884 and 1886 . 
302) 
In 1886 the Schomburgk line was expanded, according to 
Venezuela, 303) but Britain says the 1886 line was observed 
till in 1894 Venezuela destroyed the British station in 
Uruan, set up in 1891-1892,304) 
When read in the light of the foregoing, the award of 
3 October 1899 would seem to tell something which the 
tribunal is presumed to have taken into account in 
determining the boundary. The tribunal awarded Barima 
Point, Amacura Point on the right bank of the mouth of the 
Orinoco, and the area west of the Wenamu to Venezuela. 305) 
It could be inferred that the determination was based on 
the British consent in 1841 that, possibly in response to 
the Venezuelan protest against the 1840 Schomburgk line, 
the Barima and Amacura posts set up by Schomburgk should be 
removed without prejudice to the British claim on the one 
hand and the Spanish missionary settlements and activities 
in the west-northwest of the Wenamu-Cuyuni on the 
other. 
306) Otherwise the awarded boundary line seems to 
follow, in its greater parts, the Schomburgk line of 1886. 
President of the tribunal, Professor F. de Martens, in an 
interview with Reuter's correspondent, is reported to have 
said: "The boundary line which has been laid down by the 
judges is a line based on justice and law. The judges have 
been actuated by a desire to establish a compromise in a 
very complicated question, the origin of which must be 
looked for at the end of the 15th century. " 
307) 
In the Bolivia-Peru Boundary case of 1909, what the 
arbitrator believed to be an equitable boundary line was 
determined without the claims of the parties and the 
supporting evidence being carefully weighed. The compromis 
of 30 December 1902 stipulates that the arbitrator should 
act "in conformity with the laws in the Collection of 
Statutes of the Indies, Royal Letters Patent and Orders ... 
Ordinances of the Provincial Governors, diplomatic 
instruments relating to the demarcation of the frontiers, 
official maps and descriptions, and generally, with such 
documents of official character as may have been 
issued 11 . 
308) But it gives the arbitrator an additional 
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guide, which reads: 
"Wherever the royal enactments or dispositions do 
not define the right of possession to a territory in a 
clear manner, the Arbitrator shall decide the question 
equitably, keeping as far as possible to their meaning 
and to the spirit which inspired them. , 309) 
The President of Argentina, nominated the arbitrator, 
set up an Advisory Commission to examine the question in 
detail. The Commission came to the conclusion that the 
laws, ordinances and other relevant documents could not 
precisely determine the boundary in the disputed territory, 
and reported to the president accordingly. 
310) 
Based on 
its report, the arbitrator found himself obliged to 
observe, "the Arbitrator does not find any sufficient 
ground for considering, as dividing line between the 
Audiencia of Charcas and the Viceroyalty of Lima in the 
year 1810, one or the other of the demarcations claimed in 




"That, under these circumstances there must be 
strictly applied to the case the provisions of Article 
IV of the Treaty of Arbitration, which states: 
'Wherever the Royal enactments or dispositions do not 
define clearly the right of possession to a territory, 
the Arbitrator shall decide the question equitably, 
keeping as close as possible to their meaning and to 
the spirit which inspired them. ,, 
312) 
Thus the arbitrator rests his decision on equity, stating: 
110 &0 in accordance with 
the preceding 
considerations, I must decide this question in an 
equitable manner, keeping in mind, in this present 
decision, the significance of the Royal Orders invoked 
in the respective pleadings and the spirit which has 
inspired them. , 
313) 
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While on the face of it the arbitrator followed the 
provisions of the 
, 
compromis , some commentators indicate 
that he exceeded his powers in acting as a judge of 
equity. 
314) Perhaps one may be justified in getting the 
impression that the arbitrator had recourse to equity a 
little too easily, because he failed to show in his award 
that he tried to "keep as close as possible to the meaning 
of the documents and to the spirit which inspired them" in 
deciding the question "equitably", as he was obligated to 
under Article 4 of the compromis. 
b) Choice of a natural frontier in the absence of 
reliable historical and legal claims to found 
sovereignty 
In the Brazil-British Guiana Boundary case of 1904, 
the arbitrator was governed under the compromis by "such 
principles of international law as he shall determine to be 
applicable to the case". 
315) 
As he was unable to decide on 
the basis of legal considerations, however, he seems to 
have resorted to considerations of equity in adopting a 
natural frontier under his obligation to decide the 
boundary. 
From the documents produced to the arbitrator, which 
he says have been "weighed and duly considered"t 
316) it 
does not appear that "there are historical and legal claims 
on which to found thoroughly determined and well-defined 
rights of sovereignty in favour of either of the contending 
Powers over the whole territory in dispute, but only over 
certain portions of the same". He concedes that 
"it cannot 
either be decided with certainty whether the right of 
Brazil or of Great Britain is the stronger". 
317) Thus he 
comes to the conclusion: 
"In this condition of affairs, since it 
is our 
duty to fix the line of frontier between the dominions 
of the two Powers,, We have come to 
the conclusion 
that, in the present state of the geographical 
knowledge of the region, it is not possible 
to divide 
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the contested territory into two parts equal as 
regards extent and value, but that it is necessary 
that it should be divided in accordance with the lines 
traced by nature, and that the preference should be 
given to a frontier which, while clearly defined 
throughout its whole course, the better lends itself 
to a fair decision of the disputed territory. , 318) 
In following the water courses as a "fair decision", the 
arbitrator chooses the "thalweg" for a natural or neutral 
way of delimitation. 
319) 
In short, as historical and legal 
considerations proved unable to decide the case, the 
arbitrator relied on natural features which appeared to him 
to provide a "fair decision" under the circumstances. 
Although the arbitrator states that he "weighed and 
duly considered" the documents submitted, he does not show 
how he did so in the text of the award. It is therefore 
susceptible to criticism such as Fauchille's. In a 
comprehensive study of this arbitration by the King of 
Italy, the French lawyer sees the role of an amiable 
compositeur in the way the arbitrator decided the case: 
"Il semble bien, si on lit l1article 3 du 
compromis, qulil ne devait tracer la ligne fronti6re 
entre les deux Etats, que d'apr6s les droits qulil 
aurait reconnus & chacun d'eux soit sur la totalit6, 
soit sur une partie de la zone en litige. ... En 
d6finitive, en agissant comme il l'a fait, le Roi 
d'Italie a proc6d6 comme amiable compositeur, alors 
que le compromis ne lui en attribuait pas r6ellement 
la facult6. Clest seulement dans la mesure des droits 
reconnus a l'une ou a l1autre partie que l1arbitre 
pouvait f ixer la fronti6re des Guyanes. , 
320) 
(Emphasis in original) 
Fauchille further states that even if the arbitrator had 
been authorized to act as an amiable compositeur, he 
failed 
to adopt the right solution in conformity with the 
principle of natural frontiers following the water-shed of 
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the range of mountains, if partially, in the northern part 
of the disputed territory. 321) 
The Anglo-Portuguese Barotseland Bou case of 1905 
would seem to afford an instance of awarding the "lignes de 
convention g6ographiques" on the ground that a precise 
delimitation is impossible for a couple of reasons. Under 
the compromis of 1903 the King of Italy as the arbitrator 
had no basis of decision provided for him. Stating that he 
had carefully examined the m6moires and other relevant 
documents presented by the parties in a similar way to that 
he stated in his award of 1904 in the Brazil-British Guiana 
Boundary case, 
322) the arbitrator reasoned as follows: 
goo 00 en ce qui concerne la d6limitation du 
territoire sur lequel le Roi Lewanika r6gnait comme 
Chef Supr8me, toute d6limitation pr6cise est 
impossible, soit A cause de la connaissance imparfaite 
quIon a des lieux, soit A cause de llinstabilit6 
notoire des tribus et de leurs fr6quents 
entrelacements (circonstances qui ont 6t6 admises par 
le Marquis de Salisbury et le Marquis de Lansdowne) , 
de sorte que, il est indispensable, oil les lignes 
naturelles font d6faut, d1avoir recours aux lignes de 
convention g6ographiques. " 
323) 
It may be noted that the above finding, as well as the 
others which preceded it,, was made "en droit" 
324) 
and not 
11en equitV. Yet the Italian King's award, as above 
quoted, does seem to be an equitable decision taking 
account of the various local circumstances in the absence 
of decisive legal considerations. 
c) According to equity and justice, uti possidetis of 
1821 being unable to define the boundary 
In the Guatemala-Honduras Boundary case of 1933, the 
tribunal proceeding on the not altogether clear basis of 
decision, found itself obliged to have recourse to equity 
and justice on the ground that the line of uti possidetis 
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of 1821 was not established. while the primary function of 
the tribunal was to determine the line of the uti 
possidetis of 1821, it was accorded certain discretion to 
deviate from such line: 
"The High Contracting Parties are agreed that the 
only line that can be established de jure between 
their respective countries is that of the Uti 
Possidetis of 1821. Consequently it is for the 
Tribunal to determine this line. If the Tribunal 
finds that either Party has during its subsequent 
development acquired beyond this line interests which 
must be taken into consideration in establishing the 
final frontier, it shall modify as it may consider 
suitable the line of the Uti Possidetis of 1821 and 
shall fix such territorial or other compensation as it 
may deem equitable for one Party to pay to the 
other. , 
325) 
From the latter part of these provisions the tribunal is 
presumed to have certain latitude of action, which could 
include equitable consideration of the case before it. 
In the examination of the uti possidetis line the 
tribunal was faced with the different interpretations of 
the content of this Latin expression between the parties. 
Guatemala contended that the line should be drawn "in 
conformity with a fact rather than a theory, the fact being 
what the Spanish monarch had himself laid down, or 
permitted, or acquiesced in, or tolerated, as between 
Province and Province, in 1821". Honduras insisted that 
the expression meant 11uti possidetis juris"I and that "a 
line could not be considered as being juridically based on 
a uti possidetis de facto". 
326) An examination of the 
historic utilization of the expression in Latin American 
settlements to which the parties invited attentionr and of 
the view of the eminent jurists on the use of the phrase, 
however, fails to disclose such a consensus of opinion as 
would establish a definite criterion for the interpretation 
of the phrase. 
327) Reference to former treaties between 
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the parties relating to the same boundary controversy and 
mediation proceedings of 1918-1919 under the auspices of 
the United States does not clarify the matter either. 
328) 
The tribunal divides the disputed territory into some 
parts to see if the uti possidetis line can be established 
in each of them. In four such areas the tribunal fails to 
find the uti possidetis line established due to the lack or 
insufficiency of evidence, and has recourse to equity. 
i) Omoa area: 
Hence, the evidence affords no sufficient 
basis for drawing the line of uti possidetis of 1821 
so as to include Omoa in either Guatemala or Honduras. 
"It should be added that the fact that Omoa had 
been part of the territory of Honduras, and had been 
segregated solely for the purpose of a special royal 
regime which had terminated, is undoubtedly a fact 
which will require appropriate consideration in 
determining the boundary between the two Republics on 
the basis of equity and justice. ', 
329) 
ii) The Cuyamel area: 
"In view of the lack of proof as to the exercise 
of administrative control during the colonial period 
by either the Province of Guatemala or Honduras, and 
of the absence of any recognized boundary line in this 
region, and of the special situation of Omoa at the 
time of independence, it is impossible for the 
Tribunal to establish the line of uti possidetis of 
1821 so as to include the Cuyamel area, as described 
above, either in Guatemala or in Honduras. 
"Again, in this instance, the later circumstances 
disclosed must be taken into consideration in fixing 
the definitive boundary between the two Republics as 
equity and justice may require. , 
330) 
iii) The Motagua valley: 
"In the absence of royal delimitation, or of 
evidence of the exercise of administrative control, or 
of satisfactory proof of a recognized boundary, the 
Tribunal is not at liberty to allocate the territory 
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in question, that is, the region lying between the 
Motagua river and the Merendon range and extending 
from the lands of Quirigua, near the confluence of the 
Managua and Motagua rivers, to the Cuyamel area, to 
either Party on the basis of a line of uti possidetis 
of 1821. Subsequent developments in this region and 
the corresponding equities of the respective Parties 
demand, however, proper recognition in determining the 
definitive boundary which should be established 
between them in this territory according to equity and 
justice. " 331) 
iv) The Managua-Motagua confluence to El Salvador 
Fe-n-l-racing the Copan region) 
"As already observed, the former Treaties did not 
use the expression uti possidetis, and in endeavouring 
to determine the line of uti possidetis of 1821, the 
Tribunal cannot be deemed to be bound by proceedings 
under earlier Treaties with their particular 
requirements. However, in establishing the definitive 
boundary according to equity and justice, the Tribunal 
should not fail to give appropriate consideration to 
antecedent inquiries and reports as to the facts of 
actual possession at stated times, although such 
reports may not be regarded as governing the Tribunal 
in determining developments and possession as these 
now exist. , 
332) 
Those are preliminary to the decision of the 
"definitive boundary". In the background of such 
preliminary considerations would seem to have been the 
position of the tribunal being obliged to settle the 
boundary dispute finally. As the tribunal says: 
"In the light of the declared purpose of the 
Treaty,, the Tribunal is not at liberty to conclude 
that the lack of adequate evidence to establish the 
line of uti possidetis of 1821, throughout the entire 
territory in dispute, relieves the Tribunal of the 
duty to determine the definitive boundary to its full 
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extent. The Tribunal, by the provision of the Treaty 
as to the line of uti possidetis of 1821, is not 
required to perform the impossible, and manifestly is 
bound to establish that line only to the extent that 
the evidence permits it to be established. And as the 
Tribunal is expressly authorized in the interests of 
justice, as disclosed by subsequent developments, to 
depart from the line of uti posidetis of 1821, even 
where that line is found to exist, the Treaty must be 
construed as empowering the Tribunal to determine the 
definitive boundary as justice may require throughout 
the entire area in controversy, to the end that the 
question of territorial boundaries may be finally and 
amicably settled. , 
333) 
The position of the tribunal being under the obligation to 
settle the case finally may remind one of that similar 
position of the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case of 
1928, who decided the territorial sovereignty of the island 
on the strictly legal basis through a scrupulous weighing 
of the claims and evidence of the parties. 
334) Indeed in 
the present case, too, a similarly careful weighing of the 
claims and evidence of the parties is conducted in both of 
the two main sections of the award: "First. The Line of 
the 'Uti Possidetis' of 1821" and "Second. The Definitive 
Boundary 0 
335) 
d) Recognition of the existing state of affairs in 
the absence of clear provisions of a treaty 
In the Declaration attached to the judgment in the 
Frontier Land case of 1959, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
suggested that it would be equitable to give effect to the 
unchallenged local administrative acts of the Netherlands 
over a period of fifty years. His Declaration, which 
sounds like a dissenting opinion, states: 
"The Special Agreement of 26 November, 1957 (= the 
date of submission to the Court's Registrar), 
- 214 - 
submitting the dispute to the Court is by design sc 
phrased as not to confine its function to giving a 
decision based exclusively on the Convention of 1843. 
By the generality of its terms it leaves it open to 
the Court to determine the question of sovereignty by 
reference to all relevant considerations--whether 
based on the Convention or not. Accordingly, in the 
circumstances, it seems proper that a decision be 
rendered by reference to the fact, which is not 
disputed, that at least during the fifty years 
following the adoption of the Convention there had 
been no challenge to the exercise, by the Government 
of the Netherlands and its officials, of normal 
administrative authority with regard to the plots in 
question. In my opinion, there is no room here for 
applying the exacting rules of prescription in 
relation to a title acquired by a clear and 
unequivocal treaty; there is no such treaty. It has 
been contended that the uninterrupted administrative 
activity of the Netherlands was due not to any 
recognition of Netherlands sovereignty on the part of 
Belgium but to the fact that the plots in question are 
an enclave within Netherlands territory and that, 
therefore, it was natural that Netherlands 
administrative acts should have been performed there 
in the ordinary course of affairs. However, the fact 
that local conditions have necessitated the normal and 
unchallenged exercise of Netherlands administrative 
activity provides an additional reason why, in the 
absence of clear provisions of a treaty, there is no 
necessity to disturb the existing state of affairs and 
to perpetuate a geographical anomaly. " 
336) 
Judge Armand-Ugon, in his dissenting opinion, presents a 
similar view, although based on the absence of protest by 
Belgium. 337) Judge Moreno Quintana also discloses similar 
considerations in his dissenting opinion. 
338) 
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2) Recourse to equity despite the ostensible 
appi'lCation of law----ý- 
In the Chamizal case of 1911 between Mexico and the 
United States, the basis of decision was law, for under the 
compromis the tribunal, an expanded International Boundary 
Commission with the addition of a third commissioner from 
Canada, was to act "in accordance with the various treaties 
and conventions now existing between the two countries, and 
in accordance with the principles of international 
law" . 
339) The parties requested the tribunal to "decide 
solely and exclusively as to whether the international 
title to the Chamizal tract is in the United States of 
America or Mexico", and render a "final and conclusive" 
decision 0 
340) 
The two parties agreed under the Treaty of Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo of 2 February 1848, Article 5, on the middle of the 
deepest river channel as their boundary line along the 
international section of the Rio Grande. 
341) But changes 
in the channel caused by repeated floods necessitated 
series of surveys in the early part of 1853.342) 
Notwithstanding the existence of such changes the Gadsden 
Treaty of 30 December 1853, Article 1, reiterated the 
provision of Article 5 of the Treaty of 1848.343) In 1864 
a great flood pushed the channel some distance southward, 
and Mexico began to claim that such changes did not change 
the boundary line. Thus a further Boundary Convention was 
concluded on 2 November 1884. Because of their importance 
for the arbitrationr Articles 1 and 2 of the convention are 
reproduced here: 
"Article 1: The dividing line shall forever be 
that described in the aforesaid treaty and follow the 
centre of the normal channel of the rivers named, 
notwithstanding any alterations in the banks or in the 
course of those rivers, provided that such alterations 
be effected by natural causes through the slow and 
gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium and not by the 
abandonment of an existing river bed and the opening 
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of a new one. 
"Article 2: Any other change wrought by the force 
of the current, whether by the cutting of a new bed or 
when there is more than one channel by the deepening 
of another channel than that which marked the boundary 
at the time of the survey made under the aforesaid 
treaty, shall produce no change in the dividing line 
as fixed by the surveys of the International Boundary 
Commissions in 1852; but the line then *fixed shall 
continue to follow the middle of the original channel 
bed, even though this should become wholly dry or be 
obstructed by deposits. , 344) 
As a result of these provisions it was made clear that a 
change in the channel "effected by natural causes through 
the slow and gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium" 
shifts the boundary line, but that in the case of other 
changes of the channel by more violent natural force such 
as flooding the boundary line remains where it was fixed in 
1852.345) 
Based on this interpretation the tribunal proceeds to 
examine the changes in the course of the river. it 
considers the changes from 1852 to 1864 as "alterations" in 
the sense of Article 1 of the 1884 Convention: 
" The presiding commissioner and the Mexican 
commissioner are of the opinion that the evidence 
establishes that from 1852 to 1864 the changes in the 
river, which during that interval formed a portion of 
the Chamizal tract, were caused by slow and gradual 
erosion and deposit of alluvium within the meaning of 
Article I of the convention of 1884. , 
346) 
But with respect to the changes in the river in 1864 and in 
the subsequent years, the tribunal regards them 
differently: 
"With respect to the nature of the changes which 
occurred in 1864 and during the four succeeding years, 
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the presiding commissioner and the Mexican 
commissioner are of opinion that the phenomena 
described by the witnesses as having occurred during 
that period cannot properly be described as 
alterations in the river effected through the slow and 
gradual erosion and deposit of alluvium. , 347) 
In the end the tribunal divides the disputed tract into two 
in accordance with the above finding by drawing the 
boundary line along th e channel of the river as it stood in 
1864 before the great flood. But in so doing, the tribunal 
follows the precedent of Ne, braska v. Iowa, a United States 
domestic case of river boundary: 
" In that case the Court found that up to the year 
1877,, the changes in the Missouri River were due to 
accretion, and that, in that year, the river made for 
itself a new channel. Upon these findings it was held 
that the boundary between Iowa and Nebraska was a 
varying line in so far as affected by accretion, but 
that from and after 1877 the boundary was not changed, 
and remained as it was before the cutting of a new 
channel. Applying this principle, mutatis mutandis, 
to the present case, the presiding commissioner and 
the Mexican commissioner are of opinion that the 
accretions which occurred in the Chamizal tract up to 
the time of the great flood in 1864 should be awarded 
to the United States of America, and that inasmuch as 
the changes which occurred in that year did not 
constitute slow and gradual erosion within the meaning 
of the convention of 1884,, the balance of the tract 
should be awarded to Mexico. " 
348) 
Perhaps in the minds of the majority of the tribunal there 
would have been the opinion of Mr. Cushingr Attorney- 
General of the United States, which they regarded as "the 
opinion expressed by so high an authority as the Hon. Mr. 
Cushing upon the very point at issue", and which the 
Government of the United States consistently adhered to 
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while some of the higher Mexican officials occasionally 
concurred with it. 
349) 
In reply to the request for an 
opinion as to whether the boundary line under the treaty of 
1853 shifted with changes taking place in the bed of the 
river or whether the line remained constant, the Attorney- 
General, after a consideration of the provisions of the 
treaty and examination of a great number of authorities 
upon the subject, reported that 
" the Rio Grande retained its function 0f an 
international boundary, notwithstanding changes 
brought about by accretion to one bank and the 
degradation of the other bank, but that, on the other 
hand, if the river deserted its original bed -and 
forced for itself a new channel in another direction, 
then the nation through whose territory the river thus 
broke its way did not lose the land so separated; the 
international boundary in that case remaining in the 
middle of the deserted river bed. , 
350) 
In his dissenting opinion, the American commissioner 
claimed that the majority opinion departed from the 
com of 1910 by dividing the Chamizal tract which in 
his opinion the provision of Article 3 of the compromis did 
not allow the tribunal to do. He bases his argument on two 
main grounds: f irst he invokes Twiss, who says that "a 
clear departure from the terms of the reference" 
invalidates an international award; 
351) 
and secondly he 
refers to the Orinoco Steamship Co. case before the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in which the award states 
that "excessive exercise of power may consist not only in 
deciding a question not submitted to the arbitrators, but 
also in misinterpreting the express provisions of the 
agreement in respect of the way in which they are to reach 
their decisionst notably with regard to the legislation or 
352) 
the principles of law to be applied" . 
The majority opinion concluded that the disputed tract 
might be divided as a result of the interpretation and 
application of the Convention of 1884. Its reasoning seems 
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to be justified by the combined effect of Articles 1 and 2 
of the 1884 Convention. Nevertheless it has departed from 
Article 3 of the compromis. It is hard to imagine that the 
presiding commissioner was unaware of Article 3 of the 
com 0 The surmise may possibly be justified that 
inasmuch as the tribunal was obliged to render a "final and 
conclusive" decision whether unanimously or by a majority 
vote, the presiding commissioner might have thought the 
idea of dividing the disputed tract, based on a reasonable 
interpretation and application of the Boundary Convention 
of 1884, hopefully to be a fair compromise for the 
settlement of the dispute. The surmise would be reinforced 
by the fact that the authoritative opinion of Attorney- 
General Cushing, which was consistently adhered to by the 
Government of the United States,, in effect supported the 
idea of division. 
353) 
In the Argentine-Chile Palena Boundary case of 1966, 
another instance would seem to be observed of having 
recourse to equity in the tracing of the boundary line "in 
accordance with the principles of international law", as 
laid down in the compromis. 
354) 
The question which the Court of Arbitration was 
requested to consider was: 
"To the extent, if any, that the course of the 
boundary between the territories of the Parties in the 
Sector between boundary posts 16 and 17 has remained 
unsettled since the 1902 Award, what, on the proper 
interpretation and fulfilment of that Award, is the 
course of the boundary in that Section? " 
355) 
From the submissions of the parties, the Court concludes 
in 
the first instance that on the basis of the 1902 Award and 
the 1903 demarcation, the two portions of the course of the 
boundary were settled as between the parties: 
between 
Boundary Post 16 and the Confluence and between Cerro 
de la 
Virgen and Boundary Post 17: 
"The Court therefore decides that the course of 
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the boundary between Boundary Post 16 and the 
Confluence was settled by the 1902 Award and the 1903 
demarcation, the settlement being that from Boundary 
Post 16 on the north bank of the River Palena the 
boundary shall cross the Palena to the mouth of the 
River Encuentro: it shall then follow the Encuentro to 
the Confluence. 
"The Court also decides that the course of the 
boundary between Cerro de la Virgen and Boundary Post 
17 was settled by the 1902 Award and the 1903 
demarcation,, the settlement being that from Cerro de 
la Virgen the boundary shall follow the local water- 
parting southwards to the northern shore of Lake 
General Paz at Boundary Post 17. " 
356) 
In thus confirming the two parts of the course of the 
boundary as the common ground of the parties, the Court 
seems to place primary importance on the geographical 
feature "Cerro de la Virgen": 
"There is no difficulty about identifying the 
feature referred to in the Award as 'the peak called 
Virgen', in the Report of the Tribunal as 'Cerro de la 
Virgen' and in the Award Map as IC. d. l. Virgen'. This 
is an outstanding feature and is the highest peak on a 
north-south line between the River Palena and Lake 
General Paz. It is important to stress this clear 
identification of Cerro de la Virgen as Chile has at 
times suggested that by 'the peak called Virgen' in 
the Award was meant a mountain lying well to the east 
of Cerro de la Virgen. " 
357) 
Now the Court proceeds to the remaining middle portion 
of the course of the boundary: between the Confluence and 
Cerro de la Virgen. It considers the very voluminous 
material submitted by the parties, and especially Chile, 
which came to be known in this case as the 
"fulfilment 
material", but fails to find it of crucial importance. 
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"But, taken as a whole, the evidence 's 3ust what 
one would expect in any disputed zone. It shows 
settlers not surprisingly turning to the authorities 
of both countries in case of need and doing their best 
to keep good terms with both sides. The evidence is 
quite insufficient to establish any abandonment by 
Argentina of her rights under the 1902 Award or any 
acquisition of title by Chile through adverse 
possession of territory adjacent to those parts of the 
boundary line settled in 1902-03. No more, in the 
Court's view, does the evidence establish that the 
parts of the line remaining unsettled in 1903 have 
subsequently become settled in the sense now contended 
for by Chile. , 358) 
What the Court had to do about the disputed portions of the 
line was to determine the meaning of the words in the 1902 
Award "follow the River Encuentro to the peak called 
Virgen". The Encuentro bifurcates at the Confluence into 
two channels, one eastern and the other southern/western. 
In the view of the Court, when the Award does not specify 
which channel the boundary shall follow, the boundary must, 
as a matter of principle, follow the major channel. The 
Court also thinks that it must never loose sight of the 
fact that the intention of the 1902 Arbitration was to make 
the boundary follow a river as far as Cerro de la Virgen. 
These are the two principles which must dominate the 
Court's approach to the question put to it. 
359) 
Based on both historical and scientific grounds, the 
Court identifies the Eastern Channel as the major 
channel. 
360) 
Thus the boundary line from the Confluence 
"follows the thalweg of this river to a point where the 
course of the river begins to deviate from the direction of 
Cerro de la Virgenr which is a natural boundary mark ". 
361) 
As seen before, in the Court's view, Cerro de la Virgen 
must never be lost sight of, and therefore the boundary 
must leave the course of the Eastern Channel at that point 
to follow the course in the direction of Cerro de la 
Virgen. Consequently the course of the boundary runs 
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through the local water-partings of Cerro de la Virgen to 
link to the undisputed southern part of the boundary line 
to Boundary Post 17 on the northern shore of Lake General 
Paz. 
On the face of itr therefore, the finding of the Court 
of Arbitration on this middle portion of the boundary line, 
between the Confluence and Cerro de la Virgen, seems to be 
based on the application of the law, which in turn is based 
on the historical and scientific evidence. But the 
consequence is that the areas where the Chilean populations 
lived have in this way been included on the Chilean side of 
the boundary line. One may well suspect that this is a 
compromise solution between the claims of the parties, 
attributing some 71 per cent of the disputed territory to 
Argentina and giving the remaining 29 per cent to Chile. 
This smaller area, howeverr is most propitious to the 
settled people and economic development. 
362) As Professor 
R. Y. Jennings, one of counsel on behalf of Argentina in 
the proceedings, later comments: 
"Thus, when the Court af f irms that the 
'fulfilment' material advanced the questions before it 
'no further', one is left with the surmise that, 
though this was no doubt technically so, the fact that 
those people were in that area was not without its 
effect on the mind of the Court. And this suspicion 
is not removed when it is noted from a glance at the 
map that, though it is true the Award line leaves the 
line of the 'main channel' at a point where the latter 
begins to 'deviate markedly' from the direction of the 
Cerro Virgen, yet the fact is that the deviation 
towards the wrong direction is as nothing compared 
with its determinedly eastward course immediately 
above the confluence. And here the Award line 
faithfully follows itr deviating all the time most 
markedly from the direction of the Cerro Virgen. To 
this extent, thereforer the reasoning leaves an 
unresolved question in the mind. " 
363) 
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Such suspicion appears to be supported by the way the Court 
summarizes the submissions of the parties, reproducing 10 
points of the Argentine Memorial and 15 points of the oral 
arguments of Argentina on the one hand and 13 points, with 
8 subsidiary points, of the Chilean Memorial and 50 points 
of the Chilean oral arguments. 
364) 
The Chilean pleadings 
and oral arguments apparently surpass the Argentine 
pleadings and oral arguments. This is, of course, due to 
the respective volumes of the submissions of the parties, 
but would in fact seem to endorse the submissions of Chile 
in respect of the "fulfilment" aspect, rather than the 
Argentine argument that activities of a private or local 
administrative nature should not be taken into account. 
The Court explicitly supports this position of Argentina, 
and yet, by faithfully reproducing the parties' submissions 
and weighing them with care, it may virtually have paid 
equitable attention to the fact that the disputed territory 
was mainly populated by the Chilean settlers. 
365) 
In yet another, more recent case of maritime 
delimitation by the International Court of Justice, a 
similar reasoning may be discerned. When the Chamber of 
the Court,, constituted for the first time in its history 
for the Gulf of Maine case of 1984 between Canada and the 
United States, says that it applied "the fundamental norm 
of customary international law governing maritime 
delimitation" requiring "the application of equitable 
criteria and the use of practical methods capable of 
ensuring an equitable result", 
366) it may be suspected that 
the Chamber did in fact apply in its delimitation process 
what it professed to be a criterion or criteria by which it, 
would verify whether the result reached was equitable. 
Acting "in accordance with the principles and rules of 
international law applicable in the matter as between the 
Parties 01 
367) the Chamber finds the law applicable in this 
case to be an equal division of the areas of convergence 
and overlapping of the maritime projections of the 
coastlines of the States concerned in the delimitation, 
combined with the parallel and partial adoption of the 
appropriate auxiliary criteria necessitated by the relevant 
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circumstances of the area concerned. 
368) 
Of the three 
segments of the delimitation line, the controversial one is 
the third seaward segment that crosses Georges Bank, the 
real subject of the dispute because of its fisheries and 
hydrocarbon potential. In determining this segment of the 
line, the Chamber does not consider that the respective 
scale of activities of the two States connected with 
fishing, navigation, defence or petroleum exploration and 
exploitation can be taken into account as a relevant 
circumstance or an equitable criterion. 
369) Thus, 
ostensibly, those factors were excluded from consideration 
in the decision of the third segment of the delimitation 
line. 
Yet, in the verification of the equitableness of the 
result thus reached, the Chamber would seem to concede the 
suspicion that concern for the economic interests of the 
populations concerned was not without its effect on its 
mind in delimiting the boundary line. For the Chamber 
says: 
"What the Chamber would regard as a legitimate 
scruple lies rather in concern lest the overall 
result, even though achieved through the application 
of equitable criteria and the use of appropriate 
methods for giving them concrete effect, should 
unexpectedly be revealed as radically inequitable, 
that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic 
repercussions for the livelihood and economic 
well-being of the population of the countries 
concerned. " 
370) 
Recommendation of post-award measures 
a) Consideration for complaints of one party about 
the domestic 17egis tion o the other 
In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 
1910, 
the tribunal recommended a set of rules under which 
all 
questions that might arise in the 
future regarding the 
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liberties to take, dry and cure fish might be decided. 
These rules seem to have taken some equitable 
considerations into account. 
The tribunal reduces the first of the seven questions 
brought before it into two main formulations: (i) "Whether 
the right of regulating reasonably the liberties conferred 
by the Treaty of 1818 resides in Great Britain"; and (ii) 
"If such right does so exist, whether such reasonable 
exercise of right is permitted to Great Britain without the 
accord and concurrence of the United States. " 371) On these 
two questions the tribunal decides and awards as follows: 
"The right of Great Britain to make regulations 
without the consent of the United States,, as to the 
exercise of the liberty to take fish referred to in 
Article I of the Treaty of October 20th, 1818, in the 
form of municipal laws, ordinances or rules of Great 
Britain, Canada or Newfoundland is inherent to the 
sovereignty of Great Britain. 
The exercise of that right by Great Britain is, 
however, limited by the said Treaty in respect of the 
said liberties therein granted to the inhabitants of 
the United States in that such regulations must be 
made bona fide and must not be in violation of the 
said Treaty. , 
372) 
Further, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the 
compromis, which directed it to recommend for the 
consideration of the parties rules and a method of 
procedure to determine all the questions that might arise 
in the future regarding the liberties, 
373) 
the tribunal 
recommended a set of rules and such a method of procedure. 
The rules are: 
'11. All future municipal laws, ordinances or rules 
for the regulation of the fishery by Great Britain 
in 
respect of (1) the hours, days or seasons when 
fish 
may be taken on the Treaty coasts; (2) the method, 
means and implements used in the taking of 
fish or in 
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carrying , on 
f ishing operations; (3) any other 
regulation of a similar character shall be published 
in the London Gazette two months before going into 
operation. 
Similar regulations by Canada or Newfoundland 
shall be similarly published in the Canada Gazette and 
the Newfoundland Gazette respectively. 
" 2. If the Government of the United States 
considers any such laws or regulations inconsistent 
with the Treaty of 1818, it is entitled so to notify 
the Government of Great Britain within the two months 
referred to in Rule No. l. 
113. Any law or regulation so notified shall not 
come into effect with respect to inhabitants of the 
United States until the Permanent Mixed Fishery 
Commission has decided that the regulation is 
reasonable within the meaning of this award. " 
374) 
In short, Great Britain was clearly awarded the right to 
make regulations without the consent of the United States, 
but the right was not unlimited. It was laid down that any 
such regulations should be published in official gazettes 
so that the United States might have a chance to know them 
and have a say about them. It is interesting to note the 
comment of Robert Lansing, one of counsel on behalf of the 
United States Government: 
"While the Tribunal declared the sovereignty of 
Great Britain to be complete over the fisheries, it so 
effectually limited its exercise that the treaty 
rights of the United States are as fully protected as 
if the American contentions had been sustained. Great 
Britain won a technical victory upon the law, but the 
United States, from an industrial standpoint, won a 
far more valuable and substantial one upon the 
facts. " 
375) 
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b) Desirability of consultation with local inhabi-tants with a view to possible modification 
of the boundary 
In the Armenia-Turkey 
- 
Boun case of 1920, the 
arbitrator gave an equitable consideration for a possible 
post-arbitration measure, as well as taking into account 
the relevant tribal relations and movements in his decision 
itself. Under Article 89 of the Peace Treaty of S6vres of 
10 August 1920 President Woodrow Wilson was invited to 
decide the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the 
Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, 
376) 
In his 
letter of 22 November 1920 to the President of the Supreme 
Council of the Allied Powers, which originally invited 
President Wilson to act as arbitrator on 26 April 1920, he 
explained the principles which he took into account in the 
delimitation of the boundary. While conceding that the 
existing ethnic and religious distribution of the 
populations in the four vilayets were not regarded as the 
guiding element of the direction, 
377) the arbitrator seems 
to have laid some, if minor, attention to the integrity of 
tribal groupings. In his own words: 
"The conflicting territorial desires of Armenians, 
Turks, Kurds and Greeks along the boundaries assigned 
to my arbitral decision could not always be 
harmonized. In such cases it was my belief that 
consideration of a healthy economic life for the 
future state of Armenia should be decisive. Where, 
however, the requirements of a correct geographic 
boundary permitted, all mountain and valley districts 
along the border which were predominantly Kurdish or 
Turkish have been left to Turkey rather than assigned 
to Armenia, unless trade relations with definite 
market towns threw them necessarily into the Armenian 
State. Whenever information upon tribal relations and 
seasonal migrations was obtainable, the attempt was 
made to respect the integrity of tribal groupings and 
nomad pastoral movements, " 
378) 
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In addition the arbitrator suggested to the Boundary 
Commission, in regard to one portion of the frontier, "the 
desirability of consulting the local inhabitants with a 
view to possible modification of the vilayet boundary at 
this point". He ventured to call the attention of the 
Boundary Commission to such desirability, because under his 
mandate "I am not empowered to change the administrative 
boundary at this point, and these 40 square kilometers of 
territory lie outside the four vilayets specified in 
Article 89 of the Treaty of S6vres. , 
379) 
Extra-legal considerations of an equitable nature 
Express reference to equity: award to be rendered 
in equity, the arbitrators having to proceed ex 
aequo et bono 
In the Bolivia-Paraguay Chaco case of 1938 the 
tribunal was directed to decide the boundary in equity, 
acting ex aequo et. bono and in conformity with the clauses 
of the compromis. The "Trait6- de Paix, d'Amiti6 et de 
FrontAres" of 21 July 1938, after declaring that peace is 
established between the parties in Article 1, provides in 
Article 2: 
I'La ligne frontiere dans le Chaco entre la Bolivie 
et le Paraguay (le Paraguay et la Bolivie) sera 
d6termin6e par les Pr6sidents des R6publiques 
suivantes: Argentine, Br6sil, Chili, Etats-Unis 
d'Am6rique, P6rou et Uruguay, en leur qualit6 
d'arbitres selon 116quit6, lesquels, agissant ex aequo 
et bono,. formuleront leur d6cision arbitrale 
conform6ment A la pr6sente clause et aux clauses 
ci-apr6s: ,,, 
, 380) 
There was another guide for the arbitrators. 
Article 3 
lays down: 
"Les arbitres se prononceront apres avoir entendue 
les Parties et en toute conscience, compte 
tenu de 
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llexp6rience acquis par la 
des avis formul6s par les 
ladite conf6rence. ... , 
381) 
Conf6rence de la Paix et 
assesseurs militaires de 
The tautologically worded basis of decision is confirmed by 
the arbitrators, who state in the award: 
1' 0*. par l'article 2 du Trait6 de paix, dI amiti6 
et de fronti6res susvis6, la Bolivie et le Paraguay 
ont, stipu16 que la sentence sera rendues en 6quit6, 
les arbitres devant agir ex aequo et bono. , 
382) 
This is how it was applied: 
11 0&. les arbitres ont tenu compte de 11 exp6rience 
acquise par la Conf6rence de la Paix, ainsi que des 
besoins des parties quant A leur s6curit6 mutuelle et 
aux exigences g6ographiques et 6conomiques; 
11 **o11 examen de cette exp6rience et des avis 
formul6s par les assesseurs militaires a convaincu les 
arbitres que, dans les limites des zones soumises a 
llarbitrage, la fronti6re dont la d6termination suit 
est 6quitable. , 
383) 
Amiable composition 
a) Consideration for the maintenance of peace and 
security 
The Chaco case of 1938 shows, as has just been seen 
above, an equitable consideration for the sensitive 
positions of the parties just after the conclusion of a 
peace, as well as the geographical and economic exigencies 
which secure for Bolivia access to the River Paraguay and 
through it to the sea 0 
384) 
A similar consideration for peace and security was 
taken in the Rann of Kutch case of 1968. The opinion of 
the Chairman of the tribunal, to which the arbitrator 
nominated by Pakistan acceded, awarded the two deep inlets 
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lying on both sides of Nagar Parkar to Pakistan for 
considerations of peace. In the words of the Chairman: 
"The two deep inlets on either side of Nagar 
Parkar will constitute the territory of Pakistan. 
Already in 1885, the Deputy Commissioner of Thar 
Parkar pointed out that if those inlets were to be 
considered Kutch territory, 
I [a] glance at the map will show that Parkar 
would be a peninsula almost entirely surrounded by 
Kutch territory. The State could erect 
fortifications and establish Custom houses at 
places situated many miles within the district for 
instance close to Veerawah, or on some of the 
roads which, crossing inlets of the Runn, lead 
from one part of this district to another'. (Pak. 
Doc. B. 9. ) 
"In my opinion it would be inequitable to 
recognise these inlets as foreign territory. It would 
be conducive to friction and conflict. The paramount 
consideration of promoting peace and stability in this 
region compels the recognition and confirmation that 
this territory, which is wholly surrounded by Pakistan 
territory, also be regarded as such. , 
385) 
Undoubtedly this is a highly political, and hence extra- 
legal, consideration. But it was characterized as 
if 386) equitable" . Perhaps one would do well to remember 
that the compromis of 30 June 1965 was a cease-fire 
agreement. 
In a spirit of chivalry and love for peace between 
'ýhe parties 
A somewhat similar consideration for peace, combined 
with a spirit of chivalry, was shown in the rare case of 
Aaroo Mountain between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1931. The 
arbitrator,, Ibn Saud, one of the heads of State of the 
parties, decided against his own interests "for the sake of 
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peace and because of our esteem for the Imam (= King of 
Yemen) and his acceptance of us as arbitrator". In his 
telegram to the Imam, the Ibn Saud states: 
11 0*. and so I take this step, 
Presence worthy of it--and because 
among the Moslem in general and 
Kingdoms in particular, --and say t] 
Aaroo Mountain to you hoping that 
Moslems and the Arabs and the two 
and tranquility. ... , 
387) 
which I see your 
of love for peace 
between the two 
-iat we concede the 
God may guide the 
Kingdoms to peace 
As Quincy Wright aptly comments on this arbitration, this 
is an instance of an Arab leader "manifesting a spirit of 
388) 
chivalry uncommon in international transactions" . 
Compromise solution 
a) Compromise or negotiations between the arbitrators 
In the Anglo-American Bay of Passamaquoddy Islands 
case of 1817, the basis of decision was, as in some other 
territorial or boundary arbitrations between the same two 
countries at that or earlier times, simply "according to 
such evidence as shall be laid before [the two 
Commissioners appointed by Great Britain and the United 
States)". 389) The tribunal of two commissioners, without a 
third member, considered whether the islands of the Bay of 
Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the 
island of Grand Menan, in the Bay of Fundy, belonged to the 
United States or Great Britain. 
390) They awarded, "in 
conformity with the true intent of the said second article 
of said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty- 
three", Moose, Dudley and Frederick Islands in the Bay of 
Passamaquoddy to the United States, and all the other 
islands in that Bay and the Island of Grand Menan in the 
Bay of Fundy to Great Britain. 
391) 
Commentators suggest that the award is the result of 
"negotiations" or "une transaction". As Moore says, 
"The 
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British Commissioner undoubtedly exhibited much ability and 
skill in his negotiations with Mr. Holmes (= United States 
commissioner). 'You know, ' said Daniel Webster, 'we think 
that Grand Menan should have been assigned to us.,,, 
392 ) 
De 
Lapradelle-Politis comments-, "... [la d6cision) West, au 
fond, quIune transaction. ... les duex commissaires n'ont 
pas toute llimpartialit6 d6sirable. " 
393) 
Understandably 
two arbitrators would be more prone to make a compromise 
between them than when they are with a third, neutral 
arbitrator. 
When the award was delivered in the British Guiana- 
Venezuela Boundary case of 1899, the president of the 
tribunal told the correspondent of Reuter that while the 
line laid down was "based on justice and law", the 
arbitrators were "actuated by a desire to establish a 
compromise in a very complicated question , 
394) (Emphasis 
added) He also stressed that the decision had been arrived 
at unanimously whereas all the awards had been decided by a 
majority since 1873.395) According to the Venezuelan 
counsel, however, the unanimity was not a proof of the 
success of arbitration as the president of the tribunal 
claimed, and "the line drawn was a line of compromise and 
not a line of right". 
396) (Emphasis added) 
These statements of the participants in the 
arbitration, coupled with the lack of reasons for the 
award, would seem to endorse the impression that the 
tribunal would have in fact been forced to make a 
compromise solution in the face of two extreme claims of 
the parties and in the absence of adequate evidence in 
support of them. This would not be an isolated case of 
compromise solution. As W. C. Dennis says, "the methods of 
the President of the Tribunal in securing a unanimous 
compromise ... are, 
in principle, typical of much of the 
international arbitral procedure of the past. , 
397) 
b) Coaensation for taking a place f rom one of the 
parties by awarding another place thereto 
In the Honduras- icarag! ýa Boun case of 1906, the 
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King of Spain, as arbitrator, decides Cape Gracias 6 Dios 
as the common boundary on the Atlantic coast "by reason of 
historical right, of equity and of a geographical nature", 
and consequently takes the southern arm of the River 
Segovia at its mouth to the interest of Honduras. 
398) 
Then 
a "compensation" is made in favour of Nicaragua: 
on the other hand, and as compensation for 
having taken the mouth of the Segovia in the manner 
previously mentioned, the bay and town of Cape Gracias 
6 Dios remain within the domain of Nicaragua, which, 
according to facts beyond dispute and with a great 
right, would correspond to Honduras. " 
399) 
In the Anglo-Portuguese Manica Boundary case of 1897, 
the arbitrator took into account a compensation arrangement 
between the parties in deciding that one of them was 
precluded from making objection to it. Acting with some 
discretion in following the law under the compromis, 
400) he 
drew attention to the concession which Great Britain had 
made of granting a large area of territory in the north of 
the Zambezi to Portugal in compensation for what Portugal 
would lose in the Manica plateau. 
401) In other words a 
partial acceptance of the arrangement as contended for by 
Portugal was contrary to both the principles of justice and 
the rules of Article 
'2 of the compromis. 
402) The 
arbitrator states conclusively: 
"or, il serait contraire aux principes de justice 
que, sous un pr6texte quelconque, le Portugal ... 
reprit une partie du territoire en 6change duquel il a 
accept6 la dite compensation. ... Mais nous 
devons 
r6p6ter ... que le Portugal, apr6s avoir 
accept6 par 
le Trait6 ce territoire comme une compensation 
6quitable, il n'est plus recevable a opposer des 
exceptions dont, au surplus, il n1a fourni aucune 
justification, sl6tant born6 a de simples 
all6gations. , 
403) (Emphasis added) 
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Thus the arbitrator confirmed, if not devised himself, the 
compensatory arrangement of the parties. 
An exceptional, though slight, deviation from the 
strictly legal attitude of the Court of Arbitration would 
seem to have occurred in the way of a possible compensation 
for its general decision in the Beagle Channel case of 
1977. In the tracing of the boundary line the Court was 
guided by the considerations indicated in Annex IV, which 
shows how the line, an adjusted median line, was 
traced. 404) As a result it decided that the line should 
run between Isla Picton and Islas Becasses, instead of 
between the latter and Isla Grande. It attributed Islas 
B6casses, lying slightly nearer to Isla Grande than to Isla 
Picton, to Argentina although it could logically have 
awarded them to Chile on the basis of the main waterway 
which passed between Islas B6casses and Isla Grande. 
Consequently, one may well suspect that, as Malcolm Shaw 
says, "the B6casses was awarded to Argentina as a form of 
compensation for the general decision of the Court "0 
405) 
Unless this decision is based on the principle of 
proximity, which the Court fails to specify, it may well be 
characterized as extra-legal, provided the principle of 
proximity is a legal principle. 
c) Consideration to avoid undue advantage being 
obtained by one of the parties 
In the Island of Timor case of 1914 between the 
Netherlands and Portugal, the arbitrator was directed to 
decide I'sur les donn6es fournies par les Parties" and "en 
se basant sur les trait6s et les principes g6n6raux du 
droit international". 406) The basis of decision was thus 
law, but the arbitrator seems to have worked out an 
equitable balancing between the interests of the parties at 
least in a portion of the disputed boundary. 
Based on the understanding that it is important not to 
lose sight of equity in the international relations, the 
arbitrator decides as follows: 
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"Enfin, si Pon se place au point de vue de 
116quite, qu'il importe de ne pas perdre de vue dans 
les relations internationales, la ligne de faite 
sugg6r6e par les Pays-Bas nlest pas contraire a 
1'6quit6,, en ce sens que le Portugal recevra plus de 
territorires qu'il n1en devait esp6rer selon la ligne 
th6orique A C, A laquelle il a consenti en 1904, avant 
quIon pet aller reconnaitre le terrain. La ligne AC 
est toute entiere trac6e A l'int6rieur du territoire 
qui reviendra au Portugal; la R6publique portugaise 
sera de la sorte partag6, en fait, quIelle ne pouvait 
sly attendre .... Si, au contraire, le trac6 oriental 
sugg6r6 par le Gouvernement portugais 6tait adopt6, 
les Pays-Bas pourraient avec raison pr6tendre qu'on 
les prive de presque tout le territoire qui leur avait 
6t6 attribu6 th6oriquement en 1904 en contre-partie de 
l'abandon de 1'enclave de Maukatar [= Dutch enclave 
within the eastern Portuguese territory) au centre de 
11ile de Timor et en contre-partie de l1abandon des 
revendications n6erlandaises sur l1ensemble de 
ll<<enclave>> d'Ambeno Portuguese enclave within 
11407) the western Dutch territory] . 
The finding could be better understood in the light of the 
fact that on the whole the Netherlands claims were allowed 
as a result of the pursuit of consensus of the parties. 
In the Beagle Channel case of 1977 the Court of 
Arbitration showed a rare instance of equitable 
consideration in connexion with the controversial 
compromise between the parties concerning Patagonia: 
"if, therefore, as the Court thinks, Argentina, by 
the combined effect of Articles I and II [= Articles I 
and II of the 1881 Boundary Treaty], obtained the 
whole of Patagonia north of the Dungeness-Andes line 
and east of the Cordillera of the Andes, it does not 
seem unreasonable to regard Chile as receiving in 
principle under Article II the much smaller area 
between that line and Cape Horn, subject always to the 
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effect of the 'without prejudice' clause and the 
provisions of Article 111. ,, 408) (Emphasis in original) 
d) Artificial line devised to reconcile the claims 
of the parties which both conform to the treaty 
The Honduras-Nicaragua Mixed Commission, set up by the 
"Basis of Arrangement" drafted by the Inter-American Peace 
Committee and accepted by the Governments of Honduras and 
Nicaragua with a view to implementing the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice of 18 November 1960 
concerning the Arbitral Award of 1906, was "Under the terms 
of the Arbitral Award of December 23,1906, to fix on the 
ground the boundary line from the juncture of the Bodega or 
Poteca River with the Guineo River as far as Portillo de 
Teotecacinte" . 
409 ) 
As there was agreement between the two 
national commissioners on the boundary line up to the 
Rinc6n de Murupuxi (point A), 
410) 
the Mixed Commission had 
to decide the section of the line beyond that point. The 
lines proposed by the two States,, however, were found by 
the Commission to be "in agreement with the terms of the 
411) Award" . 
Thereupon the Chairman of the Mixed Commission, based 
on his powers to make the final decision in the event of 
disagreement between the Honduran and Nicraguan 
commissioners under the Basis of Arrangement, paragraph 
6,412) devised an artificial straight line from the Rinc6n 
de Murupuxi to the Lim6n (or Poteca) River: 
"Consequently, the western boundary of the Sitio 
de Teotecacinte, which is, in the understanding of the 
undersigned, a straight line from the corner marker of 
Murupuxi, south 8 degrees, 31 minutes, 30 seconds 
west, according to the triangulation of the Commission 
of Engineers, should be followed. After approximately 
600 meters, this boundary crosses the Lim6n River, one 
of whose headwaters rises in the Portillo 
de 
Teotecacinte. ... 
"If the whole of the frontier traced by the Award 
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were examined in the light of the argumentation of the 
Representative of Honduras relative to the deviation 
which this demarcation undergoes in the south-east 
corner of the Sitio de Teotecacinte, the eastern and 
northern boundaries of the Sitio, together with the 
600 meters south from Murupuxi, would clearly appear 
as the only break in continuity in a perfect natural 
boundary. " 413) 
Although the function of the Mixed Commission was "to fix 
on the ground the boundary line" rather than that of an 
arbitral tribunal, its determination of a straight line, if 
only for a short distance, on the basis of what would seem 
to be the Chairman's equitable considerations under the 
circumstances, is a delimitation, and not a mere 
demarcation of a technical nature. 
3. A Summary Review of the Cases Analyzed 
(1) Equitable considerations in procedural matters 
Equitable considerations in procedural matters, 
although not directly linked to those on the merits of the 
case, are not irrelevant to equitable considerations in 
respect of the substantive matter. The tribunal's liberty 
of accepting and collecting evidence, as seen in the Island 
of Palmas and Rann of Kutch cases, the acceptance of 
additional documents during the preliminary phase in the 
Argentine-Chile Palena case, and the examination of pleas 
of estoppel and the critical date in the same case all 
turned out the respective tribunal's willingness to take 
into account as much evidence and as many relevant 
circumstances as possible in forming its judgment on the 
merits of the case. In the Lake Lanoux case the tribunal's 
somewhat conciliatory method of interpretation was the 
forerunner of its equitable balancing of the legal 
positions of the parties. 
To look at the matter from a different angle, 
it would 
be illogical for the tribunal to give a consideration to 
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procedural questions and quite another kind of 
consideration to substantive points in one and the same 
case. It is only natural that the tribunal should be 
consistent in its whole process of reasoning, and 
consequently it is small wonder if an equitable 
consideration in a question of procedure should lead to 
another such consideration on the merits of the case. 
Equitable considerations in substantive matters 
1) The analysis made in the previous section shows 
that many of the older compromis have an equitable basis of 
decision in a variety of expressions. Under those terms of 
reference the tribunal was enabled to take a broader view 
of the point or points at issue than a strict application 
of the law would have allowed it to do, or to proceed to 
decide the case simply by reference to equity. 
Some recent compromis for ad hoc arbitrations refer 
only to law as the basis of decision, as do, naturally, the 
special agreements to submit a case to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice or the International Court of 
Justice. Yet, as has been seen above, some equitable 
considerations have been given in such arbitrations and the 
cases of judicial settlement. In some cases before the 
Court at The Hague, however, it would seem to have been 
thought necessary to say that the Court was applying equity 
as part of law and that it was not acting ex aequo et 
bono. 414) The same thing is true of some recent 
arbitrations which were expressly based on law. 
One notable feature of some recent cases before 
the 
International Court of Justice is that express reference 
is 
made to "equitable principles" in the compromis or 
the 
submissions of the parties. 
415) As the Court is a court of 
law which is to decide "in accordance with 
international 
law", 416) such reference to "equitable principles" ought 
to 
be within the domain of law. 
2) Even where the basis of decision was 
law or was 
not clearly provided, the tribunal appears 
to have had 
frequent recourse to equity or equitable considerations 
by 
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taking account of the special or relevant circumstances of 
the case. Perhaps it would be well to recall that the lack 
of definition of the basis of decision can be a 
evidence of the tribunal being allowed to have recourse to 
equitable considerations since it is not requested to 
decide on the basis of law, 
417) 
3) To review what role equity has played in the 
arbitration and judicial settlement of territorial and 
boundary disputes, here are some salient features of the 
cases analyzed in the preceding Section. 
(i) Weighing of the claims and evidence of the 
parties is properly a part of the process of legal 
reasoning. But the very careful manner in which the 
tribunal weighs them, as it did in the Island of Palmas 
case, the Eastern Greenland case and the Rann of Kutch 
case, is not merely a process of legal consideration but 
amounts to thoughtfulness for the parties, an equitable 
consideration to give satisfaction to the losing party that 
it was duly heard, as well as the winning party. 
(ii) In many of the cases the "relevant (special or 
particular) circumstances" were taken into account. The 
way in which they were taken into account may be divided 
into two broad categories: one in which they were taken 
into account for the interpretation of the relevant treaty 
or other legal instruments or acts and the other in which 
they were taken account of as part of the decision of the 
case. 
The first category includes the North Atlantic Coast 
Fisheries, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Jurisdiction), 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf, Frontier Land and the 
Temple of Preah Vihear cases. It is as interesting as 
instructive to note that equity was defined by the 
arbitrator of the Georges Pinson case of 1928 as the 
liberty to appreciate the evidence according to the 
concomitant circumstances. 
418) It implies a typical 
example of equity infra legem. 
Secondly, the "relevant circumstances" were taken into 
account in the decision of the merits in the maritime 
boundary delimitation cases of the Grisbadarnal North Sea 
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Continental Shelf, Anglo-French Continental Shelf, ýýa Le 
Channeli, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf, Gulf of Maine, 
Guinea-Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Delimitation, and 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf. They also played an 
important role in the Behrinq Sea Fur Seal Arbitration,, 
Fisheries and Western Sahara cases. In some cases they 
played a crucial role and in the others a less important 
role, but on the whole they were instrumental in an 
equitable settlement of the dispute concerned. 
If the equitable considerations in those cases were 
broadly infra , the taking account of the relevant 
circumstances in the Chaco case would seem to have been 
part of the decision ex aequo et bono, for in this case the 
arbitrators were expected to proceed ex aequo et bono to 
render an award in equity. 
(iii) Whether for the interpretation of the relevant 
treaty, other legal instruments or acts, or for the 
decision of the merits of the case, the consideration of 
the "relevant circumstances" has been intended, it seems, 
to arrive at an equitable solution of the dispute. Some 
cases, mostly the recent ones, expressly state--even 
repeat--the objective of an equitable settlement of the 
dispute. Indeed the judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the 
watershed in the contemporary law of maritime boundary 
delimitation, emphasizes the importance of a "reasonable 
result" irrespective of the method of delimitation. 
419) 
The arbitral award of the Anglo-French Continental Shelf 
case followed suit, and the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf 
case is most emphatic about the overriding importance of an 
equitable result. The Court says that the "equitableness 
of a principle must be assessed in the light of its 
usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an equitable 
result". 
420) 
On the other hand, in the final draft article on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1981, the phrase "in 
order to achieve an equitable solution" appeared for the 
first time to indicate the purpose of continental shelf 
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421) boundary delimitation. The text of the draft article 
is quoted in the judgment of the Tunisia-Libya Continental 
Shelf case, 
422) 
which endorses the influence of that phrase 
on the judgment of the Court. Thus the predominant 
importance of an equitable result in the delimitation of 
continental shelf boundaries seems to have crystallyzed as 
a customary rule of international law; the final draft 
article's wording has remained unchanged in the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 1982. 
(iv) One further point of importance is the balancing 
of relevant interests. The judgment of the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases points out that "more often than 
not it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that 
will produce this result [= equitable result] rather than 
reliance on one to the exclusion of all others" . 
423 ) 
Thus 
the various interests involved of the parties were balanced 
up in one way or another in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf, Fisheries Jurisdiction, Anglo-French Continental 
Shelf, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf, Behring Sea Fur 
Seal,, Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Lake Lanoux and 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries cases. Perhaps of 
particular interest is the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf 
case in which he states: "All the relevant circumstances 
are to be considered and balanced; they are to be thrown 
together into the crucible and their interaction will yield 
the correct equitable solution of each individual 
case. Il424) 
(v) In some cases recourse was had to equity in the 
absence of law or despite ostensible application of law. 
This kind of equity could be defined as equity praeter 
,, rather than 
inf ra legem. Here again it may be 
suspected that the overriding concern of the tribunal was 
to achieve an equitable solution for the satisfaction of 
the parties. 
(vi) Still another notable feature is the tribunal's 
consideration for peace and security in a couple of cases 
and a solution of compromise in some of the older 
boundary 
arbitrations. Consideration for peace and security may 
be 
- 242 - 
better understood in the broader context of the case 
concerned in which the arbitration was worked out as part 
of the peace treaty between the parties. With respect to 
the compromise solution by the tribunal of the dispute, one 
might be reminded of the comments of William Cullen Dennis 
in his article, "Compromise - the Great Defect of 
Arbitration" (Columbia Law Review, vol. 11,1911), and 
elsewhere. In the old case of Bay of Passamaquoddy Islands 
of 1817 between Great Britain and the United States, where 
there was no neutral third State arbitrator, a compromise 
or negotiation between the arbitrators may well have been 
unavoidable for a solution of the dispute. Even if this is 
an exceptional case of compromise of a diplomatic nature, 
which is "the great defect of arbitration" in the words of 
Dennis, it would not be entirely wrong to say that the 
borderline between a compromise solution and an "equitable 
solution" as a result of balancing all the relevant 
considerations may be a very fine one. 
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Chapter IV 
Theoretical Review of Applications of Equity 
The discussion of considerations of equity in the 
previous Chapter has now raised a number of points of 
theoretical interest. They deserve discussion in more 
detail from theoretical points of view, which will 
hopefully help to make the r6le of equity in its relation 
to law clear. Such points,, among others, are: (1) the 
growing reference to "equitable principles"; (2) the 
important function of "relevant circumstances" in the 
settlement of disputes; (3) the predominant importance of 
an "equitable solution" of the dispute and elements of 
compromise therein; (4) the criticism on equity; (5) the 
need for careful weighing of "relevant circumstances"; and 
(6) the relevance of historical and cultural circumstances. 
1. The Growing Reference to "Equitable Principles" 
The International Court of Justice in its judgement in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases quoted the relevant 
portion of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 on the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries, 
1) 
and formed 
its guidelines for negotiations between the parties in 
which it states: "delimitation is to be effected by 
agreement in accordance with equitable principles" .2) This 
has, as has already been seen, been followed by the earlier 
draft articles on the delimitation of continental shelf 
boundaries in the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea 
3) 
and the subsequent arbitral and judicial 
decisions on the same subject. 
4) 
What is the status of "equitable principles" in 
international law then? The International Court 
characterizes them as a part of law, for it says that "it 
is precisely a rule of law that calls for the application 
of equitable principles. " 
5) This view seems to have been 
adopted by the subsequent arbitral tribunals and the 
parties before them and the International Court as well as 
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the International Court itself. In the opinion of Judge 
Shigeru Oda, "equitable principles" are "undoubtedly taken 
in the Anglo-American law as synonymous with 'principles of 
equity'". 
6) 
If his presentation of equity as a part of 
"general principles of law" in his capacity as counsel for 
the Federal Republic of Germany before the International 
Court in 1968 7) has remained unaffected, "principles of 
equity" are a part of law. 
In the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982 
equity and equitable principles are discussed in some 
detail. Pointing out the dual use of "equitable 
principles", the International Court of Justice stresses 
the predominant importance of the result of their 
application: 
"This terminology, which is generally used, is not 
entirely satisfactory because it employs the term 
equitable to characterize both the result to be 
achieved and the means to be applied to reach this 
result. It is, however, the result which is 
predominant; the principles are subordinate to the 
goal. The equitableness of a principle must be 
assessed in the light of its usefulness for the 
purpose of arriving at an equitable result. It is not 
every such principle which is in itself equitable; it 
may acquire this quality by reference to the 
equitableness of the solution. 118) 
It is true that the importance of an equitable result was 
mentioned in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
9) 
and 
the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, 
10) but this is the 
first time ever that the primordial imoprtance has been 
attached to an equitable result in such unequivocal terms. 
Unfortunately, however, this raises the question of how the 
application of equitable principles is to be distinguished 
from a decision ex aequo et bono, which likewise aims at an 
equitable solution of the dispute. The Court states 
elsewhere in the same judgment : "Application of equitable 
principles is to be distinguished from a decision ex aequo 
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et bono. " 
11) 
But it fails to show categorically that the 
two methods of decision belong to two fundamentally 
different domains. What is the use of such distinction, it 
may be asked, when they have the same object of arriving at 
an equitable result? Unless there is a satisfactory 
explanation furnished for the reason and criterion for such 
distinction, except that one requires prior agreement of 
the parties for its application whereas the other does not, 
the implication may well be that by allegedly applying 
equitable principles, the Court could virtually decide ex 
aequo et bono. 
In this connexion it may be noted that in the Gulf of 
Maine case the Chamber of the International Court of 
Justice avoided the use of "equitable principles" and 
preferred to use "equitable criteria" "for reasons of 
clarity". 
12) (Emphasis added) It offers no more reasons. 
While the term "criteria" can certainly make easier 
identification of criteria for the tribunal's decision than 
the term "principles" which needs further specification for 
application, it may be suspected that it absolves the 
tribunal from the obligation to apply principles of law. 
Whether the Chamber's substitution of "criteria" for 
"principles" was the right course of action, the full Court 
reverted to the use of "equitable principles" in the 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf case. 
13) 
This nevertheless does not answer the recurrent 
question of what is the specific content of equitable 
principles. All that can be said is that they can be 
specified by virtue of consideration of the relevant 
circumstances in a given case. 
2. The Important Function of "Relevant Circumstances" 
in the Settlement of Disputes 
The importance of taking account of the "relevant 
circumstances" or "special circumstances" in a given case 
seems now firmly established. All the recent judicial and 
arbitral decisions on the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries have taken this factor into account in one way 
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or another, while the modern precursor may be the 
Grisbadarna case of 1909.14) This is supported by not a 
few instances of State practice. For example, the 
conclusion of the Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty on 
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries of 18 December 1978 15) 
was made possible by a comprehensive consideration of all 
the relevant circumstances. As a member of the Australian 
team for negotiating the treaty writes, "Although the 
Treaty is primarily a delimitation agreement, it was only 
possible to arrive at a solution on maritime boundaries by 
tackling all the other related issues. " He suggests that 
"only in this way can complex delimitation issues be 
resolved". 
16) 
Although not related to territorial or boundary 
delimitation issues but to equitable uses of waters of 
international rivers, the Helsinki Rules of 1966 adopted by 
the International Law Association have some pertinent 
provisions. Article V, paragraph (1), runs: 
"What is a reasonable and equitable share within 
the meaning of Article IV is to be determined in the 
light of all the relevant factors in each particular 
case., , 
17) 
This is followed by a list of relevant factors to be 
considered, numbering eleven but not limited to these, in 
paragraph (2). 
18) This formula is a good evidence that the 
determination of a reasonable and equitable share must be 
made in the light of all the relevant factors. This can 
also be true of any other kind of determination. 
Writers too are broadly in favour of the consideration 
of relevant factors. Cukwurah stresses its 
importance in 
the process of delimitation: 
it it is essential for an effective 
boundary 
delimitation that diplomats and their adviserst or 
in 
the case of arbitral or judicial 
delimitation, that 
the tribunal should possess all the relevant 
facts, 
obtained through prior reconnaissance and 
inquiries, 
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concerning the topographical conformation of the area 
to be delimited, and also the political, social, 
economic and ethnic interests which may be affected by 
it. 1119) 
In a comment on the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, 
Yadh Ben Achour makes a similar remark by saying: "Tout 
fait quelconque, qulil soit g6ographique, historique, 
diplomatique, 6conomique ou autre, susceptible, par sa 
nature, ou son poids dans l1ensemble du contexte, d'avoir 
une influence sur 11op6ration de d6limitation, constitue 
une circonstance pertinente. , 
20) 
Similarly, but in more 
general terms, Wortley refers to the judge's duty to 
attempt to evaluate an alleged legal rule or custom "in the 
light of all the knowledge and the facts which seem to him 
to be relevant", for he says that parties to a dispute may 
usually be counted upon to bring to the judge's notice 
facts that might affect the judge's decision. 
21) 
What r6le does the consideration of relevant 
circumstances play in more specific terms then? When the 
basis of arbitral or judicial decision is law, it will in 
principle be a r6le infra legem; when the basis of decision 
is equity or unspecified in the compromist it could play a 
r6le praeter legem, a corrective r6le or even one contra 
legem. This process of consideration of relevant factors 
may now be briefly reviewed to see its function in the 
settlement of the dispute concerned. 
Here may be hazarded a distinction between a case of 
determination of territorial sovereignty and a case of 
boundary delimitation, although it is admitted that the 
test of effective control counts not only in the former 
case but, if partly, in the latter. Charles de Visscher 
agrees to such a distinction: 
11 on st accorde pour admettre une distinction 
fondamentale entre les questions que pose directement 
le titre a l'attribution en souverainet6 d'une surface 
ou masse territoriale donn6e et celles que souleve la 
d6limitation des surfaces lorsque, dans les r6gions de 
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conf ins, le probleme se ramýne au tracg d'une 
frontiere. Clest en ce sens que llon parle de 
conflits territoriaux d'attribution et de conflits 
territoriaux de de"limitation. " 22) 
The justification for the distinction would be that in a 
case of the first type the issue is the attribution of the 
disputed territory to one or the other party, whereas in a 
case of the second type the principal issue is to delimit 
the boundary line which can if it is deemed as necessary, 
divide the disputed area. 
23) 
These two types of cases are 
conveniently represented here by the Island of Palmas on 
the one hand and the British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary and 
Palena cases on the other. 
In the Island of Palmas case the sole arbitrator finds 
that neither party's claimed title is sufficient to 
establish its sovereignty over the Island, and consequently 
that "the decision of the Arbitrator would have to be 
founded on the relative strength of the titles invoked by 
each Party" . 
24 For the compromis in its Article I lays 
down, in part: 
"The sole duty of the Arbitrator shall be to 
determine whether the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) in 
its entirety forms a part of territory belonging to 
the United States of America or of Netherlands 
territory. " 
25) 
The Arbitrator further states with emphasis that "since, 
according to the terms of its Preamble, the Agreement of 
January 23rd, 1925, has for object to 'terminate' the 
dispute, it is the evident will of the Parties that the 
arbitral award shall not conclude by a 'non liquet', 
but 
shall in any event decide that the island forms a part of 
the territory of one or the other of two litigant 
26) Powers" . In other words, 
the Arbitrator was driven into 
a difficult situation where he had no other choice 
but to 
decide to attribute the Island to one or the other of 
the 
parties. It would be due partly to this situation 
that the 
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arbitrator's reasoning led to the mentioned very careful 
weighing of the claims of the parties. The basis of 
decision was "the principles of International Law and any 
applicable treaty provision "r 27) which the arbitrator 
applied as did the parties. But the very process of 
extremely careful weighing of the claims and evidences 
preferred by the parties could rightly be called a function 
of equity to assist or complement the application of law. 
On the other hand, the geographical and economic 
circumstances were not taken into account in this 
arbitration, as they are normally taken into account in the 
other cases, while only such acts of the States as display 
State authority and create its legal titles to sovereignty 
were taken into account. In other words, strictly legal 
considerations were bestowed on the claims and evidences of 
the parties,, and it is of the careful weighing of those 
from the legal points of view that equity or equitable 
considerations may be mentioned. 
In a boundary delimitation case, too, count is set on 
the peaceful and continuous display of State sovereignty 
claims to which are as carefully weighed as in a case of 
territorial attribution. Some of the boundary cases, 
however, have taken account of acts of a private nature as 
well as of a public nature. Generally, in boundary 
disputes each party tends to claim the boundary line to lie 
in what the other party claims to be its own territory or 
area of Jurisdiction, and the tribunal is compelled to 
weigh the respective claims and evidences. 
28) This would 
appear to be the reason why the tribunal comes to a 
seemingly compromise solution unless the claims of one 
party are proved unequivocally to prevail over those of the 
other party. 
29) This is the more so if a declaration of 
nonliquet is generally not allowed to be made. 
30) 
Thus in the British Guiana-Venezuela Boundaa case 
both Great Britain and Venezuela made extensive reference 
to their official acts as well as those of their 
predecessor States, the Netherlands and Spainy making 
efforts to prove their superior political control over the 
disputed territory. 
31) In addition they relied on their 
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people's acts and activities of a private nature as a 
complementary means in support of their claims. They 
invoked, for example, the settlement of missionaries, 32) 
farming, fishing and trade 
33) in their claimed territories. 
But in the eyes of the tribunal many of the massive 
evidences were not effective enough to establish the claims 
of the parties. Under these circumstances the tribunal 
would seem to have been obliged to decide a boundary line 
which was later to be suspected by one of the parties of a 
"compromise" line. 34) 
In the Palena Bo case of 1966 between Argentina 
and Chile,, the Court of Arbitration officially refrained 
from taking account of the private activities claimed by 
the parties. But the suspicion or surmise, as pointed out 
by one commentator, 
35) 
could hardly be wiped out that 
private activities may have been in the mind of the 
arbitrators in deciding the crucial part of the boundary 
line. The point at issue is the consideration of "land 
use, settlement and circulation of local trade". According 
to Argentina, "much of the Chilean material amounts to no 
more than this: that persons possessing Chilean nationality 
are or have been living in the disputed area. This is not 
evidence of 'occupation' or 'control' of territory, whether 
in legal principle or as a matter of political reality. . 
36) 
This was rejected by the Court of Arbitration. The Court 
states: "[Tlhe Court has not taken the view that 'the 
fulfilment material' [= the material concerning the 
implementation of the 1902 award] submitted by either side 
ought to be excluded as completely irrelevant. This is 
because, in the Court's opinion, such evidence is relevant 
to the question of settlement--whether for instance what 
was settled in 1902-03 has since become unsettled or has 
become settled in a different way, and whether too 'the 
fulfilment material' throws any light on the question 
whether what was left unsettled in 1902-03 has since become 
settled. " 
37) As a result of an examination of such 
material, however, the Court concludes: "But, taken as a 
whole, the evidence is just what one would expect 
in any 
disputed zone. It shows settlers not surprisingly turning 
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to the authorities of both countries in case of need and 
doing their best to keep on good terms with both sides. 
The evidence is quite insufficient to establish any 
abandonment by Argentina of her rights under the 1902 Award 
or any acquisition of title by Chile through adverse 
possession of territory adjacent to those parts of the 
boundary line settled in 1902-03. No more, in the Court's 
view, does the evidence establish that the parts of the 
line remaining unsettled in 1903 have subsequently become 
settled in the sense now contended for by Chile. , 38) 
Nevertheless, by identifying the Eastern Channel as 
the major channel of the River Encuentro--which choice, 
incidentally, coincides with the Chilean claim--, 
39) the 
Court did delimit a boundary line which in effect 
attributed to Chile the California Valley where many 
Chilean nationals had settled. Thus one may be left with 
the suspicion that the Court of Arbitration, while 
proceeding to interpret the 1902 award in good faith on the 
legal basis of decision as provided for in the compromis, 
did in fact rest its decision on such consideration of the 
"relevant (or special) circumstances" of the case. 
40) if 
this consideration is one of equity, it would not be an 
aspect of equity inherent in the application of law but 
might well be a substitution for law with a view to 
avoiding an inequity which could have resulted from the 
application of law. 
It is a truism to say that geographical, political, 
socio-economic, historical and cultural factors have their 
varying r6les to play according to the particular 
circumstances of a given case. But what is of crucial 
importance is the "balancing-up of all such 
considerations ... rather than reliance on one 
to the 
exclusion of all others", to employ the words of the 
International Court of Justice in its judgment in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases. 
41) The same idea is embodied 
in the International Law Association's Helsinki Rules on 
Uses of Waters of International Rivers, Article V, 
paragraph (3) : 
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"The weight to be given to each factor is to be 
determined by its importance in comparison with that 
of other relevant factors. In determining what is a 
reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors 
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached 
on the basis of the whole. , 
42) 
All this is undoubtedly intended for an equitable solution 
of a problem. But it is well to remember the caveat that 
emphasis on the equitableness of a solution could induce a 
compromise solution. 
3. The Predominant Importance of an "Equitable Solution" 
of the Dispute and Elements of Compromise Therein 
As has already been seen, the International Court of 
Justice, in its judgment in the Tunisia-Libya Continental 
Shelf case, made an unequivocal statement that an equitable 
result is predominant, equitable principles being 
subordinate to this goal. 
43) 
This is only natural, it is 
submitted, in so far as an arbitral or judicial decision is 
to settle or solve a. dispute. From this point of view, the 
statement is reasonable that "The aim of delimitation has 
always been to find a mutually acceptable boundary, based 
on principles and rules that would provide an equitable 
result. " 
44) Indeed the element of mutual acceptableness to 
the parties can be said to be contained in an equitable 
solution. 
45) This leads to a discussion of compromise. 
Most writers who discuss sharing resources or 
environmental issues seem to agree on the necessity of a 
proper balance among competing interests or values. 
For 
example, Ganther Handl, after listing some concepts such as 
"international solidarity", "ecological good 
neighbourliness" in his discussion of shared natural 
resources, has this to say: 
"The gist of these notions is simply that states 
share an equitable interest in the utilization 
of a 
common natural resource; that accordingly states 
are 
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under an obligation to attempt to reconcile their 
interests with those of other potentially affected 
states; and that any claim to the righful use of a 
shared natural resource has, therefore, to be judged 
in, in particular, the overall sociall environmental 
and economic context in which the right is being 
asserted. , 
46) 
This is another way of saying, as Oscar Schachter does, 
that "the concrete problem is often one of achieving a 
proper balance or trade-off among competing values". This 
author rightly points out that the "idea of trade-offs is 
especially prominent when issues of equity are in the 
47) forefront" . 
From yet another point of view, Cukwurah defends a 
compromise solution of a boundary dispute, stating that 
"The Chamizal award illustrates another instance of 
boundary dispute in which only a compromise settlement 
would have been near to the truth. It does not seem 
unthinkable,, particularly in a dispute of such a complex 
nature, that one who has power to find title wholly in one 
party or the other has also the power, unless this is 
expressly excluded, to find it partly in one and partly in 
the other. , 
48) 
Perhaps a strong case for a compromise solution may be 
found in a statement on this subject by an experienced 
lawyer-diplomat, William Cullen Dennis. Once writing a 
critical article on compromise, "Compromise - the Great 
Defect of Arbitration"r 
49) in 1911, he subsequently turned 
out somewhat sympathetic towards it. In a comment he made 
in 1950 on the British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary case, he 
conceded that compromise is involved in adjudication. He 
said: "We cannot claim even yet to have reached the stage 
where the element of compromise is eliminated as completely 
from international, as it has been from national, judicial 
proceedings (and it has not and probably never will 
be 
completely eliminated from any human procedure) 
50) 
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4. The Criticism on Equity 
Consideration of "relevant circumstances" plays 
varying r6les in individual cases. How it is concerned 
with law, when law is the basis of decision, can only be 
determined in the light of the particular circumstances of 
each individual case. Such would be the nature of equity. 
on the other hand, it must be logically admitted that as 
its criteria are not necessarily clear, equity is 
susceptible to arbitrary application. In this sense an 
argument has recently been advanced that equity, being of 
such a nature, should be avoided and that "general 
principles of law" might as well be applied instead. 51) 
This deserves serious discussion. But it seems to be based 
on the assumption that equity and "general principles of 
law" belong to different branches of norm. 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, however, it 
was argued that equity forms a part of "general principles 
of law". Consequently, it is necessary first to see 
whether the former constitutes a part of the latter, and 
then whether, as has been argued, the latter must be used 
rather than the former. 
Whether equity is a part of "general principles 
of law" 
In its pleadings in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases Federal Republic of Germany asserted that the alleged 
principle of "just and equitable share" should be applied 
in the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries, and 
that it was a substantive principle forming a part of 
"general principles of law" . 
52 ) The Court did not accept 
the German thesis in toto, but in effect admitted that 
equity is a part of "general principles of 'law" . 
53 ) The 
logic, as propounded by the Federal Republic, is that 
equity as distinguished from ex aequo et bono is an 
of 
54) 
instance of general principles of law" . The 
distinction between ex aequo et bono and 11general 
principles of law" is easy to see in the light of how they 
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were embodied in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the first in paragraph 2 
and the second in paragraph 1.55) 
But as to whether equity is included in "general 
principles of law", adequate studies of comparative lawyers 
will be required, as Schwarzenberger suggests, 56) to prove 
that equity, along with other moral values, is recognized 
in the world's major legal systems as part of "general 
principles of law". That is far beyond the scope of the 
present study. 
57) 
A strong case against the inclusion of equity in 
"general principles of law" is presented by Charles de 
Visscher. He maintains that in its simply interpretative 
r6le equity is inherent in the sound application of rules 
of law, whereas in its complementary r6le it is an 
independent source of law, distinct from not only treaties 
and customary law but "general principles of law" .5 
8) His 
opposition to its inclusion in "general principles of law" 
is clearly seen in this statement: 
"Quelques auteurs ont cherch6 a ramener 11e'quit6 
aux lvprincipes g6n6raux de droit reconnus par les 
nations civilis6es". Il nly a pas lieu de slarr8ter a 
cette suggestion. Quelque id6e que llon se fasse des 
principes g6n6raux de droit tels qu'ils figurent a 
l1article 38 du Status, il est certain qulils y 
revetent, tout comme le trait6 et la coutume, un 
caractOre de g6n6railit6- ou de positivit6, alors que 
116quite se caract6rise essentiellement comme une 
expression individualis6e de la justice. , 
59) 
As has been seen above in Chapter III, the consideration of 
"relevant circumstances" or "special circumstances peculiar 
to the case" has not only the interpretative r6le but the 
r6le to complement or supplement the law and even correct 
the inequity which the strict application of the law would 
entail. This latter function of equity or equitable 
considerations could not be included in that of "general 
principles of law". 
60) 
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(2) Whether "general 
instead of equity 
rinciples_of law" should be & lied 
Writers have pointed out a number of defects of 
equity. Sir Francis Vallat, for example, in discussing 
draft Article 25 on the dissolution of a State in the draft 
Articles on succession of States in respect of matters 
other than treaties at a meeting of the International Law 
commission, referred to equity as a "very mobile quantity", 
because in his opinion "a political factor, in the loose 
sense, for one State might be regarded as a matter of 
61) 
equity by another" . Such elasticity gives the tribunal 
considerable latitude in its application, and it is on this 
point that many writers make critical comments. 
In the earlier days of English law Sir Francis Bacon 
advocated a rigid separation between courts of law and 
court of equity, while Lord Kames believed that the 
separation of law from equity was a chimerical idea and 
that justice demanded a mixed jurisdiction for each court. 
Beneath their differences, however, there was a crucial 
underlying agreement that equity, though necessary to 
correct the harshness of strict law, could degenerate into 
arbitrary judicial discretion. 
62) Aristotle is known to 
have entertained fear of judicial discretion. 
63) Modern 
writers, no less critical of judicial discretion, point out 
that international judges have wider discretion than 
national judges, 
64) 
and that international judges have a 
greater risk of error in the ex aequo et bono procedure 
65) 
than in the ordinary procedure. 
Michael Akehurst lists "dangers of applying equity": 
the concept of equity could be used to give an "aura of 
respectability" to exceptions to rules of law; ideas of 
equity often vary according to the interests and culture of 
the State concerned; equity is subjective; criteria of 
equity are obscured in the international society where 
political, ethical and cultural values are far more 
heterogeneous than in a national society; international 
lawyers from communist countries are opposed to the 
application of equity on the grounds that it is subjective; 
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some arbitrators upheld, on the grounds of equity, that a 
State should be made liable for the acts of unsuccessful 
rebels, while others rejected the idea as inequitable; in a 
legal system where there is no compulsory judicial 
settlementr States base claims on considerations which seem 
equitable to them but not to their opponents; a judgment 
which seems equitable to the winning party may not seem 
equitable to the losing party, who will be tempted to 
66) refuse to execute the judgment. In view of these 
"dangers" the author suggests that more use may as well be 
made of "general principles of law", which he submits 
provide a more reliable criterion for determining the 
content of equity. 
67) 
All he says in terms of "dangers of applying equity" 
has to be admitted to be true. But one must note the 
author's disclaimer that he treats only those cases in 
which the basis of decision was law but equity was 
applied. 
68) In the cases where the tribunal was authorized 
by the compromis to apply equity, which are excluded from 
his study, it may be surmised that the parties concluded 
such a compromis on the understanding that they would be 
ready to accept a decision which could have such "dangers". 
Since international adjudication still remains a procedure 
based on the agreement of the parties on its institution, 
the fact must be admitted that some States do indeed rely 
on the "dangerous" application of equity in their chosen 
third-party adjudication. 
In the same line of thought as Akehurst's is Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice when he suggests the need to study 
equity, as distinguished from ex aequo et bono, in the 
context of "general principles of law". 
69) The suggestion 
is made on the understanding that the maintenance of a 
reasonable predictability as to the basis of decision could 
help to ensure increased resort to the International Court 
of Justice. 
70) He seems to stress, as does Akehurst, 
"general principles of law" as a more objective basis of 
decision. But the trouble is that it is not always clear 
whether a principle or standard belongs in the realm of 
equity or "general principles of law". Nor is it always 
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clear to the tribunal whether there is a "general principle 
of law" common to the parties unless one or the other party 
cites it. Consequently, while one can understand or even 
sympathize with the suggestion of Fitzmaurice and Akehurst 
in favour of "general principles of law"r one cannot 
underestimate the fact that there are some States which 
prefer to rely on equity for its elasticity despite the 
caveat that it has a number of "dangers" in its 
application. 
5. The Need for Careful Weighing of "Relevant 
Circumstances" 
It has already been noted that reference to "relevant 
circumstances" is an inevitable trend, whether it is 
expressly laid down in the compromis or not. But, as it 
has also been noted, there is a danger that the way in 
which they are taken into account can be arbitrary. The 
problem now is, therefore, to find out how the claimed 
relevant circumstances are to be weighed in a rational and 
systematic way. 
According to a commentator,, mediaeval English judges 
quite confidently referred to equity without providing 
reasons in arriving at their decisions, whereas 20th- 
century judges, living in an age of self-consciousness, are 
concerned about what objective foundation their decisions 
have or how they can be sure that their decisions are not 
subjective. Such questions, he says, have a debilitating 
effect on concepts such as justice and equity. 
71) If this 
is so, it is submitted that it is a welcome tendency, for 
it shows that judges are aware of ambiguities and dangers 
of equity, being careful in its application. 
It must be admitted in the first instance that 
application of equity can be arbitrary. Its application by 
the tribunal appears "comme une justice plus ou moins 
individualis6e". In other words, equity "se conwit par 
rapport a la r6gle dont elle invite 'a' se d6partir dans la 
mesure oQ l1exige une justice adaptee a 1'espece". 
72) This 
process of adapting equity to the particular circumstances 
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of the case involves the consideration of relevant 
circumstances. Such consideration, as well as the 
antecedent evaluation of the particularities of the case, 
is taken at the discretion of the tribunal. 
Secondly it may be pointed out that in the recent 
cases of maritime boundary delimitation, especially since 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 mentioned the 
taking account of "all the relevant circumstances to 1 
73) 
the 
parties have presented for consideration by the tribunal as 
many "relevant circumstances" as they can think of. 
74) In 
the face of the massive evidence in support of their 
claims, the tribunal, being constituted on the basis of the 
consent of the parties, has responded to it either by 
taking a part of it into account for the decision or by 
using it, or a part of it, for the verification of 
equitableness of the solution adopted by other criteria. 
Some dissenting opinions point out a change--a departure 
from the past jurisprudence--in the reasoning of the 
International Court of Justice on equity in the Tunisia- 
Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982. Judge Andr6 Gros, in 
his dissenting opinion attached to the Chamber's judgment 
in the Gulf of Maine case of 1984, states: 
"Llarr8t de 1969 et la sentence de 1977 avaient 
construit des barrieres a 1'emploi de la notion de 
116quit6; llarr&t de f6vrier 1982 et le pr6sent arr8t 
les ont. supprim6es. , 
75) 
Such criticism would seem to suggest the need for 
adequate weighing of the various considerations presented 
by the parties to the tribunal. To quote Judge Gros again, 
"dans 116tat actuel du droit international, selon la 
jurisprudence de la Cour dans Varr8t de 1982 fond6 sur le 
texte conventionnel de 1982, tout peut d6sormais 6tre jug6 
pertinent pour arriver 'a une r6sultat 6quitable si les 
Etats int6ress6s sont d1accord pour le soutenir ou si le 
juge en est convaincu. " 
76) Sharing this critical view of 
Judge Gros, Jonathan I. Charney proposes a set of rules for 
the process of balancing "relevant factors" 
in the 
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delimitation of maritime boundaries. 77) The attempt is 
intended as an aid for evolving a substantive rule of law 
for all cases. 
78) 
Composed of five separate but 
consequential steps, its gist merits mention here: 
" (1) The functions served by coastal state 
jurisdiction in the specific ocean zone to be 
delimited should be identified. 
(2) All the facts concerning the instant boundary 
area that reflect the functions to be served by the 
zone should be identified. 
(3) To the extent possible, each piece of 
information identified in the prior paragraph should 
be used to construct a line or range of lines that 
best suits the function to which it relates. 
(4) These alternative lines and previously 
identified factors should be studied and weighed 
according to their importance. In a process that 
might even approach vector analysis, a line that best 
reflects all the relevant factors in light of their 
importance to the zone should be sought. 
(5) A cartographical method should be selected to 
describe the line accurately and reliably. " 
79) 
An inductive approach to the analysis of the recent cases 
of maritime boundary delimitation--the North Sea 
Continental Shelf, Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf and 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf cases giving guidelines for 
negotiations between the parties and the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf, Gulf of Maine and Guinea-Guinea Bissau 
Maritime Boundary cases delimiting the boundary line--could 
work out a set of rules and principles,, together with a 
complementary set of "relevant circumstances" to be taken 
into account. A further elaboration of these rules and 
principles might well contribute to the formulation of 
general rules for the weighing up of "relevant 
circumstances". 
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The Relevance of Historical and Cultural Circumstances 
There is a question which can conveniently be included 
in "relevant circumstances" but in fact is of a more 
fundamental nature: that is the historical and cultural 
aspects of equity. These can be discussed, as they have 
been discussed above in Chapter III, as part of "relevant 
circumstances", to be sure, but it is submitted that they 
could have more basic implications than a mere functional 
role. 
With respect to the historical perspective in which to 
view equitable considerations, some lawyers argue that 
equitable considerations must be given to a point at issue 
in a given case in the context of decolonization. The 
argument seems to centre upon the alleged 'excess profits' 
of the colonial Powers during their colonial rule. 
80) 
When 
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a 
resolution on 14 December 1962 on "Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources", the first of its kind, it laid 
down that "appropriate compensation" must be made for 
"nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning" . 
81 ) But 
in its third resolution on the same subject adopted on 17 
December 1973,, the General Assembly replaced the phrase 
If 82) appropriate compensation" with "possible compensation" . 
(Emphasis added) This, however, was changed back to 
"appropriate compensation" in the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, another General Assembly 
resolution of 12 December 1974.83) (Emphasis added) At any 
rate these are expressions of the idea that compensation 
for nationalization should be balanced against the past 
profits of the foreign owner of the property. 
84) In 
propounding a thesis "Pour un nouvel order economique 
international", Mohammed Bedjaoui forcefully denounces the 
colonialism and argues for its rectification in search of 
the "elimination of inequities". 
85) 
But it can be contended on the other hand that taking 
of an inventory of the past in this way should not be 
extended infinitely, for it could undermine the fundamental 
security of treaty and other legal relations of States. In 
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the course of the discussion of the draft articles of the 
law of treaties,, and more specifically Article 53 on the 
legal consequences of the termination of a treaty, in the 
International Law Commission in 1966, Paul Reuter Stated: 
"Suppose there was a rule of jus cogens that 
annuled territorial changes obtained by force or by 
other means contrary to the Charter. Would that rule 
apply only to treaties concluded after its emergence, 
or could it also apply to earlier treaties, such as 
treaties establishing a colonial protectorate? it 
would be agreed that nullity of that kind could not be 
extended into the past ad infinitum. " 
86) 
He wanted to stress that "there were many cases in which, 
even where jus co5ens applied, the requirements of 
stability were important. " 
87). 
It is true that in the interpretation of facts and 
legal documents account must be taken of their historical 
context. In the Temple of Preah Vihear case of 1962 Judge 
Wellington Koo, impressed by the weak bargaining power of 
the Siamese Government vis-a-vis the French, defended that 
lack of reaction on the part of the Siamese. In the words 
of a commentator, "In that situation, the learned Judge 
added, it was wholly natural and reasonable that Siam 
should refrain from any reaction for fear of adverse 
consequences. Legal niceties, in short, must be 
interpreted with regard to political realities. , 
88) 
"Confronted by what were in effect adverse facts of State' 
cloaked in Western legalities, [the Siamese authorities] 
found it prudent to react only 0*0 by polite 
acquiescence. 1189) As the commentator says, "As a 
precedent, the Temple case may be dangerously narrow in 
declining to look beyond immediate questions of treaty law 
into the broad and equivolcal sphere of historical 
justice, "90) If this comment stresses the importance of 
the historical context in which interpretation should 
be 
made, the Namibia case of 1971 emphasizes the evolutionary 
aspect of the law. In interpreting Article 
22 of the 
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Covenant of the League of Nations, the International Court 
of Justice states: 
"The Court is bound to take into account the fact 
that the concept embodied in Article 22 of the 
Covenant ... were not static, but were by definition 
evolutionary, as also, was the concept of the 'sacred 
trust'. The Parties to the Covenant must consequently 
be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, 
viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take 
into consideration the changes which have occurred in 
the supervening half-century, and its interpretation 
cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development 
of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and 
by way of customary law. Moreover, an international 
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within 
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at 
the time of the interpretation. " 
91) 
The same thing is meant by Edward McWhinney when he says: 
"The normative quality, in legal terms today, of the old 
International Law rules, is increasingly subjected to the 
test of reason: those rules are to be critically 
re-examined in the context of the historically limited 
space-time dimension of their origins, and then tested in 
terms of their claims, such as they may be, to continuing 
relevance and reasonableness in the larger World Community 
of our times. , 
92) 
International law has, as any law does, a dual 
requirement of development or change and stability. 
Excessive emphasis on one to the detriment of the other 
destroys the normal evolution of international law. This 
is rightly pointed out in a resolution of l'Institut de 
Droit International on "Le probleme intertemporel en droit 
international public" of 1975. In its preamble the 
resolution recites: 
"Consid6rant le besoin de favoriser llgvolution de 
l'ordre juridique international tout en sauvegardant 
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le principe de la s6curit6 juridique, 616ment 
essentiel de tout systeme de droit; 
Consid6rant que toute solution d1un proble'me 
intertemporel dans le domaine international doit tenir 
compte de ce double imp6ratif de 1'6volution et de la 
s6curite; 
Consid6rant qu'un probl6me comparable se pose 
quand une regle se r6fere a une notion dont la port6e 
ou la signification a vari6 dans le temps, ... , 
93) 
Now to turn to cultural aspects of equity, it is well 
to remember Article 9 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, where reference is made to the importance 
of fair representation of various cultural values in these 
terms: 
"At every election, the electors shall bear in 
mind 000 that in the body as a whole the 
representation of the main forms of civilization and 
of the principal legal systems of the world should be 
assured. , 
94) 
Since it is impossible to represent all the different forms 
of civilization and legal systems of the world, it seems 
agreed that Article 9 is a fair compromise. Yet critical 
comments have off and on been made on the Court's findings. 
For example, Judge Sir Percy Spender, in his dissent in the 
Temple of Preah Vihear case (merits) of 1962, presented an 
argument which carries not only historical but cultural 
overtones: 
"It would not, I think, be just to apply to the 
conduct of Siam in this period objective standards 
comparable to those which reasonably might today be or 
might then have been applied to highly developed 
European States. " 
95) 
Views in the same vein are expressed in the symposium 
on "Judicial Settlement of International Disputes" of 1972 
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sponsored by the Max-Planck-Institut fiir ausldndisches 
6ffentliches Recht und V61kerrecht, much as in the Hague 
Academy's workshop in 1983 on "The Future of International 
Law in a Multicultural World", which we have briefly 
discussed above in the Introduction. T. 0. Elias "wished 
to construe Article 9 of the Statute as not emphasizing the 
principal legal 'systems' in the traditional sense, but 
rather the distinctive legal 'cultures' which had grown 
beyond the range of civil law and common law systems. 
These clearly distinguishable cultures that had been 
developing within Latin America, Asia and Africa should be 
given as fair representation as possible. , 
96) 
Shabtai 
Rosenne stated: "The Chinese concept of a civilized society 
placed far greater importance on conciliation than on 
judicial settlement. This conception was increasingly in 
evidence the further one went eastwards from the 
Mediterranean. And if the International Court was to be a 
truly international court, it must absorb into its 
intellectual reservoir some of these other ideas about how 
a court fitted into different mechanisms or formulae for 
the settlement of disputes. , 
97) jean salmon pointed out: 
"The information given about practice in China and Africa 
also indicated that the conception of international 
adjudication was perhaps too strongly marked with the stamp 
of European thinking and unsuitable for exportation to 
other parts of the globe. The task facing European lawyers 
was rather to understand than to condemn or to rest 
complacently on their own laurels. It was not a question 
of relinquishing the ICJ and arbitration. On the contrary, 
they must be vigorously defended, but only in those spheres 
where such procedures were appropriate--in areas where both 
parties were satisfied with the law to be applied and 
consented to the proceedings. , 
98) 
Indeed there are striking contrasts between the 
Western and non-Western conceptions of legal significancer 
as it was made clear in the Hague Academy's workshop of 
1983. After referring to a number of instances in which 
the West and non-Western States have different legal 
concepts due to their different cultural values-- 
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predominant importance of the tribe under cover of the 
State fagade, relations of war and peace differently 
perceived, different concepts of dispute settlement, the 
rigid notion of contract in the West and preference of 
harmony or equitable adaptation of contract in the 
non-Western States, etc. --, 
99) 
Ren6-Jean Dupuy concludes: 
"Toutes ces observations du comparatiste 6clairent 
llinternationaliste sur les malentendus qui opposent a 
11heure pr6sente les juristes tiers-mondes et ceux 
qui, en Occident, restent attach6s au 
positivisme. " 
100) 
As it is correctly pointed out by Oscar Schachter, 
international law is not 'value-free' in the sense that 
physics or chemistry is. 
101) 
It is important to keep in 
mind the Imalentendus' based on different cultural values 
in the interpretation of facts and law. " It would be 
excessively optimistic, even fatuous, " as Schachter says, 
"to assume that a collective effort in international law on 
a truly international scale could ignore these profound 
differences or cover them up with high-sounding 
generalities. , 
102) 
In more specific terms, it is likely that a State 
traditionally more accustomed to conciliation than to 
adversary adjudication lacks a diligent sense of rules of 
procedure for adjudication. It may thus be suspected that 
such a State is likely to face an unfavourable finding by 
the tribunal. There seems to be ample evidence to support 
this suspicion in the fact that at least in the recent 
arbitral and judicial cases most of the parties to the 
dispute have employed as their counsel experienced British 
or French international lawyers who are believed to be well 
versed in adjudicative rules of procedure. 
103) 
On the other hand it may be cautioned that as cultural 
considerations can be as selective as arbitrary, they must 
be given in good faith. The international 
judge or 
arbitrator may feel bound to deal with such considerations 
as part of the "relevant circumstances" presented 
by the 
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parties, rather than ignoring them as extra-legal factors. 
But inasmuch as he is not free from latent or subconscious 
cultural values, it is desirable that he should act with 
the greatest care to ensure as fair a judgment of the 
merits as possible. 
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Conclusions 
We have seen the growing reference to equity in the 
problems of international law in the recent years. It is 
abundantly found in some of the recent treaty clauses, 
notably those of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982 and the Vienna Convention on Succession 
of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 
of 1983, and the most recent arbitral and judicial 
decisions on maritime boundary delimitation, 1) 
There is a growing awareness among States of the 
importance of equity in international law and relations, 
and naturally this has given rise to a considerable number 
of publications discussing equity, most of them in its 
favour. 2) Thus although there is admittedly some criticism 
of the application of equity which has various 'dangers', 
3) 
there is evidence that the raison d18tre of equity as 
States see it is growing. This is so especially in the 
settlement of disputes. 
contemporary disputes are increasingly complex, with 
multi-faceted issues involved, and require 
multi-dimensional settlement. A variety of circumstances 
are entangled in a dispute in such a complicated way that 
it may not be amenable to a clear-cut solution which 
decides entirely in favour of one party or determines one 
party's justice and the other's injustice. As a Japanese 
expert in the law of civil procedure writes in his recent 
general treatise on law, such a dispute would require a 
reconciliatory settlement taking account of the respective 
equities of the parties in search of the extent to which as 
members of the same community they should share the 
forbearance or loss incurred. 
4) This mode of settlement 
contrasts with the modern Western type of adjudication 
which opposes one party to the other in a legal struggle 
before the tribunal. 
5) 
As it is, however, this seems to be 
an overstatement in view of the present perception that 
States have of the nature of the international society. 
But this is not the end of the matter. When an 
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equitable solution of the dispute is stressed, as in some 
of the recent arbitral and judicial decisions on maritime 
boundary delimitation, the implication is that it is 
somewhat reconciliatory settlement acceptable to both 
parties as immediately interested neighbours, if not as 
members of the international society. This would be the 
reason why reference to "equitable principles" and 
"relevant circumstances" to be taken into account has 
recurred. Especially the emphasis on the need to take 
account of "all the relevant circumstances" makes a sharp 
contrast with the traditional method of singling out the 
relevant issues of the dispute for the application of the 
law. Could this then constitute a departure from the 
traditional mode of applying the relevant legal rules and 
principles? 
If, as is generally agreed, the consideration of 
"relevant circumstances" is part of the application of law, 
it follows that an expanded scope of "relevant 
circumstances" should lead to an expanded notion of law. 
Law evolves. Any rule of law, at the time of its 
formation, cannot predict every conceivable future 
situation to which it is to be applied. 
6) It tends to lag 
behind developments of fact. It is here in the fact-law 
gap that equity can play its role. In the words of B. A. 
Wortley, 
"A legal order that recognizes no equity would be 
hard indeed and difficult to imagine. Such an order 
might work to some extent in a static society that 
demanded nothing more than a 'slot machine' method of 
justice, ... But in a 
dynamic and changing society, 
law without the moderation of equity, without some 
discretion in permitting remedies and in awarding 
punishment, seems inconceivable. 117) 
More particularly new developments in international 
relations make States aware of the advisability of equity. 
As Paul Reuter points out: 
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"la puissance de l'homme sur la nature s'est 6tendue, 
mais ä travers l'intervention de l'Etat et c'est aux 
Etats que les nouvelles richesses sont attribuges; les 
societ6s humaines ici se fragmentent, la s'unifient; 
de nouvelle rgpartitions des glgments constitutifs des 
Etats en r6sultent; ainsi naissent les nouveaux 
domaines d'gquitC?. j) 
Similarly in the domestic context of the United States 
equity seems to have filled the gap created by the new 
social and economic developments, as it is reported by 
Brendan F. Brown: 
"Many examples i 
legal justice lags 
United States. Soo 
able to solve the 
society, caused by 
property, and by 
conditions. "" 
are available to demonstrate that 
behind equitable justice in the 
Only equity, not law, has been 
many problems of contemporary 
the emergence of new forms of 
changing economic and social 
And this American example is not an isolated case. As a 
well documented research on the role of private law 
principles in the development of international law shows, 
"There exists a customary rule of international 
law to the effect that 'general principles of law', 
'justice' and 'equity' should, in addition to and 
apart from custom and treaties, be treated as binding 
upon international tribunals. These sources, which 
are shown by the practice of international tribunals 
to connote legal rules proper and not precepts ex 
aequo et bono, are, for the most part, identical with 
generally recognized rules of private law. " 
10) 
The same study, done in the mid-1920s, concludes that "the 
approximation to corresponding general principles of 
private law is, as a rule, tantamount to the realization of 
a principle of justice and equity hitherto obscured by the 
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part which force plays in international relations. "") 
Indeed what was not questionable in the Euro-centric 
international legal context in the nineteenth century has 
come to be questioned by a large number of newly 
independent States in the latter half of this century. 
These States,? for example, have put forward claims for a 
new international economic or information order in the 
general trend of 'decolonization'. In so far as they seek 
to establish new legal norms, such claims inevitably come 
into conflict with the traditionalist position of the 
older, developed States. 
This tendency is re-inforced by the growing 
particularism in the world today that sets count on 
cultural and historical particularities. When a specific 
dispute arises between a State with new values and another 
which adheres to traditional norms under these 
circumstances, an equitable solution would seem to require 
a balanced consideration of the equities of both parties 
unless customary international law indicates that one or 
the other is patently wrong. New social and economic 
conditions may defy the strict application of traditional 
rules and principles of law, but require instead an 
adequate consideration of various relevant circumstances 
for an equitable settlement of the dispute. 
Thus it has been shown that emerging necessities of 
international relations are the principal basis for the 
functioning of equity. But it must be remembered that 
equity is basically a particularized form of justice. 
12) 
In this sense we could rightly conclude with Daniel 
Bardonnet that "on ne doit pas oublier que 1'6quit6 
constitute le fondement m8me du droit, car, comme le 
remarquait Hauriou, Ile droit r6side dans le discernement 
du juste et de llinjustee'" 
13) 
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82. Manning 260. Much the same provisions can be found in the 
following clauses: 
Argentina - Uruguay, General Arbitration Treaty, 8 June 1899, 
Article 10 (Mannin & 264); 
. Argentina - Paraguay, General Arbitration Treaty, 6 November 
1899, Article 10 (Manning 286); 
Bolivia - Peru, General Arbitration Treaty, 21 Nov ember 1901, 
Article 8 (190 Parry 219); 
Argentina - Bolivia, General Arbitration Treaty, 3 February 
1902, Article 10 (Manning 318); and 
Argentina - Chile, General Arbitration Treaty, 28 May 1902, 
Article 8 (Manning 330). 
83.2 Martens NRG-III 302. Identical or similar provisions may be 
f ound in: 
Denmark - Portugal, Convention d'Arbitrage obligatoire, 20 March 
1907, Article 2 (2 Martens NRG-III 304); 
Costa Rica - Italy, General Arbitration Treaty, 8 January 1910, 
Article 3 (105 BFSP 590); and 
Switzerland - Turkey, Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration, 9 December 1928, Article 8 (159 LNTS 224). 
84.167 LNTS 283. 
85.12 LNTS 285. The formula in an identical wording is given in: 
Germany - Sweden, Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, 29 
August 1924, Article 5 (42 LNTS 127); 
Germany - Finland, Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation, 
14 March 1925, Article 5 (43 LNTS 369); 
Germany - Estonia, Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation, 
10 August 1925, Article 5 (63 LNTS 126); 
Germany - Netherlands, Convention of Arbitration and 
Conciliation, 20 May 1926, Article 4 (66 LNTS 121); 
Germany - Denmark, Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, 
2 
June 1926, Article 4 (61 LNTS 340); and 
Germany - Luxembourg, Treaty of Arbitration and 
Conciliation, 11 
September 1929, Article 5 (118 LNTS 106). 
86.60 LNTS 305. The same or much the same f ormula, at least in so 
far as the second paragraph is concerned, may be 
found in the 
following clauses: 
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Denmark - Sweden, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, 14 January 1926, Article 2 (51 LNTS 258); 
Denmark - Norway, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 15 January 1926, Article 2 (60 LNTS 321); 
Finland - Sweden, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 29 January 1926, Article 2 (49 LNTS 370); 
Denmark - Finland, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 30 January 1926, Article 2 (51 LNTS 371); 
Denmark - Haiti, Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, 5 April 
1928, Article 4 (99 LNTS 22); 
Denmark - Iceland, Convention regarding the Procedure to be 
Followed for the Settlement of Disputes, 27 June 1930, Article 2 (118 
LNTS 129); 
Iceland - Sweden, Convention regarding the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 27 June 1930, Article 2 (127 LNTS 74); and 
Iceland - Norway, Agreement regarding the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 27 June 1930, Article 2 (126 LNTS 424). 
87. Habicht 680. Identically worded or much the same provisions can 
be found in these clauses: 
Italy - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 19 April 1928, 
Article I (Ibid. 725); 
Germany - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 5 May 1928, 
Article I (Ibid. 739-40); 
Finland - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 7 June 1928, 
Article I (Ibid. 760); 
Denmark - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 14 June 1928, 
Article 1 (Ibid. 781); 
Austria - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 16 August 1928, 
Article I (Ibid. 817); 
Czechoslovakia - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 16 August 
1928, Article 1 (89 LNTS 227); 
Poland - United States, Treaty of Arbitration, 16 August 1928, 
Article 1 (Habicht 824); 
Albania - United States, Treaty of Arbitrations 22 October 
1928, 
Article I (Ibid. 847); 
Sweden - United States, Treaty of Arbitrations 27 October 
1928, 
Article 1 (Ibid. 859); 
United States - Lithuania, Treaty of Arbitrations 
14 November 
1928, Article I (UN Systematic Survey 468); 
United States - Bulgaria, Treaty of Arbitrations 
21 January 
1929, Article I (Ibid. 514); 
United States - Kingdom of Serbsq Croats and 
Slovenes, Treaty of 
Arbitration, 21 January 1929, Article I (Ibid. 517); 
United States - Ethiopia, Treaty of Arbitrations 
26 January 
1929, Article 1 (Ibid. 522); 
United States - Hungary, Treaty of Arbitrations 
26 January 1929, 
Article I (Ibid. 525); 
ion, 20 February 1929, United States - Norwayq Treaty of Arbitrat 
Article 1 (Ibid. 533); 
United States - Belgium, Treaty of Arbitrations 
20 March 1929s 
Article I (Ibid. 541); 
ration, 21 March 19299 United States - Roumania, Treaty of Arbit 
Article I (Ibid. 544); 
United States - Luxembourg, Treaty of 
Arbitration, 6 April 19291, 
Article 1 (Ibid. 555); 
United States - Egypt, Treaty of Arbitration, 
27 August 1929, 
Article 1 (Ibid. 642); 
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United States - Estonia, Treaty of Arbitration, 27 August 1929, Article 1 (Ibid. 644); 
United States - Netberlands, Treaty of Arbitration, 13 January 1930, Article 1 (Ibid. 727); 
United States - Latvia, Treaty of Arbitration. 11L Tnirmnrxr 101n 
Article I (Ibid. 728) 
United States 
Article 1 (Ibid. 802-3 
United States - 
Article I (Ibid. 804); 
United States - 
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15 May 1930, Treaty of Arbitration, 
Treaty of Arbitration, 
Treaty of Arbitration, 
88. UN Systematic Survey 874. 
19 June 1930, 
27 June 1930, 
89.48 LNTS 180. An identical formula is in Article 16 of the Austria - Czechoslovakia Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement of 5 March 1926 (51 LNTS 356). 
90. Provisions to the same effect may be found in the following 
clauses: 
Poland - Switzerland, Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, 7 
March 1925, Article 15 (50 LNTS 268); 
France - Switzerland, Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and 
Judicial Settlement, 6 April 1925, Article 15 (147 LNTS 97); 
Denmark - Poland, Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, 23 
April 1926, Article 16 (61 LNTS 252); 
Belgium - Switzerland, Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration, 5 February 1927, Article 18 (68 LNTS 54); 
Colombia - Switzerland, Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and 
Judicial Settlement, 20 August 1927, Article 14 (Habicht 614); 
Germany - Lithuania, Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, 29 
January 1928, Article 5 (90 LNTS 247); 
Germany - Turkey, Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, 16 May 
1929, Article 5 (109 LNTS 465); 
Czechoslovakia - Turkey, Convention of Judicial Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, 17 March 1931, Article 5 (133 LNTS 151); 
and 
Greece - Poland, Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and 
Arbitration, 4 January 1932, Articles 7 and 23 (131 LNTS 234,240). 
91.54 LNTS 310. The other three Arbitration Treaties of Locarno of 
16 October 1925 between Germany and Czechoslovakia, France and Poland 
have an identical clause in their respective Article 16 (Ibid. 348, 
322,334). 
92. Identical or very much the same provisions are in: 
France - Roumania, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes, 10 June 1926, Article 16 (58 LNTS 240); 
Denmark - France, Arbitration Treaty, 5 July 1926, Article 
17 
(71 LNTS 462); 
Denmark - Czechoslovakia, Arbitration Treaty, 30 November 
1926, 
Article 17 (67 LNTS 112); 
France - Luxembourg, Treaty of Conciliation, 
Arbitration and 
Judicial Settlement, 17 October 1927, Article 17 (Habicht 642); 
France - Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
Arbitration 
Convention, 11 November 1927, Article 16 (68 LNTS 388); 
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Spain - Hungary, Treaty of Conciliationg Judicial Settlement and 
Arbitration, 10 June 1929, Article 17 (101 LNTS 258-60) ; 
Denmark - Latvia, Treaty of Arbitration, 28 February 1930, 
Article 17 (113 LNTS 34); 
Bulgaria - Latvia,, Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement 
and Arbitration, 23 May 1933, Article 17 (UN Systematic Survey 1034) 
and 
Latvia - Czechoslovakia, Convention of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration, 11 October 1933, Article 17 (155 LNTS 
195). 
93.102 LNTS 112. Identical provisions are included in the 
following clauses: 
Netherlands - Czechoslovakia, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, 14 September 1929, Article 4 (107 LNTS 
204); 
Luxembourg - Netherlands, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, 17 September 1929, Article 4 (107 LNTS 
38); 
Netherlands - Roumania, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, 22 January 1930, Article 4 (112 LNTS 
124); 
Netherlands - Poland, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration 
and Conciliationg 12 April 1930, Article 4 (113 LNTS 68); 
Belgium - Roumania, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration 
and Conciliationg 8 July 1930, Article 4 (128 LNTS 406); 
Netherlands - Turkey, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration 
and Conciliationg 16 April 1932, Article 4 (143 LNTS 237); and 
Norway - Netherlands, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, Arbitration 
and Conciliation, 23 March 1933, Article 4 (146 LNTS 294). A similar 
stipulation in Japan - Netherlands, Treaty of Judicial Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliationg 19 April 19339 Article 3 (163 LNTS 354). 
94.101 LNTS 336. An alternýtive means of conforming to the 
provisions in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice is laid down in Article 15 of the Polish - Swedish Treaty of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of 3 November 1925 (62 LNTS 270). 
95.60 LNTS 357-9. 
96.34 LNTS 394. The other similar clauses are in the following: 
Netherlands - Yugoslavia, Treaty of Judicial 
Settlement, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, 11 March 19319 Article 6 
(129 LNTS 92); 
Netherlands - Venezuela, Treaty of 
Arbitration, Judicial 
Settlement and Conciliation, 5 April 1933, Article 
6 (144 LNTS 356); 
Denmark - Venezuela, Treaty of Arbitration, 
Judicial Settlement 
and Conciliation, 19 December 1933, Article 
6 (158 LNTS 252-4); 
Brazil - Uruguay, Treaty of 
Conciliation and Obligatory 
Arbitration, 22 August 1934, Article 17 (UN Systematic 
Survey 1077); 
and 
Norway - Venezuela, Treaty of Arbitration, 
Judicial Settlement 
and Conciliation, 13 May 1935, Article 
6 (167 LNTS 422). 
97.522 UNTS 240. Identical provisions are in the 
following 
clauses: 
Belgo - Luxembourgian Economic 
Union - Tunisia, Convention 
concerning the Encouragement of Capital 
Investment and the Protection 
of Property, 15 July 1964, Article 
4 (561 UNTS 302); 
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Netherlands - Ivory Coast, Agreement on Economic and Co-operation, 26 April 1965, Article 12 (634 
' 
UNTS 90); 
Belgo - Luxembourgian Economic Union - Morocco, 
concerning the Encouragement of Capital Investment and the 
of Property, 28 April 1965, Article 5 (620 UNTS 176); 
Netherlands - Senegal, Agreement on Economic and Co-operation, 12 June 1965, Article 6, paragraph 5 (602 UNTS 
Netherlands - Cameroon, Agreement on Economic and 
Co-operation, 6 July 1965, Article 12, paragraph 5 (571 UNTS 
98.615 UNTS 402. 





236) ; and 
Technical 
70). 
100. The word "referee", not amiable compositeur, is used in the 
English text which is official, but the official Spanish text has 
"amigable componedor" (70 UNTS 136,137). The same provision is in 
Article 7 of the Paraguay - Spain Treaty of Peace and Amity of 12 
October 1949 (155 BFSP 827). 
101.85 UNTS 350. 
102. This is the text of the relevant part of the Danish - German 
Agreement (ST/LEG/SER. B/16, p. 424). A slightly different English 
version is in the Dutch - German Agreement (Ibid,. , p. 419). 
103.540 UNTS 36-7. 
104. Ibid. 17. 
105. Ibid. 33. 
106. Ibid. 35. 
107. Ibid. 55. 
108.8 De Clercq 34. It is worth noting that the mixed commission 
was to act basically "dans un esprit d'e"quite". 
109. Ibid. 185. Also worth noting is the staff officers proceeding 
to the demarcation of the boundary line "soit pour etablir une 
demarcation convenable, soit pour favoriser, des deux cotes, les 
proprietaires frontaliers dans des vues commune d'6quit6". (Emphasis 
added) 
110. Quoted in Jones, St. B., Boundary-Making: A Handbook for 
Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissions, 1945, p. 59. 
111. Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise, 21 novembre 1947, 
p. 11489, as quoted in Bardonnet, D., "Equite et Frontieres terrestres" 
in M91anges offerts a Paul Reuter - Le droit international: 
Unite et 
Diversite, 1981, p. 49. 
112.30 LNTS 66. Further, Clause 1 provides in part that 
"Subject to 
any decision of the arbitrators to the contrary, the procedure shall 
be governed by the provisions of the Convention of 
The Hague of 
October 18,1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. " (Ibid. 64) 
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The following may also be mentioned as examples falling under the heading "consideration of relevant circumstances": 
Guatemala - El Salvador, Treaty for the Delimitation of the Boundary, 9 April 19389 preambular paragraph 4: 
"That the Joint Commission proceeded ... and at points where the frontiers were not clearly definedg establishing by consulting 
old titles, the right of possession claimed by one or the other brother country, and confirming boundary-stones or points 
acknowledged to be undisputed and traditional, adopting wherever 
possible the median natural line, and taking into consideration 
old-established estate interests in the territory, and being 
wholly governedg wherever doubt arose as to the precise line to be adopted, by a spirit of absolute equality and justice. 
(189 LNTS 289) 
Act XVI of the Joint Frontier Commission, dated 5 December 1937, 
which, in accordance with Article 3 of the frontier delimitation 
treaty, is to be regarded as an integral part of the said treaty, and 
which includes Act XV recording the proceedings of the Commission on 
16 October 1937: 
"V. Where an estate is situated within both national 
jurisdictions, the frontier shall not be so drawn as to 
prejudice the interests of either country, but shall continue to 
divide the estate, which shall thus belong to both 
jurisdictions. 
VI. Where two recognized boundary-marks have to be joined by a 
dividing line, consideration shall be had to the natural 
configuration of the ground, and all necessary adjustments made 
so that neither Party benefits at the expense of the other. " 
(Ibid. 303) 
France - Luxembourg, Accord portant rectification de frontiere, 
16 juillet 1963, which effected an exchange of 2,233 square metres in 
order to establish "un trace de frontiere rationnel, supprimant toutes 
les anomalies et repondant aux conditions locales". (645 UNTS 38) 
113. ST/LEG/SER. B/18, p. 43. 
114. United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, Office of the Geographer, 89 Limits in the Seas 1,2. A 
similar consideration of two islands, one Iranian and the other Saudi 
Arabian, as exceptional was given in the Iran - Saudi Arabia Agreement 
concerning the Sovereignty over the Islands of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi 
and the Delimitation of the Boundary Line Separating the Submarine 
Areas of 24 October 1968, Article 3 (696 UNTS 214; a comment in 24 
Limits in the Seas 4). 
115.97 Parry 385. 
116. Nweihed, K. G. , 
"EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-enclosed 
Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements Between Venezuela and Her Neighbors", 
8 Ocean Development and International Law Journal 25 (1980). 
117.97. Parry 114,119 Parry 135. 
118. Article 3 of the Costa Rica - Nicaragua Convention of Peace 
(Manning 32), and Articles 94 and 95 of the Treaty of Peace with 
t-urkey (28 LNTS 80). 
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119. J. Dumont, 6 Corps universel diplomatique 85, as quoted in Schwarz enberger, G-, The Dynamics of International Law, 1976, p. 62. 
120.48 LNTS 266. See also the Convention between Ecuador and Peru of 15 December 18949 Article 1 of which runs in part: 
conciliandos de modo que la linea frontera este fundada en el derecho 
y en la equidad. " La Fontaine 324. 
121. Manning 159. 
122. Ibid. 160. In a subsequent complementary protocol between the 
same parties for carrying out the arbitral and other provisions of the boundary convention of April 20,1886, signed at La Paz on 24 April 1886, Article 2 provides in part that "the four ministers shall be 
constituted into an international commission to deliberate and determine by majority vote the delimitation found to be just or proper for both parties. " (Manning 162) 
123.513 UNTS 160. Mentioning ex aequo et bono in the parenthesis 
after the phrase "in accordance with equity" is an interesting 
assimilation of the two phrases. 
124. The Iran - Saudi Arabia agreement in 696 UNTS 212; the Iran - 
Qatar agreement in 787 UNTS 172; the Iran - Bahrain agreement in 826 
UNTS 234; and the Iran - United Arab Emirates agreement in Conforti, 
B. & G. Francalanci, Atlante dei Confini Sottomarini, 1979, p. 119. 
Another similar provisi on can be found in the Haliti-San Domingo Traite 
de Paix, d'Amitie", de Commerce, de Navigation et d'Extradition of 9 
November 1874, Article 4 of which reads: "Les hautes parties 
contractantes s'engagent formellement a etablir, de la maniere la plus 
conf orme A Vequit6 et aux inte"rets re'ciproques des deux peuples, les 
lignes, qui separent leurs possessions actuelles. " 27 Martens NRG-II 4. 
125.753 UNTS 192. Much the same wording is in Article 8 of the 
Agreement of 13 November 1970 concerning the settlement of outstanding 
financial problems between Belgium and Luxembourg on the one hand and 
Roumania on the other (801 UNTS 230). 
126. The Netherlands - Indonesia agreement, Article 22, paragraph 5 
(799 UNTS 28); the Netherlands - Sudan agreement, Article 17, 
paragraph 5 (829 UNTS 66) ; and the Netherlands - Thailand agreement, 
Article 12, paragraph 5 (866 UNTS 60). 
127.620 UNTS 204. 
128.509 UNTS 102. In a companion "Frontier Treaty" or the Treaty 
concerning the course of the common frontier, the boundary waters, 
real property situated near the frontier, traffic crossing the 
frontier on land and via inland waters, and other frontier questions 
of the same date, Article 71, paragraph 3 provides: 
"The umpire shall 
first discuss the difference with the two Governments with a view to 
bringing about a settlement. If he considers his efforts to 
have 
failed he shall inform the two Governments accordingly. 
" (508 UNTS 
200) Further in a Supplementary Agreement of 14 May 1962 to the 
Ems-Dollard Treaty of 8 April 1960, Article 10, paragraph 
6, refers to 
equity: "The arbitral tribunal shall lay down a settlement 
binding 
upon the Contracting Parties and the affected concessionaires with 
respect to all questions of law or discretion which are at 
issue. In 
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its decision, the arbitral tribunal may also take into account considerations of equity. " (509 UNTS 148) 
129. ST/LEG/SER. B/16, p. 403. 
130. A/CONF. 39/27, p. 16. 
131.41 LNTS 274-5. An identically worded clause is included in the following: 
United States - Sweden, Convention respecting the Regulation of the Liquor Traffic, 22 May 1924, Article 4 (29 LNTS 424-5); 
United States - Norway, Convention respecting the Regulation of the Liquor Traffic, 24 May 1924, Article 4 (26 LNTS 47); 
United States - Denmark, Convention respecting the Regulation of the Liquor Traffic, 29 May 1924, Article 4 (27 LNTS 365); 
United States - France, Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, 30 June 1924, Article 4 (601 LNTS 
419); 
United States - Netherlands, Convention respecting the 
Regulation of the Liquor Traf f ic, 21 August 1924, Article 4 (33 LNTS 
437); 
United States - Spain, Convention for the Prevention of 
Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, 10 February 1926, Article 6 (67 
LNTS 135); and 
United States - Cuba, Convention f or the Prevention of Smuggling 
Operations between Their Respective Territories, 4 March 1926, Article 
4 (61 LNTS 372-3). 
Substantially the same provision, though differently worded, is 
in the Netherlands - Poland Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 30 
May 1924, Protocole de cloture I (Procedure d'arbitrage) , paragraph 2: "Au cas ou' le diffe"rend sera soumis a la Cour permanente d'Arbitrage, 
les stipulations de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour 
le reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux seront applicbles. 
**a" (34 LNTS 26) 
132.181 UNTS 86-88. Virtually the same provision may be found in 
Article 18, paragraph B (2), of the Egypt - Yugoslavia Agreement 
concerning Regular Air Transport Services of 20 February 1955 (255 
UNTS 228). 
133.201 LNTS 128. 
134.8 UNTS 226. An identical wording may be seen in Article 16 of 
the Hungary - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation of 15 July 1947 (216 UNTS 276). 
135.14 LNTS 279. 
136.4 UKTS 162 (1919, Cmd. 153). The same clause is in the 
following three treaties: 
Allied & Associated Powers - Austria, Treaty of Peace, 10 
September 1919, Article 2561, Annex, paragraph 2 (11 UKTS 85 (1919, 
Cmd. 400)); 
Allied & Associated Powers - Bulgaria, Treaty of Peace, 27 
November 1919, Article 188, Annex, paragraph 2 (5 UKTS 60 (1920, Cmd. 
522)); and 
Allied & Associated Powers - Hungary, Treaty of Peace, 
4 June 
1920, Article 239, Annex, paragraph 2 (10 UKTS 81 (1920, Cmd. 896)). 
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Much the same provision is in Article 12 of the Anglo-American Treaty relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between 
Canada and the United States of 11 January 1909, which reads in part: The Commission may adopt such rules of procedure as shall be in 
accordance with justice and equity, ... 
" (208 Parry 220) 
137.7 LNTS 95. A similar provision is in Article 7 of the Yugoslav - Greek Agreement concerning Hydro-economic Questions of 18 June 1959 (363 UNTS 138). Provisions to the same effect may be found in Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Denmark - Sudan Agreement on Air 
Services between and beyond Their Respective Territories of 11 May 1959 (445 UNTS 114), and Article 10 of the French - Swiss Convention 
concerning the Extension into French Territory of the Site of the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research of 13 September 1965 (689 
UNTS 68), whose basis of decision goes back to Article 15 of the 
French - Swiss Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration of 6 April 1925 
(147 LNTS 97). 
138.866 UNTS 146. Identical or similar provisions are in the 
following clauses: 
France - Khmer Republic, Air Transport Agreement, 15 January 
1964, Article 9, paragraph 3 (796 UNTS 32); 
Lebanon - Senegal, Air Transport Agreement, 27 December 1966, 
Article 9, paragraph 3 (794 UNTS 248); 
Philippines Republic of Korea, Air Transport Agreement, 22 
July 1969, Article 12, paragraph 3 (710 UNTS 142); 
Netherlands Gabon, Air Transport Agreement, 14 October 1969, 
Article 8, paragraph 3 (796 UNTS 96); and 
Austria - France, Convention generale sur la securite sociale, 
28 mai 1971, Article 38, paragraph 3 (856 UNTS 140). 
139. The Articles of Agreement of the International Development 
Association, approved on 26 January 1960 f or submission to Governments 
by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Article 10, paragraph (d) in part 
provides: "The umpire (i. e. of a tribunal of three arbitrators) shall 
have full power to settle all questions of procedure in any case where 
the parties are in disagreement with respect thereto. " (439 UNTS 288) 
The sentence "The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal" 
is included in the following clauses: 
International Atomic Energy Agency - German Democratic Republic, 
Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 7 March 
1972, 
Article 22 (895 UNTS 20); 
International Atomic Energy Agency - Nepal, Agreement for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 24 March and 22 June 1972, Article 
22 (Ibid. 96); 
International Atomic Energy Agency - Cyprus, Agreement for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the 
Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 26 June 1972, Article 
22 (Ibid. 
250); 
International Atomic Energy Agency - Holy Seeg Agreement 
for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the 
Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 26 June 1972, 
Article 22 (Ibid. 
173-4); and 
International Atomic Energy Agency - Mongolia, Agreement 
for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the 
Treaty on the Non- 
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Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 17 July and 9 August 1972, Article 
22 (Ibid. 364). 
Much the same formula is in Article 20 of the France - European Organization for Nuclear Research Agreement concerning the Legal 
Status of the Said Organization in France of 16 June 1972 (871 UNTS 
222). 
140.793 UNTS 224. 
141.484 UNTS 374. 
142.73 Parry 133-4. The Arbitral Convention of 2 April 1918 between 
France and the Netherlands concerning the indemnity for requisition of 
potatoes likewise provides for equity as the basis of decision (Stuyt 
No. 321a). 
143. La Fontaine 647. Another guide for decision is in Article 1 
which provides: "As the conciliatory arbitrators and amiables 
compositeurs shall be nominated Sres. Jenaro Larrea and Francisco 
Andrade Marin so that they may resolve the claim from the Salesian 
priests, after hearing both parties. " (ibid. ) 
144. Ralston-Doyle 2. In addition to the traditional f ormula of the 
Commissioners and the Umpire taking solemn oath "carefully to examine 
and impartially decide, according to justice "absolute equity" 
is provided as the principal basis of decision. This seems to be 
further re-inforced by the phrase "without regard to objections of 
technical nature, or of the provisions of local legislation". The 
same or much the same provisions may be found in the following: 
Mexico - Venezuela, Protocol of an Agreement for Submission to 
Arbitration of All Unsettled Claims of Mexican Citizens, 26 February 
1903, Article I (Ibid. 876); 
France - Venezuela, Protocol, 27 February 1903, Article I (Ibid. 
484); 
Netherlands - Venezuela, Protocol of an Agreement for Submission 
to Arbitration and Payment of All Unsettled Claims of the Government 
and Subjects of the Netherlands, 28 February 1903, Article 1 (Ibid. 
890); 
Belgium - Venezuela, Protocol of an Agreement for Submission to 
Arbitration and Payment of All Unsettled Claims of the Government and 
Subjects of Belgium, 7 March 1903, Article 1 (Ibid. 262); 
Sweden - Norway - Venezuela, Protocol of an 
Agreement for 
Submission to Arbitration of All Unsettled Claims of Citizens of 
Sweden and Norway, 10 March 1903, Article I (Ibid. 946); 
Spain - Venezuela, Protocol of an Agreement 
for Submission to 
Arbitration of All Unsettled Claims of Spanish Subjects, 2 April 
1903, 
Article I (Ibid. 918); 
ent for the Decision of the Great Britain - Venezuela, Agreem, 
Claims by a Mixed Commission, 7 May 1903, Paragraph 
6 (96 BFSP 104); 
Germany - Venezuela, Agreement, 7 May 
1903, Article 2 (Ralston- 
Doyle 516); and 
Italy - Venezuela, Agreement, 7 May 
19039 Article 2 (Ibid. 646). 
145.52 Parry 251. The formula of "justice and equity" may 
be found, 
with or without additional guides for 
decision, in the following 
clauses: 
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Austria - Baden - Bavaria - France - Great Britain - Hesse - Darmstadt - Nassau - the Netherlands - Prussia, Articles concerning 
the Navigation of the Rhine, 24 March 1815, Article 28, paragraph 3 (64 Parry 23); 
Great Britain - United States, Convention for Determining the 
Indemnity Due under Article 1, Treaty of Ghent, 12 July 1822, Article 
1 (72 Parry 427); 
Great Britain - United States, Convention for the Settlement of 
Private Claims by a Mixed Commission, 8 February 1853, Article 1 (9 
Hertslet 767); 
United States - New Granada, Claims Convention, 10 September 
1857, Article 1 (1 Malloy 320); 
Great Britain - Brazil, Convention for the Settlement of 
outstanding Private Claims by a Mixed Commission, 2 June 1858, Article 
1 (10 Hertslet 725-6); 
Great Britain - United States, Treaty for the Settlement of the 
Claims of the Hudson's Bay & Puget's Sound Agricultural Companies, 1 
July 1863, Article 2 (12 Hertslet 933); 
United States - Colombia, Convention of Claims, 10 February 
1864, Article 1 (1 Malloy 322); 
Great Britain - Mexico, Convention for the Investigation and 
Settlement of British Claims by a Mixed Commission, 26 June 1866, 
Article 1 (12 Hertslet 656); 
United States - Peru, Convention for the Settlement of Claims, 4 
December 1868, Article 1 (2 Malloy 1412); 
Great Britain - United States, Treaty for the Amicable 
Settlement of All Causes of Difference between the Two Countries, 8 
May 1871, Article 12 (13 Hertslet 976-7), Article 23 (Ibid. 980); 
France - Guatemala, Protocole d'arbitrage pour le reglement de 
la reclamation Bezault et de la contre-reclamation du Guatemala, 25 
April 1904, Article 3 (102 BFSP 607); 
United States - Venezuela, Agreement for the Decision and 
Adjustment of Certain Claims, 13 February 1909, Article 5 (4 Martens 
NRG-III 76); 
Great Britain - Portugal, Compromis of Arbitration concerning 
the Claims of Major Campbell, 1 August 1930, Preambular paragraph 
4 
(23 Martens NRG-III 723); and 
Agreement Providing for the Germany - United States, 
Determination of the Amount of the Claims against Germany under the 
Treaty of August 259 19219 10 August 19229 Administrative 
Decision No. 
II of 1 November 1923 (18 AJIL 178-9 (1924)). 
146.17 Martens NRG-III 302. Provisions to the same effect are in: 
Spa . in - Mexico, Convention, 25 November 
1925, Article 2 (Feller 
522); 
Great Britain - Mexico, Convention 
for the Settlement of British 
Claims in Mexico Arising from Revolutionary Acts, 19 November 
1926, 
Article 2 (23 Martens NRG-III 10); and 
Italy - Mexico, Convention 
for the Settlement of Italian Claims 
Arising from Revolutionary Acts in Mexico, 13 January 
1927, Article 2 
(Feller 504). 
147.17 Martens NRG-III 303. The following clauses also 
have 
provisions to the same effect: 
Spain - Mexico, Convention, 25 November 
19259 Article 6 (Feller 
523); 
Great Britain - Mexico, Convention 
for the Settlement of British 
Claims in Mexico Arising from Revolutionary Acts, 
19 November 1926, 
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Article 6 (23 Martens NRG-III 14) ; and 
Italy - Mexicoq Convention for the Settlement of Italian Claims Arising from Revolutionary Acts in Mexico, 13 January 1927, Article 6 (Feller 507). 
148. France - Mexico, Convention respecting the Settlement of French Claims Arising out of Revolutionary Acts in Mexico, 25 September 1924, 
Article 2 (122 BFSP 591), and Germany - Mexico, Convention relating to Compensation to German Nations for Damage during Revolutionary 
Disturbances in Mexico, 16 March 1925, Article 2 (Ibid. 687). Article 
6 of the French - Mexican Convention and Article 7 of the German - Mexican Convention have much the same provisions as those of Article 6 
in the American, Spanish, British and Italian Conventions with Mexico 
seen supra note 147 (122 BFSP 593 and 689). 
149.12 Hertslet 1205. This f ormula. is also f ound in Article 7 of 
the Japanese - British Protocol for Submitting to Arbitration Certain 
Questions as to the Interpretation of Treaties with Japan with Regard 
to Lease Held in Perpetuity of 28 August 1902 (23 Hertslet 826). 
150.7 LNTS 280. 
151. Ibid. 286. 
152.48 BFSP 105. 
153. These expressions may be found in the following: 
Spain - United States, Collective Letter to Submit to 
Arbitration the Indemnification to the owner of the "Masonic", 28 
February 1885, Paragraph 2 (LaFontaine 281); 
Great Britain & United States - Portugal, Protocol to Submit to 
Arbitration the Indemnity Resulting from the Rescision of the 
Concession of the Lorengo Marques Railway, 13 June 1891, Article 3 (La 
Fontaine 398); 
Great Britain - Transvaal, Award of the Arbitrator with 
Reference to the Matters in Controversy, relative to Article 14 of the 
Convention of London of 1884, Pronounced to Bloemfontein, 2 April 
1895, (Ibid. 459-60); 
Great Britain - United States2 Convention for the Submission to 
Arbitration of British Claims in Connection with the Behring Sea Seal 
Fishery, 8 February 1896, Article 2 (20 Hertslet 936); 
Great Britain - Belgium, Convention Referring to Arbitration the 
Case of Mr. Ben Tillett, 19 March 1898, Preamble (21 Hertslet 271); 
Brazil - United States2 Protocol of an Agreement 
Submitting to 
Arbitration a Claim of Citizens of the Latter against the Government 
of the Former, 6 September 19029 Article I (Manning 332-3); 
Peru - United States, Protocol for the Submission to 
Arbitration 
of the Landreau Claim against Peru, 21 May 1921, Article 
1 (6 LNTS 
173); and 
Canada - United States compromis of 25 March 
1965 in the Gut Dam 
Arbitration, Article 29 paragraphs 2 and 3 (607 UNTS 146). 
154. La Fontaine 120. 
155. For similar provisions, see the Argentine - British 
Convention 
(48 BFSP 41-2), and the Argentine - Sardinian Convention 
(49 BFSP 
479). 
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FY-1 - -- 
156.6 Hertslet 727. But see Article 11, which runs in part: "if the Commission can arrive at a moral conviction of the justice or of the injustice of a claim, they mayg notwithstanding the absence or incompleteness of vouchers, decide such claim according to principles 
of equity, keeping in view the letter and the spirit of such contracts 
as may apply to the case. " (Ibid. 728-9). 
157.17-1 Martens NRG-1 257. 
158.126 Parry 473. For the Spanish text, see ibid. A similar 
stipulation may be found in Article I of the Chile - Peru Protocol for 
the Liquidation of the Accounts of the Expenditures on Account of the 
Allied Squadron during the War with Spain of 27 September 1871 (3 
Lapradelle-Politis 536). 
159. La Fontaine 221-2. 
160. Ibid. 579. 
161.32 Martens NRG-II 85-6. Provisions granting the arbitrator or 
arbitrators or tribunal the powers of an amiable compositeur may also 
be found in the following clauses: 
United States - Chile, Protocol of Submission of the Alsop 
claim, I December 1909, paragraph 2 (5 AJIL 1080(1911)); 
Morocco - Netherlands, Decret cherifien, 9 January 1914, Article 
2 (90 JORF 3047, as quoted in Stuyt No. 316); 
Societe Europeenne d'Etudes et d'Entreprise - Yugoslavia, 3 
January 1932, Article 17 (ILR 761 (1957)); and 
Belgium - Luxembourg - Netherlands, Protocol etabli lors des 
conversations ministerielles, 21 October 1950, Article 4, paragraph 3 
(12 RIAA 322). 
162.17-1 Martens NRG-I 244. The ex aequo et bono formula is in: 
Brazil - Italy, Protocollo concernente i reclami italiani, 12 
February 1896, Article 4 (La Fontaine 519); 
Brazil - Italy, Protocollo per la soluzione dei reclami italiani 
originati da requisizioni, 12 February 1896, Article 1 (Ibid. 527); 
Great Britain - Panama, Convention (on the "James Pugh" case), 
15 October 1932, Article 3 (3 RIAA 1441-2); and 
France - Switzerland, Reglement concernant les importations en 
Suisse des produits des Zones franches, 1 December 1933, Article 8 
(Ibid. 1474). 
163.97 BFSP 692. 
164.16 Martens NR 626. 
165.11 UKTS 73 (1920, Cmd. 964). 
166.11 Martens NRG-III 614. Article 339 bore upon the Czechoslovak 
- German cessions. For Article 357 bearing on the 
French - German 
cessions, see ibid. 622-3. For similar provisions, see the Following: 
Article 300, Treaty of Saint German with Austria, 10 September 1919 
(11 UKTS 95 (1919, Cmd. 400)); Article 284, Treaty of Trianon with 
Hungary, 4 June 1920 (10 UKTS 92 (1920, Cmd. 896)); and Article 228, 
Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, 27 November 1919 
(5 UKTS 70 (1920, 
Cmd. 522)). 
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167.61 BFSP 102. A provision in nearly the same wording can be found in Article 2 of the Colombia - United States Convention for the Arbitration of the Case of the "Montijo" of 17 August 1874 (5 Moore 4698). 
168. Manning 141. 
169. Ibid. 142. 
170.5 Moore 4700. 
171.52 Parry 252. 
172. Ibid. 
173. Ibid. 251. 
174. A justice-equity-law formula may be found in the following: 
Spain - United States, Treaty of Friendship, Boundaries, 
Commerce and Navigation, 27 October 1795, Article 21 (53 Parry 29); 
Mexico - United States, Convention in Execution ofý Article 6 of the Convention of 30 January 1843,20 November 1843, Article 1 (14 
Martens NRG-I 39); 
United States - Costa Rica, Convention relative to the Claims of United States Citizens, 2 July 1860, Article 2 (1 Malloy 347); 
United States - Peru, Convention of Claims, 12 January 1863, 
Article 3 (54 Hertslet 1125); 
United States - Mexico, Convention for the Adjustment of Claims, 4 July 1868, Article 1 (1 Malloy 1129); 
United States - France, Convention relative to the Settlement of 
Certain Claims of the Citizens of Either Country against the Other, 15 
January 1880, Article 4 (6 Martens NRG-II 494); 
Guatemala - Mexico, Convention for Claims, 26 January 1888, 
Article 4 (La Fontaine 325-6); 
United States - Venezuela, Convention to Submit to Arbitration 
the Claims of the Venezuela Steam Transportation Company, 20 January 
1892, Article 3 (22 Martens NRG-II 264); 
United States Cuba, Convention for Settling the Mutual Claims 
by Arbitration, 7 August 1892, Article 4 (Ibid. 340); 
Great Britain - Haiti, Protocol, 27 February 1904, Article 2 
(1904 Descamps-Renault 945, as quoted in Stuyt No. 269); 
Rexico - United States, Convention for the Settlement of Claims 
by the Citizens of Each Country against the Other, 8 September 1923, 
Article 2 (17 Martens NRG-III 294-5); 
Panama - United States, Claims Conventiong 28 July 1926, Article 
2 (25 Martens NRG-III 7-8); 
Unit-pti Rtnt-pq Art- nf rnnarp. q. -, fnr the United States - Mexico 
Claims case, 10 April 1935, Section 3, paragraph (a) (Feller 540); and 
Ecuador - United States, Agreement, Article 1 ((1913) US Foreign 
Relations 502). In the Mexico - United States Convention of 8 
September 1923 and the Panama - United States Convention of 28 July 
1926, Article 5 has identically-worded equitable provisions: "The high 
contracting parties, being desirous of effecting an equitable 
settlement of the claims of their respective citizens, thereby 
affording them just and adequate compensation for their losses or 
damage, agree that no claim shall be disallowed or rejected by the 
Commission by the application of the general principle of 
international law that the leRal remedies must be exhausted as a 
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condition precedent to the validity or allowance of any claim. " (17 Martens NRG-III. 296; 25 Martens NRG-III 9). 
175.1 Malloy 432. Much the same 
1 of the United States - Venezuela 
1866 (2 Malloy 1856) and Article 3 
Convention respecting the Claims 4 
against Venezuela under the Treaty 
(76 BFSP 951). 
provisions may be found in Article 
Convention of Claims of 25 April 
I of the United States - Venezuela 
Df Citizens of the United States 
of April 25,1866,5 December 1885 
176. Stuyt No. 225. 
177.32 Martens NRG-Il 76. 
178.21 Hartslet 1181. Other examples of "law and/or equity" 
provisions may be found in these clauses: 
Italy - Colombia, Compromis d'arbitrage concernant l'affaire 
Cerruti, 28 October 1909, Article 6 (11 RIAA 382); 
Great Britain - United States, Agreement for the Settlement of 
Certain Pecuniary Claims, 18 August 1910, Article 7 (6 Martens NRG-III 
363); 
Great Britain, France & Spain - Portugal, Agreement to Submit to 
Arbitration the Question of Religious Properties Seized in Portugal, 
31 July 1913, Article 3 (20 Martens NRG-III 363); 
France - HaTti, Protocol of Arbitration for the Settlement of 
Claims of French Citizens, 10 September 1913, Article 3 (8 Martens 
NRG-III 346); 
France - Turkey, Compromis d'arbitrage afin de regler les 
reclamations formulees aupres de la Porte Ottomane par les 
ressortissants frangais, 18 December 1913, Preamble (8 Martens NRG-III 
721); 
Norway - United States, Agreement for the Submission to 
Arbitration of Certain Claims of Norwegian Subjects ("Norwegian 
shipowners claims"), 30 June 1921, Article 1 (114 BFSP 896); and 
United States - Egypt, Protocol of Agreement for the Settlement 
by Arbitration of the Claims of United States Citizen George J. Salem, 
20 January 1931, Article 3 (26 Martens NRG-III 68). 
179.18 UKTS 3 (1937, Cmd. 5444). 
180.20 ILM 232 (1981). 
181. Oellers-Frahm --WUhler 888. 
182.95 BFSP 974. 
183.138 UNTS 186. Similar provisions are in the Rules of Procedure 
of the French - German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of 
2 April 1920, 
Articles 5 and 98 (Oellers-Frahm - Wuhler 7071,719), and 
in the 
Resolution of the same Tribunal of 12 April 19219 paragraph IX 
(Ibid. 
720). 
184.12 RIAA 163. 
185.22 Martens NRG-II 101. Article 2 of the British - American 
Treaty for Submitting to Arbitration the Questions relating to the 
Seal Fisheries in Behring's Sea of 29 February 1892 
has a similar 
provision (19 Hertslet 891-2). 
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186.15 RIAA 485. 
187. Ibid. 487. 
188.168 Parry 266. 
189.52 Parry 249. 
190.63 Parry 424. 
191.7 ILM 637 (1968). 
192.3 RIAA 1819. 
193. Ibid. 1820. 
194.20 Martens NRG-I 2. "Equitable solution", "equitable judgment", 
"just award", "equitable delimitation". etc. may be found in the 
following clauses: 
Great Britain - Portugal, Protocol of Conference Agreeing to 
Refer to Arbitration Their Respective Claims to the Island of Bulama, 
13 January 1869, Article 9 (13 Hertslet 690); 
Orange Free State - Transvaal, Compromis, 30 October 1869, 
(Award) (2 Lapradelle-Politis 578); 
Barolong, Batlaping & Griquas - Transvaal, Compromis, I March 
1871, Article 10 (47 British Parliamentary Papers 150 (1871, C. 459)); 
Great Britain - Portugal, Protocol of Conference to Refer to 
Arbitration the Respective Claims in Delagoa Bay, 25 September 1872, 
Article 9 (13 Hertslet 710); 
Ecuador Peru, Convention for Submitting to Arbitration the 
Question of the Boundary, 1 August 1887, Article 1 (78 BFSP 47); 
Colombia Ecuador - Peru, Supplemental Arbitration Convention 
to the Garcia Herrera Treaty of 2 May 1890,15 December 1894, 
Article I (La Fontaine 324); 
Honduras - Nicaragua, Bonilla - Gamez Treaty, 7 October 1894, 
Articles I and 2, paragraph 5 (11 RIAA 107); and 
Great Britain - France, Declaration with Regard to the Kingdom 
of Siam and Other Matters, 15 January 1896,, Article 5 (20 Hertslet 
306). 
195. Manning 117. 
196.100 BFSP 803. 
197. Ibid. 804. 
198.2 AJIL Off. Doc. 287 (1908). 
199.112 Parry 33. An identical wording, in so far as the relevant 
provisions are concerned, is included in the following clauses: 
Great Britain - Guatemala, Convention relative to the Boundary 
of British Honduras, 30 April 1859, Article 3 (11 Hertslet 346); 
Great Britain - Honduras, Treaty respecting the Bay Islands, the 
Mosquito Indians, and the Rights and Claims of British Subjects, 28 
November 1859, Article 6 (Ibid. 369); and 
Great Britain - Nicaragua, Treaty relative to the 
Mosquito 
Indians, and the Rights and Claims of British Subjects, 28 January 
1860, Article 10 (Ibid. 449). 
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200. La Fontaine 505. Similar provisions are in Articles 6 and 7 of 
the Guatemala - Honduras Convention of Boundary of 1 March 1895 (87 
BFSP 532). 
201.20 Hartslet 945-6. "Law and equity" f ormulas may be found in 
Article I of the Colombia - Peru Treaty of 6 May 1904 (1904 Descamps- 
Renault 1031, as quoted in Stuyt No. 271), and Article 1 of the 
Colombia - Peru Treaty of 12 September 1905 (1905 Descamps-Renault 
853, as quoted in Stuyt No. 281). 
202.201 UNTS 328. 
203.26 Hertslet 1092. 
204.217 Parry 299. 
205. Ibid. 291. 
206.64 Parry 390. 
207. La Fontaine 288. In the Costa Rican - Panamanian Convention for 
the Settlement by Arbitration of the Boundary Dispute of 17 March 
1910, Article 1 provides in part: ". .. the arbitrator will take into 
account all the facts, circumstances, and considerations which may 
have a bearing upon the case (6 AJIL Off. Doc. 2 (1912)). 
208. Latvia - Lithuania Convention, Article 3 (2 LNTS 235); and 
Estonia - Latvia Convention, Article 4 (Ibid. 189). 
209. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 21, para 2. 
210.102 BFSP 732. Article 2. paragraph 6, of the Secret Annex to 
the Treaty of Amity and Alliance of 29 February 1912 between Bulgaria 
and Servia provides for the "frontiere de"finitive" to be found by the 
arbitrator best to meet the "droits et interets des deux parties" (8 
Martens NRG-III 6). 
211. (1892) US Foreign Relations 2. A similar provision may be seen 
in a Declaration relative to the Manica Boundary Arbitration between 
Great Britain and Portugal of 7 January 1895 (181 Parry 16). 
212. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 23, para. 4. 
213. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 53, para. 101(C)(1). 
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Notes: Chapter III 
1. ICJ Rýjports, 1978, pp. 35-36, para. 85. 
2.2 RIAA 84 1. 
3. Ib id . The pleadings of the case suggest that the Arbitrator's 
understanding of his latitude in procedural matters coincided with 
that of the Netherlands Government, rather than that of the United 
States Government which, based on the common lawyer's view, did not 
allow him a wide latitude. In a reply to the International Law 
Commission's questionnaire on "Arbitral Procedure". communicated by 
the Secretary-General in his letter dated 11 July 1949 (LEG 
291/01/YLL) to all Governments of Members of the United Nations, the 
Netherlands Government discusses "Questions of Procedure in the Palmas 
or Miangas Case", and comments as follows: 
"The Netherlands Memorandum is preceded by a Note, reading as 
follows: 
In the following memorandum various documents are being 
referred to. Authentic copies are available; they will 
be produced if desired by the Arbitrator. The more 
important of the documents are annexed to the 
memorandum. 
This note is severely criticezed in the United States 
Counter Memorandum. It 'indicates a procedure which it is 
believed may be properly characterized as remarkable and without 
precedent in international arbitrations. The treatment of 
evidence in cases before international tribunals is not governed 
by the rigid rules which are applied by domestic courts. 
When the Arbitrator requested an explanation from the Netherlands 
Government on this point, it replied: 
"'In the Opinion of the Netherlands Government, the necessity 
of evidence arises if the judge or arbitrator finds that the 
parties are divided with regard to certain facts which in his 
opinion can be considered doubtful, and which he thinks 
material and not known to him or to be ascertained by himself. 
He may accept as true the statements of either party when, in 
the light of the whole case, such statements seem to him 
sufficient or when the contestation of such statements by the 
other party does not seem to him to be sufficiently well- 
founded. On the other hand, he may ask f or evidence about any 
point, even when it has not been contested, if he thinks it 
necessary to do so. "' 
The Netherlands comment continues: 
"Whereas in the Netherlands contention the civilian is 
speaking, the United States contention gives the view of the 
common lawyer, in whose ears the former opinion is 'heresay'. 
It must, however, be borne in mind that the present case is an 
arbitration under the Permanent Court of Arbitration and that 
the rules for the Arbitrator's conduct are to be found in the 
Hague Convention of 1907. ... from Article 
72, paragraph I (les 
membres du tribunal ont le droit de poser des questions aux 
agents _et 
aux conseils des parties et de leur demander des 
eclaircissements sur les points 
ýouteux)q it appears that the 
Netherlands Government opinion is in accordance with the civil 
procedure, generally followed on the European Continent. 
" 
On the basis of these considerations, it concludes: 
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"It may thus be deemed established that, failing special 
provisions, an Arbitrator under a special agreement is wholly 
master of the situation; he is even to decide 'points left aside by the Parties'. " 
Replies from Governments to Questionnaires of the International Law 
Commission, A/CN. 4/19,23 March 1950, ILC Year Book, 1950, Vol. II, 
pp. 153-154. 
17 RIAA 14. 
Ibid. 11. 
ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 9. para. 17. 
7. Ibid., pp. 21-22, para. 48. 
Similarly, but in more general terms, the arbitrator interpreted 
his competence as not denied by an ambiguous arbitration clause in the 
phase of the Preliminary Question of the Forest of the Central Rhodope 
of 4 November 1931. In the words of Arbitrator Osten Unden: 
"Le Gouvernement defendeur (=Bulgarie) soutient qu'il 
convient, en cas de doute sur la protee d'une clause arbitral, 
de conclure toujours a Vincompetence de l'Arbitre, en raison du 
principe general selon lequel un Etat n'est oblige a recourir a 
Varbitrage que dans les cas oU' il existe un engagement formel -a 
cet effet. L'Arbitre ne sourait se rallier a ce principe 
d'interpretation des clauses arbitrales. Une telle clause doit 
etre interpretee plutOt d'apres la meme me"thode que les autres 
stipulations contractuelles. Si Vanalyse du texte et Vexamen 
de son but montrent que les raisons militant en faveur de la 
competence de l'Arbitre sont plus plausibles que celles pouvant 
etre invoquees en sens contraire, clest aux premieres qu'il 
convient de se ranger. " 
Sentence arbitrale (Question prearable), Affaire des Forets du Rhodope 
central, 4 novembre 1931,3 RIAA 1403. 
16 RIAAI 123. 
Ib id. 
10. Ib id. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 173. 
13. Compromis of 18 February 1983, Article 2, Tribunal Arbitral pour 
la Delimitation de la Frontiere Maritime Guinee/Guinee-Bissau: 
Sentence du 14 fevrier 1985, para. 1.89 RGDIP 488 (1985). 
14. Sentence, para. 70. 
15. Sentence, para. 9. 
16. Sentence, para. 76. 
17.16 RIAA 164-165. 
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19. Ibid. 167. In a similar way the International Court of Justice held, in the Minguiers and Ecrehos case of 1953, that the later of the two alleged critical dates should be adopted to take into account all the relevant circumstances. The United Kingdom submits that, though the parties have for a long time disagreed as to the sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos groups, the dispute did not become 'cristalized' before the conclusion of the compromis of 29 December 1950, and that this date should be considered as the critical date, 
with the result that all acts before that date must be taken into 
consideration by the Court. By contrast the French Government 
contends that the date of the Convention of 1839, which concerned fishery and particularly the oyster fishery between the Island of Jersey and the neighbouring coast of France, should be selected as the 
critical date, and that all subsequent acts must be excluded from 
consideration. The Court in effect takes up the British contention for the following reasons: 
"At the date of the Convention of 1839, no dispute as to the 
sovereignty over the Ecrehos and Minquiers Groups had yet 
arisen. The Parties had for a considerable time been in 
disagreement with regard to the exclusive right to fish oysters, 
but they did not link that question to the question of 
sovereignty over the Ecrehos and Minquiers. In such 
circumstances there is no reason why the conclusion of that 
Convention should have any effect on the question of allowing or 
ruling out evidence relating to sovereignty. A dispute as to 
sovereignty over the groups did not arise before the years 1886 
and 1888, when France for the first time claimed sovereignty 
over the Ecrehos and the Minquieres respectively. But in view 
of the special circumstances of the present case, subsequent 
acts should also be considered by the Court, unless the measure 
in question was taken with a view to improving the legal 
position of the Party concerned. In many respects activity in 
regard to these groups had developed gradually long before the 
dispute as to sovereignty arose, and it has since continued 
without interruption and in a similar manner. in such 
circumstances there would be no justification for ruling out all 
events which during this continued development occurred after 
the years 1886 and 1888 respectively. " 
ICJ Reports, 19539 pp. 59-60. Such a procedural consideration of an 
equitable nature seems to have given rise to the Court's consideration 
of substantive matters: the exercise of jurisdiction, local 
administration and legislation. Ibid., pp. 65-67,69-72. 
20.12 RIAA 301. See for a similar comment A. G. , 
"Note", 62 RGDIP 
121 (1958). 
21. Dulery, Frangoise, "L'Affaire du Lac Lanoux", 62 RGDIP 481-482 
(1958). 
22. Special Agreement, Article 1.2 RIAA 832. 
23. Ibid. 869. 
24. Ibid. 
25. lb id. 
26. Preamble. Ibid. 831. 
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27. Ibid. 866-867. 
28. Ibid. 867. 
29. Ibid. 869. 
30. Ibid. 867. 
31. Ibid. 870. 
32. Ibid. 870-871. 
33. Ibid. 850. 
34. Huber, Max, "Observations" on "La Competence du Juge 
International en eee Equit': Rapport pr'liminaire" by Eug'ne Borel, 
Institut de Droit International, 38 Annuaire 235 (1934). 
35. De Visscher, Charles, De 1'Equite dans le Rýglement arbitral ou 
judiciaire des Litiges de Droit international public, 1972, p. 102. 
See also Friedmann, Wolfgang, The Contribution of English Equity to 
the Idea of an International Equity Tribunal, 1935, pp. 33-34. 
36. PCIJ Publications, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46. 
37. Compromis, Article 3, paragraph (11). 17 RIAA 8. 
38. Ibid. 11. 
39. Ibid. 528. 
40. Ibid. 569-570. 
41. "Chapter III: Historical Background", ibid. 31-63; "Chapter V: 
Surveys and Maps", ibid. 83-165; "Chapter VII: Certain Non- 
Cartographic Evidence", ibid. 252-323; "Chapter IX: Acts of 
'Jurisdiction' in the Northern Half of Rann", ibid. 358-417. 
42. Salmon, J. J. A., "La Sentence du 19 Fevrier 1968 du Tribunal 
d'Arbitrage dans l'Affaire de la Frontiere occidentale entre l'Inde et 
le Pakistan (Affaire de Rann de Kutch)", AFDI 236 (1968). 
Incidentally, the above three cases may be compared with the 
Guatemala-Honduras Boundary case of 1933. In this case, the tribunal 
was urged by the compromis to effect a final solution 
for the boundary 
dispute, but allowed to modify the line of uti possidetis of 
1821 as 
appropriate "according to equity and justice" 
(2 RIAA 1311,1312, 
etc. ). It actually decided the case on this 
latter basis while 
showing some careful comparison in the process. 
43. Republic of Chile, B eagle Channel Arbitration 
between the 
Republic of Argentina and the Repu lic of Chile: Report and 
Decision 
of the Court of Arbitration, 1977, pp. 184-268. 
44. Indeed Judge Gros says that the review was quite unnecessary. 
His "declaration", ibid. , p. 274. 
45. De La Rochere, Jacqueline Dutheil, 
(Sentence rendue par la Reine d'Angleterre 
"L'Af f aire du Canal Beagle 
ý le 22 avril 1977)", AFDI 
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428 (1977), where she says: "Dans la meilleure tradition anglo-saxonne 
qui a tellement marque la pratique judiciaire internationale, il 
examine toutes les preuves, tous les arguments des parties af in de se former une opinion. " 
46. Fitzmaurice, Gerald G. , "Hersch Lauterpacht and His Attitude to 
the Judicial Function", 50 BYBIL 11 (1979). 
47. in some recent ' arbitral and judicial decisions on the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries, it is emphasized that 
the primary purpose of delimitation by application of equitable 
principles, including the equidistance principle, is the equitable 
settlement of the dispute. See, for example, the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases of 1969, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 92; 
the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case of 1977, Cmnd. 7438, paras. 
70,97,239,251; the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case of 1982, 
ICJ Re2orts, 1982, paras. 70,103,114,133; the Gulf ýf Maine case of 
1984, ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 339, para. 230, p. 344, para. 241; the 
Guinea-Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Delimitation case of 1985, 
Sentence du 14 fevrier 1985, para. 88,89 RGDIP 521 (1985); the 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf case of 1985, ICJ Reports,, 1985, para. 
79A(I). The importance of an equitable solution is likewise stressed 
in Articles 74/83 of the new United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. 
48.11 RIAA 107. 
49. Ibid. 108. 
50. Ibid. Ill. 
51. Ibid. 115. 
52. Ibid. 116. 
53. ICJ Reportsq 1960, p. 216. 
54. Article 1.1 RIAA 290. 
55. Ibid. 292. 
56. Ibid. '293. 
57. Ibid. 294. De Lapredelle-Politis characterize the award as 
based on equity: "Au cours de la procedure, 
les pouvoirs de Varbitre 
ayant paru trop etroits, un protocol 
fut signe le 15 fevrier 1886 pour 
les elargir. Desormais le Roi d'Espagne n'etait pas oblige 
de borner 
son choix, suivant la stricte application 
de l'uti pssidetis juris, a 
l'une des lignes proposees par les parties: il etait autorise a se 
fonder sur 1'equite pour fixer ceux des points 
de la ligne frontiere 
qui ne pouvaient pas etre exactement situ6s 
sur la base des 
documents. " A. de Lapradelle et N. Politis, 
"Lindivisibilite' de la 
Frontiere et le Conflit Colombo-Venezuelien", 
Extrait de la RGDIP 10 
(1921). 
58.11 RIAA 294. 
59. Ibid. 267. 
- 313 - 
60. Ibid. 272. 
61. Ibid. 268. 
62. Ibid. 302-304. 
63. Ibid. 304-305. 
64. Ibid. 305-306. 
65. See for a similar evaluation of the case Cukwurah, A. 0., The 
Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, 1967, p. 180. 
66.11 RIAA 199. See also de Visscher, Charles, Problemes de 
Confins en Droit international public, 19699 pp. 113-114. 
67. Article 2.9 RIAA 35. 
68. Ibid. 40. Dr. Alexandre Alvarez, however, makes a different 
comment. He says that the general arbitration treaty of 28 May 1902 
improved the relations of the parties, and that whatever its content 
might have been, the arbitral award would have been accepted, "Des 
Occupations de Territoires contestes: a propos de la question de 
limites entre le Chile et la Re"publique Argentine", Extrait de la 
RGDIP 23 (1903). More specifically he comments that the tribunal took 
into account the territorial occupation by Argentina after the start 
of the litigation, not basing itself on any scientific consideration 
of orography, hydrography or topography. He denies that the tribunal 






Article 2, paragraph 1. 
Ibid., p. 48, para. 70. 
Ibid. 
Cmnd. 7438, p. 6. 
ICJ Reports, 1978, p. 21, para. 48. 
Ibid., p. 34, para. 81. 
74. Ibid. The judgment repeats: "The particular circumstances of 
the present dispute have also to be taken into account. " Ibid. 
p. 36, para 87. 
75. ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 225. It is interesting to note that the 
award of the Franco - Mexican Georges Pinson case of 1928, a claims 
case, says: "Si Vusage du mot 'equite' dans ce contexte se heurte a 
des objections, je (=president of the tribunal) suis tout dispose a le 
remplacer par 'liberte d'apprecier les preuves selon les circonstances 
concomitantes'. " 5 RIAA 414. 
76. Descamps-Renault, 
Siecle 750 (1902). 
77. Ibid. 745. 
78. Ibid. 735. 
.0 
Recueil International des Traites de XXe 
- 314 - 
79. Ibid. 748. 
80. Ibid. 749. 
81. Ibid. 750. 
82. Ib id. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Article 2.89 BFSP 715 (18963,1897). 
85. Ibid. 724. 
86. Ibid. 729. 
87. Ibid. 748. 
88.11 RIAA 328. 
89. Ibid. 
90. Convention f or the Arbitration of the Chamizal Case concluded on 
24 June 1910, Preamble, ibid. 313. 
91. Ibid. 329. 
92. ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 15. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his 
separate opinion, points out that the Court should have specified the 
reason why it dismissed considerations of a topographical, historical 
and cultural nature: 
"The Court has dismissed these in a sentence, as not being 
legally decisive. I agree that they are not; but I think it 
desirable to say why, since these considerations occupied a 
prominent place in the arguments of the Parties. Such matters 
may have some legal relevance in a case about territorial 
sovereignty which turns on the weight of factual evidence that 
each party can adduce in support of its claim, and not on any 
more concrete and positive element, such as a treaty. In the 
present case it is accepted, and indeed contended by both 
Parties, that their rights derive from the treaty settlement of 
1904, and on the subsequent events relative to or affecting that 
settlement. In consequenceg extraneous factors which might have 
weighed with them in making that settlement, and more 
particularly in determining how the line of the frontier was to 
run, can only have an incidental relevance in determining how 
the line of the frontier was to rung can only have an incidental 
relevance in determining where todayq as a matter of law, it 
does run. " (Ibid., p. 53. ) 
This is an equitable consideration for the positions of the parties, 
and would seem to foreshadow how he is some years later to give 
similar considerations to the "corroborative or confirmatory incidents 
and material" as President of the Court of Arbitration in the Beagle 
Channel case. See supra notes 43 and 46 and the accompanying texts. 
93. ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 32. 
- 315 - 
94. Lauterpacht, Hersch, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas", 27 BYBIL 389-390 (1950). 
95. ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 41. For a critical comment on this point, see subsection 4)-d). 
96. For a detailed description of the incident, see ICJ E222rts, 1962, pp. 89-91. 
97. ibid., p. 90, para. 33. 
98. Ibid., p. 91, para. 34. 
99. Ibid., pp. 96-97, para. 46. 
100. Ibid., p. 128. 
101. Ibid, p. 129. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Ibid., p. 131. 
104. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 49, para. 89. 
105. Ibid., p. 54, para. 101. 
106. Ibid., p. 53, para. 101. 
107. Cmnd. 7438, pp. 113-114, paras. 240-244. 
108. Ibid., p. 113, para. 240. 
109. Ibid., p. 114, para. 244. 
110. Ibid., p. 116, para. 248. 
111. The Court does not say anything further about what the "one 
instance" (Ibid., p. 117, para. 251. ) is, but it would presumably be 
how Kharg Island off the 12-mile Iranian territorial sea was treated 
in the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement of 1968 on the maritime boundary 
delimitation. For a description of the half-effect given to Kharg 
Island in the agreement initialled on 13 December 1965 (which was 
later formally signed on 24 October 1968), see Al-Baharna, Husain M., 
The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty 
Relations and Their International Problems, Manchester University 
Press, 1968, pp. 310-311. See also United States Department of State, 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, Limits 
in the Seas, No. 24 for a more detailed analysis of the 1968 
agreement. 
112. Cmnd. 7438, pp. 116-117, para. 249. 
113. Ibid., p. 117, para. 251. 
114. Ibid. 
- 316 - 
115. Ibid., p. 192, para 110. Professor D. W. Bowett., who acted as a 
member of counsel for the British Government in the 1977 arbitration, 
comments that the "half-effect" technique is an original device of the 
Court: "France at no stage argued that the Scillies should be given a 
reduced effect nor, for obvious reasons, did the United Kingdom. 
Thus, the treatment of the boundary as a lateral boundary, the 
decision to give to the Scillies half-effect, and above all the 
technique of applying half-effect, were all matters of crucial 
importance, but none was argued by the Parties. " Bowett, D. W.,, "The 
Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France concerning the 
Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and South-Western 
Approaches", 49 BYBIL 21 (1978). He also says that the half-effect to 
Kharg Island "may well have been based entirely on what was 
politically feasible at that time, having nothing to do with the 
Parties' conception of equity". Ibid. 20. Professor Queneudec calls 
the half-effect solution a sort of compromise: "Se fondant sur un 
precedent fourni par la pratique conventionnelle, le Tribunal decide 
en quelque sorte de 'coupe la poire en deux' et de n'attribuer a ces, 
tles qu'un demi-effet dans le trace de la ligne de de"limitation. " 
Queneudec, J. -P., "L'Affaire de la Delimitation du Plateau continental 
entre la France et le Royaume Uni", 83 RGDIP 100 (1979). 
116. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 21, para. 1. 
117. Ibid, p. 23, para. 4. 
118. Ibid., pp. 60-61, para. 72. 
119. Ibid., p. 63, para. 78. 
120. Ibid., p. 64, para. 79. 
121. Ibid., pp. 83-85, paras. 117-119. 
122. Ibid., p. 91, paras. 130-131. 
123. Ibid., p. 63, para. 78. 
124. Ibid., p. 87, para. 124. This reference-point is used for two 
purposes: for obtaining a line which, extending from that point on 
its parallel of latitude, is to intersect the initial delimitation 
line extending from the outer limit of the territorial sea 
(ibid., p. 
87, para. 124. ) and for obtaining a line giving half-effect to 
Kerkennah Islands which is a bisector of the angle produced by drawing 
a line between that point and Ras Kaboudia and another 
between that 
point and the most seaward point of the Islands 
(ibid., pp. 88-89, 
paras. 128-129. ). 
125. ICJ Reports, 1985, paras. 21,22. See also Map 2 attached to 
the judgment. 
126. Ibid., para. 52. 
127. Ibid., para. 53. 
128. Ibid.., para. 69. 
129. Ibid. 
- 317 - 
130. Ibid., para. 72. See also ibid., para. 73 for a summary description of the delimitation method. 
131. Ibid., para. 73. 
132. Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, pp. 10-11. 
133. Ibid. , 
134. Ibid. , pp. 14-15. 
135. Ibid-9 p. 15. 
136.11 RIAA 153-154. 
137. Article 2. Ibid. 153. 
138. Ibid. 160. 
139. Ibid. For a sympathetic comment on this aspect of the award, see Rhee, Sang-Myon, "Sea Boundary Delimitation between States before 
World War 11", 76 AJIL 571 (1982). 
140. Ibid. 161. 
141. For a comment that the award dealt mainly with facts and only incidentally with principles of international law, see "Editorial 
Comment". 4 AJIL 187 (1910). 
142.11 RIAA 162. 
143. Republic of Chile, supra note 43, at p. 182, para. 110. 
144. Ibid., p. 350, para. 4. 
145. Ibid., P. 272, para. 2. 
146. Cmnd. 7438, p. 90, para. 185. 
147. Ibid., p. 90, para. 187. But the Court declines to take account 
of the security concern of the Parties in the region. The French urge 
that there should be a "continuous link between the eastern and 
western parts of its continental shelf in the Channel", and the 
British that there should be a "continuous link between the 
continental shelf of the Channel Islands and that of the mainland". 
However, "the weight of such considerations in this region is, in any 
event, somewhat diminished by the very particular character of the 
English Channel as a major route of international maritime navigation 
serving ports outside the territories of either of the Parties. " 
Ibid., p. 91, para. 188. 
148. Ibid., p. 91, para. 187. 
149. But Professor Bowett 
itmight be s 
effect concedes to 
12-mile territorial 






cal of this solution: 
the Court's award of 12 miles in 
more than their entitlement to a 
accords to them no true shelf at 
only serves to emphasize the 
- 318 - 
subjectivity of notions of 'equity', for the 12-mile enclave is 
not a reasoned result: the Court gives no particular reasons why 
the enclave should be 12 miles rather than, say, 14 miles. The 
existence of a 12-mile fishery zone was a fact, but scarcely a 
reason germane to shelf determination and the Court does not 
suggest why the two delimitations should coincide. " 
Bowett, D. W., supra note 115, at p. 9. 
150. General Assembly resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974, 
operative paragraph 1, reproduced in ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 14, para. 
1. 
151. Ibid. 2 P. 68, para. 162. 
152. For a contrary view, see Okere, B. 0., "The Western Sahara 
Case", 28 ICLQ 312 (1979): "In the process the Court operated a 
delicate balancing act which recognized all and yet satisfied none. " 
153. Ibid. 305-306. 
154. ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 41, para. 87. 
155. The phrase means international law particular to Moslem States. 
Okere, supra note 152, at 305. 
156. ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 42, para. 88. 
157. Ibid., p. 42, para. 89. 
158. Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
runs: 
"At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only 
that the persons to be elected should individually possess the 
qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole 
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systems of the world should be assured. 
" 
159. ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 127. 
160. Ibid., p. 128. 
161. Ibid. 
162. Cmnd. 7438, p. 77, para. 148. 
163. Ibid., p. 85, para. 170. 
164. Ibid., p. 94, paras. 196-197. 
165. Ibid., p. 94, para. 197. 
166. Ibid., p. 94, para. 198. 
167. Ibid.,, pp. 95-96, paras. 201-202. For a criticism of 
this 
solution by Professor Bowett, see supra note 
149. 
168. ICJ Reportsq 19829 p. 63, para. 79. 
- 319 - 
169. Ibid, p. 64, para. 79. 
170. Ibid., pp. 88-89, para. 128. 
171. Judge Schwebel points this out in his separate opinion. Ibid. 
P. 99. 
172. Ibid. , p. 89, para. 129. See also the 
, 
Gulf of Maine case of 1984 in which the Chamber gave Seal Island off the southwestern tip of Nova Scotia a "half-effect" in calculating the length of the Canadian 
coastlines. ICJ Reports, 1984, pp. 336-337, para. 222. 
173. Compromis of 18 February 1983, Article 2. Tribunal Arbitral 
pour la De"limitation de la Frontiere Maritime Cuinee/Guine"e Bissau: 
Sentence du 14 fevrier 1985, para. 1.89 RGDIP 488 (1985). 
174. Sentence, para. 106. Ibid. 527. 
175. Sentence, para. Ill, subpara. a). Ibid. 529. 
176. Article 2.176 Parry 449. 
177. Article 1. Ibid. 
178. (1894) US For. Rel. Appendix 1 112. 
179. The United States Agent describes the nature of the 
"Regulations" in his Final Report to his Government: 
"The regulations as finally framed and promulgated are the 
result of an honest and conscientious effort on the part of the 
neutral arbitrators to do all they conceived possible and 
necessary for the protection and preservation of the seal herd 
consistent with their decision on the fifth point. " 
I Moore 959. 
180. (1894) US For. Rel. Appendix 1 113. 
181. ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 128. 
182. Ibid., p. 133. 
183. ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 24-25, paras. 55-56. 
184. Ibid. 9 p. 25, para. 57. 
185. Ibid. 9 p. 23, para. 52. See also ibid., pp. 
25-26, paras. 57-58 
for a discussion of State practice on this concept. 
186. ICJ Pleadings, Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Vol. 1,1975, p. 
12. 
187. ICJ Reports, 1972, p. 16, para. 23. The Court referred to the 
Faroe Islands' exceptional dependence on fisheries as provided for in 
the Arrangement Relating to Fisheries in Waters Surrounding the Faroe 
Islands of 18 December 1973. ICJ Reports, 1974, p. 26, para. 58. 
188. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 51, para. 97. 
- 320 - 
189. Ibid., p. 52, para. 97. 
190. Ibid., p. 53, para. 101. 
191. Ibid. , pp. 66-84. The Judgment of the Court lacks 
considerations of this sort, presumably because the Parties, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, contended, in reply to a 
question put to them by Judge Jessup, that the present cases should be 
considered from geographical, rather than economic, points of view. See reply of Professor Jaenicke, Agent for the Federal Republic, at the 9th Public Hearing on 4 November 1968. ICJ Pleadings, North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, Vol. 11,1968, p. 164. 
192. ICJ Reports, 1982, pp. 320-321. 
193. Ibid., p. 71, para. 96. 
194. Ibid., p. 321. 
195.11 RIAA 160. 
196. Ibid. 
197. See above (2)-I)-b) "Consideration of actual circumstances". 
198. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 71, para. 96. 
199. Ibid., pp. 83-84, para. 117. 
200. Ibid, p. 84, para. 118. 
201. Ibid., pp. 84-85, para. 119. As has been seen in the quotation, 
the modus vivendi was entered into for the lateral delimitation of 
fisheries jurisdiction. It was taken into account in adopting the 26* 
line, and yet Tunisia's historic sponge-f ishing rights were disallowed 
in the delimitation (ibid., pp. 76-77, para. 105). On the other haný, 
Judge Ago, in his separate opinion, stresses the importance of 
historic fishing rights (ibid., pp. 96-98, paras. 2-5) as does Judge 
ad hoc Jime"nez de Arechaga in general terms in his separate opinion. 
On the significance of the taking of sponges for a continental shelf 
delimitation, Judge ad hoc Jimenez de Arechaga has this to say: 
"The taking of sponges, as of other living resources 
permanently attached to the sea-bed at the harvestable stage was 
considered by the International Law Commission and defined in 
the 1958 Convention, not as a sedentary fishery, but as a form 
of shelf exploitationg as much as is the extraction of oil and 
gas. Consequently, the taking of sponges in the area was really 
an exploitation of shelf resources, which began in Tunisia and 
Tripolitania in the last centuryg and continued into the present 
century, thus long antedating the Truman proclamation. " 
Ibid., p. 123, para. 81. 
202.89 BFSP 61. 
203. ICJ Reportst 1969, p. 50, para. 93. 
204. See Miyoshi, Masahiro, "Some Comments on Legal Aspects of 
Precedents for Joint Development", The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon 
- 321 - 
Potential and Possibilities of Joint_R! ýýýý (Proceedings of the EAPI/CCOP Workshop, East-West Centreq Honolulu, Hawaii, 5-12 August 1980), 1981, p. 1361. 
205. Cmnd. 7438, p. 92, para. 192. 
206. Ibid., p. 93, para. 194. 
207. See above (2)-l)-e) "Presence of islands as a special circumstance". 
208. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 21. 
209. Ibid., p. 109, para. 35. 
210.176 Parry 451. 
211. (1894) US For. Rel. Appendix 1 112. 
212. Ibid. 112-113. 
213. Final Report of the United States Agent to his Government, I 
Moore 959. 
214. PCIJ Publications, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 73-74. 
215. Ibid., p. 74. 
216. Ibid., p. 75. 
217. Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
218. Ibid, p. 77. 
219. Ibid., p. 78. 
220. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
221.12 RIAA 301-302. The issue, as it was originally phrased in 
Article I of the compromis of 19 November 1956 was: 
"Le Gouvernement f rangais est-il f onde a soutenir qu'en 
execution, sans un accord prealable entre les deux 
Gouvernements, des travaux d'utilisation des eaux du lac Lanoux 
dans les conditions prevues au projet et aux propositions 
frangais vises au preambule du present compromis, il ne 
commettrait pas une infraction aux dispositions du Traite de 
Bayonne du 26 mai 1866 et de l'Acte additionnel de la meme 
date? " 
Ibid. 286. 
222. Ibid. 308. 
223. Ibid. 306. 
224. Ibid. 309,314. See a comment by Schachter: "Recent trends, 
particularly in the wake of heightened environmental concerns, suggest 
the emergence of a general rule of international law for a 'system of 
information and prior consultation' in regard to the utilization of 
- 322 - 
the common resources of two or more states. " Schachter, 0., Sharing 
the World's Resources, 1977, P. 69. See also Handl, G., "The Principle of 'Equitable Use' as Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International 
Disputes over Transfrontier Pollution", 14 RBDI 56 (1978/79-1), where the author discusses the duty of information and consultation. For 
some examples of the 'international duty of information and 
consultation', see ibid. 56-61. 
225.12 RIAA 315. 
226. Ibid. 317. 
227. Ibid. 
228.11 RIAA 175,194. 
229. Ibid. 195. 
230. ICJ Reports, 1974, pp. 28-29, paras. 63-65. 
231. Ibid-io p. 30, para. 70. 
232. Ibid., p. 30, paras. 69-70. 
233. Ibid., p. 31, para. 71. 
234. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 94. 
235. Ibid., p. 52, para. 98. 
236. Ibid., p. 54, para. 101. 
237. See Miyoshi, Masahiro, "The Role of Equitable Principles in the 
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries", The Ocean Association of Japan, 
The Frontier of the Seas: the Problems of Delimitation (Proceedings of 
the 5th International Ocean Symposium 1980), 1981, p. 43. 
238. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 52, para. 98. 
239. U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
Office of the Geographer, 83 Limits in the Seas 13-15 (1979). 
240. Cmnd. 7438, p. 60, para. 99. 
241. Ibid., p. 60, para. 100. 
242. Ibid. , p. 61, para. 101. 
243. Ibid., p. 89, para. 182. 
244. ICJ Reports, 19829 p. 91, para. 130. 
245. Ibid., p. 91, para. 131. 
246. Ibid., p. 93, para. 133. 
247. Ibid., p. 138, para. 117. 
- 323 - 
248. Ibid., p. 152, para. 17. 
249. Ibid., p. 259, para. 163. 
250. Ibid., p. 314, para. 23. 
251. ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 323, para. 185. 
252. Ibid, p. 322, para. 184. 
253. Ibid. , pp. 336-337, paras. 221-223. Judge Schwebel attached a separate opinion in which he criticized the Chamber f or its inclusion 
of the whole of the Bay of Fundy coastlines in the calculation of the Canadian coasts' length. By way of illustration, he pointed out, on the basis of the United States pleadings, the distorting effect of the inclusion. He states that the "inclusion of the whole of the Bay of Fundy increases by just 7 per cent the sea area appertaining to Canada in the proportionality test ... while at the same time it increases the Canadian coastline length by 93 per cent. " (Ibid., p. 356. ) He 
agreed to the idea of including limited portions of the Bay of Fundy 
coastlines. 
254. ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 68. 
255. Ib id. 
256. Ibid., para. 56. 
257. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 51, para. 96. 
258. ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 73. 
259. Ibid. 
260. Ibid., para. 72. 
261. Ibid., para. 75. 
262. Article 4.89 BFSP 60-61. 
263. Gist of what Sir Richard Webster, counsel for the British 
Government, said of the discretionary power of the tribunal on the 2nd 
day of the oral arguments, 15 June 1899. 
' 
Proceedings of the 
Arbitration between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the 
United States of Venezuela: British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary, Paris, 
1899, Vol. 1, pp. 20-21. (Hereinafter to be cited as Proceedings. ) 
264. Precisely, these are the words of Lord Russell, one of the 
arbitrators, which Sir Robert Reid, counsel for the British 
Government, endorsed by saying: "Yes, that is what we mean. 36th 
day, 30 August 1899. Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 2254. 
265. The words of Mr. Soley, counsel f or the Venezuelan Government, 
on the_35th day, 29 August 1899. Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 2168. 
266. The words of Lord Russell which Mr. Soley acceded to. Ibid. 
- 324 - 
267. The president of the tribunal disclosed this number in his f inal 
remarks on the 56th day of the proceedings. Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 3238. 
268. See the text of the award read by Mr. d'oyly Carte,, Assistant 
Secretary of the Tribunal, on the 56th day of the proceedings. Ibid. t pp. 3237-3238. 
269. Lauterpacht, H., Private Law Sources and Analogies of 
International Law (with special reference to international 
arbitration), London, 1927, p. 230. 
270. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, p. 230. 
271. Proceedings, Vol. 9, pp. 2599,2603. 
272. British. Counter-Case, p. 135. 
273. Ibid. s p. 114; Proceedings, Vol. 8, pp. 2238-2239; Ibid. , Vol. 11, pp. 3110-3111. 
274. Proceedings, Vol. 3, pp. 819-849. 
275. British 
' 
Case, pp. 119-120; British Counter-Case, pp. 130-142; 
Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, pp. 221-229; Venezuelan Counter-Case, Vol. 1, 
pp. 71-72. 
276. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, pp. 155-156; Venezuelan Counter-Case, 
Vol. 1, p. 33. 
277. British. Case, pp. 159 379 52-542 78. 
278. Ibid., p. 78. 
279. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, pp. 222-223; British Case, p. 78; 
British Counter-Case, pp. 130-131. 
280. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, p. 222; British Counter-Case, p. 131. 
281. Printed Argument of Venezuela, Vol. 1, p. 140. 
282. British Case, p. 32. 
283. British Counter-Case, pp. 103-105. 
284. British Case, p. 50. 
285. Ibid., p. 16. 
286. Ibid., p. 51. 
287. Ibid. 9 pp. 17,57-58. 
288. Ibid. , p. 62. 
289. Ibid. , pp. 62-63. 
290. Ibid. , p. 63. 
- 325 - 
291. Ibid. 
292. Ibid. , p. 64. 
293. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1,, p. 199. 
294. British Counter-Case, p. 127. 
295. British Case, p. 17. 
296. Printed Argument of Venezuela, Vol. 1, pp. 125-126. 
297. British. Case, p. 70. 
298. Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1. p. 205. 
299. British. Case, p. 70. 
300. British. Counter-Case, p. 134. 
301. Printed Argument of Venezuela, Vol. 1, pp. 60-61. 
302. British. Case, pp. 73,74-75. 
303. Printed Argument of Venezuela, Vol. 1,125-126. 
304. British. Case, p. 77. 
305. Proceedings, Vol. 11, p. 3237. 
306. See British Case, p. 70. 
307. The Times, 4 October 1899, p. 6. 
308. Article 3.11 RIAA 139. 
309. Article 4. Ibid. 
310. According to P. Fiore, who comments on this case, the Advisory 
Commission arrived at the following conclusion: 
"Apres avoir etudie les allegations ecrites, les repliques et 
les critiques des ministres des deux Republiques, comme defense 
de leurs doctrines respectives, nous sommes arrives a la 
conclusion que les lois de la Recopilacion des Indes, les 
cedules et decrets royaux, les ordonnances des Intendants, les 
actes diplomatiques relatifs a la demarcation des frontieres et 
en general les documets d1un caractere officiel produits pour 
donner leur veritable signification et execution auxdites 
dispositions royales ne definissent pas d'une maniere claire et 
precise le domaine du territoire discute. " (Livre bleu argentin, 
pp. 85,86. ) 
Fiore, P., "Observations sur la Sentence arbitrale rendue par le 
President de la Republique argentine le 9 juillet 1909 dans le Conflit 
entre la Republique de Bolivie et Celle du Pe'rou au Sujet de la 
Delimitation de la Frontiere de ces Deux Etats", 17 RGDIP 243-244 
(1910). 
311.11 RIAA 143. 
- 326 - 
312. Ibid. 
313. Ibid. 
314. Fiore, supra note 310, at 235,241; Weisss Andre, "L'Arbitrage 
de 1909 entre la Bolivie et le Perou", 17 RGDIP 126-136, esp. 130-136 (1910). 
315. The compromis of I November 1901, Article 4. 
316. Ibid. 21. 
317. Ibid. 22. 
318. Ibid. 
319. Ibid. 23. 
II RIAA 18. 
320. Fauchille, Paul, Le Conflit de Limites entre le Bresil et la 
Grande-Bretagne et la. Sentence arbitrale du Roi dItalie, 1905, p. 
117. 
321. Ibid., pp. 117-120. For a similar detailed criticism of the 
award, see De Laparadelle, A. et N. Politis, "L'Arbitrage 
Anglo-Bresilien de 1904", 22 Revue de Droit public et de la Science 
politique en France et ýa l'Etranger 241-345, esp. 301-345 (1905). 
322. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
323.11 RIAA 69. 
324. Ibid. 68. 
325. The compromis of 16 July 1930, Article 5.2 RIAA 1311. 
326. Ibid. 1322. 
327. Ibid. 1323. 
328. Ibid. 1323-1325. 
329. Ibid. 1336. 
330. Ibid. 1337. 
331. Ibid. 1341. 
332. Ibid. 1342. 
333. Ibid. 1352. 
334. See supra Section 2-(I)-l). 
335.2 RIAA 1325-1351,1351-1364. 
336. ICJ Reports, 1959, pp. 231-232. 
- 327 - 
337. Ibid. , p. 250, where Judge Armand-Ugon refers to the Fisheries case of 1951, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 138. 
338. Ibid., p. 255. 
339. The compromis of 24 June 1910, Preamble. 11 RIAA 313. 
340. Article 3. Ibid. 313-314. 
341.102 Parry 36. 
342.11 RIAA 321. 
343. Ill Parry 237. 
344.164 Parry 338-339. 
345. See 11 RIAA 328. 
346. Ibid. 329-330. 
347. Ibid. 330. 
348. Ibid. 332-333. 
349. Ibid. 322. 
350. Ibid. 
351. Twiss, The Law of Nations, 2nd ed. , 1875, p. 8, as quoted ibid. 355. 
352. Ib id. 
353. A brief account of the f inal settlement of the Chamizal dispute 
may be found in Cukwurah, A. 0., The Settlement of Boundary Disputes 
in International Law, 1967, pp. 206-208. For a more detailed 
discussion of the settlement of this case, see Miyoshi, Masahiro, "On 
the Settlement of the Chamizal Case" (in Japanese), A Collection of 
Legal Essays in Commemoration of the 125th Anniversary of Keio-Gijuku, 
1983, pp. 125-150. 
354. The compromis of 1 April 1965, Article 1, paragraph (2). 16 
RIAA 119. See also ibid. 163. 
355. Article 1, paragraph (1). Ibid. 119. 
356. Ibid. 172. 
357. Ibid. 154. 
358. Ibid. 173. 
359. Ibid. 177. 
360. Ibid. 177-179. 
361. Ibid. 180. 
- 328 - 
362. Rousseau, Charles, "Chronique des faits internatinaux", 71 RGDIP 172 (1967). 
363. Jennings, R. Y. , "The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute: a case study", International Disputes: The Legal Aspects, 1972, pp. 324-325. In contrast to such suspected considerations for the Chilean 
settlers in this case, a legally based decision rejected the claim that a boundary line dividing the territory of the native people would be contrary to the relevant treaty in the Netherlands-Portugal 
" 
Island 
of Timor case of 1914. Portugal claimed that a direct north-south line between two river sources would divide the territory of the Portuguese Ambenos, which would be contrary to the treaty of 1859. But the arbitrator rejected this objection, seemingly based on 
equitable considerations, for the following reasons of a legal nature: 'Vobjection que les territoires d'une meme tribu. ne doivent 
pas etre morceles, ne saurait ainsi retenue par Varbitre, car 
elle aurait du' etre presentee au cours des negotiations de 
1902-1904; actuellement, elle est tardive, parce que le traite 
de 1904 ... ne fait aucune mention d'une volonte des Parties de 
ne jamais se"parer des populations indigenes; ce traite a au 
contraire trace le ligne de demarcation a la suite de Conference 
au cours desquelles il a ete entendu que les considerations de 
ce genre ne doivent pas etre preponderantes. " 
11 RIAA 507. 
364.16 RIAA 124-140. 
365. It may be of interest to note that Mr. E. Lauterpacht, one of 
counsel on behalf of Chile in the proceedings, in his oral argument on 
the 9th day, quoted a passage from Wittemore Boggs' book on 
International Boundaries of 1940. Of particular interest is the 
following part: 
"The common sense view is ... that a good boundary is one 
which serves the particular purposes for which it is designed, 
with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of friction. " 
Oral Arguments on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Chile, 
Corrected Transcript of Oral Hearings (mimeo. ), 1966, Vol. II, p. 95. 
366. ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 300, para. 113. 
367. The Special Agreement of 29 March 1979, Article II, paragraph 1. 
Ibid., p. 253, para. 5. 
368. Ibid., P. 328, para. 197. 
369. Ibid., p. 342, para. 237. 
370. Ibid. 
371.11 RIAA 180. 
372. Ibid. 188-189. 
373. Ibid. 176. 
374. Ibid. 191. 
- 329 - 
375. Lansing, Robert, "The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
Arbitration", 59 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 138 (1910). 
376. The text of Article 89 of the Treaty of S'evres is reproduced in 
the award. 31 Bulletin de I'Institut Juridique International 329 (1934). 
377. Hackworth, I Digest of International Law 715. 
378. Ibid. 715-716. 
379.31 Bulletin de l'Institut Juridique International 334, note 1. See also ibid. 335 for that portion of the award in which the 
arbitrator suggests to the Boundary Commission a consultation with the 
local inhabitants. 
380.3 RIAA 1819. 
381. Ibid. 1820. 
382. Ibid. 1824. 
383. Ibid. A similar example of identifying equity with ex aequo et 
bono can be found in Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the 
Mixed Commission for the iron gates of 30 November 1963 between 
Yugoslavia and Romania, which reads: 
"The Board for the Settlement of Differences shall settle 
differences in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, 
Conventions and Protocols concerning the Iron Gates System and, 
in the absence of any provisions applicable to the specific 
case, in accordance with equity (ex aequo et bono). 11 
513 UNTS 160. Assuming that this is a correct translation of the 
original Serbo-Croatian and Romanian texts, it clearly takes the 
expressions of "in accordance with equity" and "ex aequo et bono" to 
be interchangeable. 
384.3 RIAA 1824-1825. This was in ef f ect envisaged in Article 7 of 
the compromis. Ibid. 1820. Woolsey comments: 
"And so the century-old controversy over the deserts and 
marshes of Gran Chaco has been finally settled. The boundary 
apparently gives Paraguay something more than her military 
position at the time, but less than her farthest demands. On 
the whole she has increased her territory over one and one-half 
times and in excess of any of the previous tentative agreements. 
On the other hand, the line runs approximately one hundred miles 
short of the oil f ields of Bolivia and gives her access to the 
sea through the Paraguay and Parana Rivers. " 
Woolsey, L. H. , "The Settlement of the 
Chaco Dispute", 33 AJIL 128 
(1939). La Foy points out that pressure was put on "the belligerents 
until sufficient concessions were granted to make an agreement 
possible". La Foy, Margaret, The Chaco Dispute and the League of 
Nations, 1941, p. 142. Schurz,, formerly American Commercial Attache 
at Rio de Janeiro and other posts in Latin America, predicted 
in 1929 
that "international equity demands that Bolivia have a direct outlet 
to the Paraguay River at some point". Schurz, William L., 
"The Chaco 
Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay", Foreign Affairs,, July, 1929, p. 
655. 
- 330 - 
385.17 RIAA 571. 
386. See Untawale, M. G. , "The Kutch-Sind Dispute: A Case Study in 
International Arbitration", 23 ICLQ 830-831 (1974). One would be 
reminded of another instance of considerations for peace as given in 
the report of 16 July 1925 presented to the Council of the League of 
Nations by the Commission constituted pursuant to a resolution of 30 
September 1924 on the question of the Turkey - Iraq frontier. The 
report invokes "Vimportance primordiale d'une paix durable et de 
bonnes relations entre les pays voisins. Cet argument implique ... 
une solution qui donne a l'Irak le territoire qui lui est necessaire 
pour vivre et se developper. " S. D. N., C. 400. M. 147,1925, VII, p. 86, 
as quoted in Bardonnet, D., "Equite et Frontieres terrestres", 
M61anges offerts a Paul Reuter: Le Droit international: Unite et 
Diversite, 1981, p. 45, note 35. 
387.33 AJIL 357 (1939). 
388. Ibid. 358. 
389. Treaty of Peace of 24 December 1814 (Treaty of Ghent) , Article 
4.63 Parry 424. See the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 
19 November 1794 (Jay Treaty) between Great Britain and the United 
States, Article 5.52 Parry 249. 
390. Treaty of Ghent, Article 4.63 Parry 424. 
391. Moore, 6 International Adjudications, Modern Series 36. 
392. Ibid. 37. 
393.1 Lapradelle-Politis 304. 
394. The Times, 4 October 1899. p. 6. 
395. Ibid. On the 56th and last day of the proceedings the president 
of the tribunal stated in his closing address: 
"Ici, nous avons eu le bonheur d'avoir l'unanimite sur tous 
les articles de la sentence, sans aucune reserve. 
"Permettez-moi de croire que, dans les conflits 
internationaux de l'Arbitrage, cette unaimite est un immense 
bien; c'est un fait qu'il est necessaire d'affirmer et 
de 
proclamer, et je crois que c'est la un ideal vers 
lequel il faut 
tendre; parce que, s'il ya force legale pour les Puissances en 
litige dans une sentence arbitrale adoptee a la majorite, 
il y 
manque cette force morale qui est d'un bien autre prix encore. 
" 
Proceedings, Vol. 11, p. 3240. 
396. The Times, 4 October 1899, p. 6. 
397. Dennis, W. C09 "The Venezuela - British Guiana Boundary 
Arbitration of 1899", 44 AJIL 727 (1950). See also the same author, 
"Compromise--the Great Defect of Arbitration". 11 Columbia Law Review 
493-513 (1911). It would not be necessary to go into the 
details of 
the controversy as to whether the president of the 
tribunal exerted 
pressure on the arbitrators nominated 
by Venezuela to secure a 
unanimous compromise. For the memorandum of 
Mallet-Prevost, who acted 
as. counsel for Venezuela in the arbitration, and 
the ensuing 
- 331 - 
disucssion on the alleged pressure or transaction, see Schoenrich, Otto, "The Venezuela - British Guiana Boundary Dispute", 43 AJIL 523- 
530 (1949); Child, Clifton J., "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary 
Arbitration of 1899", 44 AJIL 682-693 (1950); Dennis, op. cit., ibid. 
720-727. 
By way of comparison reference may be had to a diplomatic 
settlement of the Afghan frontier dispute between Great Britain and 
Russia in 1887. By a protocol of 10 September 1885 the Commissioners 
nominated by the parties were instructed to examine and trace "sur les 
lieux les details de la frontiere afghane fixee par Varticle 
precedent". Article 2,166 Parry 333. In fulfilling their duties the 
Commissioners were to take due account of "des Localite's et des 
necessites, et du bien-etre des populations locales". Article 3, 
ibid. 334. According to the London Protocol of 10 September 1885, the 
British gave up the source of water supply, some I mile above the 
frontier, of the Penjdeh Valley between the Murghab and the Kushan in 
the northwestern part of Afghanistan, as well as the Penjdeh Valley 
itself where the Russians had pastured sheep exclusively, in exchange 
f or the withdrawal on the part of the Russians of their claim to the 
lef t bank of the Amu Darya (Oxus) to the east. As the British 
Commissioner reported to the Foreign Office, 
"Under these circumstances, in exchange for a belt of from 12 to 
16 miles of pasturage along the frontier up to the Oxus, I have 
agreed to give up the head of the Kashan Canal, which is about 1 
mile above the present frontier. ... " (Communication from Sir W. 
Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosenberg, 14 May 1886. C. 5235 (1887)9 
No. 107, p. 71. ) 
He further reported: 
"It was after consideration of these facts that Her Majesty's 
Government authorized me to negotiate a settlement according to 
which the Ameer (=of Afghanistan) should restore to the Sariks 
most of the lands of which they had been deprived between the 
Kushk and Murghab3, in exchange for the withdrawal of the Russian 
claims to all the districts at present in the possession of the 
Afghans on the Oxus, and to the wells and pastures necessary for 
the prosperity of the Uzbegs of Afghan Turkeskan. " 
(Communication from Col. Sir West Ridgeway to the Marquis of 
Salisburyq Londons 27 July 1887. C. 5114 (1887). No. 3, p. 2. ) 
That afforded the basis for the final protocol of 22 July 1887. Thus 
the procedure which started as a quasi-arbitral joint commission, with 
powers of giving some equitable considerations in its work of 
demarcation, ended in a diplomatic settlement. See 169 Parry 410-416. 
398.11 RIAA 115. 
399. Ibid. 116. 
400. Article 2 of the Treaty of 11 June 1891.89 BFSP 715. 
401. Ibid. 748. 
402. Ibid. 741. 
403. Ibid. 748. 
404. For the text of Annex IV see Republic of Chilet supra note 
43, 
p. 350, para. 4. 
- 332 - 
405. Shaw, Malcolm, "The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award". 6 International Relations 430,431 (1978). 
406. The compromis of 3 April 1913, Article 2.11 RIAA 487. 
407. Ibid. 507. 
408. Republic of Chile, supra note 43, p. 98, para. 46. 
409. Basis of Arrangement accepted by the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, 13 March 1961, paragraph 4(b). 30 ILR 77 (1966). 
410. Decision. Ibid. 87. 
411. Ibid. 85. 
412. Ibid. 78. 
413. Ibid. 88. 
414. Individual opinion of Judge Hudson, PCIJ Publications, Series 
A/B, No. 70, pp. 76-77; ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 48, para. 88; ICJ 
Reports, 1982, p. 60, para. 71; ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 45. 
415. The Special Agreement of 10 June 1977 between Tunisia and Libya, 
Article 1, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 21, para. 2, p. 23, para 4; the 
United States submission in the Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Reports, 1984, 
p. 258, para. 12, p. 261, para. 13; the Libyan submission in the 
Libya-Malta Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 11. 
416. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, 
paragraph 1. 
417. See Chapter II. 
418.5 RIAA 414. In more general terms Dr. Max Huber describes 
equity in its strict sense in his "Observations" in response to M. 
Eugene Borel's Rapport to the Institut de Droit International on "La 
Competence du Juge International en Equite" of 1934: 
"La conception la plus etroite de 1'equite est celle qui 
comporte, entre plusiers interpretations possibles du droit, 
celle qui tient le mieux compte de la situation individuelle des 
parties en litige et de la balance des droits et obligations 
correspondants. " 
Institut de Droit International, 38 Annuaire 233 (1934). 
419. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 49, para. 90, p. 50, para. 92. 
420. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 59, para. 70, where the Court says: 
"The result of the application of equitable principles must be 
equitable. ... It is, however, the result which 
is predominant; 
the principles are subordinate to the goal. The equitableness 
of a principle must be assessed in the light of its usefulness 
f or the purpose of arriving at an equitable result. It is not 
every such principle which is in itself equitable; it may 
acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness of the 
solution. 
- 333 - 
421. U. N. Document A/CONF. 62/L. 78, p. 34. 
422. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 49, para. 49. 
423. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 92. 
424. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 109, para. 35. 
- 334 - 
Note: Chapter IV 
1. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 33, para. 47. 
2. Ibid., p. 53, para. 101. 
3. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 1. p. 57; A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 2, p. 59; A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3, p. 34. 
4. Cmnd. 7438, pp. 59-60, para. 97; ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 92, para. 133; ICJ R ports, 1984, pp. 299-300, para. 112; ICJ Reports, 1985, 
para. 79. 
5. The North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, ICJ Reports, 
1969, p. 48, para. 88. 
6. Judge Oda's dissenting opinion in the Tunisia-Libya Continental 
Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 256, para. 158. 
ICJ Pleadings, 1968, Vol. II, p. 61. 
8. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 59, para. 70. 
ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 49, para. 90; ibid. 9 p. 50, para. 92. 
10. Cmnd. 7438, p. 48, para. 70; ibid. , pp. 59-60, para. 97. 
11. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 60, para. 71. 
12. ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 292, para. 89. 
13. ICJ Reports, 1985, para. 79. 
14. The compromis of 14 March 1908, in its Article 3, provided that 
the tribunal should decide the boundary line "en tenant compte des 
circonstances de fait et des principes du droit international" 
(emphasis added). 11 RIAA 153-154. The tribunal accordingly took due 
account of the "circonstances de fait" in the delimitation of the 
boundary line. Ibid. 161-162. 
15. For the text of the Treaty, see 18 ILM 291-331. 
16. Burmester, H., "The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean Boundary 
Delimitation by Agreement", 76 AJIL 349 (1982). 
17. International Law Association, Report of the 52nd Conference, 
Helsinki, 1966, p. 488. Article IV reads: 
"Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a 
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the 
waters of an international drainage basin. 
" 
Ibid., p. 486. 
18. The "relevant factors" listed in Article V, paragraph (2), are: 
"(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the 
extent of the drainage area in the territory of each basin 
State; 
- 335 - 
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the 
contribution of water by each basin State; 
(c) the climate affecting the basin; 
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including 
in particular existing utilization; 
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each 
basin State; 
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the 
economic and social needs of each basin State; 
(h) the availability of other resources; 
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of 
waters of the basin; 
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the 
co-basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among 
uses; and 
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be 
satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin 
State. " 
Ibid., p. 488. 
19. Cukwurah, A. 0., The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in 




Yadh Ben, "L'affaire du plateau 
(Analyse empirique)", 110 Journal du Droit 
21. Wortley, B. A. , Jurisprudence, 1967, p. 372. 
22. De Visscher, Charles, 
international public, 1969, p. 25. 
23. Ibid. 
24.1 RIAA 869. 
25. Ibid. 832. 
26. Ibid. 869. 
Problemes de Confins de Droit 
27. Preamble of the c-ompromis, ibid. 831. 
28. It is interesting to note a comment by an expert who acted as 
the Agent for the United States Government in the Gulf of Maine case: 
"However, we are unaware of any modern international maritime 
boundary adjudication where a state received the 
boundary that 
it claimed. That experience confirms that claimants are not 
likely to receive what they request, but rather a compromise of 
some sorts. Thus, it may serve the interest of a party 
to claim 
the maximum to which it is conceivably entitled. 
" 
Robinson, Davis R., et al., "Some Perspectives on Adjudicating 
before 
the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case", 79 AJIL 
591 (1985). 
29. On this type of boundary arbitration, R. Y. Jennings comments: 
there is usually some legal truth on both sides of 
the 
argument and what seems to the uninstructed eye 
to be a mere 
compromise may in fact be an attempt to 
do justice to the weight 
continental 
International 
- 336 - 
and persuasiveness of the argument on one side 
other. " (Emphasis original) 
Jennings, R. Y., "The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute: 
International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (Report of a 
the David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
p. 324. 
and on the 
A Case Study", 
Study Group of 
Studies), 1972, 
30. See on this point Article 12 of the International Law 
Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, ILC Year Book, 1958, 
Vol. II, pp. 8,14. See also Article 19 of the "Projet de reglement 
pour la procedure arbitrale internationale" of 28 August 1875 of 
l'Institut de Droit International, Wehberg, Hans, Tableau General des 
Resolutions (1873-1956), 1957, p. 152. For a discussion of the 
subject, especially the point at issue, see Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald, 
"The Problem of Non-Liquet: Prolegomena to a Restatement", Me"langes 
offerts_ a Charles Rousseau: La Communaute internationale, 19749 
pp. 92,101. 
31. For example, in respect of the British claims, see "Political 
control". Summary, British Case, pp. 119-120; British Counter-Case, 
Tr- o- pp. 130-142. See, in respect of the Venezuelan claims, C nclusive 
propositions of fact", Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, pp. 221-229; 
Venezuelan Counter-Case, Vol. 1, pp. 71-72. 
32. For example, Venezuelan Case, Vol. 1, pp. 155-156; Venezuelan 
. 
Counter-Case, Vol. 1, p. 33. 
33. For example, British Case, pp. 15,37,52-543,78. 
34. Venezuela subsequently contended that the award line was 
unjustified, and as a result of the negotiations concluded with the 
United Kingdom an Agreement to Resolve the Controversy over the 
Frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana on 17 February 1966. 
Article I of the Agreement provides: 
"A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of 
seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of 
the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which 
has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the 
Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana 
and Venezuela is null and void. " 
561 UNTS 323. 
35. Jennings, supra_note 29, pp. 324-325. 
36. Argentine Cuonter-Memorial, Vol. 1, pp. 133-134. 
37.16 RIAA 173. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Chile stated the "essential issue" in these words: 
"The essential issue between the Parties is thus whether, as 
Argentina contends, these words (=the controversial part of 
the 
1902 award) require that the course of the 
boundary shall follow 
the Encuentro along the minor channel and be connected 
to the 
Cerro Virgen, or, as Chile contends, these words require 
that 
the course of the boundary shall follow the 
Encuentro along the 
major channel and thus place the whole area west of 
the line of 
- 337 - 
the Chilean submission within Chilean territory. " 
Chilean Memorial, Vol. 1, p. 195. The key passage of the 1902 Award 
reads: "the boundary shall follow the River Encuentro to the peak 
called Virgen", and the corresponding passage of the Report of the Tribunal appointed by the Arbitrator, which constituted the basis of 
the Arbitrator's Award, reads: %the boundary] shall follow the 
Encuentro along the course of its western branch to its source on the 
western slopes of Cerro Virgen". Ibid.; 9 RIAA 37,, 42. 
40. Mr. E. Lauterpacht, counsel f or the Government of Chile, during 
his oral argument on the 9th day, characterized the Court of 
Arbitration as "a practical Court charged with a task of political, 
economic and social significance", and went on to say, "The task is 
not an academic one, and it cannot properly be discharged in a 
vacuum. " Corrected Transcript of Oral Hearings, Vol. II, p. 95. 
41. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 50, para. 95. 
42. International Law Association, supra note 17, p. 488. For a 
comment on this clause, see Handl, Gunther, "The Principle of 
'Equitable Use' As Applied to Internationally Shared Natural 
Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over 
Transfrontier Pollution", 14 RBDI 48 (1978-1979). For a similar 
comment by the same author, see "Balancing of Interests and 
International Liability for the Pollution of International 
Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisited", 13 CYBIL 176 
(1975). 
43. ICJ Reports, 1982, p. 59, para. 70. 
44. Rhee, Sang-Myon, "Sea Boundary Delimitation between States 
before World War 11", 76 AJIL 588 (1982). 
45. Miyoshi, Masahiro, "The Delimitation of Continental Shelf 
Boundaries and 'Equitable Principles"' (in Japanese), Kikan Kaiyo-Jiho 
(Quarterly Review of Marine Affairs), No. 16 (February, 1980), p. 25. 
Davis R. Robinson and associates who represented the United States 
Government before the Chamber of the International Court of Justice in 
the Gulf of Maine case remark in a joint paper they wrote 
"while our 
memories are fresh": 
in a court where only sovereign states can be parties, the 
judges in a given case may sense pressure to arrive at a 
decision that is acceptable to all. " 
Robinson, Davis R., et al., supra note 28, at 590. 
46. Handl, supra note 42,14 RBDI 44 (1978-1979). 
47. Schachter, Oscar, Sharin g the World's Resources, 1977, p. 24. 
48. Cukwurah, supra note 19, pp. 205-206. 
49. Dennis, William Cullen, "Compromise - the Great Defect of 
Arbitration", 11 Columbia Law Review 493-513 (1911). 
50. Id., "The Venezuela - British Guiana Boundary 
Arbitration of 
1899", 44 AJIL 727 (1950). 
- 338 - 
51. Akehurst, Michael, "Equity and General Principles of Law". 25 ICLQ 801-825 (1976). 
52. "Memorial submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany", ICJ Pleadings, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 30-36; 'nReply submitted by the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany", ibid., pp. 391-395; "Argument of Professor 
Jaenicke",, ICJ Pleadings, North 
, 
Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1968, 
Vol. 2. p. 32; "Argument of Professor Oda". ibid., p. 61. 
But when Sir Humphrey Waldock, counsel for Denmark and the 
Netherlands, pointed out that -the Federal Government had failed to 
provide the Court with anything to assist it in its appreciation of 
the alleged principle of "just and equitable share" (Ibid.,, p. 118), 
Professor Jaenicke, the German Agent, replied in a manner which does 
not necessarily link the alleged principle to "general principles of 
law" (Ibid., p. 179), thereby revealing a slight difference from 
Professor Oda's treatment of it as a "general principle of law". 
53. ICJ 
, 
Reports, 1969, p. 48, para. 88. Cf . Judge Hudson's separate 
opinion in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case, PCIJ 
Publications, Series A/B, No. 70, p. 76. 
54. See, for example, Professor Oda's reply, which quotes Judge 
Hudson's separate opinion in the Meuse case. ICJ Pleadings, supra 
note 52, Vol. 2, p. 200. 
55. See Chapter 11,1, (2): "The Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice". 
56. Schwarzenberger, Georg, The Dynamics of International Law, 1976, 
pp. 61-62. 
57. For a comprehensive comparative law study of principles of 
equity, see Newman, Ralph A. (ed. ) , Equity in the World's Legal 
Systems: A Comparative Study, 1973. 
58. De Visscher, Charles, "Contribution a 1'Etude des Sources du 
Droit international". 14 Revue de Droit International et de 
L6gislation Comparee 415 (1933); Id., "Observations on Eugene Borel's 
"Rapport preliminaire - La Competence du Juge International en 
Equite", Institut de Droit International, 38 Annuaire 239 (1934). By 
contrast,, H. Lauterpacht seems to include equity in 
"general 
principles". For he says: "The equitable principles are included 
in 
the general principles of law which the Court is bound to apply 
by 
virtue of Article 38(3) of the Statute. 
" Lauterpacht, H., 
International Law: Collected Papers (edited by E. Lauterpacht), Vol. 
1,1970, p. 257. 
59. De Visscherg Charles, De VESuite' dans le Raglement arbitral ou 
judiciaire des Litiges de Droit international public2 19729 pp. 6-7. 
60. But this does not exclude the possibility that equity may 
be 
considered as a material source of law. Cf. Reuters 
Paul, Droit 
international public, 19589 pp. 85-86. 
61.1503rd Meeting on 19 June 1978. 
p. 157. 
ILC Year Bookq 1978, Vol. 1, 
- 339 - 
62. McDowell, Gary L. , Equity and the Constitution: The Court, Equitable Relief, and Public Policy, 1982, pp. 5-6. 
63. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1354a-b, as quoted in McDowell, 
supra note 62, p. 18. 
64. Lauterpacht, Eli, "Oil and Gas Resources of British Waters: Some 
Problems of International Law", paper presented at the Petroleum Law 
Seminar sponsored by the International Bar Association in Cambridge, 
8-13 January 1978, p. 11. 
65. Habicht, Max, The Power of the International Judge to Give a Decision "ex aequo et bono", 1935, p. 72. 
66. Akehurst, supra note 51, at 808-811. The same author writes to 
the same effect in his book review of Charles de Visscher's De 
l'Equite dans le R4glement arbitral ou judiciaire des Litiges de Droit 
international public, 1972.46 BYBIL 543-544 (1972-1973). 
67. Akehurst, supra note 51, at 813-825. 
68. Ibid. 801. 
69. Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald G. , 
"The Future of Public International 
Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of 
Today", Institut de Droit International, Livre du Centenaire 
1873-1973: Evolution et perspectives du droit internatinoal, 1973, pp. 
325-326. 
70. Ibid., p. 325. 
71. Blecher, M. D., "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf", 
73 AJIL 87-88 (1979). 
72. De Visscherg supra_note 59, p. 3. 
73. ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 53, para. 101. 
74. See critical comments by Judge Gros in his dissenting opinion in 
the Gulf of Maine case. ICJ Reports, 1984, p. 383, para. 38; p. 377, 
para. 26. 
75. Ibid., p. 388, para. 47. 
76. Ibid., p. 377, para. 26. 
77. Charney, Jonathan I. , 
"Ocean Boundaries between Nations: A 
theory for Progress", 78 AJIL 585,596-606 (1984). 
78. Ibid. 606. 
79. Ibid. 597. The author elaborates on these five steps, ibid. 
598-606. 
80. Francioni, Francesco, of Compensation of Nationalisation of 
Foreign Property: The Borderland between Law and Equity", 24 ICLQ 279 
(1975). 
- 340 - 
81. General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) , I, para 
82. General Assembly resolution 3171 (XXVIII) , para 3. 
83. General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX),, Article 2, paragraph 2(c) . 
84. Francioni, supra note 80, at 278-280. 
85. Bedjaoui, Mohammed, Towards a New International Economic Order, 
1979, pp. 119. 
86. ILC Year Book, 1966, Vol. I. Part II, p. 17, para. 74. 
87. Ibid., p. 18, para. 78. 
88. Kelly, G. M., "The Temple Case in Historical Perspective", 39 
BYBIL 467 (1963). 
89. Ibid. 471. 
90. Ibid. 470. 
91. ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 31, para. 53. 
92. McWhinney, Edward, "The Time Dimension in International Law, 
Historical Relativism and Intertemporal Law", in Makarczyk, Jerzy 
(ed. ), Essays in International Law in Honour of Jud&e Manfred Lachs, 
1984, p. 196. 
93. Institut de Droit International, 56 Annuaire 536 (1975). 
94. Cf. Article 8 of the Statute of the International Law Commission 
which runs: 
"At the election the electors shall bear in mind ... that in 
the Commission as a whole representation of the main forms of 
civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world 
should be assured. " 
95. ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 128. 
96. Max-Planck-Institut fuir ausla**ndisches 3ffentliches Recht und 
V031kerrecht, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: 
Tnternational Court of Justice, Other Courts and Tribunals, 
Arbitration and Conciliation - An International Symposium, 1974, p. 
31. 
97. Ibid., p. 157. 
98. Ibid., p. 167. 
99. Academie de Droit International de La Haye LAvenir 
int-p-rn. qt-i, nn;; l dans un Monde multiculturel, 19849 pp. 
452-454. 
100. Ibid., p. 454. 
du Droit 
- 341 - 
101. Schachter, Oscar, "The Role of the Institute of International Law and its Methods of Work - Today and Tomorrow: Special Report", 
Institut de Droit International, supra note 69, p. 412. 
102. Ibid., p. 413. 
103. See Prott, Lyndell V., The Latent Power of Culture and the 
International Judge, 1979, p. 2, where the author states: 
"The strong influence of the British and French legal systems 
on the practice of the International Court generally is plainly 
evident. The law to be applied was of course early influenced 
by the concepts native to those systems. ... Their long diplomatic and arbitral experience (cf . Britain's pioneering 
participation through the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the Alabama 
Arbitration of 1872) led to a similarly strong influence on 
matters of procedure and evidence. The use of French and 
English by history and tradition, as the languages of most 
international tribunals, led of course to the introduction of 
certain legal concepts of these systems such as those of 
'equity' and 'ordre public' quite early in the history of 
international jurisprudence. " 
- 342 - 
Notes: Conclusions 
1. See Introduction and Chapters II and III. 
See the attached Bibliography. 
3. Akehurst, Michael, "Equity and General Principles of Law" 25 ICLQ 808-812 (1976). 
4. Mikazuki, Akira, Hogaku-Nyumon (An Introduction to Juris- prudence), 1982, p. 272. 
Ibid. 
6. Decenciere-Ferrandiere, A., "Quelque Re'flexions touchant le Reglement des Conf lits internationaux", 36 RGDIP 432 (1929), where the author says: 
"Le propre du droit, c'est de prevoir d'avance la solution qui devra etre donee. Il correspond a une idee d'ordre et de 
securite: meme s'il s'inspire de la justice, il ne peut jamais la. realiser completement. Il ne peut la realiser compl6tement 
parce qu'il est impossible de savoir, au moment oU' la norme est 
posee, si son application sera juste ou non dans l'avenir. Cela 
dependra de circonstances qu'on ne peut connaltre d'avance avec 
certitude, car l'homme ne peut prevoir Vavenir. " 
7. Wortley, B. A. g. Jurisprudence, 1967, p. 390. 
8. Reuter, Paul, "Quelques reflexions sur Ve"quite en droit 
internatinoal", 15 RBDI 185-186 (1980). 
9. Brown, Brendan F. , "Equity in the Law of the United States of 
America", in Newman, Ralph A. (ed. ) . Equity in the World's Legal 
Systems: A Comparative Study, 1973, p. 222. 
10. Lauterpacht, Hersch, Private Law Sources and Analogies of 
International Law (With special reference to international 
arbitration), 1927, pp. 298-299. 
11. Ibid., p. 303. 
12. De Visscher, Charles, De_ l'Equite dans le R6glement arbitral ou 
judiciaire des Litiges de Droit international public, 1972, p. 3, 
where the learned author states: 
'Ve'quite" apparalt dans le plan judiciaire conme une justice 
plus ou moins individualisee. Elle se congoit par rapport a la 
regle dont elle invite a se departir dans la mesure oU- Vexige 
une justice adaptee 'a Vespece. " 
13. Bardonnet, Daniel, "Equite et Frontieres terrestres". in 
M91anges of f erts A Paul Reuter: Le Droit international: Unite et 
Diversite", 1981, P. 37. 
- 343 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Academie de Droit International de La Haye, L'Avenir du Droit international dans un Monde multiculturel: Colloque 1983, The Hague, 1983. 
Achour, Yadh Ben, "L'Affaire du Plateau continental tuniso-libyen (Analyse empirique)", 110 Journal du Droit international 247-292 
(1983). 
Adami, C. V., National Frontiers in Relation to International Law, 
London, 1927. 
Adams, George Burton, "The Origin of English Equity", 16 Columbia Law 
Review 87-98 (1916). 
Adede, A. 0. , 
"Toward the Formulation of the Rule of Delimitation of 
Sea Boundaries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts", 
19 Virginia Journal of International Law 207-255 (1979). 
Agostini, E., L'Equite, Paris, 1978. 
Akehurst, Michael, "Equity and General Principles of Law", 25 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 801-825 (1976). 
to The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law", 47 British 
Year Book of International Law 273-285 (1974-75). 
Al-Baharna, Husain M., The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A 
Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International 
Problems, Manchesterg 1968. 
Alexander, Lewis M. , 
"Baseline Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries", 
23 Virginia Journal of International Law 503-536 (1983). 
Allen, Sir Carlton Kemp, Law in the Making, 6th edition, Oxford, 1958. 
Alvarez, Alexandre, "Des Occupations de Territoires contest6s: aý 
propos de la question de limites entre le Chile et la Republique 
argentine", 10 Revue generale de Droit international public 
(1903). Extrait. 
American Society of International Law, "ICJ Decision in the Libya- 
Tunisia Continental Shelf Case: A Workshop", Proceedings 150-165 
(1982). 
Amin, S. H. , 
"Customary Rules of Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf: The Gulf States Practice", 11 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 509-526 (1980). 
"The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Legal Implications", 31 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 167-188 
(1982). 
"Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: 
The Gulf Example"'. 
27 Netherlands International Law Review 335-346 (1980). 
- 344 - 
Anand, Ram Prakash, International Courts and Contemporary Conflicts, London, 1974. 
Anderson, Chandler P. , "The Costa Rica-Panama Boundary Dispute", 15 American Journal of International Law 236-240 (1921). 
"The Final Outcome of the Fisheries Arbitration". 7 American 
Journal of International Law 1-16 (1913). 
Antonakopoulos, Antoine L. , 
"La Theorie du Droit chez Aristote"I 29 
Revue hellenique de Droit international 173-192 (1976). 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 Great Books of the Western World 
376-387 (1952) 
Baker,, P. V. . 
"The Future of Equity", 93 Law Quarterly Review 529-540 
(1977). 
Bardonnet, Daniel, "Equite et FrontiZeres terrestres", M61anges offerts 
a Paul Reuter: Le Droit international: Unite et Diversite 35-7T 
(Paris, 1981). 
Basdevant, J., "Contributions a Vetude de regime juridique de 
l'utilisation domestique agricole et industrielle des eauxli 21 
L'Evolution du Droit public: Etudes en l'Honneur d'Achille 
mestre Y-Z4 kraris, 
Bastid, Suzanne, "Les Problemes 
la Cour internationale 
367-495 (1962-111). 
territoriaux dans la Jurisprudence de 
de Justice", 107 Recueil des Cours 
Bedjaoui, Mohammed, lowards a New International Economic Order, New 
York, 1979. 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg, Jay's Treaty, New York, 1923. 
Berlia, G., Essai sur la Portee de la Clause de Jugement en Equitg en 
Droit des Gens, Paris, 1937. 
Berry, K. B. , 
"Delimitation and the Anglo-French Arbitration", 6 
Australian Year Book of International Law 139-152 (1978). 
Bilder, Richard B. , 
"Some Limitations of Adjudication as an 
International Dispute Settlement Technique", 23 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 1-12 (1982). 
"The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International 
Law of the Environment". 144 Recueil des Cours 
139-239 (1975-1). 
Blecher, M. D. , 
"Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf", 73 
American Journal of International Law 60-88 (1979). 
Boggs, S. W., International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary: 
Functions 
and Problems, New York, 1940. 
- 345 - 
Bollecker-S tern, Brigitte, "L'Arbitrage dans l'Affaire du Canal de Beagle entre VArgentine et le Chile". 83 Revue g6n6rale de Droit internationa1public 7-52 (1979). 
Bore , Eugene, ee La Comp'tence du Juge international en Equit-: Rapport 
preliminaire", 38 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international 
182-225 (1934). 
9 
"La Competence du Juge international en Equit': Rapport e de"finitif", Ibid. 251-301. 
Borel, Eugene, et Nicolas Politis, 'VExtension de l'Arbitrage 
obligatoire de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale", 33 
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international 669-761 (1927-11). 
Bouchez, L. J. , "The Fixing of Boundaries in International Boundary 
Rivers", 12 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 789-817 
(1963). 
Bourne,, C. B. "The Right to Utilize the Waters of International 
Rivers" 3 Canadian Year Book of International Law 187-264 
(1965). 
Bourne, C. B. , and D. M. McRae, "Maritime Jurisdiction 
Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-Examined", 14 
Book of International Law 175-223 (1976). 
in the Dixon 
Canadian Year 
Bowett, D. We. "The Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France 
concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel 
and South-Western Approaches", 49 British Year Book of 
International Law 1-29 (1978). 
9 
It Contemporary Development in Legal Techniques in the Settlement 
of Disputes", 180 Recueil des Cours 169-236 (1983-11) . 
The Legal Regimeof Islands in International Law, New York, 
1979. 
Brauer, Robert H. , 
"International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ 
Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute", 23 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 463-486 (1983). 
Brierly, James L., "The General Act of Geneva, 1928", 11 British Year 
Book of International Law 119-133 (1930). 
Brown, E. D. , 
"The Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone: 
The Problem of Delimitation at UNCLOS 111", 4 Maritime 
Policy 
and Manazement 377-408 (1977). 
"Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the 
United 
Kingdom", 2 Marine Policy 181-211,275-303 (1978). 
Brownlie, Ian, African Boundaries: A LeSal and 
Diplomatic 
Encyclopaedia, London, 1979. 
"Legal Status of Natural Resources in International 
Law (Some 
Aspects)", 162 Recueil des Cours 247-317 (1979-1). 
- 346 - 
Bull, Hedley, "The Third World and International Society: 
, Year Book of World Affairs 15-31 (1979). 
Burmester, H. , 
"The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean Boundary Delimitation 
by Agreement", 76 American Journal of International Law 321-349 
(1982). 
Caf lisch, Lucius, "L'Avenir de l'Arbitrage interetatique", Annuaire 
frangais de Droit international 9-45 (1979). 
Caloyanni, Megalos . "The Organization of International Justice, 
Justiciable and Political Disputes, and Prospects Thereof", 23 
Grotius Society Transactions 71-84 (1938). 
Castberg, F. , 
"L'Exces de Pouvoir dans la Justice internationale", 35 
Recueil des Cours 353-472 (1931). 
Chapal, Philippe . L'Arbitrabilite" des Dif f e"rends internationaux, 
Paris, 1967. 
Charney, Jonathan I. , 
"The Delimitation of Lateral Seaward Boundaries 
Between States in a Domestic Context", 75 American Journal of 
International Law 28-68 (1981). 
"Ocean Boundaries between Nations: A Theory for Progress", 78 
American Journal of International Law 582-606 (1984). 
9 
of Remarks" at the Workshop: "ICJ Decision in the Libya-Tunisia 
Continental Shelf Case". Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law 154-160 (1982). 
Chattopadhyay, S. K. , 
"Equity in International Law: Its Growth and 
Development", 5 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 381-405 (1975). 
Chemillier-Gendreau, Monique, "La Signification des Principes 
Equitables dans le Droit international contemporain", 16 Revue 
belge de Droit international 509-535 (1981-82). 
Cheng, Bin, "Justice and Equity in International Law", Current 
Legal 
Problems 185-211 (1955). 
Chhak, M. Sarin, Les Frontieres du Cambodge, Paris, 1966. 
Child, Clifton J. , 
"The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration 
of 1899" 44 American Journal of 
International Law 682-693 
(1950). 
Christie, Donna R. , 
"Coastal Energy Impact Program Boundaries on the 
Atlantic Coast: A Case Study of the Law Applicable 
to Lateral 
Seaward Boundaries",, 19 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 
841-882 (1979). 
- 347 - 
Christie, Donna R. , "From the Shoals 
Tripoli: The Tunisia/Libya 
Delimitation", 13 Georgia 
Comparative Law 1-30 (1983). 
Clain, Levi E. , "Gulf of Maine -A Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a Single Maritime Boundary", 25 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 521-620 (1985). 
Colliard, Claude-Albert, "Evolution et Aspects actuels du R6gime 
juridique des Fleuves internationaux"! 
o 125 Recueil des Cours 337-442 (1968-111). 
Colson, David A. , 
"The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf 
Arbitration", 72 American Journal of International Law 95-112 
(1978). 
"The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf Arbitration: 
Interpretive Decision of March 1978", 73 American Journal of 
International Law 112-120 (1979). 
Conference internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 18 mai-29 juillet 1899, 
Sommaire ggne"ral, 4 parties, Paris, 1899. 
Confortiq Benedetto, and Giampiero Francalanci (eds. ), Atlante dei 
Confini Sottomarini, Milano, 1979. 
Cook, Walter Wheeler, "Equity", 5 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 
582-588 (15th printing, 1963). 
Corbett, Percy E. , 
"The Diplomacy of Arbitration", in id., Law in 
Di2lomacy 136-186 (Princeton, 1959). 
------ The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes, New Haven, 
1937. 
Cot , Jean-Pierre, 
"LAf f aire de la Frontiere des Andes (Sentence 
arbitrale de la. reine Elisabeth II du 9 decembre 1966)", 
Annuaire frangais de Droit international 237-259 (1968). 
Cukwurah, A. 0., The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International 
Law, Manchester, 1967. 
David, Rene, "L'Arbitrage, Solution d'Avenir pour le Droit 
international", L'Avenir du Droit international dans un Monde 
multiculturel 401-413 (The Hague, 1983). 
David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
Studies, 
International Dis2utes: The Legal Aspects, London, 1972. 
Decenciere-Ferrandiere, A. , "Quelques Ref 
lexions touchant le Reglement 
des Conf lits internationaux". 36 Revue generale de Droit 
international public 416-431 (1929). 
Degan, V. D., L'Equite et le Droit international, La Haye, 
1970. 
of Ras Kaboudia to the Shores of 
Continental Shelf Boundary 
Journal of International and 
- 348 - 
De 
rrance et a i'mranger Z41-345 (1905). 
Lapradelle, A., et N. Politis., 
1904", 22 Revue de Droit public 
"L'Indivisibilite de la Frontiere et le Conflit Colombo- 
Venezue"lien", 28 Revue generale de Droit international public (1921), Extrait. 
Recueil des Arbitra&es 
1923,1954). 
(Paris, 1905, 
De la Rochere, Jacqueline Dutheil, "L'Affaire du Canal de Beagle 
(Sentence rendue par la Reine d'Angleterre le 22 avril 1977)",, 
Annuaire frangais de Droit international 408-435 (1977). 
Delin, Lars, "Shall Islands Be Taken into Account When Drawing the 
Median Line according to Article 6 of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf? ", 41 Nordisk Tidsskift for International Ret 
205-219 (1971). 
Dennis, William Cullen, "Compromise - the Great Defect of Arbitration"P 
11 Columbia Law Review 493-513 (1911). 
"The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899", 44 
American Journal of International Law 720-727 (1950). 
De Pinho Campinos, Jorge, "L'Actualite de 1'<uti possidetis>", Societe' 
frangaise pour le Droit international, La Frontiere: Colloque de 
Poitiers 95-111 (Paris, 1980). 
Deschaermaeker, J. , 
"Une Frontiere inconnue, les Pyrenees de 1'Ocean aý 
l'Aragon", 49 Revue generale de Droit international public 
239-277 (1941-45). 
Deuxieme Conference internationale de la Paix, La Haye, 15 juin-18 
octobre 1907, Actes et Documents, 3 tomes, La Haye, 1907. 
De Visscher, Charles, Aspects recents du Droit _procedural 
de la Cour 
internationale de Justice, Paris, 1966. 
"Contribution 
13-14 Revue de 
395-420 (1933) . 
"Cours ge"ne"ral dE 
Chiptre IV: Le 
internationaux", 86 
principes de droit international public: 
reglement judiciaire des differends 
Recueil des Cours 521-543 (1954-11). 
De 1'Equite dans 
- 
le Reglement arbitral ou judiciaire des 
Litiges de Droit international public, Paris, 1972. 
"Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. Borel: 
"La 
.9. -*11 38 Annuaire de Compeftence du Juge international en Equite 9- 
l'Institut de Droit international 238-244 (1934). 
Problemes de Confins en Droit international public, 
Paris, 
1969. 
internationaux, 3 tomes 
a VEtude des Sources du Droit international" 
Droit international et de Lggislation com2are 
"L'Arbitrage Anglo-Bresilien de 
, et de la Science politique en 
- 349 - 
De Visscher, Charles, Problemes d'Interpretation judiciaire en Droit international public, Paris, 1963. 
Dickinson, Edwin D., "The Clipperton Island Case", 27 American Journal 
of International Law 130-133 (1933). 
Dipla, Haritini, "Les Regles de Droit international en Matiýere de 
De'limitation fluviale: Remise en Question? ", 89 Revue generale de Droit international public 589-624 (1985). 
Drago, Luis M., "Un Triomphe de l'Arbitrage (Les Pecheries du 
Nord-Atlantique) 19 Revue generale de Droit international 
public (1912), Extrait. 
Dulery, Frangoise, "L'Affaire du Lac Lanoux", 62 Revue generale de 
Droit international public 469-516 (1958). 
Editorial Comment, "The Chamizal Arbitration Award". 5 American 
Journal of International Law 709-715 (1911). 
"Statement by the President of the Tribunal That the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Award Was a Compromise", ibid. 725-726. 
Ely, Northcutt, "Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States: The Effect 
to Be Given Islets as 'Special Circumstances"', 6 International 
Lawyer 219-236 (1972). 
Ely, Nortchcutt, and Robert F. Pietrowski, Jr., "Boundaries of Seabed 
Jurisdiction Off the Pacific Coast of Asia", 8 Natural Resources 
Lawyer 611-629 (1975). - 
Evensen, Jens, "La De"limitation du Plateau continental entre la 
Norvege et l'Islande dans le Secteur de Jan Mayen", Annuaire 
frangais de Droit international 711-738 (1981). 
Evershed, Raymond, "Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity After 
75 Years", 70 Law Quarterly Review 326-341 (1954). 
Fahrney II, Richard L. , 
"Status of an Island's Continental Shelf 
Jurisdiction: A Case Study of the Falklands Islands", 11 Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce 539-553 (1979). 
Fauchille, Paul, Le Conf lit de Limites entre le Bresil 
Bretagne et . la Sentence arbitrale du Roi d'Italie, Paris, 1905. 
Feldman, Mark B., "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf 
Geographic Justice or Judicial Compromise? ", 77 American 
of International Law 219-238 (1983). 
Feldman,, Mark B.., and David Colson, "The Maritime Boundaries of the 
United States", 75 American Journal of International Law 729-763 
(1981). 
et la Grande- 
case -. 
Journal 
- 350 - 
Feller, A. H. , 
Journal of 
"The German-Mexican Claims Commission", 
_International 
Law 62-79 (1933). 
27 American 
The Mexican Claims Commissions 1923-1924: Law and Procedure of International Tribunals., New York, 1935. 
Feulner, Gary R. , "Delimitation of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction 
Between States: The Effect of Physical Irregularities in the Natural Continental Shelf", 17 Virginia Journal of International Law 77-105 (1976). 
Fiore, Pasquale, "Observations sur la Sentence arbitrale rendue par le President de la Republique argentine le 9 juillet 1909 dans le 
Conflit entre la Republique de Bolivie et Celle du perou au Sujet de la Delimitation de la Frontiere de ces Deux Etats"P 17 
Revue gene"rale de Droit international public (1910), Extrait. 
Fisher, F. C. , "The Arbitration of the Guatemalan-Honduran Boundary 
Dispute", 27 American Journal of International Law 403-427 
(1933). 
Fitzmaurice,, Sir Gerald G., "The Future of Public International Law 
and of the International Legal System in the Circumstances of 
Today", Institut de Droit international, Livre du Centenaire 
1873-1973: Evolution et perspectives du droit international 
196-328 (Basel, 1973). 
"Hersch Lauterpacht and His Attitude to the Judicial Function", 
50 British Year Book of International Law 1-12 (1979). 
"The Problem of Non-Liquet: Prolegomena to a Restatement". 
Melanges offerts a Charles Rousseau: La Communaute 
internationale 89-112 (Paris, 1974). 
"The United Nations and the Rule of Law", 38 Grotius Society 
Transactions 135-150 (1953). 
Francioni, Francesco, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign 
Property: The Boarderland between Law and Equity", 24 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255-283 (1975). 
Frederick, Michel, "La. Delimitation du Plateau continental entre le 
Canada et les Etats-Unies dans la Mer de Beaufort", 17 Canadian 
Year Book of International Law 30-98 (1979). 
'Friedmann. Wolfeana. The Contribution of 
an International Equity Tribunal, 
lish Equi 
London, 1935. 
7 to the Idea of 
"The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases -A Critique", 64 
American Journal of International Law 229-240 (1970). 
Funada, Kyoji, "Roma ni okeru Kohei no Kannen" (The Concept of Equity 
in Rome) , 41 Hogaku- okai 
Zasshi (Journal of the Law 
Association of Tokyo University) 1014-1058,1223-1258,1421- 
1444,1628-1661 (1923). 
- 351 - 
"The Tacna-Arica Question"q 11 British Year Book of International Law 187-193 (1930). 
G. , A., "Note" (on the Lake Lanoux case), 62 Revue ge"nerale de Droit international public 119-123 (1958). 
Garner, J. W. 1, "The Doctrine of the Thalweg as a Rule of International Law". 29 American Journal of International Law 309-310 (1935). 
Gebrehana, Teklewold, 
Stockholm, 1984. 
Arbitration: An Element of International Law, 
Goldie, L. F. E. , "Reconciling Values of Distributive Equity and Management Efficiency in the International Commons". The 
Settlement of 
_Disputes 
on the New Natural Resources: Workshop, 




Miroslas, "Political Arbitration under the General 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", 
Journal of International Law 469-490 (1933). 
Grif f in, W. L. , "The Use of Waters 
under Customary International 
International Law 50-80 (1959). 
Act 
27 
of International Drainage Basin 
Law", 53 American Journal of 
Grisel, Etienne, "The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and 
the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases", 64 American Journal of 
International Law 562-593 (1970). 
Gros, Andre, "La Recherche du Consensus dans les Decisions de la Cour 
international de Justice", V61kerrecht als Rechtsordnung 
Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Menschenrechte: Festschrift fur 
Hermann Mosler 351-358 (Berlin, 1983). 
Gross, Leo, "The Dispute between Greece and Turkey concerning the 
Continental Shelf in the Aegean", 71 American Journal of 
International Law 31-59 (1977). 
(ed. ) , The Future of the International Court of Justice, 
2 
vols., Dobbs Ferrys 1976. 
Guggenheim, Paul G. , Traite de Droit international public, tome 
1, 
Geneve, 1953. 
Guilhaudis, Jean-Frangois, "Remarques a propos des re'*cents Conf lits 
territoriaux entre Etats africains", Annuaire franrais de Droit 
international 223-243 (1979). 
Habicht, Max, Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputs: A Compilation and Analysis of Treaties of 
Investigation, Conciliation, Arbitration, and Compulsory 
Adjudication, Concluded during the First Decade Following the 
World War, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931. 
- 352 - 
Habicht, Max, The Power of the International Judge 
-to 
Give a Decision lex aequo et bono', London, 1931. 
Hammarskj6ld, Ake, "Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. 
Borel: "La Competence du Juge international en Equite", 38 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international 237-238 (1934). 
Handl, Gunther, "Balancing of Interests and International Liability 
for the Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary 
Principles of Law Revisited" . 13 Canadian Year Book of International Law 156-194 (1975). 
"The Principle of 'Equitable Use' As Applied to Internationally 
Shared Natural Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential 
International Disputes over Transfrontier Pollution". 14 Revue 
belge de Droit international 40-64 (1978-79). 
Hay, Sir Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary 
Problems", 120 Geographical Journal 433-443 (1954). 
Hedges, R. Y., "The Juridical Basis of Arbitration", 7 British Year 
Book of International Law 110-120 (1926). 
Higgins, Rosalyn, "The Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication: 
Conventional Wisdom or Continuing Truth? ", Fawcett, J. E. SOS 
and Rosalyn Higgins (eds. ), International Organization: Law in 
Movement: Essays in Honour of John McMahon 37-52 (London, 1974). 
Holdsworth, W. S. , "Equity", 51 Law Quarterly Review 142-161 (1935) . 
Huber, Max, "Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. Borel: 
"La Comp6tence du Juge international en Equite", 38 Annuaire de 
l'Institut de Droit international 231-236 (1934). 
Hudson, Manley 0., The Permanent Court of International Justice: A 
Treatise, New York, 1934. 
International Law Association, "Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the 
Waters of International Rivers: Resolution with Comments", 
Report of the 52nd Conference (Helsinki) 484-532 (1966). 
Ireland, Gordon, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South 
America, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938. 
Jane, Cecil, "The Question of Tacna-Arica, " 15 Grotius Society 
Transactions 93-119 (1930). 
Janis, M. W. , 
"Equity in International Law", 7 Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law 74-78 (1984). 
Jenks, C. Wilfred, "Equity as a Part of the Law Applied 
by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice", 53 Law Quarterly 
Review 519-524 (1937). 
- 353 - 
Jenks, C. Wilfred, "International Equity", 52 Law Quarterly Review 
290-294 (1936). 
------ The Prospects of International Adjudication, London, 1964. 
Jennings,, R. Y. I' The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 
Manchester, 1963. 
"The Argentine-Chile Boundary 
Davies Memorial Institute 
International Disputes: The Le 
1972). 
Dispute: A Case Study", David 
for International Studies, 
gal Aspects 315-325 (London, 
"The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: 
Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment", 18 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 819-832 (1969). 
Some Possible 
International 
Jessup, Philip C., "El Chamizal", 67 American Journal of International 
Law 423-445 (1973). 
it The Palmas Insland Arbitration", 22 
International Law 735-752 (1928). 
American Journal of 
Johnson, D. H. N. , "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law", 
27 
British Year Book of International Law 332-354 (1950). 
jo 
"Arbitration in English Law and in International Law". 41 
Grotius Society Transactions 91-109 (1956). 
Jones, St. B. 9 'B 
oundary-Making, A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty 
Editors and Boundary Commissions, Washington, D. C. 9 1945. 
Kaikobad, Kaiyan Homi, "Some Observations on the Doctrine of 
Continuity and Finality of Boundaries", 54 British Year Book of 
International Law 119-141 (1983). 
Karl, Donald, "Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf: 
A Framework for Analysis", 71 American Journal of International 
Law 642-673 (1977). 
Kaufmann, Erich, "R-egles generales du Droit de la Paix", 
54 Recueil 
des Cours 313-615 (1935-IV). 
Kelly, G. M- 9 
"The Temple Case in Historical Perspective", 39 British 
Year Book of International Law 462-472 
(1963). 
Kelsen, Hans, "Continuity as a Title to Territorial 
Sovereignty", 
Rechtsf raRen der Internationalen Organisation: 
Festschrif t fdr 
Hans Wehberg zu seinem. 70. Geburtstag 200-210 
(Frankfurt a. M., 
1956). 
Khadduri, Majid, "The Alexandretta Dispute", 
39 American Journal of 
International Law 406-425 (1945). 
KUlz, Helmut R., "Further Water Disputes between 
India and Pakistan", 
18 International and Comparative Law Quar_terly 718-738 
(1969). 
- 354 - 
La Fontaine, H., Pasicrisie international: Histoire documentaire des Arbitrages internationaux, Berne, 1902. 
La Foy, Margaret, The Chaco Dispute and the League of Nations, Bryn Mawr, 1941. 
Lagoni, Rainer, "Oil and Gas Deposits across National Frontiers". 73 
American Journal of International Law 215-243 (1979). 
Lamb, Alstair, "Treaties,, Maps and the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute", I Australian Year Book of 
International law 37-52 (1965). 
Lammasch, Heinrich, "L'Abitrage obligatoire et les deux Conferences de 
la Paix", 17 Revue &enerale de Droit international public 
(1910), Extrait. 
9 Die Rechtskraft Internationaler Schieds , Kristiania, 1913. 
Lang,, Jack, Le Plateau continental de la Mer du Nord, Paris, 1970. 
Lansing, Robert, "The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration", 59 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 119-150 (1910). 
Lauterpacht, Eli, "Equity, Evasion, 
International Law", Proceedings 
International Law Association 33 
Equivocation and 
of the American 
47 (1977-78). 
9 
"Oil and Gas Resources of British Waters: Some Problems of 
International Law", Petroleum Law Seminar: Proceedings of the 
International Bar Association, Cambridge, England, 1978. 
"River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-al-Arab 
Frontier", 9 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 208-236 
(1960). 
Lauterpacht, Hersch, "The Absence of the International Legislature and 
the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals", 11 
British Year Book of International Law 134-157 (1930). 
9 The Development of 
International Law by the International 
Court, London, 1958. 
The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford, 
1§33. 
International Law: Collected Papers (ed. by E. Lauterpacht), 
Vol. 1, Cambridge, England, 1970. 
Private Law Source8 and Analogies of International Law 
(With 
special reference to international arbitration), 
London, 1927. 
"Sovereignty over Submarine Areas", 27 British Year Book of 
International Law 376-433 (1950). 
Evolution in 
Branch of the 
- 355 - 
Lawson, Karin L. , 
"Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United States-Canada Beaufort Sea Boundary", 22 
Virginia Journal of International Law 221-246 (1981). 
Laylin, John G. , and Rinaldo L. Bianchi, "The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes", 53 Americal Journal of International Law 30-49 (1959). 
League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly: Meetings of the Committees, 2 vols., Geneva, 1920. 
Records of the First Assembly: Plenary Meetings, Geneva, 1920. 
Le Fur, Louis-Erasme, "Le Developpement historique du Droit 
international: de l'Anarchie a une Communaute internationale 
organisee", 41 Recueil des Cours 505-601 (1932-111) . 
* 
"Observations" sur le Rapport de MM. Borel et Politis: 
'VExtension de l'Arbitrage obligatoire et la Competence 
obligatoire de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale", 33 
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international 772-802 (1927-11). 
Legault, L. H., and Blair Hankey, IfFrom Sea to Seabed: The Single 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Case", 79 American 
Journal of International Law 961-991 (1985). 
Legault, L. H. and D. M. McRae, "The Gulf of Maine Case", 22 Canadian 
Year Book of International Law 267-290 (1984). 
Lindley, M. R. , The Acquisition and Government of Backward 
Territory 
in International Law, London, 1926. 
Loquin, E., L'Amiable Composition en Droit compare et international: 
Contribution a Vetude du non-droit dans Varbitrage commercial, 
Paris, 1980. 
Lumb, R. D. , 
"Australia and the Law of the Sea: Recent Development", 
29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 151-165 (1980). 
"The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea", 7 
Australian Year Book of Internationa Law 72-86 (1976-77). 
MacChesney, Brunson, "Lake Lanoux Case (France-Spain)", 53 American 
Journal of International Law 156-171 (1959). 
Macdonald, R. St. J. , and Douglas 
M. Johnston, "International Legal 
Theory: New Frontiers of the Discipline", Id. 
(eds. ) The 
Structure and Process of International Law: Essays 
in Legal 
Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory 1-14 (The Hague, 1983). 
McDorman, Ted L., et al., Maritime Boundary Delimitation: 
An Annotated 
Bibliography, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983. 
McDowell, Gary L., Equity and the Constitution: The 
Supreme Court, 
Equitable Relief, and Public Policy, Chicagot 1982. 
- 356 - 
MacGibbon, I. , 
"Customary International Law and Acquiescence, ' 33 British Year Book of International Law 115-145 (1957). 
"The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law"t 31 British Year Book of International Law 143-186 (1954). 
"Some Observations on the Role of Protest in International Law", 30 British Year Book of International Law 293-319 (1953). 
McRae, D. M. 3, "Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and France: the Channel Arbitration". 15 Canadian Year Book of International Law 173-197 (1977). 
"The Gulf of Maine Case: The Written Proceedings", 22 Canadian 
Year Book of International Law 266-283 (1983). 
McWhinney, Edward, "Equity in International Law"q Newman, Ralph A. (ed. ). Equity in the World's Legal Systems: A Comparatice Stud 
581-588 (Bruxelles, 1973). 
"Special Chambers within the International Court of Justice: 
The Preliminary, Procedural Aspect of the Gulf of Maine Case" . 12 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Copmerce 1-13 
(1985). 
"The Time Dimension in International Law, Historical Relativism 
and Intertemporal Law", Makarczyk, Jerzy (ed. ), Essays in 
International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs 179-199 (The 
Hague, 1984). 
Maier, Georg, "The Boundary Dispute between Ecuador and Peru", 63 
American Journal of International Law 28-46 (1969). 
Malloy, W. M., Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols 
and Agreements between the United States of America and other 
Powers 1776-1909,2 vols. , Washington, D. C. , 1910; Continuation 
1910-1923, Washington, D. C., 1923. 
Mandel, Robert, "Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Disputes", 24 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 427-454 (1980). 
Manin, Philippe, "Le Juge international et la Regle ge"ne"rale: 
Reflexions a partir des arrets rendus par la Cour internationale 
de Justice dans l'affaire du plateau continental de la mer du 
Nord (1969) et dans l'affaire des pecheries (1974)", 80 Revue 
g6ingrale de Droit international public 7-54 (1976). 
Manner,, Eero J. , 
"Settlement of Sea-Boundary Delimitation Disputes 
according to the Provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention", Makarczykq Jerzy (ed. ) , Essays in International 
Law 
in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs 625-643 (The Hague, 1984). 
"Some Basic Viewpoints oi 
Neighboring States", Ocean 
the Seas: The Problems of 
Delimitation of Marine Areas between 
Association of Japan, The Frontier of 
Delimitation: Proceedings of the 5th 
International Ocean Symposium, 1980 7-17 (Tokyo, 1981). 
- 357 - 
Manning, W. R., 
Close-of 
Arbitration Treaties among the American Nations to the the Year 1910, New York, 1924. 
Marston, Geoffrey, "The 
Trindade, 1895-6".. 
222-239 (1983). 
Anglo-Brazilian Dispute over the Island of 54 British Year Book of International Law 
Martin, Antoine, L'Estoppel en Droit international public: Prece"de d'un Apergu de la Theorie de VEstoppel en Droit anglais, . Paris, 1979. 
Max Planck Institut fur auslaNndisches Öffentliches Recht und 
VO**lkerrecht, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: An 
International Symposium$ Berlin, 1974. 
Menon, P. K. , "The Anglo-Guatemalan Territorial Dispute over Belize", 
Caribbean Year Book of International Relations 115-145 (1977). 
"International Boundaries -A Case Study of the Guyana-Surinam 
Boundary", 27 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
738-768 (1978). 
Mensah-Brown, A. K. (ed. ), African International Legal HistoEx (A 
UNITAR Study), New York, 1975. 
Merrills, J. G. , 
"The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf 
Arbitration", 10 California Western International Law Journal 
314-364 (1980). 
Michael, Michael L. , 
"The Allocation of Waters of International 
Rivers", 7 Natural Recources Lawyer 45-66 (1974). 
Miyoshi, Masahiro, "The Japan-South Korea Agreement on Joint 
Development of the Continental Shelf", 10 Energy 545-553 (1985). 
"On the Settlement of the Chamizal Case" (in Japanese) ,A 
Collection of Legal Essays in Commemoration of the 125tK 
Anniversary_of Keio-Gijuku, Vol. 3-. Keio Association of Law and 
Politics 125-150 (Tokyo, 1983). 
"The Role of Equitable Principles in the Delimitation of 
Maritime Boundaries", Ocean Association of Japan, The Frontier 
of the Seas: The Problems of Delimitation: Proceedings of the 
5th International Ocean Symposium, 1980 42-46 (Tokyo, 1981). 
"Some Comments on Legal Aspects of Precedents for Joint 
Development", 6 Energy 1359-1362 (1981). 
Mont iel-Arguello, Alejandro, "Frontie'res et Litiges de Delimitation", 
75 Revue generale de Droit international public 
461-464 (1971). 
Moore, John Bassett, History and Digest of the 
International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, 
6 
vols., Washingtong D. C. 9 1898. 
Mouskheli, Michel, 'V19quite" en Droit international", 
40 Revue 
generale de Droit international public 
347-373 (1933). 
- 358 - 
Muller, JO**rg Paul, and Tbomas Cottier, "Estoppel", 7 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 78-81 (1984). 
Munkman, A. L. W. , "Adjudication and Judicial Decision and the Settlement 
Disputes", 46 British Year Book 
(1972-73). 
Murti, B. S. N. , "The Kutch Award: A Preliminary Study", 8 Indian 
Journal of International Law 51-56 (1968). 
Nakauchi, Kiyofumi, "Problems of Delimitation in the East China Sea 
and the Sea of Japan", 6 Ocean Development and International Law 
305-316 (1979). 
Nelson, L. D. M. , 
"The Arbitration of Boundary Disputes in Latin 
America", 20 Netherlands International Law Review 267-294 
(1973). 
"Equity and the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries", 11/12 
Revue iranienne des Relations internationales 197-218 (1978). 
Newman, Ralph A. , "Equity in Comparative Law", 17 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 807-848 (1968). 
Equity in the World's Legal Systems: A Comparative Study, 
Bruxelles, 1973. 
Nweihed, Kaldone G. , 
"EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-enclosed 
Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements Between Venezuela and the 
Neighbors", 8 Ocean Develo2ment and International Law 1-33 
(1980). 
Oellers-Frahm, Karin, "Die Entscheidung des IGH zur Abgrenzung des 
Festlandsockels zwischen Tunisien und Libyen: ein Abkehr von der 
bisherigen Rechtsprechung? ", 42 Zeitschrift fÜr ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und VOlkerrecht 804-814 (1982). 
Oellers-Frahm, Karin, and Norbert WGhler (eds. ), Dis pute Settlement in 
Public International Law: Texts and Materials, Berlin, 1984. 
Okere, B. 0., "The Western Sahara Case", 28 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 296-312 (1979). 
Onorato, William T., "Apportionment of an International Common 
Petroleum Deposit", 17 International and ComparatiVe Law 
Ouarterlv 85-101 (1968). 
"Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit", 







I Law 1-116 
- 359 - 
Oraison, Andre", "A Propos du Dif f e'rend f ranco-malgache sur les Iles 
eparses du Canal de Mozambique (La succession d'Etats sur les Iles Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa et Bassas da India)", 85 
Revue ge"nerale de Droit international public 465-513 (1981). 
Padwa , David J., "Submarine Boundaries". 9 
Comparative Law Quarterly 628-653 (1960). 
International and 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Proces-verbaux of the 
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists 16 June-24 July 
1920, The Hague, 1920. 
Pirotte, Olivier, "La Notion d'Vquite' dans la Jurisprudence r6cente de 
la Cour internationale de Justice", 77 Revue generale de Droit 
international public 92-135 (1973). 
Politis,, Nicolass "Observations" sur 
Borel: "La Compeftence du Juge 
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit 
M. 
38 
Pollard, Duke E., "The Guyana/Surinam Boundary Dispute in 
International Law", Caribbean Year Book of International 
Relations 217-252 (1976). 
Pollock, Sir Frederick, "The Transformation of Equity", id. , Essays in 
the Law 180-198 (London, 1969). 
Pondaven, Philippe, Les Lacs-frontiere, Paris, 1972. 
Pound, Roscoe, "The Decadence of Equity", 5 Columbia Law Review 20-35 
(1905). 
9 
it The Maxims of Equity - I: Of Maxims Generally", 34 Harvard Law 
Review 809-836 (1921). 
Prescott, J. R. V., The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 
Chicago, 1965. 
Prott, Lyndel V. , 
"The Future of the International Court of Justice". 
Year Book of World Affairs 284-303 (1979). 
3, The Latent 
Power of Culture and the International Judge, 
Abingdon, England, 1979. 
Queneudec, J. -P., "L'Affaire de la Delimitation 
du Plateau cont inental 
entre la France et le Royaume-Uni", 83 Revue generale 
de Droit 
international public 53-103 (1979). 
----- 9 "Remarques sur 
le Reglement des Conflits frontaliers en 
Afrique", 74 Revue generale de Droit international public 69-77 
(1970). 
le Rapport preliminaire de 
ý international en Equite"', 
international 228-230 (1934). 
- 360 - 
Ralston, Jackson H., International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 
Stanford, California, 1929. 
The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals: Being a Resume of the Views of Arbitrators upon Questions Arising 
' 
under 
the Law of Nations and of the Procedure and Practice of International Courts, Revised ed., §tanford, California, 1926. 
Sup2lement to 1926 Revised Edition of The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals, Stanford, California, 1936. 
Ralston, Jackson H. , and W. T. S. Doyle,, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, Washington, D. C., 1904. 
Renault, Louis, "Une Nouvelle Mission donnee aux Arbitres dans les 
Litiges internationaux: a propos de Varbitrage de Behring", 1 
Revue generale de Droit international public 44-51 (1894). 
Reuter, Paul, "La Motivation et la Revision des Sentences arbitrales a 
la Confe"rence de la Paix (1899) et le Conflit frontalier entre 
le Royaume-Uni et le Ve"ne*zuela", Melanges offerts a J. Andrassy 
237-247 (The Hague, 1968). 
9 "Quelques R6f lexions sur Vi9quite" en Droit international", 15 
Revue belge de Droit international 165-186 (1980). 
Rhee, Sang Myon, "The Application of Equitable Principles to Resolve 
the United States-Canada Dispute over East Coast Fishery 
Resources", 21 Harvard International Law Journal 667-683 (1980). 
"Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute between 
the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine", 75 American 
Journal of International Law 590-628 (1981). 
9 
"Sea Boundary Delimitation between States bef ore World War II" 
76 American Journal of International Law 555-588 (1982). 
Rigaldies, Francis, "La Delimitation du Plateau continental entre 
Etats voisins", 14 Canadian Year Book of International Law 
116-174 (1976). 
Robinson, Davis R. , et al. , 
"Some Perspectives 
the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case", 
International Law 578-597 (1985). 
on Adjudicating before 
79 American Journal of 
Rosenne, Shabtai, "Equitable Principles and the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals", Festschrift 
fur Rudolf 
Bindschedler 407-425 (Bern, 1980). 
"Some Procedural Aspects of the English Channel Continental 
Shelf Arbitration", Essays in Honour of Erik Castren 
96-115 
(Helsinki, 1979). 
Rothpfeffer, Tomas, "Equity 
42 Nordisk Tidsskrift 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases", 
for International Ret 81-137 (1972). 
- 361 - 
Rotondi, Mario, "Considerations sur le Role de 1'Equite' dans un Systeme de Droit positif ecrit". Aspects nouveaux de la Pensee 
juridique: Recueil d'Etudes en Hommage a Marc Ancel, tome 1, 
43-57 (Paris, 1975). 
Rousseau, Charles, "Argentine et Chili: R'glement du conflit e de Limites entre les deux Etats par la Sentence arbitrale de la 
reine Elizabeth d'Angleterre (9 de5cembre 1966)" (Chronique des 
Faits internationaux), 71 Revue generale de Droit international 
public 150-173 (1967). 
'VEquite"', id. ,1 Droit international public 398-415 (Paris, 1970). 
"Inde et Pakistan: Reglement du Differend relatif a 
l'Appartenance territoriale du Rann de Kutch - Sentence 
arbitrale rendue le 19 fevrier 1968" (Chronique des Faits 
internationaux), 72 Revue generale de Droit international public 
1100-1121 (1968). 
Rubin, Alfred P. , 
"The Sino-Indian Border Dispute", 9 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 96-125 (1960). 
Ryan, K. W. . and M. W. White. 
"The Torres Strait Treaty", 7 Australian 
Year Book of International Law 87-113 (1976-77). 
St. John, Ronald Bruce, "The Boundary Dispute between Peru and 
Ecuador", 71 American Journal of International Law 322-330 
(1977). 
Salmon, J. J. A. , 
"La Sentence du 19 Fe"vrier 1968 du Tribunal 
d'Arbitrage dans l'Affaire de la Frontiere occidentale entre 
l'Inde and le Pakistan (Affaire de Rann de Kutch)", Annuaire 
francais de Droit international 217-236 (1968). 
Schachter, Oscar, "The Role of the Institute of International Law and 
its Methods of Work - Today and Tomorrow", Institut 
de Droit 
international, Livre du Centenaire 1873-1973: 8volution et 
perspectives du droit international 403-451 
(Basel, 1973). 
Sharing the World's Resources, New York, 1977. 
Scheuner, Ulrich, "Decision ex aequo et bono by International 
Courts 
and Arbitral Tribunals", Sanders, 
Pieter (ed. ), International 
Arhitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke 275-288 
(The Hague, 
1967). 
Schindler, Dietrichq "The Administration of 
Justice in the Swiss 
Federal Court in International Disputes", 15 American 
Journal of 
International Law 149-188 (1921). 
"Les Progres de l'Arbitrage obligatoires depuis la Creation 
de 
la Societe des Nations", 25 Recueil des Cours 237-361 
(1928-V). 
- 362 - 
Schneider, Jan, "The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable 
Result", 79 American Journal of International Law 539-577 
(1985). 
Schoenrich, Otto, "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute", 43 
American Journal of International Law 523-530 (1949). 
Schurz, William L. . 
"The Chaco Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay", 
7 Foreign Affairs 650-655 (1929). 
Schwarzenberger, Georg, The Dynamics of International Law, Milton, 
England, 1976. 
"Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge", 51 American 
Journal of International Law 308-324 (1957). 
Sharma, Surya P., International Boundary Disputes and International 
Law: A Policy-Oriented Study, Bombay, 1976. 
Shaw, Malcolm N., "The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award", 6 
Tnternational Relations 415-445 (1978). 
Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues, 
Oxford, 1986. 
Simons, Walter, "Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. 
Borel: "La. Competence du Juge international en Equite", 38 
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit international 250 (1934). 
Skubiszewski, Krzystof, "La Frontiere polono-allemande en Droit 
international", 61 Revue Jngrale de Droit international public 
242-258 (1957). 
Societe Frangaise pour le Droit International, La Frontiere: Colloque 
de Poitiers, Paris, 1980. 
Sohn, Louis B., "Arbitration of International Disputes Ex aequo et 
bono". Sanders, Pieter (ed. ), International Arbitration: Liber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke 330-337 (The Hague, 1967). 
"The Function of International Arbitration Today", 108 Recueil 
des Cours 9-113 (1963-1). 
"Report on the 'Changing Role of Arbitration 
in the Settlement 
of International Disputes"', International 
Law Association, 
Report of the 52nd Conference (Helsinki) 
325-356 (London, 1967). 
"The Role of Arbitration in Recent International 
Multilateral 
Treaties", 23 yjajnjýj_ýrnal of International 
Law 171-189 
(1983). 
"Settlement of Disputes Relating to the 
Interpretation and 
Application of Treaties". 150 Recueil 
des Cours 195-294 
(1976-11). 
Strupp, Karlq "Le Droit du Juge international 
de Statuer selon 
1'Equite", 33 Recueil des Cours 357-481 
(1930-111) . 
- 363 - 
Strupp, Karl, "Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. Borel: "La Competence du Juge international en Equite"', 38 Annuaire de 
l'Institut de Droit international 245-249 (1934). 
Stuyt, A. M. , Survey of International Arbitrations 1794-1970., Leyden, 1972. 
Swan, George Steven., "That Gulf of Maine Dispute: Canada and the United States Delimit the Atlantic Continental Shelf", 10 
Natural Resources Lawyer 405-456 (1977). 
Symmons, Clive R., "British Off-shore Continental Shelf and Fishery 
Limit Boundaries: An Analysis of Overlapping Zones", 28 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 703-733 (1979). 
The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, The Hague, 
1979. 
Taijudo, Kana'e, "The Decline of International Adjudication and the 
African and Asian States" (in Japanese), 89-6 Hogaku Ronso 
(Kyoto University Law Review) 1-38 (1971). 
Taoka, Ryoichi, "The Optional Caluse: Past and Present" (in Jananese) 
63-6 Hogaku Ronso (Kyoto University Law Review) 1-57 (1958). 
Terr . Leonard B. . 
"The 'Distance plus Joint Development Zone' Formula: 
A Proposal f or the Speedy and Practical Resolution of the East 
China and Yellow Seas Continental Shelf Oil Controversy", 7 
Cornell International Law Journal 49-71 (1973). 
Timm, Charles A., The International Boundary Commission, United States 
and Mexico, Texas, 1941. 
Tucker, Robert W., The Inequality of Nations, New York, 1977. 
United Nations, A Survey of Treaty Provisions for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes 1949-1962, New York, 
1966. 
Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes 1928-1948, New York, 1949. 
Untawale, M. G. 9 
"The Kutch-Sind Dispute: A Case S tudy in 
International Arbitration", 23 International and Comparative 
Law 
QuarterlX 818-839 (1974). 
Vallat, Francis A., "The Continental Shelf", 
23 British Year Book of 
International Law 333-338 (1946). 
"Ownership of the Sea-bed: United States of 
America v. State of 
California", 24 British Year Book of International 
Law 382-385 
(1947). 
- 364 - 
Verzijl, J. H. W. . 
"The Basis of International Judgment in the Course 
of History", id. ,8 International Law in Historical Perspective 
540-557 (Leyden, 1976). 
Vitanyi, Bela, "Les Positions doctrinales concernant le Sens de la 
Notion de 'Principes generaux de Droit reconnus par les Nations 
civilisees"', 86 Revue generale de Droit international public 48-116 (1982). 
Voelckel, Michel, "Apergu. de quelques Problemes techniques concernant la Delimitation des Frontieýres maritimes", Annuaire f rangais de 
Droit international 693-711 (1979). 
Von Mangoldt, Hans, "Arbitration and Conciliation". Max Planck 
Institut fur auslaindisches *o*ffentliches Recht und V61kerrecht, 
Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: An International 
Symposium 417-552 (Berlin, 1974). 
"La Competence des Systemes de Droit comme Moyen d'Elaboration 
de la Procedure des Tribunaux internationaux", 40 Zeitschrift 
für ausla*ndisches o**ffentliches Recht und Vohkerrecht 554-572 
(1981). 
Waldock, C. H. M. , 
"The Decline of the Optional Clause", 32 British 
Year Book of International Law 244-287 (1955-56). 
Wang, Erik B., "Adjudication of Canada-United States Disputes". 19 
Canadian Year Book of International Law 158-228 (1981). 
Wehberg, Hans, "Observations" sur le Rapport preliminaire de M. Borel: 
"La Competence du Juge international en Equite", 38 Annuaire de 
l'Institut de Droit international 244-245 (1934). 
Weiss, Andre, "L'Arbitrage de 1909 entre la Bolivie et le P6rou", 17 
Revue g6n6rale de Droit international public (1910), Extrait. 
Wetter, J. Gillis, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration", 65 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 346-357 
(1971). 
Williams, S. M., "The Role of Equity in the Law of Outer Space". 
5 
International Relations 776-799 (1975). 
Wilson, Larman C., "The Settlement of Boundary Disputes: 
Mexico, the 
United States, and the International Boundary Commission". 
29 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38-53 
(1980). 
Winthrop, Delba, "Aristotle and Theories of 
Justice". 72 American 
Political Science Review 1201-1216 (1978). 
Witenberg, J. C., L'Organisation Judiciaire: 
La Procedure et la 
Sentence internationales: Traite pratique, 
Paris, 1937. 
Woolsey, L. H. , 
"Boundary Disputes in Latin America", 24 American 
Journal of International Law 324-333 
(1931). 
- 365 - 
Woolsey, L. H. , 
"The Settlement of the Chaco Dispute", 33 American 
Journal of International Law 126-129 (1939). 
Wortley, B. A. , Jurisprudence, Manchester, 1967. 
Yakemtchouk, R. , "Les Frontieres af ricaines" 74 Revue g6nerale de Droit international public 27-68 (1970). 
Young., Richardq "Equitable Solutions for 
Saudi Arabia - Iran Agreement" 
International Law 152-157 (1970). 
Offshore Boundaries: The 1968 
0 64 American Journal of 
Zoller, Elisabeth, "L'Affaire de la Delimitation du Plateau 
continental entre la Republique f ranraise et le Royaume-Uni de 
Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord (Decision du 30 juin 
1977)", Annuaire frangais de Droit international 359-407 (1977). 
La Bonne Foi en Droit international public, Paris, 1977. 
"Note sur la Sentence interpretative du 14 mars 1978 rendue 
dans l'Affaire de la Delimitation du Plateau continental entre 
la Republique frangaise et le Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et 
d'Irlande du Nord". Annuaire frangais de Droit international 
1293-1303 (1977). 
"La Premiere Constitution d'une Chambre speciale par la Cour 
internationale de Justice: Observations sur l'Ordonnance du 20 
Janvier 1982". 86 Revue g6nerale de Droit international public 
305-324 (1982). 
9 
"Recherche sur les Methodes de Delimitation du Plateau 
continental: A propos de l'Affaire Tunisie - Libye (Arret du 24 
fevrier 1982)", 86 Revue generale de Droit international public 
645-678 (1982). 
- 366 - 
CORREMONO 
P. 11 Under 4: for on' read 'of'. 
P. 13 For 'Matrens N. RG' read 'Martens NRG'. 
18 Para. 2, line 14: for 'were' read 'was'. 
11.21 Main para. 2, line 1: for 'problematique' read 
'"problematique"'. 
P. 23 Third quotation, line 6: for 'function' read 
'fonction'. 
P. 26 Under (2), para. 1, line 7: for Isynonimous' 
read 'synonymous'. 
P. 27 line 11: for Vatch' read 'Kutch'. Para. 2 , Para. 2, lite 15: for 1puet' read 'peut'. 
P. 31 Para. 4, line 5: for 's, ynonimous' read 
'synonymous'. 
P. 51 First quotation, line 0: for 'composteurs' read 
l. compositeurs'. 
P. 66 First quotation, line 2: for '&a Haya' read 'La 
Hayel. 
1). '12 Main para. 1, line 1: for 'mentioned' read 
'above-mentioned'. 
P. 113 Para. 2, line 9: for 'setting' read 'settling'. 
1-1. 120 Under (2), para. 1: for the first sentence read 
'In the Arqentine-Chile Frontier case of 1966, 
the President of the Court of Arbitration gave 
an equitable warning to Argentina, which provided 
her with an opportunity to file with the Court 
a relevant memorandum. ' 
P. 123 quotation, line 6: for Iratife' read 
Quotation, line 15: for 'protugais' read 
'portugais'. 
P. 129 Second quotation, line 15: for 'contiquity' read 
'contiguity'. 
135 First quotation, line 2: for 'Gracia a Dios' read 
'Gracias a Dios'. 
P. 136 First quotation, line 10: for 'it' read 'il'. 
P. 137 ilara. 2, line 4: for 'Queel' read 'Queen'. 
P. 143 Under f) , Vara. 1, line 
4: for '"HalastO)' read 
I "Halasto'l )I. 
P. 153 Under (2) 1) a), para. 1, line 4: insert 'weight' 
after 'given'. 
P. 183 Last para., line 4: for 'internation' read 
'international'. 
P. 189 First quotation, line 1: for 'au' read 'aux'. 
Last quotation, line t: for 'd'avid, read 'd'avis'. 
P. 195 Last quotation, line 3: for 'equiteis' read 
'equities'. 
P. 222 Main para. 1, line 9: for 'loose' read 'lose'. 
P. 262 Para. 2, line 22: for 'order' read lordrel. 
P. 263 Line 4: for 'Stated' reýjd 'stated'. 
I (ýuotation, line 2: for 'annuled, read annulled'. 
Last para., line 18: for 'equivolcal' read 
'equivocab'. 
P. 282 Note 39, line 8: for 'synonimous' read 'synonymous'. 
P. 287 Note 27: for 'Reflexions' read 'Considerations'. 
P. 309 Note 3, first quotation, line 8: for Icriticezed' 
read Iciticized'. 
Note 3, third quotation, line 3: for 'heresay' 
read 'hearsay'. 
P. 310 Note 7, quotation, line 2: for 'probel read 
'portee'. 
Note 7, quotation, line 6: for 'sourait' read 
Isaurait'. 
P. 311 Note 11), line 7: for 'cristalized' read 
'crystallized'. 
Note 19, quotation, line 12: for 'Minquieres' 
read 'Minquiers'. 
P. 317 Note 115, lines 1-2: delete ' a member of'. 
P. 331 Note 387: before '33 AJiL 55? (1939)' insert 
'Wright, Quincy, "The Arbit ration of the Aaroo 
Mountain", '. 
P. 332 Note 397 (continued), line 1: for 'disucssion' 
read 'discussion'. 
P. 550 Ninth entry: for QortchcuLt' read 'Northcutt'. 
